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Foreword
László Kálmán and András Kornai, two outstanding linguists who have
inﬂuenced generations of students and colleagues around the world, cele-
brated their 60th birthdays in 2017. This collection is a revised and ex-
tended version of the online Festschrift K+K=120 (www.nytud.hu/kk120),
published for the occasion in 2017, featuring papers written by their stu-
dents, friends, collaborators, and other scholars who, by being part of
the project, wanted to express their appreciation for András and László.
László Kálmán’s main interests lie in the theory of grammar, formal
semantics and computational linguistics, but there is virtually no subdo-
main of linguistics that he hasn’t tried his hands at. He has written about
phonology, morphology, (lexical) syntax, pragmatics, as well as problems
of compositionality, analogy-based learning, monotonicity, and common-
sense reasoning. He coauthored and edited a volume on descriptive Hun-
garian syntax (2001), coauthored a descriptive grammar of Boyash (2009,
with Anna Orsós) and several textbooks (in 2002 with Gábor Rádai, and
in 2007 with Viktor Trón, among others). He has also made signiﬁcant
contributions to the popularization of science and to reforming the teach-
ing of Hungarian grammar at Hungarian primary and secondary schools.
András Kornai has, since the early 1980s, pursued research at the
intersection of mathematics and linguistics. Over the past four decades
he made inﬂuential contributions to all major areas of (computational)
linguistics, some notable examples of which are his formal construction of
X-bar theory with Geoﬀrey K. Pullum (1990), and his monographs on mor-
phology (1994), phonology (1995), mathematical linguistics (2007), and se-
mantics (2019). Over the last 15 years, András has also established a new
school of human language technologies in Budapest, mentoring and lead-
ing an interdisciplinary team of mathematicians, linguists and engineers.
András and László, beyond their extensively overlapping interests
across a broad range of research topics, also share numerous rare scholarly
and human qualities. These include their outstanding intellectual abilities,
which enabled them to become experts in an exceptionally wide range of
domains spanning linguistics, mathematics and computer science. Further,
both of them are known for their rigorous standards and uncompromising
critical attitude, which, however, they are ready to apply to themselves as
much as to others. All this already showcases László and András as cre-
ative scholars; but their spark and ﬂair bear mentioning also: colleagues
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and students of theirs have always appreciated their witty, open-minded,
approachable and entertaining personalities, and their ability to pursue
interesting conversations with anyone on just about any topic. These qual-
ities, in addition to their intellectual abilities and enthusiasm for teaching,
have made them inspiring teachers and mentors for many generations of
students, some of whom appear as authors in this collection. The diversity
of topics appearing in this Festschrift is illustration of the variety of ﬁelds
on which the work of Kálmán and Kornai has made an impact, including
virtually all branches of theoretical linguistics and their intersections with
mathematics and computer science.
The number and scope of manuscripts received was vast and the ed-
itors are greatly indebted to all those who have supported the seemingly
endless process of compiling this collection. For reviewing the contribu-
tions to the volume, we thank all the authors as well as Thomas Graf,
Péter Rebrus, Paul Thompson, Dániel Varga, Dániel Vásárhelyi, Richard
Zach, and Zsóﬁa Zvolenszky. We are also grateful to Zoltán G.Kiss for
typesetting the volume, to Uwe Reichel for technical assistance, to Zsóﬁa
Zvolenszky for her help with the current Foreword, and to András Rung
for the painting on the cover (prepared for this occasion) and for the cover
design. For their help with the organization of the birthday workshop, for
ﬁnancial support for the production of the Festschrift and for taking on
the role of the publisher we wish to express our gratitude to the MTA
Research Institute for Linguistics, particularly to Veronika Lipp, Gábor
Prószéky, Ágnes Talián, Judit Temesvári and Tamás Váradi.
Budapest, May 2019
the editors
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ABSTRACT
We present an experimental method for mapping English words to
real-valued vectors using entries of a large crowd-sourced dictionary.
Intuition tells us that most of the information content of the average ut-
terance is encoded bywordmeaning (Kornai 2010 posits 85%), andmap-
pings of words to vectors (commonly known as word embeddings) have
become a core component of virtually all natural language processing
(NLP) applications over the last few years. Embeddings are commonly
constructed on the basis of large corpora, approximating the seman-
tics of each word based on its distribution. In a set of pilot experiments
we hope to demonstrate that dictionaries, the most traditional genre of
representing lexical semantics, remain an invaluable resource for con-
structing formal representations of word meaning.
1. Background
Nearly all common tasks in natural language processing (NLP) today
are performed using deep learning methods, and most of these use word
embeddings – mappings of the vocabulary of some language to real-valued
vectors of ﬁxed dimension – as the lowest layer of a neural network. While
many embeddings are trained for speciﬁc tasks, the generic ones we are
interested in are usually constructed with the objective that words with
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similar distributions (as observed in large corpora) are mapped to similar
vectors. In line with the predictions of the distributional hypothesis, this
approach causes synonyms and related words to cluster together. As a re-
sult, these general-purpose embeddings serve as robust representations of
meaning for many NLP tasks; however, their potential is necessarily lim-
ited by the availability of data. Lack of training data is a major issue for all
but the biggest languages, and not even the largest corpora are suﬃcient
to learn meaningful vectors for infrequent words. Lexical resources created
manually, such as monolingual dictionaries, may be expensive to create,
but crowdsourcing eﬀorts such as Wiktionary or UrbanDictionary provide
large and robust sources of dictionary deﬁnitions for large vocabularies and
– in the case of Wiktionary – for many languages.
Recent eﬀorts to exploit dictionary entries for computational seman-
tics include a semantic parser that builds concept graphs from dependency
parses of dictionary deﬁnitions (Recski 2016; 2018) and a recurrent neu-
ral network (RNN) architecture for mapping deﬁnitions and encyclopaedia
entries to vectors using pre-trained embeddings as objectives (Hill et al.
2016). In this paper we construct embeddings from dictionary deﬁnitions
by encoding directly the set of words used in some deﬁnition as the repre-
sentation of the given headword. We have shown previously (Kornai et al.
2015) that applying such a process iteratively can drastically reduce the
set of words necessary to deﬁne all others. The extent of this reduction de-
pends on the – possibly non-deterministic – method for choosing the set of
representational primitives (the deﬁning vocabulary). The algorithm used
in the current experiment will be described in section 2. Embeddings are
evaluated in section 3, section 4 presents our conclusions.
2. Word vectors from dictionary definitions
In this research, we eschew a fully distributional model of semantics in
favor of embeddings built from lexical resources. At ﬁrst glance, the two
approaches seem very diﬀerent: huge corpora and unsupervised learning
vs. a hand-crafted dictionary of a few hundred thousand entries at most.
Looking closer, however, similarities start to appear. As mentioned pre-
viously, generic (“semantic”) embeddings are trained in such a way that
synonyms and similar words cluster together; not unlike how deﬁnitions
paraphrase the deﬁniendum into a synonymous phrase (Quine 1951). The
two methods thus can be viewed as two sides of the same empirical coin;
we might not fully go against Quine then when we “appeal to the nearest
dictionary, and accept the lexicographer’s formulation as law”. Represent-
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ing (lexical) semantics as the connections between lexical items has a long
tradition in the NLP/AI literature, including Quillian’s classic Seman-
tic Memory Model (Quillian 1968), widely used lexical ontologies such as
WordNet (Miller 1995) and recent graph-based models of semantics such
as Abstract Meaning Representations (Banarescu et al. 2013) and 4lang
(Kornai 2012; Recski 2018).
In the model presented below, word vectors are deﬁned not by count
distributions (as in e.g., Pennington et al. 2014), but by interconnections
between words in the dictionary. For the purpose of this paper, we chose
the English Wiktionary1 as the basis of our embedding, because it is freely
available; however, the method would work on any monolingual dictionary.
The word vectors are computed in three steps.
First, we preprocess the dictionary and convert it into a formal struc-
ture, the deﬁnition graph: a directed graph whose vertices correspond to
headwords in the dictionary. Two vertices A and B are connected by an
edge A  B if the deﬁnition of the head contains the tail, e.g., A: B C
D. Deﬁnition graphs can be weighted and unweighted. In the former, each
vertex distributes the unit weight among its in-edges equally; in the latter,
each edge has a weight of 1. Continuing the previous example, the edges
from B, C and D to A have a weight of 13 in the weighted graph and 1 in
the unweighted one.
Next, an iterative algorithm is employed to ﬁnd an “Ouroboros” set of
words, which satisﬁes two conditions:
1. the whole vocabulary can be deﬁned in terms of it, i.e., all directed
paths leading to a word in the deﬁnition graph can be traced back
to the Ouroboros set
2. it can deﬁne itself, so no words outside the set appear in the deﬁ-
nitions of its members (we call this self-containedness the ouroboros
property).
The idea that a small set of primitives could be used to deﬁne all words in
the vocabulary is not new (Kornai 2018); several such lists exist. The most
relevant to the current work is probably the Longman Deﬁning Vocabulary
(LDV), used exclusively in the deﬁnitions of earlier versions of the Long-
man Dictionary of Contemporary English (LDOCE) (Bullon 2003). The
LDV is not minimal, and in previous work it served as our starting point
to reduce the size of the essential word set as much as possible (Kornai
1 https://www.wiktionary.org/
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et al. 2015). Here we chose a diﬀerent approach, not least because no such
list exists for Wiktionary.
Finding the Ouroboros set would be easy if the deﬁnition graph was a
DAG. However, due to the interdependence of deﬁnitions in the dictionary,
the graph contains (usually many) cycles. Our algorithm deals with this
by choosing a “deﬁning” node in each cycle, and collecting these in a set.
Then, all arrows from outside of the set to inside it are removed. It is clear
that this set is deﬁning, as every non-member vertex is reachable from
the nodes in it. Furthermore, after the removal of inbound edges, the set
satisﬁes the second condition and therefore it is an Ouroboros.
Trivially, the whole dictionary itself is an Ouroboros set, provided that
dangling edges (corresponding to words in deﬁnitions that are themselves
not deﬁned in the dictionary) are removed from the deﬁnition graph.2
Needless to say, we are interested in ﬁnding the smallest possible (or at
least, a small enough) set that satisﬁes the property.
Mathematically inclined readers might recognize our Ouroboros as the
feedback vertex set of the deﬁnition graph. In the remainder of this paper,
we shall stick to the former (perhaps inaccurate) name, as it also hints at
the way it is generated – see section 2.2. Furthermore, elements of the set
shall be referred to – perhaps even more incorrectly than the singular term
– with the plural form, ouroboroi.
In the ﬁnal step of the algorithm, the vertices of the deﬁnition graph
are mapped into real valued vectors in Rn, where n is the size of the
Ouroboros set. The vectors that correspond to the ouroboroi serve as the
basis of the vector space; they are computed from the structure of the
Ouroboros subgraph. Other words are assigned coordinates in this space
based on how they are connected to the ouroboroi in the deﬁnition graph.
It is worth noting that in our case, the dimensionality of the embedding
is dictated by the data; this is in sharp contrast to regular embeddings,
where n is a hyperparameter.
The steps are explained in more detail below.
2.1. Preprocessing the dictionary
A dictionary is meant for human consumption, and as such, machine read-
ability is, more often than not, an afterthought. Wiktionary is no excep-
tion, although its use of templates makes parsing a bit easier. We used the
2 This move might sound dubious, but justiﬁable if the dictionary encompasses a large
enough portion of the vocabulary of the language.
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English dump of May 2017, and extracted all monolingual entries with the
wiktionary_parser tool from the 4lang library.3 The deﬁnitions are then
tokenized, lemmatized and tagged for POS by the corresponding modules
of the Stanford CoreNLP package (Manning et al. 2014).
At a very basic level, tokenization is enough to produce a machine
readable dictionary. However, further transformations were applied to the
dictionary to improve recall and decrease its size by removing irrelevant
data, as well as to correct inconsistencies in how it was compiled. Raw
word forms generally give low recall because of the diﬀerence in inﬂection
between deﬁnienda and deﬁnientia. To solve this problem, we employed
two essential techniques from information retrieval (IR): lemmatization
and lowercasing. Our aim with the dictionary is to build a deﬁnition graph
of common words. Looking at the dictionary from this angle, it is clear
that it contains a large amount of irrelevant data.
• Multiwords: Wiktionary has entries for multiword units, such as ex-
pressions and noun compounds. While this poses no problems for the
algorithm described below, currently we have no means to evaluate
such lexical units.
• Proper nouns: proper nouns often cluster into strongly connected
groups, such as mythologies (Étaín, Midir and the Dagda, amongst
others, represent Ireland) or country-capital pairs (e.g., Dehradun
and Uttarakhand from French India). Each such group inevitably
“delegates” one of its members to the ouroboros, increasing its size
for negligible gains.
• Punctuation: punctuation marks clearly have no role on the seman-
tic level; on the syntactic side, our BOW approach renders them
superﬂuous.
• Stopwords: similarly to punctuation, function words bring very little
to the table; removing them is a common practice in IR.
We created a dictionary ﬁle for every combination of the transformations
described above. Proper nouns and punctuation were ﬁltered by their POS
tags; stopwords according to the list in NLTK (Bird et al. 2009). In case of
the latter two, not only were the tokens removed from the deﬁnitions, but
their entries were also dropped. Table 1 lists the most important versions,
as well as the eﬀect of the various ﬁltering methods on the size of the
3 https://github.com/kornai/4lang/
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vocabulary and the Ouroboros of the resulting dictionary. It can be seen
that lowercasing and lemmatization indeed increase the recall, and that
multiwords and proper nouns make up about one third of the dictionary.
The eﬀect on the size of the Ouroboros seems more incidental; it is certainly
not linear in the change in vocabulary size.
Table 1: Eﬀect of ﬁltering steps on vocabulary and Ouroboros size
Preprocessing steps Vocabulary size Ouroboros size
none 175,648 3,263
lowercasing 176,814 3,591
lemmatization 179,212 3,703
no multiword 140,058 3,231
no proper nouns 151,652 2,688
no punctuation 175,651 3,263
no stopwords 171,389 3,196
all 122,397 3,346
The linguistic transformations above have been straightforward. However,
we are also faced with lexicographical issues that require further considera-
tion. The ﬁrst of these concerns entries with multiple senses: homonymous
and polysemous words. While the former needs no justiﬁcation, the inter-
pretation of polysemy, as well as the question of when it warrants multiple
deﬁnitions, is much debated (see e.g., Bolinger 1965; Kirsner 1993 and the
chapter on lexemes in Kornai 2018). Aside from any theoretical qualms
one may have, there is also a practical one: even if the diﬀerent senses of a
word are numbered, its occurrences in the deﬁnitions are not, preventing
us from eﬀectively using this information. Therefore, we decided to merge
the entries of multi-sense words by simply concatenating the deﬁnitions
pertaining to the diﬀerent senses.
The second problem is inconsistency. One would logically expect that
each word used in a deﬁnition is itself deﬁned in the dictionary; however,
this is not the case. Such words should deﬁnitely be added to the ouroboros,
but having no deﬁnition themselves, would contribute little to its seman-
tics. As such, we eliminated them with an iterative procedure that also
deleted entries whose deﬁnition became empty as a result. The procedure
ran for 3–4 iterations, the number of removed entries/tokens ranging from
5342/912,373 on the raw dictionary to 707/125,509 on the most heavily
ﬁltered version.
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Finally, in some entries, the deﬁniens contains the deﬁniendum. Since
the presence or absence of these references – an artifact of the syntax of
the language the deﬁnition is written in, not the semantics of the word in
question – is arbitrary, they were removed as well.
2.2. The Ouroboros
Once the dictionary is ready, the next step towards the embedding is cre-
ating the Ouroboros set, which will serve as the basis of the word vector
space. The Ouroboros is generated by an iterative algorithm that takes the
deﬁnition graph as input and removes vertices at each iteration. The ver-
tex set that remains at the end is the Ouroboros. A high-level pseudocode
of the algorithm is included at the end of this section.
An iteration consists of two steps. In the ﬁrst, we iterate through all
words and select those that can be replaced by their deﬁnition. A word
can be replaced if the following conditions hold:
1. no other words connected to the word in question in the deﬁnition
graph (via both in- or out-edges) have been marked for replacement;
2. the vertex that corresponds to the word has no self-loop.
The ﬁrst condition is simply a way of preventing race conditions in the
replacement process. The second one, however, calls for some explanation.
As we made sure that no deﬁnition contains its headword in the dictionary,
initially, the deﬁnition graph contains no self-loops. However, as more and
more words are removed, self loops start to appear. This is also our ﬁnal
stopping condition: the algorithm exits when all remaining vertices are
connected to themselves. One can look at this condition as a way of saying
that a word in the Ouroboros cannot be deﬁned solely in terms of other
words – in a way, it eats its own tail.
The second step performs the actual replacement. It removes the ver-
tices marked by the ﬁrst step, and connects all of their direct predeces-
sors in the graph to their directs successors. In the weighted version, the
weights are updated accordingly: the weight of a new edge will be equal to
the product of the weights of the two edges it replaces. Figure 1 illustrates
the replacement procedure with an example.
This step is also responsible for building the embedding graph. At ﬁrst,
the graph is empty. Each vertex removed by the algorithm, together with
its in-edges, is added to it. By the time the algorithm stops, all vertices will
have been added to the embedding graph. It is easy to see that this graph
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Figure 1: The deﬁnition graph before (left) and after (right) the word dog is re-
placed with its predecessors. Note that the sum of the in-weights for
bark and dogless remains constant.
is a DAG, with the ouroboroi as its sources: what the whole algorithm
eﬀectively does is decrease the size of the cycles in the deﬁnition graph,
vertex-by-vertex and edge-by-edge. The cycles never disappear completely,
but become the self loops that mark the Ouroboros set. It follows then,
that the Ouroboros contains at least one vertex and one edge (the self loop)
from each cycle in the original deﬁnition graph and thus the embedding
graph is free of (directed) cycles.
This algorithm can be tuned in several ways. The attentive reader
might have noticed that the order in which the words are evaluated in the
ﬁrst step strongly determines which end up as replaceable. Several strate-
gies were considered, including alphabetical and random order, shortest/
longest, or rare/most common word (in deﬁnitions) ﬁrst. Not surprisingly,
rare words ﬁrst performed best: this agrees with the intuition that the “ba-
sis” for the embedding should mostly contain basic words. Consequently, all
numbers reported in this paper were attained with the rare ﬁrst strategy.
We also experimented with decreasing the size of the embedding graph
by deleting edges below a certain weight threshold; this is the equivalent of
magnitude-based pruning methods in neural networks (Hertz et al. 1991).
However, the performance of the embeddings created from pruned and
unweighted graphs lagged behind those created from weighted ones. Hence,
we used the latter for all experiments.
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2.3. The embedding
This section describes the algorithm that takes as its input the ouroboros
and embedding graphs and produces a word embedding. First, the basis
of the vector space is computed. Since our goal is to describe all words in
terms of the Ouroboros, the vector space will have as many dimensions
(denoted with D) as there are vertices in the Ouroboros graph. Each co-
ordinate corresponds to a word; the mapping is arbitrary, and we opted
for alphabetic order. The word vectors for the ouroboroi (the ﬁrst D rows
of the embedding) are chosen to be the basis vectors of the vectors space.
The basis vector for an Ouroboros word w, however, can be calculated
in two ways:
1. Ouroboros-as-coordinates (OAC): as a sparse vector, where the only
nonzero coordinate is the one that corresponds to the word itself.
The ﬁrst D rows of the embedding thus form the identity matrix.
2. Ouroboros-as-vectors (OAV): as a vector whose nonzero coordinates
correspond to the direct predecessors of w in the ouroboros graph.
The values of the coordinates are the weights of the edges between
its predecessors and w.
The two variants have opposing properties. OAV is much denser, which
might bring words much closer in the semantic space than they really
are, introducing “false semantic friends”. OAC, on the other hand, is so
sparse that the similarity of two Ouroboros words is always zero. This
property might be useful if our algorithm was guaranteed to ﬁnd the most
semantically distributed feedback vertex set; however, no such guarantee
exists. Since it is hard to choose between the two based solely on theoretical
grounds, both variants are evaluated in the next chapter.
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The vectors for the rest of the words are computed from the embed-
ding graph. The graph is sorted topologically, with the ouroboroi at the
beginning. The algorithm iterates through the words. The vector of a word
w is set to be the weighted sum of the vectors of its direct predecessors in
the embedding graph:
vw =
X
w0:(w0;w)2EG
vw0  e(w0;w);
where e(i;j) is the weight of the edge between i and j. The topological sort
ensures that by the time we arrive to w, the vectors for all w0s have already
been calculated.
More by accident than design, we also created a third embedding
beside OAC and OAV. Here the basis is taken from OAV, but the rest of the
vectors are the same as for OAC; accordingly, we named it Chimera (CHI).
While the construction of this embedding is mathematically incorrect, it
performed unexpectedly well, so we included it in the evaluation alonside
OAC and OAV.
3. Evaluation
The algorithm presented in section 2 creates word embeddings, i.e., map-
pings from the vocabulary of a dictionary dataset to real-valued vectors of
ﬁxed dimension. This section will present two sets of experiments, both of
which indicate that the distance between pairs of word vectors is a mean-
ingful measure of the semantic similarity of words. In section 3.1 we will
use two semantic similarity benchmarks for measuring semantic similar-
ity of English word pairs to evaluate and compare our word embeddings.
Section 3.2 presents a qualitative, manual analysis of each embedding that
involves observing the set of words that are mapped to vectors in the
immediate vicinity of a particular word vector in the embedding space.
3.1. Benchmark performance
The embeddings were evaluated on two benchmarks: SimLex-999 (Hill
et al. 2015) and WS-353 (Finkelstein et al. 2002).
SimLex is the new standard benchmark for the task of measuring the
semantic similarity of English word pairs. It contains 999 word pairs, each
annotated with a gold standard similarity score, the average of scores given
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by human annotators. Performance of systems is measured as the Spear-
man correlation between a system’s scores and the gold standard scores.
State of the art systems achieving correlation scores in the 0.7–0.8 range
(Mrkšić et al. 2016; Recski et al. 2016) combine multiple word embeddings
and lexical resources, other competitive systems use word embeddings cus-
tomized for the task of measuring word similarity (Schwartz et al. 2015;
Wieting et al. 2015). General-purpose embeddings typically achieve a cor-
relation in the 0.1–0.5 range; scores for some commonly used models are
shown in Table 2.
The WS-353 dataset contains 353 word pairs. It was originally devised
to quantify any kind of semantic association: both similarity and related-
ness. Here we use the subset that targets the former, selected by Agirre
et al. (2009). Similarly to Simlex, performance is measured by Spear-
man’s . WS-353 has been around longer than Simlex, and various corpus-
(Gabrilovich & Markovitch 2007; Halawi et al. 2012) and knowledge-based
methods (Hassan & Mihalcea 2011) have been evaluated against it; the
current state-of-the-art, 0.828 was achieved by a hybrid system that also
makes use of word embeddings (Speer et al. 2017).
Table 2: Coverage and performance of some word embeddings, measured by
Spearman’s 
System Simlex WS-353
Coverage  Coverage 
Huang et al. (2012)4 996 0.14 196 0.67
SENNA5(Collobert & Weston 2008) 998 0.27 196 0.60
GloVe.840B6(Pennington et al. 2014) 999 0.40 203 0.80
Word2Vec7(Mikolov et al. 2013) 999 0.44 203 0.77
We evaluate various versions of our ouroboros-embeddings on both data-
sets. Results are presented in Table 3. Top scores on Simlex are just above
0.2, which outperforms Huang, but falls short of GloVe and Word2Vec by
a similar margin. On the much easier WS-353 dataset, even our best result
is below that of the competition. Nevertheless, these results conﬁrm that
4 http://www.socher.org
5 http://ronan.collobert.com/senna/
6 https://nlp.stanford.edu/projects/glove/
7 https://code.google.com/archive/p/word2vec/
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our method yields vectors that are at least comparable to other general-
purpose embeddings.
An early observation is that embeddings created using the OAV con-
dition (see section 2.3) perform considerably worse than those built with
the OAC condition. The most surprising part is the performance of the
CHI embedding: while it tails behind the other two methods on Simlex,
it improves dramatically when stopwords are ﬁltered (the last two rows),
to the extent that it becomes the best method on both datasets.
Table 3: Coverage and correlation of Wiktionary embeddings on Simlex and
WS-353
Preprocessing Simlex WS-353
Cov. OAC CHI OAV Cov. OAC CHI OAV
none 943 0.18 0.04 0.11 193 0.19 0.18 0.10
lowercasing 961 0.21 0.03 0.08 191 0.17 0.23 0.11
lemmatization 956 0.17 0.02 0.08 197 0.23 0.25 0.17
no multiword 943 0.15 0.03 0.10 193 0.19 0.15 0.08
no proper nouns 943 0.14 0.04 0.08 186 0.21 0.20 0.15
no punctuation 943 0.15 0.03 0.09 193 0.21 0.17 0.10
no stopwords 938 0.17 0.22 0.15 192 0.27 0.46 0.19
all 956 0.21 0.20 0.16 188 0.30 0.46 0.25
In order to gain further insight into how the three embeddings behave dif-
ferently, we devised a further experiment based on the all embedding. The
word pairs in the evaluation datasets have been divided into three groups,
depending on how many of the two words are ouroboroi. Table 4 presents
the results. Unsurprisingly, the numbers for CHI equal to OAV when both
words are in the Ouroboros and to OAC when neither is. Perhaps pre-
dictably, our concerns about both OAC and OAV have been conﬁrmed by
the results: the orthogonal OAC basis breaks down when both words in
a pair are in it, while the over-dense OAV fails to quantify the similarity
of out-of-basis pairs. CHI, on the other hand, manages to be the “best of
both worlds”, at least as far as the ﬁrst and the last row is concerned.
Its exceptional performance in the middle row (in italics) is perplexing,
because this is the point where OAV basis vectors are measured against
OAC vectors; where the snake meets the lion, so to speak. Unfurling this
mystery is left as future work.
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Table 4: A more in-depth look into the performance of the all embedding
Word in basis Simlex WS-353
Size OAC CHI OAV Size OAC CHI OAV
Both 313 0.00 0.13 0.13 46 0.00 0.27 0.27
One 468 0.27 0.20 0.21 85 0.34 0.53 0.36
Neither 175 0.30 0.30 0.12 57 0.50 0.50 0.23
Both SimLex and WS-353 contain pairs of frequent words. Our hope is
that in the next section our method will show its strength on infrequent
words that cause trouble for distributional models that are limited by the
amount of training data available.
3.2. Nearest neighbors
As mentioned in section 1, we expect our embeddings to yield meaningful
representations even for infrequent words that pose a problem for distri-
butional approaches. We have no knowledge of reliable datasets contain-
ing the semantic similarity of infrequent words, a quantitative analysis
is therefore not possible. A more subjective method to evaluate whether
the angle between word vectors is proportional to semantic similarity is
to observe vectors in the immediate vicinity of a particular vector to see
whether they are semantically related to the word corresponding to that
vector. Our experiment involves examining the nearest neighbors of vec-
tors corresponding to a small sample of infrequent words in our least noisy
ouroboros-embedding (using all ﬁltering steps on the Wiktionary data)
and a large, publicly available embedding trained using GloVe on 840 bil-
lion words of raw English text and containing vectors for 2.2 million words.
To create a sample of infrequent English words, we used a word fre-
quency list constructed from the UMBCWebbase Corpus (Han et al. 2013).
To extract words that are in English, correctly spelled, and can be expected
to appear in a dictionary, we matched the list against the full vocabulary
used in a late draft version of (Kornai 2018), which we know to contain
many infrequent words. After manually excluding from the resulting list
technical words related to mathematics or linguistics, we kept the ﬁve least
frequent ones for the purposes of the current experiment. The ﬁve words,
along with their deﬁnitions in Wiktionary, are shown in Table 5. For both
the uroboros and GloVe embeddings we extracted the nearest neighbors
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of each of the ﬁve words in our sample. Tables 6 and 7 show for each word
the top two neigbors in the uroboros and GloVe embeddings, respectively.
We also include Wiktionary deﬁnitions of these neighbor words, where
available.
Table 5: Sample of ﬁve infrequent words used in (Kornai 2018)
Word Wiktionary deﬁnition
compter A counter (token used for keeping count)
A prison attached to a city court; a counter
entelechy The complete realisation and ﬁnal form of some potential concept or function
A particular type of motivation, need for self-determination,
and inner strength directing life and growth to become all one is capable of
being
hinny The hybrid oﬀspring of a stallion (male horse) and a she-ass (female donkey).
perron A stone block used as the base of a monument, marker, etc.
A platform outside the raised entrance to a church or large building
quodlibet A form of music with melodies in counterpoint.
A form of trompe l’oeil which realistically renders domestic items
Table 6: Nearest neighbors of our sample words in the ouroboros embedding
Word Neighbor Deﬁnition
compter jeton a counter or token
countify to use as a count noun
entelechy subtyping a form of type polymorphism (…)
convolve to compute the convolution function
hinny fummel a hinny
zebrinny the oﬀspring of a male horse and a female zebra
perron stereobate the foundation, typically of a stone building
the steps of the platform beneath the stylobate
jamo any of the 24 building blocks of the Korean (hangeul) alphabet.
quodlibet planctus a lament or dirge, a popular literary form in the Middle Ages.
chorale a chorus or choir.
a form of Lutheran or Protestant hymn tune.
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Table 7: Nearest neighbors of our sample words in the GloVe embedding
Word Neighbor Deﬁnition
compter compuer n/a
copouter n/a
entelechy aristotelianism the philosophical system of Aristotle and his followers
somethingness the quality of being something
hinny tuchus alternative form of toches ! the buttocks, rear end, butt
hiney buttocks
perron chingon (as chingón:) (Mexico, slang) very smart, intelligent (…)
chido (Mexico, slang) cool, acceptable, easy
quodlibet sequitur A logical conclusion or consequence of facts.
peric n/a
Even such a small and non-representative sample of infrequent English
words is suﬃcient to exemplify some of the issues that arise when repre-
senting infrequent words with distributional models. Typos of more fre-
quent words may dominate the total number of occurrences in a corpora:
compter and hinny are clearly represented by the GloVe embedding as
alternative forms of computer and hiney, respectively. Neighbors of the
other three sample words in the GloVe embedding are seemingly random.
Meanwhile, in 4 out of the 5 example cases, uroboros maps rare words
into the vicinity of highly related lexemes.
4. Conclusion
In this work, we examined the possibility of creating word embeddings
from a dictionary. While the performance of our embedding in the word
similarity task lags behind those obtained by prediction-based methods, it
is perhaps better suited to ﬁnd relevant neighbors of rare words.
In future work, we hope to iron out the sparsity/density problem that
is, in part, responsible for the lackluster similarity scores. Another av-
enue of research we intend to pursue is to consolidate prediction- and
dictionary-based embeddings into a hybrid model that combines the ad-
vantages of both.
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ABSTRACT
A central concern in the syntax of pronominals is the correct repre-
sentation of the syntactic relationship between a pronominal and its
antecedent, where we can think of the antecedent as the expression
that determines the pronominal’s interpretation. Elements like reflex-
ives are of particular interest, because they must have syntactically cir-
cumscribed antecedents, in contrast to pronouns, which may refer de-
ictically. Two common ways to represent the binding relation between a
reflexive and its antecedent are through coindexation or linking, where
these are seen as strict alternatives to each other. Coindexation is sym-
metric and transitive, whereas linking is asymmetric and intransitive.
However, this raises a problem, as empirical data has shown that both
transitivity and asymmetry are required of binding relations. A solution
presents itself in the binding equations of Lexical-Functional Grammar,
which are transitive due to their use of equality (a standard transitive re-
lation), but asymmetric due to their use of an ANTECEDENT feature (if x is
the ANTECEDENT of y, y is not the ANTECEDENT of x).
One common way to represent the relationship between a pronominal
and its antecedent – let’s call it “the coconstrual relation” (following Saﬁr
2004a;b) – is through the use of indices on nominals:
(1) Alli1 told Thora2 that she1/2/3 was next.
The proper names Alli and Thora have distinct indices, which is under-
stood to mean that they refer to distinct individuals. The pronoun she
can be coindexed with either of the proper names, in which case it refers
to the same individual as the name in question. The indexing relation is
transitive such that if Alli and she are coindexed, then Thora and she
are contra-indexed, since Alli and Thora are contra-indexed. Lastly, the
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pronoun need not be coindexed with either of the names mentioned, in
which case it bears an index contra-indexed with both names.
Coindexation is a symmetric relation: if A is coindexed with B, then
B is coindexed with A. A variety of asymmetric representations of the
antecedent–pronominal relation have also been explored (Higginbotham
1983; 1985; Dalrymple 1993; Heim 1998; Fox 2000; Saﬁr 2004a;b; Büring
2005a;b). As Higginbotham (1983) points out, only an asymmetric relation
actually directly captures the antecedence relation. This is evident if we
compare the coindexation representation in (2) to Higginbotham’s linking
representation in (3), where the head of the arrow is at the antecedent and
the tail of the arrow is at the anteceded element:
(2) Thora1 said she1 thought Alfred had tickled her1.
a.(3) Thora said she thought Alfred had tickled her.
b. Thora said she thought Alfred had tickled her.
The arrow notation makes it clear that the linking relation is asymmetric
and represents that Thora is the antecedent of she and that she is the
antecedent of her in (3b), whereas Thora is the antecedent of both she and
her in (3a). In contrast, the coindexation in (2) does not capture whether
Thora or she is the antecedent of her.1 Heim (1998) proposes a notational
variant of the linking arrows, using dual indices (which she calls “inner” and
“outer” indices); Büring (2005a;b) also adopts a kind of dual indexation.2
1 Coindexation per se does not even capture, e.g., whether Thora is the antecedent of
she or vice versa, but independent considerations in any theory that uses coindexation
would settle this question in favour of the former option.
2 It should be noted that both the coindexation and linking syntactic representations in
fact represent two diﬀerent kinds of semantic relationship between the pronoun and
its antecedent, where the exact nature of the relationship depends on the nature of
the antecedent. If the antecedent is a referential noun phrase, the relationship can be
one of simple coreference. If the antecedent is an operator, the relationship must be
something akin to logical variable binding (Bach & Partee 1980; Büring 2005a, 81ﬀ).
The following standard sort of example makes this clear; for simplicity, let us assume
that the others in question are not related to Harry:
(i) Only Harry heard his sister.
Interpretation 1: Only Harry is an x who heard Harry’s sister.
Interpretation 2: Only Harry is an x who heard x’s sister.
The ﬁrst interpretation is a coreferential interpretation, such that the pronoun refers
to whatever the proper name Harry refers to. On this interpretation, the others did
not hear Harry’s sister, but may have heard their own sisters. The second interpre-
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These representational diﬀerences in binding relations have linguistic
consequences, although this is not obvious from (2) and (3) alone. Let us
call the conﬁguration in (3a) cobinding and the conﬁguration in (3b) tran-
sitive binding, following Heim (1998) and Büring (2005b). The following
example from Büring (2005b, 264) – modiﬁed to use the linking represen-
tation – illustrates that cobinding and transitive binding can give rise to
distinct interpretations (all caps indicates focus):
(4) Every man is afraid that only HE voted for his proposal.
a. Cobinding:
every man is afraid that only he voted for his proposal
Fear: ‘No one else voted for my proposal!’
b. Transitive binding:
every man is afraid that only he voted for his proposal
Fear: ‘No one else voted for his own proposal!’
A symmetric relation like coindexation cannot capture the distinction be-
tween cobinding and transitive binding, making it diﬃcult for a theory
that represents the antecedent–pronominal relation symmetrically to ac-
count for (4).
Another distinction between the coindexation relation and the linking
relation is that the former is transitive, whereas the second is not. The
issue of transitivity is a long-standing one in the syntax of pronominals. In
the early literature on pronominal syntax (Jackendoﬀ 1972; Wasow 1972),
the problem concerned how to relate the reﬂexive to the matrix subject
in (5) without introducing a rule that would also overgenerate (6). From
this point on, I use bold face in example sentences to indicate coconstrual.
(5) Thora worried that she might implicate herself.
(6) *Thora worried that Alfred might implicate herself.
Coindexation plus a locality restriction on the antecedent–anaphor rela-
tion neatly solved this problem: the reﬂexive must have a suitable local an-
tecedent. Alfred and she are both local, but only she is a suitable antecedent
for the feminine reﬂexive (assuming Alfred names a male individual, as is
tation is the semantically bound interpretation, such that the pronoun is bound by
the quantiﬁcational noun phrase Only Harry. On this interpretation, the others in
question did not hear their own sisters, but may have heard Harry’s sister.
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conventionally the case). If the reﬂexive is coindexed with she, it would
be related to Thora in (5) by transitivity of coindexation, on the relevant
reading where Thora is coindexed with she. However, it cannot be directly
related to Thora, as would have to be the case for (6) to be grammatical,
because the matrix subject is not suﬃciently local to the reﬂexive.
The transitivity of coindexation similarly explains the pattern in (7),
which turns out to be a problem for asymmetric relations such as linking:
a.(7) *Isak said he saw him.
b. Isak said he saw him.
c. Isak said he saw him.
Isak can be the antecedent of he or him, as in (7b) and (7c), but it cannot
be the antecedent of both, as in (7a). On the standard assumption that
these pronouns can only take antecedents that are suitably non-local, if he
and him are both coindexed with Isak, then he and him are also coindexed
with each other, but he is too local to him. Lasnik (1976) discusses sim-
ilar examples, in light of the previous work on transitivity of coconstrual
mentioned above.
Higginbotham (1983, 406) immediately observed that (7a) is problem-
atic for an asymmetric antecedent–pronominal relation, because there is
a cobinding representation in which he is not the antecedent of him, such
that each of he and him have the relation to Isak that they have in (7b)
and (7c), which are independently grammatical:
(8) Isak said he saw him.
Büring (2005b, 265) points out that these sorts of examples have normally
lead to various theoretical complications for asymmetric theories of cocon-
strual.
However, it is possible to simultaneously reap the beneﬁts of asymmet-
ric linking and transitive coindexation through an antecedent–pronominal
relation that is both asymmetric and transitive. One such relation is that
of Dalrymple (1993), which is couched in the theory of Lexical-Functional
Grammar (Kaplan & Bresnan 1982; Bresnan et al. 2016; Dalrymple 2001).
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Dalrymple’s relation can be abbreviated as follows, where f can be
thought of as the pronominal in question:3
(9) (f ANTECEDENT) = f
This constraint states that – at the level of semantic structure (Halvorsen
& Kaplan 1988; Dalrymple 1999; 2001; Asudeh 2012), indicated by the sub-
script  – the pronominal is equal to its antecedent. The feature ANTECE-
DENT introduces asymmetry: it is not the case that if A is the ANTECEDENT
of B, then B is the ANTECEDENT of A. Equality introduces transitivity: if
A is the antecedent of B and C, then (at semantic structure) A equals B
and A equals C, which means that B equals C.
This relation captures the distinction between cobinding and transi-
tive binding, as in (4), due to the asymmetry of the antecedent–anaphor
relation. It also correctly captures the pattern in (7) while correctly ruling
out (8), due to the transitivity of equality.
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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses two instances of variation in the nominal morphol-
ogy of Northern Vlax Romani varieties as spoken in Hungary. The dis-
cussion is conducted in an analogical framework, relying only on sur-
face forms and their relationships, using Construction Morphology and
taking the notion of schemata as introduced by Booij (2010) one step fur-
ther. I will also make an attempt at defining the notion of a weak point
as a locus of the emergence of variation. If differentmorphological tools
are employed by different stems for the same semantic function within
a strictly delimited paradigm, pattern-seeking may begin. The different
patterns may result in one and the same stem employing different tools
to express the same function; thus, the patterns will serve as different
analogical forces that influence the extent and nature of variation. This
paper focuses on variation in the strict sense, that is, phenomena involv-
ing vacillating stems.
1. The data
Romani is the only New Indo-Aryan language not spoken in India but
rather in Europe, its closest relatives among other Indo-Aryan languages
being Rajasthani and Gujarati. Although realistic estimates of the num-
ber of speakers are not easy to make, Bakker (2001) put their number at
approximately 4.6 million in Europe at the beginning of the third millen-
nium. The total number of the Romani people in Europe, including both
speakers and non-speakers, has been estimated at anywhere between 4 and
12 million. Due to more recent migrations, Romani has also been spoken
in the Americas, where the numbers are even harder to determine, but
conservative estimates (cf. Matras 2005) suggest that there are upwards of
500 000 speakers, and there are probably more, as there are about 800 000
Romani people living in Brazil alone (cf. Gaspar 2012) and approximately
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one million in the United States (Hancock 2013). Romani monolingual-
ism virtually does not exist; all speakers of Romani are at least bilingual.
The dialect classiﬁcation still in use in current Romani linguistic lit-
erature builds upon the branches established by Miklosich (1872–1880),
relying mostly on contact phenomena. One of the four main dialect groups
of Romani is Vlax Romani, which is, based on certain diagnostic features,
further divided into a Southern and a Northern group, with the former spo-
ken mostly in the Balkans, while the latter in Romania, Hungary, Moldova
and Serbia. Some confusion is caused by the fact that the Northern Vlax
group has often been referred to simply as Vlax Romani in papers written
about Romani as spoken in Hungary (e.g., Erdős 1959; Vekerdi 2000).
Authentic and trustworthy corpora as such, of any variety of Romani,
have not existed until very recently, and when looking into instances of syn-
chronic variation, new and authentic data are of utmost importance. The
situation in the international landscape is better now, although the small
corpora of Thrace Romani–Turkish–Greek and Finnish Romani–Finnish
have been collected with the aim of research into language contact, and
the corpus of Russian Romani does not include the newly collected spoken
data yet (Kozhanov 2016).
Therefore, we set out to collect new, authentic, up-to-date, real life
Romani data in Hungary in 2015 within the framework of the project
Variation in Romani Morphology (OTKA K 111961, PI: László Kálmán).1
Based on a questionnaire speciﬁcally designed for this purpose by the au-
thor, but also recording spontaneous speech, we carried out ﬁeldwork in
several locations in Hungary, and thus far we have carried out Northern
Vlax Romani interviews with 30 informants or groups of informants all over
the territory of Hungary. Although the quantity of the data is not large,
small corpora have actually been used eﬀectively in the course of conduct-
ing valuable research (Adamou 2016). In the present study, we will exclu-
sively rely on these data, occasionally referring to another fairly reliable
but slightly outdated source, Vekerdi (1985). The Northern Vlax Romani
varieties where the data come from include Lovari, Mašari and Drizari. Al-
though sometimes considered as separate linguistic groups within Northern
Vlax Romani (Erdős 1959; Tálos 2001), a comprehensive study on the Vlax
dialects of Romani, Boretzky (2003) does not include them as separate di-
alects. Based on their similarity seen so far, I will consider them as one
variety from a linguistic aspect, used by diﬀerent, self-designated groups.
1 The ﬁeldwork was carried out by Mátyás Rosenberg and the author.
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2. The notion of a weak point
In order to clarify what a weak point is,2 I will use the idea that the reg-
ularities on a particular level of linguistic description can be expressed in
terms of schemata (Booij 2010, following the notion of schema, as described
by Rumelhart 1980). Although related, schemata represent a more com-
plex notion than constructions. While the latter denote a pairing of form
and meaning (Goldberg 1995; Jackendoﬀ 2008), the former, in the case
of morphological schemata, contains phonological, syntactic and semantic
information.3 For example, the schema for deverbal -er in English is as
follows, where the symbol $ stands for correspondence (Booij 2010, 8).
Figure 1: Schema for deverbal -er in English
The three kinds of linguistic information included here are the phonologi-
cal form !, the syntactic information, and the semantic information. The
syntactic information in the original form of the schema is encoded as
N, meaning that the word containing the deverbal -er suﬃx is a noun.
There may often be a need for morpho-syntactic properties to be speci-
ﬁed, however (Booij 2010, 7). As the precise elaboration of the syntactic
component is not part of the present paper, I will use the more general
symbol s to indicate that a schema like this can represent constructions
2 A weak point is fundamentally similar to an unstable point, as deﬁned by Rebrus
and Törkenczy (2011). They deﬁne an unstable point in paradigms as “those points
in the paradigm where more than one conﬂicting analogical requirement applies with
approximately equal strength” (op.cit., 139). Although the present paper will mainly
deal with formal connections, they add that a functional relationship can also serve
as an analogical connection.
3 Rebrus and Törkenczy (2005) do something similar when they underspecify the input
in the framework of Optimality Theory by deﬁning its morpho-syntactic character-
istics only and rely on output-output constraints to determine the outcome of two
cases of lexical allomorphy in the Hungarian verbal paradigm. The two cases are
Deﬁniteness Neutralisation and Anti-Harmony, and the constraints they use require
paradigmatic uniformity on the one hand and paradigmatic contrast on the other.
We may say that, in some way, the underspeciﬁed inputs correspond to the seman-
tic and the morpho-syntactic component of the schemata, while the correspondences
between the components of a schema or between components of diﬀerent schemata
are similar to the ranking of the constraints.
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on any level of morphological or syntactic complexity. Thus, the schema
for the Hungarian plural suﬃx -k would be the one shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Schema for the Hungarian plural suﬃx -k
Instead of this linear representation, based on the idea of Booij (2010),
I suggest a circular representation of the schema, as sketched in Figure 3,
where every kind of information is connected to the other two through
correspondences, marked by arrows in both directions, as there is also a
relationship between the semantic and the phonological information. This
is not unlike what Jackendoﬀ (2012) suggests, for example, when he claims
that a word like cow is stored in memory, and “it involves a pronunciation
linked with a meaning and the syntactic feature Noun” (op.cit., 176). One
reason why it is important to postulate interrelations among all three com-
ponents is, as it is pointed out by Jackendoﬀ (2012), that there are words
which lack one of the components, like ouch, which has phonology and
meaning but lacks syntactic features. Another reason for postulating a di-
rect relationship between the phonological and the semantic components is
that it is a signiﬁcant one in the argumentation below as the variation seen
in the nominal morphology of Northern Vlax Romani takes place along the
correspondence between these two components, while leaving the syntac-
tic component intact, which provides evidence for the solution proposed
here, a schema showing an interrelated matrix of the three components.
Figure 3: Improved schema for the Hungarian plural suﬃx -k
A schema like this becomes weaker when there is a disturbance in any of
the correspondences. For example, if a new phonological form, !0i started
to appear in the same syntactic position and with the same meaning as the
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deverbal -er or the plural -k, then this would weaken the schema, which
may in turn trigger variation and the schema would become a weak point.
It is also possible that more than one correspondence becomes unstable,
like the locative case in Northern Vlax Romani, where the semantic com-
ponent may pair up with a diﬀerent phonological form and a diﬀerent
syntactic position, resulting in variation.4 Thus, a weak point in morphol-
ogy is a schema where at least one of the correspondences is not mutually
unambiguous.
We can draw up the following, combined schema, shown in Figure 4,
consisting of two schemata, for the locative case in Northern Vlax Romani.
The upper section of the schema describes the agglutinative case marking:
for example e kheréste ‘in the house’, where e is the inﬂected form of
the deﬁnite article and kheréste is the locative form of kher ‘house’. It
contains the phonological form; the morpho-syntactic information, which
says that the case aﬃx is attached to the oblique base of the noun; and the
semantic component, which is the locative function in this case. There is an
alternative way of expressing the locative, by means of a preposition, shown
in the lower section of the schema: andó kher ‘in the house’. In addition to
the noun kher ‘house’, this form is composed of the preposition ande ‘in’
and the base form o of the deﬁnite article.
Figure 4: Schema for the locative case in Northern Vlax Romani
4 The variation investigated in the present paper is not completely unlike microvaria-
tion, but Barbiers et al. (2007) focus on inter-dialectal variation, using a typological or
a generative approach. Further research into microvariation tries to account more “for
the range and (limits) of inter- and intra-speaker variation in a principled way while at
the same time testing existing formal theories against these microvariational data and
thus contributing to the theory of language variation”, but it still investigates closely
related language variants, thus going with a dialectologically oriented approach, “ap-
plying the formal theoretical concepts of generative grammar” (Brandner 2012, 113).
However, the variation we are dealing with in Northern Vlax Romani is intra-dialectal
variation, which manifests itself as either inter- or intra-speaker variation.
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The thick arrows in this schema mean that the correspondences in that
direction prevail in the expression of the locative case, so the prepositional
form is more typical than the agglutinative one. However, the presence of
both forms suggests that the locative function does not exclusively corre-
spond to either the form represented by agglutinative case marking or the
form represented by the preposition.
As another example, let us take the English past tense. There is a
strong relationship between the semantic function “past tense” and the
way of marking commonly called “regular” (the addition of the suﬃx -ed).
If all English verbs were inﬂected that way, there would only be one single
schema for the past tense.
However, this is not the case. There are several alternative, so-called
“irregular” verbs of lower or higher frequency, making up smaller or bigger
groups (sing–sang, cut–cut, keep–kept etc.). The existence of these groups
of verbs means that the correspondence between the past tense function
and the marker -ed is not unambiguous, and neither is the correspon-
dence between the past tense function and the morpho-syntactic property
of aﬃxation for the past tense. Several other morpho-syntactic ways and
phonological forms are used in the formation of the English past tense,
for example ablaut (sing–sang), vowel shortening (keep–kept) or reverse
umlaut (think–thought).
Figure 5: Schema for the English past tense
With so many schemata coalescing around the same semantic component,
the correspondences become ambiguous and represent a weak point, where
variation may emerge, although it does not necessarily do so. This probably
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depends on other factors, such as frequency, the extent of the embedded
nature of the forms etc. However, if variation emerges, then we have ev-
ery reason to think that there are patterns which are competing for the
same function, or patterns which have some other kind of phonological or
morpho-syntactic inﬂuence on the forms that begin to vary.
3. An overview of the weak points under discussion
in Northern Vlax Romani
I will brieﬂy introduce the two weak points in the nominal inﬂection of
Northern Vlax Romani where variation occurs5 and where the surface
forms (surface similarities and diﬀerences; in general, cf. e.g., Kálmán et al.
2012) and analogical eﬀects might play a role in producing and maintaining
this variation.
1. The ﬁrst weak point we will look at is the masculine oblique base.6
One oblique marker for masculine nouns is -es- in the singular and -en-
in the plural, so the oblique bases of a word like šēró ‘head’7 are šērés-
and šērén-, respectively. However, this schema does not exclusively prevail
within the masculine nouns. It is weakened by the existence of another
phonological form, containing -os- in the singular and -on- in the plural,
so, for example, the oblique forms of the word hīŕo ‘a piece of news’ are
hīrós- and hīrón-, respectively.
2. The second weak point can be found in the feminine plural oblique
base. The oblique marker in the singular is invariably -a-: šej ‘girl’ šejá-,
žuv ‘louse’ žuvá-. However, there are two available patterns in the plural.
One of the possible feminine plural oblique markers is -an-, for example the
plural oblique base of šej ‘girl’ is šeján-; but there is also another phono-
logical form of the feminine plural oblique marker, -en-, see for example
žuv ‘louse’, whose plural oblique base is žuvén-.
5 We must note that the present paper does not deal with the possible diachronic
processes that could have led to this variation and are emphasised heavily in the
literature on Romani linguistics.
6 The case declension system of Romani primarily relies on a nominative/oblique op-
position. Further case markers are attached to the oblique base (Matras 2002, 43–44),
as is not unusual in New Indo-Aryan languages (Masica 1991, 230–248).
7 Stress is marked by an acute accent, while a macron marks a long vowel.
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4. The masculine oblique base
In this section, we will look at the ﬁrst weak point, the masculine oblique
base, in more detail. Following the description of the phenomenon in ques-
tion, we will analyse two possible reasons for the weakness and the ensuing
variation, and discuss to what extent there can be interaction between the
possible reasons and the variation. They are the following.
1. The position of stress. At ﬁrst glance, it seems that there is at least
some sort of correlation between the variation of the oblique forms and
the fact that Northern Vlax Romani lacks a straightforward stress pat-
tern. Stress is lexical, which means it cannot be predicted based merely on
the form of the word or the number of syllables. So, while the level of un-
predictability is high by default, it is further complicated by the fact that
the position of stress in certain words with three syllables may also vary.
While the stress pattern of disyllabic words (word-initial or word-ﬁnal)
seems to determine the form of the oblique base unambiguously, the vary-
ing stress pattern of trisyllabic words pairs up with the unpredictability of
oblique forms.
2. The number of syllables. This is related to the position of stress to
some degree, as oblique forms begin to vary when the number of syllables
reaches or exceeds three. The variation is especially ostensible on trisyllabic
words with a stem-ﬁnal /o/, while disyllabic words never vary.
4.1. Description of the phenomenon
In this section, we will introduce the variation in the masculine oblique base
and we will also see that this variation is closely linked to the masculine
nouns which have a stem-ﬁnal /o/.
In Northern Vlax Romani, there are two sets of suﬃxes for the oblique
base. One of them comprises -es- for the singular and -en- for the plural,
but there are masculine nouns which, without any apparent phonological
or morpho-phonological reason, take a diﬀerent oblique marker: -os- in the
singular and -on- in the plural.
(1) šēró ‘head’ ! obl. šērés-/šērén-
hīŕo ‘a piece of news’ ! obl. hīrós-/hīrón-
Masculine nouns can be divided into three groups according to the oblique
form: in the ﬁrst group, only the oblique in -es-/-en- is used, in the second
group, only the the oblique in -os-/-on-, and there is a third group where
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the two possible forms vary. The two competing patterns can be seen here
next to each other throughout the whole paradigm in Table 1.
Table 1: The two masculine paradigms
Masculine bakró ‘sheep’ sókro ‘father-in-law’
Singular Plural Singular Plural
Nominative bakró bakré sókro sokrurá
Accusative bakrés bakrén sokrós sokrón
Dative bakréske bakrénge sokróske sokrónge
Locative bakréste bakrénde sokróste sokrónde
Ablative bakréstar bakréndar sokróstar sokróndar
Instrumental bakrésa bakrénca sokrósa sokrónca
Genitive bakrésk- bakréng- sokrósk- sokróng-
Vocative bakrá bakrále sokrá sokrále
We can draw up the following schema, shown in Figure 6, for the masculine
oblique base, where N is a masculine noun. It contains the oblique marker
-es-/-en- as the phonological form on the one hand, and the oblique marker
-os-/-on- on the other.
Figure 6: Schema for the masculine oblique base8
In this combination of two separate schemata, one containing the phono-
logical form !i[ ]j [es/en]k and the other one containing the phonological
8 Although the oblique case is ultimately a morphological category, it can be split up
into a syntactic and a semantic component. The syntactic component si covers the
syntactic position and structure, while [OBL] denotes the semantic component in the
schema. In Conceptual Semantics (cf. e.g., Jackendoﬀ 2006), plurality, for example, is
encoded as a function in the semantic structure. The oblique can also be considered as
a function whose argument is the set of items being enabled to take further semantic
functions on; the output of the function is the aggregate of such items.
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form !i[ ]j [os/on]k, the same semantic content corresponds to two diﬀer-
ent phonological forms. The correspondence between the phonological form
!i[ ]j [es/en]k and the semantic content OBLj is weakened by the presence
of the other schema, where the same semantic content corresponds to a
diﬀerent phonological form, !i[ ]j [os/on]k, and this is also true the other
way round: the correspondences between each phonological form and the
semantic content OBLj are weakened by each other.
To illustrate this, the masculine nouns we have from the newly col-
lected data are listed in Tables 2–4. Only items which have at least one
attested oblique form were taken into consideration. The tables contain
28 masculine nouns whose oblique form is -es-/-en-, 23 masculine nouns
whose oblique form is -os-/-on-, and, in addition, there are nine lexical
items whose oblique forms vary. In the tables, the words are grouped to-
gether in the order of the number of syllables (nouns with one syllable
only appear among the ones with the oblique form -es-/-en-, while nouns
with four syllables only appear among the ones with the oblique form -os-/
-on-). Within the groups, the words are listed according to the end of the
stem: whether there is a consonant, an /i/ or an /o/.
Table 2: Masculine nouns with the oblique form -es-/-en-
Noun Attested oblique forms
One syllable
berš ‘year’ beršésko
del ‘god’ devléske/dēvléske
gad ‘shirt, clothes’ gādénca/gadéske/gādéske/gādénge/gādéngo
gav ‘village’ gavéske
grast ‘horse’ grastéske/grastén
kašt ‘tree’ kaštéske/kaštésa/kašténge/kašténca
kher ‘house’ kheréske/kherésko
kraj ‘king’ krajéske/krajénge
murš ‘man’ muršéske
nāj ‘ﬁnger’ nājénca
rom ‘Romani man’ roméske/roménca/romén/romés
than ‘place’ thanéste/thanés
vast ‘hand’ vastésa
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Two syllables
abáv ‘wedding’ abavéske
bijáv ‘wedding’ bijavéske
gurúv ‘bull’ guruvén
kotór ‘cloth’ kotorésa
manúš ‘man’ manušés/manušén/manušéste/manušésko/
manušéstar/manušénca/manušénge
bāló ‘pig’ bālén
gāžó ‘non-Romani man’ gāžéske/gāžéstar/gāžén
kurkó ‘week’ kurkéstar
šāvó ‘boy’ šāvéske/šāvés/šāvén/šāvénge/šāvénca
Three syllables
gḗzeši ‘train’ gēzešésa
koldúši ‘beggar’ koldušéstar/koldušés/koldušén/koldušénca
kopā́či ‘tree trunk’ kopāčéske
pohā́ri ‘glass’ pohārénca
Table 3: Masculine nouns with the oblique form -os-/-on-
Noun Attested oblique forms
Two syllables
ā́tko ‘curse’ ātkónca
búso ‘bus’ busósa
čā́so ‘hour, watch’ čāsóngo
fṓro ‘town’ fōróske
gíndo ‘problem’ gindóstar/gindónca
hīŕo ‘a piece of news’ hīróstar
nā́so ‘child’s father-in-law’ nāsósko
nīṕo ‘relatives’ nīpósa/nīpós
pújo ‘chicken’ pujón
ríto ‘ﬁeld’ ritóske
trájo ‘life’ trajósko
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Three syllables
āláto ‘animal’ ālatón/ālatós
bārṓvo ‘baron’ bārōvóske
čalā́do ‘family’ čalādós/čalādósa/čalādón
falató ‘a little bit of food’ falatóske/falatón
xāmásko ‘food’ xāmaskós
jōsā́go ‘livestock’ jōsāgós
laptópo ‘laptop’ laptopósa
sómsḗdo/sómsīd́o ‘neighbour’ somsēdósko/somsēdóski/somsīdós/somsēdós/somsēdóske
vonáto ‘train’ vonatósa
Four or more syllables
ternimā́ta ‘the young ones’ ternimātós/ternimātóske/ternimātónca/ternimātónge
šegīččḗgo ‘help’ šegīččēgóske/šegīččēgós
sā́mītōgḗpo ‘computer’ sāmītōgēpósa
Table 4: Masculine nouns where there is variation
Noun Attested oblique forms
Two syllables
sókro ‘father-in-law’ sokróske/sokrónge/sokrénge
Three syllables
bašadó ‘telephone, mobile’ bašadésa/bašadósa
čókano ‘hammer’ čokanésko/čokanósko
dúhano ‘tobacco’ duhanés/duhanéski/duhanós/duhanóski
kirā́ji ‘king’ kirājéske/kirājénge/kirājén/kirājón
mobiló ‘mobile phone’ mobilésa/mobilósa
pokrṓco ‘blanket’ pokrōcésa/pokrōcósa
Four syllables
kirčimā́ri ‘bartender’ kirčimārésa/kirčimārósa/kirčimāréstar/kirčimāróstar/
kirčimārénca
telefóni/telefóno ‘telephone’ telefonésa/telefonósa
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As for the stems whose oblique forms vary, the variation is slight in some
cases, with one or the other more dominant, but there are cases, like
dúhano, where we ﬁnd that the amounts of the two diﬀerent oblique oc-
currences are basically equal.9 The overall proportion of the frequency of
the stems with the oblique forms -es-/-en-, -os-/-on- and the stems where
the forms vary can be seen in Table 5.
Table 5: Number and proportion of the frequency of the stems with the oblique
forms -es-/-en-, -os-/-on- and the varying stems
Oblique form Number Percentage
-es-/-en- 28 47%
alternating 9 15%
-os-/-on- 23 38%
The varying stems and the total number of occurrences of both variants in
the data are repeated in Figure 7 (overleaf), except for two items, where
the variation is very slight and needs further evidence: there is only one
instance containing the suﬃx -en- for sókro ‘father-in-law’ and there is
only one instance containing the suﬃx -on- for kirāj́i ‘king’.
Variation seems to appear more often among words where the ﬁnal
vowel of the nominative singular form is /o/, see for example čokáno ‘ham-
mer’, dúhano ‘tobacco’, mobílo ‘mobile phone’, pokrōćo ‘blanket’, telefóno
‘telephone’.
The word telefóno has apparently got an alternative nominative form,
telefóni, and there are some other masculine nouns ending in /i/ which
show variation, like kirčimāŕi ‘bartender’, kirāj́i ‘king’. The fact that we
may ﬁnd variation in the oblique form of lexical items the nominative
singular ending of which is -i needs further investigation and conﬁrma-
tion when we have more data at hand. The fact that the oblique form
of the word telefóni/telefóno ‘telephone’, for example, appears both as
telefonés- and as telefonós- might as well be the result of the diﬀerent
nominative forms. Similar instances have been attested, for example the
coexistence mǖšoró and mǖšorí ‘programme’. With regard to the vari-
ation in the words kirčimāŕi ‘bartender’ and kirāj́i ‘king’ we must note
that there are ambiguous cases, but there is not enough information avail-
9 More evidence for the variation comes from Cech et al. (1999), who provide a further
example: the oblique form of the word kókalo ‘bone’ appears as both kokalós- and
kokalés-.
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Figure 7: The total number of occurrences of the varying masculine stems in the
data
able to draw a conclusion from them. While in the Kalderaš dialect, Bo-
retzky (1994) documents oblique forms with -es-/-en- only for nouns with
a stem-ﬁnal /i/, for example limóri ‘grave’ limorés-/limorén-, Cech and
Heinschink (1999) only quote masculine nouns with a stem-ﬁnal /i/ where
the oblique suﬃxes are -os-/-on-, for instance juhāśi ‘shepherd’ juhāsós-,
doktóri ‘doctor’ doktorós- etc. The newly collected Northern Vlax Romani
data from Hungary show that the situation is not so straightforward.
4.2. Possible causes and explanations
4.2.1. Variation in the position of stress
In this section, we will look at the relationship between the variation in the
position of stress and the appearance of one or the other oblique form and
we will see that even though one is not the direct consequence of the other
(as the choice of words in Table 1, where the two diﬀerent patterns are
presented, intentionally suggests), there is certainly correlation between
the two aspects, which means that there are certain other factors that we
might want to take into consideration besides the stem-ﬁnal vowel.
A possible cause of the variation in the oblique forms, which needs
further investigation, is the variation in stress. Generally, and especially for
disyllabic words, where the stress falls on the last syllable of the nominative
singular form, there is no variation, the oblique suﬃx will be -es-/-en-, and
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where the stress falls on the ﬁrst (penultimate) syllable, the oblique suﬃx
will be -os-/-on-. No matter what the oblique ending is and where the stress
falls in the nominative singular form, the stress in the oblique forms always
falls on the oblique ending, so bakró ‘sheep’ will give bakrés-. On the level
of the word, so on the surface, this results in penultimate stress: dative
bakréske, locative bakréste, ablative bakréstar and instrumental bakrésa.
A child who is acquiring Northern Vlax Romani as their mother tongue
can base their assumptions concerning the oblique form on stress in case
of disyllabic words.
For words with three syllables, stress is also lexical, but as there are
more syllables, there are more options, and there is no such straightforward
correlation as in the case of disyllabic words, where one position in the
nominative predicts one oblique form and the other position predicts the
other oblique form. While the oblique form of trisyllabic words will always
have penultimate stress, the stress of the nominative form can fall anywhere
between the ﬁrst through the penultimate to the last syllable.
As we can see in Tables 2–4, the position of the stress cannot unam-
biguously predict the oblique form. While it is true that words with stem-
ﬁnal stress take the oblique forms -es-/-en- without exception, the oblique
form of words where the stress shifts to a penultimate or ante-penultimate
position is not so obvious. The words padlōv́o ‘ﬂoor’ and rablōv́o ‘robber,
highwayman’, for example, have the oblique forms padlōvés- and rablōvós-,
respectively (cf. Vekerdi 1985), in spite of the fact that both have penul-
timate stress. As we can see from the newly collected data, the oblique
form of certain stems vary, for example mobílo ‘mobile phone’mobilés-/
mobilós- or dúhano ‘tobacco’ duhanés-/duhanós-. The choice of pattern
may further be complicated by the fact that the stress of the nominative
form may even vary within one stem, for example kóčiši/kočíši ‘coachman’
(Vekerdi 1985). In sum, where stress is not in a straightforward relation-
ship with the oblique (that is, in words with three or more syllables), the
vowel of the oblique suﬃx will become unpredictable and the oblique form
may even begin to vary for individual items.
4.2.2. The number of syllables
There might be a correlation between the number of the syllables a noun
has and the degree of variation it shows concerning the oblique forms. This
is what we will examine in this section, eventually coming to the conclusion
that the higher the number of syllables is, the more likely it is that the
oblique form will vary.
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Monosyllabic nouns always end in a consonant and invariably take the
same oblique pattern, so drom ‘road’ and dromés- ‘road’ obl. This pattern
is valid for other nouns ending in a consonant that are disyllabic, so rašáj
‘priest’ and rašajés- ‘priest’ obl. The other pattern appears when two fac-
tors, namely disyllabicity and a stem-ﬁnal vowel present themselves simul-
taneously. A stem-ﬁnal vowel introduces a certain amount of disturbance
in the system, because it conﬂicts with the initial vowel of the oblique suf-
ﬁx, which is straightforward for consonant-ﬁnal stems. Among disyllabic
stems with a stem-ﬁnal /o/, however, there is no variation in the strict
sense: every lexical item which has two syllables and a stem-ﬁnal /o/ will
choose either one or the other pattern, and the position of the stress (ﬁ-
nal or penultimate) appears to be a reliable clue in this case, as seen in
Tables 2–4: stress on the last syllable predicts the -es-/-en- form, while
penultimate stress predicts the -os-/-on- form.
When the number of syllables rises to three, variation on the level of
lexical items begins, and it is both intra- and inter-speaker variation. This
means that the longer a word is, the more uncertain it gets which oblique
stem it will take. As mentioned above, there is only slight variation for
words longer than two syllables which end in a diﬀerent vowel, like /i/: the
frontness of the stem-ﬁnal vowel will dominantly predict (or trigger) a front
vowel in the oblique form. The back vowel /o/ of nouns with three syllables,
however, will not be able to predict the oblique form unambiguously, just
like disyllabic nouns ending in /o/ cannot.
Although there must be some among the trisyllabic masculine nouns
with a stem-ﬁnal /o/ that take -es-/-en- as their oblique (as attested in
Vekerdi 1985, for example), our newly collected data do not contain them.
However, they contain nine items with the oblique form -os-/-on- and four
items whose oblique forms vary. This is somewhat in line with the varying
stress pattern of trisyllabic nouns: the increase in the number of syllables
increases the chance of variation, too. While the oblique form of disyllabic
nouns never varies (it is either -es-/-en- or -os-/-on-), when the number of
syllables exceeds two, the oblique form does begin to vary. This is further
corroborated by the two items with four syllables: kirčimāŕi ‘bartender’
and telefóni/telefóno ‘telephone’.
It should also be noted in connection with the higher number of -os-/
-on- oblique forms that when variation begins, that is, at the level of trisyl-
labic nouns, the stem-ﬁnal /o/ might tip the scales in favour of the oblique
form which contains an /o/ (whereas the word kirčimāŕi ‘bartender’, with
a stem-ﬁnal /i/, seems to prefer the -es-/-en- forms).
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4.3. Summary
In this section, we had a look at the ﬁrst weak point in the morphology
of Northern Vlax Romani, the masculine oblique base, in more detail.
Following the description of the phenomenon in question, we went over
two possible reasons for the weakness and the ensuing variation, and we
found the following.
1. The position of stress. We saw that the stress pattern of disyllabic
words (word-initial or word-ﬁnal) corresponds to the choice of the oblique
marker: word-initial stress corresponds to -os-/-on-, word-ﬁnal stress cor-
responds to -es-/-en-. Stress begins to vary in trisyllabic words, and the
same lexical item can occur with diﬀerent stress patterns. That is exactly
where the oblique markers begin to vary, too, so the varying stress pattern
pairs up with the unpredictability of oblique forms.
2. The number of syllables. We found that while the oblique forms of
disyllabic nouns do not vary, the oblique forms of trisyllabic nouns with
a stem-ﬁnal /o/ do. Based on this, it seems that the number of syllables
inﬂuences the choice of oblique forms: the higher the number of syllables
is, the higher the possibility of variation is.
5. A brief sidetrack: the “inherited–borrowed dichotomy”
We must mention here that in connection with the two diﬀerent patterns,
many (e.g., Boretzky 1989; Bakker 1997; Matras 2002) emphasise the exis-
tence of a strict morphological split between the vocabulary inherited from
Indo-Aryan (as well as words borrowed from Persian and Armenian) and
the vocabulary borrowed later from Greek and other (Romanian, Serbian,
Hungarian etc.) contact languages.
“The curious thing in Romani is that the newly arisen classes had not remained
closed and limited to their constituting, i.e., Greek, lexical stratum. On the
contrary, the athematic classes have become the only ones which exhibit any
degree of contact productivity. Basically all post-Greek noun loans have been
integrated into the new, athematic, rather than the old, thematic, classes.”10
(Elšík 2000, 17)
10 In the English language literature focussing on Romani, the terms “thematic” or
“oikoclitic” and “athematic” or “xenoclitic” are used to refer to the inherited and
borrowed components, respectively.
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Within the nominal inﬂection, this would mean that the -es-/en- pattern
is used to inﬂect inherited nouns due to historical reasons, while the -os-/
-on- pattern, being itself borrowed from Greek (Bakker 1997), is used to
inﬂect borrowed nouns. For example, descriptions of Lovari (Hutterer &
Mészáros 1967; Cech & Heinschink 1999) go along this path, with minor
diﬀerences, so even masculine nouns with a stem-ﬁnal -i take the oblique
in -os-/-on- (Cech & Heinschink 1999, 22), which is clearly not the case,
as we saw in section 6.3. Elšík (2000) discusses the historical development
of nominal paradigms in detail, and, regarding the Greek-derived word
fōŕo ‘town’, he states that diachronically fōrós- replaced fōrés-, so that the
oblique form could resemble the nominative singular. However, even in a
diachronic sense, this is hard to justify, as it goes against the basic layout
of the inherited inﬂection, where the oblique singular stem ends in -es-, no
matter what the nominative ending is (for example nominative singular
bāló ‘pig’ and obl. sing. bālés-).
Psycholinguistic factors might interfere in the form of the extent to
which a native speaker “feels” that a certain word is borrowed or not, but
this is very diﬃcult to measure. Intuitively, one would think that, although
the word dúhano is an earlier loan from Serbian than the word čókano from
Romanian, the similarity of Hungarian dohány might evoke a sense of the
word being less old. The fact that there is only slight hesitation concerning
the oblique forms of sókro, a word borrowed from Romanian, does not
really justify this as the current speakers of Northern Vlax Romani in
Hungary have no access to Romanian at all. If the most important factor
were the inherited or borrowed nature of a word, then, without direct
access to the donor language, this factor would start to become obscure
and there should be more hesitation, or, alternatively, the nominal classes
would remain absolutely rigid, with no variation at all.
All in all, we have to dismiss the notion of the strict inherited-borrowed
dichotomy, and thus, its erosion and any ‘interaction’ (Elšík 2000, 23)
between the two layers, too. The two layers do not exist as there are no
two speciﬁc and unique morphological systems used for one and the other;
their inﬂection, strictly taken, is not diﬀerent. What we must see clearly
is that there are two patterns existing within the masculine paradigm of
nouns ending in -o, and the choice may depend on several factors, including
the overall frequency of the patterns. It is also true that the predominance
of -os-/-on- forms in the case of sókro, for example, can be the result of the
frequency of the forms of the particular paradigm itself (token frequency
applied to paradigms), like in the case of the paradigm of fōŕo ‘town’,
where high token frequency may be the reason for the apparent lack of
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variation. On the other hand, variation in the case of the oblique form of a
word like čókano ‘hammer’ can be the result of its lower token frequency.
Other cognitive processes might play a role, too. For example, the extent
of embeddedness is diﬃcult to measure, but it may consist of such factors
as how deeply embedded the word is mentally in language use, or what
other notions might come into play, like even intuitions concerning the
“Gypsyness” of the word.
6. The feminine oblique plural base
In this section, we will look at the second weak point, the feminine oblique
plural base, in more detail. Following the description of the phenomenon,
we will examine two possible aspects that might inﬂuence the choice of
the plural oblique ending for feminine nouns. The two aspects are the
following.
1. The masculine oblique plural -en-. Besides -an-, the other variant of
the feminine oblique plural marker is -en-. The form is identical to one
of the variants of the masculine oblique plural marker. As the semantic
content (oblique plural) is also identical, we would like to look into the
possible analogical inﬂuence of the masculine oblique plural marker on
the feminine one. As we will see, the -en- form is dominant in both the
masculine and the feminine nominal paradigms, which suggests that the
mutual inﬂuence exists.
2. The feminine nominative plural suﬃxes. We will examine whether the
nominative plural endings -i and -a have any connection to the appearance
of one or the other plural oblique marker. We will ﬁnd that there seems
to be a relationship, which is made slightly more complicated by the fact
that the singular ending of the nouns with the plural ending -i is -a and
that of the nouns with the plural ending -a is often -i.
6.1. Description of the phenomenon
The feminine oblique singular base has one single form: -a-, so the oblique
form of šej ‘girl’ is šejá-. However, the oblique plural base has got two
possible forms: one is -an-, so the oblique plural base of a word like khajnjí
‘hen’ is khajnján-, but there is another one, -en-, for instance the oblique
form of rāća ‘duck’ is rācén-. They occur simultaneously as the feminine
K + K = 120 / p. 44 / February 1, 2020
44 Márton András Baló
oblique plural base on several points of the feminine paradigm. This sug-
gests that we are dealing with two competing patterns again.11
Table 6 shows the two diﬀerent feminine paradigms. Note that the
oblique singular forms of feminine nouns are completely unaﬀected by vari-
ation: the singular oblique marker is invariably -a-.
Table 6: The two diﬀerent patterns in the feminine
Feminine rā́ca ‘duck’ māčí ‘ﬂy’
Singular Plural Singular Plural
Nominative rā́ca rācí māčí māčá
Accusative rācá rācén māčá māčán
Dative rācáke rācénge māčáke māčánge
Locative rācáte rācénde māčáte māčánde
Ablative rācátar rācéndar māčátar māčándar
Instrumental rācása rācénca māčása māčánca
Genitive rācák- rācéng- māčák- māčáng-
Vocative rā́ca rācále mā́ča māčále
The two diﬀerent patterns can be represented by the following combination
of two schemata, shown in Figure 8, where N is a feminine noun. The
correspondence between the phonological form!i[ ]j [an]k and the semantic
content OBL PLURj is weakened by the presence of the other schema,
where the same semantic content corresponds to a diﬀerent phonological
form, !i[ ]j [en]k. We can also look at it from the other direction: the
correspondence between the phonological form!i[ ]j [en]k and the semantic
content OBL PLURj is weakened by the presence of the other schema,
11 According to the literature (Matras 2002, 83; Elšík 2000, 22; Boretzky 1994, 33),
the form -an- is the result of a renewal or assimilation on the basis of the oblique
singular; in other words, it would be a diﬀerentiation process aiming at paradigmatic
opposition. For example, the oblique plural base of a word like krangá ‘branch’ is
supposed to be krangán- (Hutterer & Mészáros 1967, 49), from an original oblique
plural in -en-, and this most often happens in the Vlax dialects. However, the plural
oblique of krangá ‘branch’ exclusively appears as krangén- in the newly collected
data. We could begin to speculate whether one or the other is the “original” form
and whether, if krangén- was the original form, it could have been retrieved after an
intermediary stage; whatever the case is, all this could suggest that the variation we
see here might be a sign of an ongoing change.
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where the same semantic content corresponds to a diﬀerent phonological
form, !i[ ]j [an]k.
Figure 8: The combination of two schemata for the feminine oblique plural
The feminine nouns from the newly collected data can be seen in Table 7.
The items are grouped together according to their oblique plural form;
items with no attested plural oblique form were excluded. Out of the total
twenty items, there are four whose oblique plural marker is -an-, there are
seven items whose oblique plural marker is -en-, and there are nine stems
where the oblique forms vary. A striking fact here is that the number of
stems where there is variation is much higher than expected based on
earlier sources, like Vekerdi (1985).
Table 7: Feminine nouns and their oblique forms from the newly collected data
Noun Attested oblique forms Noun Attested oblique forms
Nouns with the oblique plural -an- Nouns with variation
xajíng ‘well’ xajingánge/xajingángo katt ‘scissors’ kattjánca/kattjénca
khajnjí ‘hen’ khajnján māj ‘meadow’ māján/mājánge/mājénge
papín ‘goose’ papinján/papinjén patrí ‘leaf’ patrénca/patránca
pīrí ‘saucepan’ pīránge šūrí ‘knife’ šūránca/šūrénca
māčí ‘ﬂy’ māčánca tjīrí ‘ant’ tjīránca/tjīrénca
Nouns with the oblique plural -en- bāj ‘sleeve’ bājánca/bājénca
angrustí ‘ring’ angrusténdar bār ‘garden’ bāránge/bārán/bārénge
armajá ‘curse’ armajénca bórotva ‘razor’ borotvénca/borotvánca
cincā́ri ‘mosquito’ cincārénca
kangrí/krangí ‘branch’ kangrénca/krangénca
kúrva ‘whore’ kurvéngo
mesají ‘table’ mesajéndar
rā́ca ‘duck’ rācén
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The overall proportion of the frequency of the stems belonging to the two
feminine oblique plural patterns and the stems where the oblique forms
vary can be seen in Table 8. We can see that the feminine class of nouns
is even more aﬀected by variation than the masculine class, with a higher
percentage of all the attested stems showing variation.
Table 8: Number and proportion of the stems belonging to the two feminine
oblique plural patterns and the varying stems
Oblique form Number Percentage
-en- 7 35%
alternating 9 45%
-an- 4 20%
The varying stems and the total number of occurrences of both variants
in the data are repeated in Figure 9, except for two items, where the vari-
ation is very slight and needs further evidence: there is only one instance
containing the suﬃx -an- for bāj ‘sleeve’ and there is only one instance
containing the suﬃx -en- for māj ‘meadow’.
Figure 9: The total number of occurrences of the varying feminine stems in the
data
We have to note here that Cech and Heinschink (1999) try to explain this
again with the diﬀerence between inherited and borrowed words: -an- is
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used with inherited words and -en- is used for borrowed words. This is,
however, completely inconsistent with the data and even with the way the
inherited-borrowed dichotomy in the masculine is traditionally analysed,
and thus should be dismissed.
The general frequency of /a/ and /e/ in the Romani verbal and nom-
inal suﬃxes can play a role in the presence and competition of the two
patterns, although this is contradicted by the fact that the proportion of
the two diﬀerent forms varies among the diﬀerent stems. As we could al-
ready see, while the vowels /u/ and /i/ appear less often in suﬃxes in
general, and even then they are more typically used in derivation, /e/ and
/a/ are quite common in the inﬂection of Romani, for example as the vowel
component of nominal oblique markers, both feminine and masculine, and
of personal concord markers on verbs.
As we can see in Table 9, the personal concord markers for consonantal
verbs (with the inclusion of the /e/ which was analysed as epenthetic by
Baló 2008) exclusively contain these two vowels.
Table 9: Verbal personal concord markers
1st sing. 2nd sing. 3rd sing. 1st plural 2nd plural 3rd plural
Present -av -es -el -as -en -en
Past -em -an -as -am -an -e
If we consider the fact that the ﬁrst and second person plural forms are less
frequent generally, we see that the proportion of personal concord markers
containing /e/ and /a/ is 5 : 3, which corresponds to the tendencies we
ﬁnd for the distribution of the two vowels in the feminine oblique plural
marker. Even if both the verbal and the oblique markers reﬂect a more
general distribution or proportion of the vowels within the language, it
is important to see that the distribution does not only present itself as
diﬀerent nominal classes formed with one or the other vowel, but also as
stem-level variation, where one single stem can form the oblique with both
markers.
The nominal oblique markers, including feminine nouns, can be -es-,
-en, -a-, -an-, all containing /e/ or /a/. In addition, /o/ also appears in the
variant oblique masculine forms -os- and -on-. The vowel /o/ is, however,
not present elsewhere in the inﬂection. Considering all this, it follows that
the variation in the feminine oblique plural between -en- and -an- is much
more salient, with variation seen in nine stems out of 20, than the variation
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in the masculine oblique between -es-/-en- and -os-/-on, where there is
variation in only nine out of 60 stems.
It is also important to note that the variation always includes /e/ as
one of the elements of varying pairs of vowels: in case of the masculine
oblique, the variation is /e//o/, whereas in the feminine oblique plural
it is /e//a/. Its presence is in line with the overall high frequency of /e/,
while the fact that it frequently takes part in some kind of variation is
in line with the hypothesis that /e/ could be a default vowel and thus it
is less stable. Let us not forget that it is always deleted where there is a
thematic vowel at the end of the stem of the verb (cf. Baló 2008).
6.2. Possible causes and explanations
6.2.1. The masculine oblique plural -en-
The presence of the -en- pattern in the feminine may be connected to
its simultaneous presence in the masculine. While the -en- pattern exerts
a neutralising eﬀect, making all plural paradigms look identical and de-
creasing the extent of gender diﬀerence, the -an- pattern exerts an opposite
eﬀect, trying to maintain an intra-gender uniformity, being more similar
to the singular oblique marker -a-. A possible, additional aspect of varia-
tion is the presence of /n/ in the plural oblique across the whole nominal
morphology; /n/ is a common trait of both the masculine and the feminine
paradigms, so variation emerges more easily.
The correlation between the masculine oblique plural -en- and the
feminine oblique plural -en- is shown in Figure 10, where the schemata for
the masculine oblique plural and the feminine oblique plural are connected
through a thick dashed bidirectional arrow, indicating mutual inﬂuence.
However, as we will see in Figure 11, separating the masculine and the
feminine phonological components containing the -en- suﬃx is not neces-
sary at all; just like the syntactic component, the identical phonological
components can be conﬂated into a single one as well.
Let us have a look at the phenomenon through the examples of rakló
‘boy’ and rakljí ‘girl’, which are apparently close cognates of each other,
related to Sanskrit laḍikka ‘child’, with the feminine form derived through
gender assignment.
As we can see from the example in Table 10, the forms show great uni-
formity, while maintaining opposition and diﬀerentiation. The back vowel
of the nominative singular rakló is replaced by the front vowel /e/ in all
other forms, while the front vowel of rakljí is replaced by the back vowel
/a/ in the other forms. The opposition of the nominative singular end-
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Figure 10: The relationship between the masculine and the feminine oblique plu-
ral endings
Table 10: Correlation between the masculine and feminine paradigms
Nominative singular Nominative plural Oblique singular Oblique plural
rakló raklé raklés- raklén-
rakljí rakljá rakljá- raklján-
ings, /o/ and /i/, are swapped in the plural and in the oblique, but the
front-back diﬀerentiation remains expressed. As we noted with regard to
the masculine, disyllabic words always inﬂect the same way, having either
/e/ or /o/ in the oblique ending. The word rakló belongs to the nouns
which take -es-/-en-. The high degree of the similarity of the two words
in the nominative singular maintains the contrast, but in case the word
rakljí had forms like *rakljén- in the plural oblique, so if there were varia-
tion, it would not really be surprising to see forms such as *raklón- for the
word rakló.
As stated before, the overall number of masculine nouns with the
marker -es-/-en- is 28, as opposed to the 23 items with the marker -os-/
-on- (not counting the stems where there is variation). If we compare this
to the seven feminine nouns with the oblique plural marker -en- and the
four feminine nouns with the oblique plural marker -an-, we can see that,
at least concerning type frequency, the -en- form dominates in both the
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masculine and the feminine paradigms, and the number of stems where
there is variation is equal: nine in both paradigms. The fact that there are
more feminine nouns which take the -en- form suggests that the dominance
of the -en- form in the masculine inﬂuences the feminine paradigm indeed.
The neutralisation eﬀect is shown in Figure 11, where the masculine oblique
plural and the feminine oblique plural converge in the ending -en-, and
diverge through the endings -an- and -on-.
Figure 11: Combined schema of the masculine and feminine oblique plural
6.3. The feminine nominative plural suffixes
It would be appealing to say that the nature of the stem-ﬁnal vowel plays a
role in the choice of the oblique plural: if it is /i/, the vowel of the oblique
plural marker is always /e/, if it is /a/, the vowel of the oblique plural
marker is always /a/. However, as we could see from the data in Table 7,
this is deﬁnitely not the case. On the other hand, there might be a possible
and even more obvious connection between the nominative plural and the
oblique plural. As we could see in Table 6, where the two patterns are
introduced, the feminine plural form ends in /a/ if the nominative is /i/,
so for example pīrí ‘pot, saucepan’pīrá ‘pots, saucepans’, and it ends in
/i/ if the nominative is /a/, see kúrva ‘whore’kurví ‘whores’. The oblique
forms seem to correspond to the plural forms as for their backness.
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(2) nominative singular pīrí ! nominative plural pīrá ! oblique plural pīrán-
nominative singular kúrva ! nominative plural kurví ! oblique plural kurvén-
If we have a closer look at the data, we ﬁnd the following numbers and
proportions. Out of the total 20 items, seven items follow the pattern. This
means that if the nominative plural ending is /i/, they will take the oblique
plural ending -en-, and if the nominative plural ending is /a/, they will
take the oblique plural ending -an-, as seen in Table 11.
Table 11: Feminine nouns where the nominative plural ending corresponds to the
oblique plural ending
Noun Nominative plural form Oblique plural form
Nouns with the oblique form -an-
xajíng ‘well’ xajingá xajingán-
khajnjí ‘hen’ khajnjá khajnján-
māčí ‘ﬂy’ māčá māčán-
pīrí ‘saucepan’ pīrá pīrán-
Nouns with the oblique form -en-
armajá ‘curse’ armají armajén-
kúrva ‘whore’ kurví kurvén-
rā́ca ‘duck’ rācí rācén-
Four items behave in the opposite way, so their nominative plural end-
ing is /a/ alongside the oblique plural ending -en-. There are no nouns
whose nominative plural ending would be /i/ alongside the oblique plural
ending -an-.
Table 12: Feminine nouns where the nominative plural ending does not corre-
spond to the oblique plural ending
Noun Nominative plural form Oblique plural form
cincā́ri ‘mosquito’ cincārá cincārén-
mesají ‘table’ mesajá mesajén-
angrustí ‘ring’ angrustá angrustén-
kangrí/krangí ‘branch’ kangrá/krangá kangrén-/krangén-
The diﬀerence is signiﬁcant, with almost twice as many items where there
is correspondence in the backness.
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Let us also check the tendencies among the seven stems where there
is signiﬁcant variation. Three of the stems where there is variation pre-
dominantly take either the nominative plural ending /a/ and the oblique
plural ending -an-, or the nominative plural ending /i/ and the oblique
plural ending -en-.
Table 13: Feminine nouns where there is variation with a bias towards the cor-
respondence between the nominative plural and the oblique plural in
backness
Word Occurrences pl. obl. -en- pl. obl. -an-
papín ‘goose’ 19 32% 68%
tjīrí ‘ant’ 16 37.5% 62.5%
bórotva ‘razor’ 9 78% 22%
On the other hand, two of the stems with varying forms go against the
tendency, with the predominant pattern being that of the combination of
the nominative plural ending /a/ and the oblique plural ending -en-.
Table 14: Feminine nouns where there is variation with a bias towards the oppo-
sition between the nominative plural and the oblique plural in backness
Word Occurrences pl. obl. -en- pl. obl. -an-
patrí ‘leaf’ 19 79% 21%
bār ‘garden’ 10 80% 20%
Finally, there are two stems where the proportion of the two patterns is
virtually equal, indicating a high degree of variation.
Table 15: Feminine nouns where there is a considerable degree of variation with
no signiﬁcant bias
Word Occurrences pl. obl. -en- pl. obl. -an-
katt ‘a pair of scissors’ 23 48% 52%
šūrí ‘knife’ 25 52% 48%
In sum, we can say that the nominative plural ending can deﬁnitely or
predominantly predict the corresponding oblique plural for eleven stems,
while this prediction goes awry in case of only seven stems. This suggests
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that there is a tendency for the feminine nominal plural suﬃx to inﬂuence
the choice of the oblique plural suﬃx, but it might be weakened by the fact
that the nominative singular suﬃx is exactly the other way round. This
is shown in Figure 12, where the schemata for the nominative plural and
the oblique plural are connected through dashed arrows. The thick arrows
represent the dominant direction of prediction, while the thin arrows show
a weak correlation.
Figure 12: The relationship between the feminine nominative plural and the fem-
inine oblique plural as shown in the form of schemata
6.4. Summary
In this section, we looked at the second weak point, the feminine oblique
plural base, in more detail. Following the description of the phenomenon,
we examined two possible aspects that might inﬂuence the choice of the
plural oblique ending for feminine nouns, and we found that the two aspects
seem to exert inﬂuence indeed.
1. The masculine oblique plural -en-. Besides -an-, the other variant of
the feminine oblique plural marker is -en-, which is identical to one of
the variants of the masculine oblique plural marker. We looked into the
possible analogical inﬂuence of the masculine oblique plural marker on the
feminine one. As we saw, the form -en- is indeed dominant in both the
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masculine and the feminine nominal paradigms, which suggests that the
inﬂuence exists.
2. The feminine nominative plural suﬃxes. We examined whether the
nominative plural endings -i and -a have any connection to the appear-
ance of the plural oblique marker -en- and -an-. We found that there is a
relationship between the nominative and the oblique plural endings, with
the front vowel /i/ predominantly predicting the marker -en- and the back
vowel /a/ predominantly predicting the marker -an-. We also found an
overall dominance of the marker -en-.
7. General conclusion
Through the example of the variation in the nominal morphology of the
Northern Vlax Romani varieties spoken in Hungary, I would like to demon-
strate that variation is an essential part of language and that its study
brings us closer to a better understanding of the nature of language change,
as language change is often preceded by variation. The study of variation,
and especially intra-dialectal and intra-speaker microvariation might also
provide us with some insights into the essential cognitive processes behind
the structure and use of language. Although neurolinguistics is still in its
infancy, based upon recent research in the ﬁeld (Menn & Duﬃeld 2014)
it seems that construction-based and usage-based approaches can provide
insights into how grammars can come closer to reﬂecting what our brains
do. This “non-analytical” approach is also in line with recent experimen-
tal research in phonetics, speech perception and speech production (Port
2007; 2010). Apparently, in speech perception “the data strongly suggest
that listeners employ a rich and detailed description of words” (Port 2007,
145) instead of abstract, segmented forms. In other words, “listeners encode
particulars rather than generalities” (Pisoni 1997, 10).
I have also attempted to show that the simultaneous presence of two
forces, regularisation on the one hand and diﬀerentiation on the other
make language a dynamic process. For the study of variation and gradi-
ence, analogy proves a useful tool, especially because even variation can be
gradient. This is illustrated through the phenomena we encounter in the
nominal system of Northern Vlax Romani. Within the nominal morphol-
ogy, we see two distinct, internally uniform patterns for both the mascu-
line oblique forms and the feminine oblique plural forms. On the one hand,
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uniformity means that we do not ﬁnd mixed paradigms; on the other, uni-
formity also refers to what we called regularisation above: the presence of
the marker -en- in the feminine plural oblique is variation in the feminine
plural paradigms but uniformity in the wider category of nouns.
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ABSTRACT
In a pilot study we found that agrammatic aphasia restricted the com-
plexity of feasible arithmetical operations but left intact the ability of
estimating quantities relative to one another aswell as the ability to con-
struct recursive sequences of figures and operations. Recursive numer-
ical sequences and recursive operations were retained in the form of
schemata or constructions.We argue for a common recursionmodule in
thehumanmind thatmaybeaccessible for representations of arithmeti-
cal constructions, whereas the representations of linguistic construc-
tions may be detached from that module in the case of Broca’s aphasia.
1. Introduction
We conducted a pilot study in which we investigated possible impairments
of recursive operations in arithmetical tasks. We started from the assump-
tion that some prerequisites of arithmetical operations are sensitivity to
structural relationships and the ability to perform recursive operations
(cf. Hauser et al. 2002; Spelke & Tsivkin 2001; Krajcsi 2006). Therefore,
we tested a healthy and a Broca’s aphasic participant for their abilities to
count and to carry out arithmetical operations. Beyond their comprehen-
sion of ﬁgures and the ability to estimate quantities, we were primarily
interested in how much the participants retained of their sensitivity to
structural features of arithmetical operations, especially the inﬁnite recur-
sion of sequences of ﬁgures.
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2. Agrammatic aphasia and calculation
2.1.Varley et al. (2005) studied agrammatic aphasics’ calculation abili-
ties. Their motivation was that the grammars of natural languages and of
arithmetical expressions exhibit some parallelism. These parallels include
recursion and structure dependence. For instance, the computation of the
correct result of numerical expressions involving subtraction or division:
(5   10; 10   5; 5  10; 10  5) or the ability to follow the bracketing of
an expression [5 (6 + 2)] requires awareness of the structural properties
of the given expression. Similarly, recursive rule application allows for the
derivation of a potentially inﬁnite number of outputs from a ﬁnite set of
constituents. This property is found both in natural language and the lan-
guage of arithmetic (e.g., The man that has a hat that has a brim that
has a…; 2 + 3 + 5 + 7 + : : : + : : :). The interdependence of language and
arithmetic can also be seen in devices like the “multiplication table”, a way
of encoding mathematical facts in a verbal form and storing the result in
one’s long-term memory. The content thus stored can be accessed with no
computation load when it is needed in the solution of novel calculation
tasks, minimizing the required overall computation load. The interaction
between arithmetical procedures and the activation of learned verbal infor-
mation leads to the hypothesis that the operation of multiplication can be
especially sensitive to aphasics’ linguistic limitations (Lemer et al. 2003).
In the case of unimpaired persons, during the execution of numerical
tasks, a bilateral network of cerebral regions is activated to mirror op-
erations of calculating the quantity of objects, sounds or other entities.
Several studies have detected activity in the language centers of the left
hemisphere when the task was to perform exact calculations with sym-
bolic expressions (Cohen et al. 2000; Friederici et al. 2011; Friedrich &
Friederici 2013). Among others, this was found in multiplication by one-
digit numbers where the use of verbally encoded information is crucial:
the frontal “linguistic” areas, including Broca’s area, were found to be acti-
vated (Dehaene et al. 1999; van Harskamp & Cipolotti 2001; Delazer et al.
2003). On the other hand, in cases of aphasic language impairment, con-
comitant problems in calculation abilities have been attested (e.g., Cohen
et al. 2000).
However, an alternative approach is also conceivable. Although arith-
metical operations are carried out by processes that are also required for
lexical and grammatical operations, by the time ontogenesis reaches adult-
hood, the architecture of the mature mind reserves a niche for counting
that is independent of language. Some studies claim that in counting tasks,
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stronger activation shows up in the right hemisphere (in the intraparietal
sulcus) than on the left side (Butterworth 1999; Dehaene et al. 2003). Some
functional cerebral imaging techniques seem to suggest that “linguistic ar-
eas” are not active in calculation tasks (Pesenti et al. 2000; Zago et al.
2001). Some accounts claim that in developmental and acquired language
impairments, linguistic and mathematical abilities may be dissociated, that
is, they do not form a single system of abilities (e.g., Ansari et al. 2003).
But such dissociations do not exclude the possibility that subsystems of
the grammar and the lexicon do support calculation performance, even in
the case of language impairment.
2.2.The studies by Varley et al. (2005) and Zimmerer & Varley (2010)
were groundbreaking in that they focused on the issue of whether recur-
sion and sensitivity to the peculiarities of hierarchical structure were par-
allel/interdependent properties of linguistic and arithmetical procedures.
Varley et al. (2005) studied three agrammatic aphasic persons. All
three were university graduates, one of them had been a professor of math-
ematics until he was aﬄicted with aphasia. According to the test results,
the calculation procedures of the three persons, including recursive op-
erations and sensitivity to hierarchical structures, had remained intact,
while they were moderate agrammatic aphasics in terms of both com-
puter tomography (CT) results and performance in status tests. They per-
formed relatively well on lexical comprehension and synonym ﬁnding. But
they exhibited severe impairment of linguistic-syntactic abilities and pro-
duced guessing-level results in grammaticality decisions with respect to
written sentences. They also showed asyntactic sentence comprehension
and guessing-level results in understanding “reversible” sentences. Their
spontaneous speech production consisted of broken phrases or constituents
thereof. Varley and her colleagues administered meticulous subtests on the
abilities of reading numbers as symbols and of identifying (mathematical)
operators, these being prerequisites to performing well on calculation tests.
Out of the three persons, only one was able to use lexical names of numbers
in speech, while the other two were not. On the other hand, the calculation
of quantities and their ratios turned out to be unimpaired for all of them.
The calculation tests were pen-and-paper-based and consisted of eight
subtests: (i) estimating the relative positions of quantities along a vertical
line; (ii) addition, subtraction, multiplication and division operations on
integers, then (iii) addition and subtraction of fractions; (iv) multiplication
both on the basis of the multiplication table and beyond it; (v) inverting an
operation yielding a positive number into one yielding a negative number;
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(vi) creating inﬁnite sets of numbers; (vii) operations involving bracketing,
where in some cases the brackets were syntactic in the sense that simply
performing the operations left-to right would not give the correct result
(e.g., 36  (3  2)), while in other cases the brackets were non-syntactic
(e.g., (3 3)  6); and persons were also asked to (viii) generate bracket-
ing (they received sequences of ﬁgures and operators with the instruction
that they should insert brackets in several diﬀerent manners and then
calculate the results accordingly). We will return to the details of these
subtests in our discussion of their Hungarian adaptations. In what follows,
we will compare the performance of a healthy person and an aphasic par-
ticipant. Varley et al.’s participants achieved good results in each of the
subtests; in some cases they performed without a single error. The results
show the mutual independence of structure-based linguistic vs. arithmeti-
cal operations within a given cognitive architecture. Although all persons
were agrammatic aphasics, they applied syntactic principles in arithmetic
appropriately.
Varley et al. (2005) and Zimmerer & Varley (2010) proposed two types
of explanations of the interrelationship of the syntax of language and the
syntax of arithmetic. According to one, the two systems work indepen-
dently of each another, and the impairment of one does not need to concern
the other. According to the other explanation, there is a shared syntactic
system that underlies both language and arithmetic, but arithmetical pro-
cessing may directly access this system without translating the expressions
into a linguistic form ﬁrst.
3. Participants
The aphasic participant was C, a 31-year-old right-handed man, 17 years
of schooling, an engineer. He was assigned to aphasia type on the basis
of CT results, the Western Aphasia Battery (WAB) tests (Kertesz 1982)
and the Token test (De Renzi & Vignolo 1962). The WAB test and the
Token test were adapted to Hungarian by Osmanné Sági (1991; 1994).
The CT showed an isochemic stroke at the left arteria cerebri media. On
the basis of the results of the Western Aphasia Battery (WAB), he was
a Broca’s aphasic with severe agrammatism, his Aphasia quotient (AQ)
equalled 56 (in healthy participants: 93.8 or above; the maximum is 100).
In the Token test he achieved 14 scores (healthy subjects above 32; the
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maximum is 36).1 According to the CT results and the results in the WAB
and Token tests, C exhibited the typical symptoms of severe agrammatic
Broca’s aphasia. C participated in our earlier investigation on the capacity
of recursive sentence embedding. In those experiments C was not able
to produce responses containing recursive sentence embedding, he gave
only some simple, short, fragmented answers (Bánréti et al. 2016). He was
severely impaired in producing recursive syntactic structures.
The healthy subject was Z, a 42-year-old right-handed man with 16
years of schooling, a teacher.
4. Materials and methods
To test our subjects’ performance on arithmetic, we administered a variety
of tasks based on Varley et al. (2005), a total of seven subtests. For details
see the Appendix.
For the estimation task, they had to mark the approximate positions
of 20 numbers (presented to them in a random order) along a 20 cm ver-
tical line (number line) of which the two ends were marked as 0 and 100,
respectively. The task probed into the degree of limitation of the subjects’
utilization of quantity concepts. (The task sheets can be found in the Ap-
pendix.) The response was taken to be correct if the marking provided by
the subject was within 5 mm from the proper value point. Next, addition
(12 items), subtraction (12 items), multiplication (9 items), and division
tasks (16 items) followed. The correct results were positive integers in
all cases.
1 The Western Aphasia Battery (WAB) uses a kind of standard protocol. Spontaneous
speech is evaluated for articulation, ﬂuency, content and presence of paraphasias.
Comprehension is tested with yes or no questions, pointing commands, and one to
three step commands. Naming is evaluated for objects, object parts, body parts, and
colors. Repetition is requested for single words to complex sentences. The level of ad-
equacy for reading and writing is also tested. Five subtests on ﬂuency, information,
comprehension, repetition, and naming impairment are classiﬁed from 0 to 10. The
maximum result of each subtest is 10 points each. Accordingly, aphasia can be clas-
siﬁed into global aphasia, Broca’s aphasia, Wernicke’s aphasia, transcortical motor,
transcortical sensory conduction aphasia, and anomic aphasia types. For instance, in
Broca’s aphasia ﬂuency ranges from 0 only to 4 points, comprehension ranges from
4 to 10, repetition is under 8 points and naming ranges from 0 only to 8. Aphasia
quotient (AQ) shows the severity of aphasia. AQ is calculated by the addition of
scores of the subtests and this sum is multiplied by two. The maximum is 100. Nor-
mal subjects score an AQ of 93.8 or above. An AQ around 50 shows a severe degree
of aphasia, cf. John et al. (2017).
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In the inversion task, two-digit numbers had to be subtracted or di-
vided in a random order, such that ﬁrst a smaller number had to be sub-
tracted from a larger one (respectively, a larger number had to be divided
by a smaller one) yielding a positive integer (e.g., 72 26; 6012), then the
other way round (yielding a negative number for subtraction and a fraction
for division, e.g., 26   72; 12  60). All this was done in three instances.
In the bracketing resolution task, there were expressions involving
syntactic bracketing (8 items) in which, if the subject followed just the
linear order of operations without taking the brackets into consideration,
the result would be incorrect, as in 36  (3  2); and there were also
expressions with non-syntactic bracketing (3 items) in which the correct
result is obtained whether or not the brackets are taken into consideration,
as in 12 (67). Among the syntactic items, there were single and double
pairs of brackets. In the latter case, another operation was embedded as
a term of the main operation. While single bracketing occurred in the left
term or in the right term double bracketing invariably occurred in the
second term (8 items).
In the bracket generation task, the subject had to generate bracketing
on sequences of four numbers linked by operators such that diﬀerent ways
of bracketing should yield diﬀerent results, e.g., (6 + 2)  5 + 8 = 48; 6 +
(2  5) + 8 = 24; 6 + 2  (5 + 8) = 32; (6 + 2)  (5 + 8) = 104; etc.
The use of brackets in calculation tasks is taken to be an instruction for
recursive operations as in these cases one or more terms of an expression
are themselves results of a recursively embedded operation.2
In the inﬁnity task, the subjects had to generate sequences of numbers.
They had to ﬁnd numbers larger than one but smaller than two, then after
each response a number that is larger than the previous answer but still
smaller than two, and so on – keeping on increasing the values without
reaching the number two.
2 Arithmetic operations have a default order: if only additions and subtractions are
involved, their order does not matter. If a division or multiplication is one of the
operations required and an addition or subtraction is the other, it is always the divi-
sion/multiplication that comes ﬁrst. Between division and multiplication, the order
has to be signaled by bracketing, e.g., (63)2 = 4 but 6 (32) = 1. In complex
expressions, it is the expression within the brackets that has to be calculated ﬁrst;
and within a pair of brackets, multiplication and division enjoy applicational prece-
dence over addition and subtraction. For instance: 3  (20–5 2) = 3  (20–10) =
3  10 = 30. The default order (division/multiplication ﬁrst) can be overridden by
bracketing: (6 + 2) 5 + 8 = 48; 6 + (2 5) + 8 = 24; 6 + 2 (5 + 8) = 32.
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5. Results
5.1. Normal participant
The calculation tasks did not represent any diﬃculty for the normal partic-
ipant except that he required a relatively long concentration of attention.
The sporadically occurring errors may be due to that factor.
Tables 1 and 2 show percentages of errors in each task (n = all calcu-
lations performed by the subject, 0: percentage of erroneous calculations
if no errors were made).
Table 1: Results of tasks in the arithmetical test in percentages of errors: normal
participant
Table 2: Results of bracketing tasks in percentages of errors: normal participant
5.2. Agrammatic aphasic participant
Tables 3 and 4 show percentages of errors in each task (n = all calculations
performed by the subject, 0: percentage of erroneous calculations if no
errors were made).
Table 3: Results of tasks in the arithmetical test in percentages of errors: aphasic
participant
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Table 4: Results of bracketing tasks in percentages of errors: aphasic participant
In the task involving the number line, C made few mistakes in localizing
given numerical values along the line, the deviation amounted to 4.6%.
(A 20 cm vertical line was at the subjects’ disposal, so 2.5% diﬀerence
meant 5 mm, C’s average deviation – above 5 mm – only about 4 mm above
the tolerance threshold). We can conclude that the notion of quantities
represented by ﬁgures was unimpaired in both subjects.
With respect to the four basic operations, he was successful in addition
and in subtraction. Here we found correct results for single-digit, two-digit,
and three-digit numbers. In case of multiplication, only that of single-digit
and two digit terms were done correctly, while no calculations with multiple
digits were carried out at all. The division of a two-digit number by a one-
digit number was correct, while C performed only one of the division tasks
of three-digit numbers correctly; out of nine cases, he gave the wrong result
in one case and gave a result that was roughly correct but not to the last
decimal value in another.
Half of the inversion tasks yielded the wrong result in subtractions,
and more than half of them in the case of divisions. In the case of negative
results, C signaled by [–] that he would get a negative number, but most
results were wrong. In the cases of dividing a smaller number by a larger
one, he overlooked only in one out of three cases that the result would not
be an integer.
The knowledge that sequences of numbers may be inﬁnite was re-
tained. He found numbers larger than one but smaller than two correctly;
he gave several correct solutions and recognized the rule.
In bracketing operations, the order of operations in tasks involving
a single pair of brackets was correct; the ﬁnal results were not always
correct due to calculation errors. In operations involving multiple brackets
(embeddings), the partial calculations and the order of operations were
correct, but the ﬁnal result could not always be given.
In the last task, C was able to generate bracketing (embedding), he
inserted brackets at diﬀerent places in each case but failed to calculate the
ﬁnal results. In that task, he also used double bracketing.
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6. Discussion
6.1. Impairments in linguistic resources
C had diﬃculties in verbalizing his calculations, but he was capable of
self-monitoring. He showed several types of impairments in linguistic re-
sources available for arithmetic operations, especially impairments in the
lexical access of numerals. During the calculations, the digits were spon-
taneously read aloud, of which “9” was mistakenly read as “8” but in each
case he corrected himself to “9”. C hesitated typically at the verbal markers
indicating place values; for example, he said: nyolc… száz… őőő nem!…
nyolc… VAN… hat ‘eight… hundred… hmm… no!… eight… TY… six’. In
the end, he was always able to produce the correct name of the digit; he
could encode the visual input into verbal form.
In his calculations, the names of the signs “+” and “ ” were produced
(called “plus” and “minus”). The verbal equivalents (names) of the division
and multiplication were not used spontaneously. The operations AB and
CD were called “A and B”, “C and D”. C did not use the words “division”,
“multiplication” either in nominal or in verbal functions (i.e., the phrases “A
multiplied by B”, and “C divided by D” were never realized). At the same
time, the symbolic signs of multiplication and division were understood
and the operations indicated by them could be performed, and their results
were often accurate, even if not always. In other words, he performed the
operations of multiplication, division, addition and subtraction without
lexically accessing the exact names of those operations, except for using the
expressions “plus” and “minus” for addition and subtraction, respectively.
C did not produce the names of the fractional numbers, he did not
say “one third” or “two sixth”, for digits like 1/3, 2/6, etc. but he called
them 1 tört 3, 2 tört 6 ‘1 fraction 3, 2 fraction 6’, etc. when he was asked
to report on how he counted. At the same time, the results of addition and
subtraction of the fractions were correct; he used the value of the common
denominator of the fractions independently and correctly.
C did not use the term “bracket” either during the silent reading of the
tasks or in the completion of the tasks containing brackets. He was able to
produce the sequence and embedding of counting operations following the
hierarchy required by the brackets.
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6.2. Effects related to aphasic limitation
We can identify several diﬀerent eﬀects related to aphasic limitation. The
ﬁrst eﬀect is that of complexity; in particular, the complexity of operations
to be performed in each task. C was able to perform addition and subtrac-
tion without errors, while in division and multiplication three digit terms
were avoided, inversion resulting in a negative number and the resolution
of all bracketed formulae came with high error rates and the resolution of
formulae generated by the subject himself proved to be even more diﬃ-
cult (100% error rate). Such robust eﬀect of complexity is of course not
surprising under the circumstances of severe agrammatic aphasia.
The second eﬀect involves the participant’s ability to estimate quan-
tities within a given domain. C’s error rate was only 4.6%. His ability in
certain calculation procedures is more severely impaired than his ability
to estimate quantities within a domain. C did not commit any errors with
respect to the relative order of the quantities along the number line; the
error rates werre due to cases in which they marked the points of the num-
ber line more than 5 mm oﬀ target. (C’s average deviation – above 5 mm
– was only about 4 mm). We can conclude that the notion of quantities
represented by ﬁgures was unimpaired in the aphasic participant.
The third eﬀect was the ability to generate sequences of numbers in
a recursive manner. This was probed into by the task requiring the pro-
duction of inﬁnite sequences of numbers (Appendix VIII), and by the task
asking for the generation of bracketing (Appendix VII) – including mul-
tiple bracketing – of the same series of numbers in several diﬀerent ways.
In those two tasks, C performed without error. He was able to produce se-
quences of numbers and sequences of operations that recursively contained
other sequences of numbers and operations, respectively. However, C was
not able to do the actual calculation on task (viii). He did not produce erro-
neous results but rather deemed the calculation of the value of the formula
he had produced himself to be too diﬃcult and gave up without trying.
In sum, the agrammatic aphasia did aﬀect (limit) the complexity of
calculations but left the ability intact to estimate relative distances of
quantities and the ability to create recursive sequences of numbers or
operations. The latter was done in terms of schemas/constructions, the
calculations yielded concrete numerical end products were avoided.
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7. Conclusion
The dissociations outlined above are interesting especially in view of
the fact that in earlier studies we found strong limitations of linguistic-
syntactic recursion in Broca’s aphasia (Bánréti et al. 2016). These observa-
tions are now complemented by the ﬁnding that, in the case of arithmetical
operations, albeit complexity eﬀects show up similarly, the relative esti-
mation of quantities and the ability of generating recursive sequences of
numbers and operations can be retained in Broca’s aphasia. The arith-
metic operations by the aphasic person show limitations, but these do not
concern the basic operations themselves, only their more complex versions.
The diﬃculties in accessing the verbal linguistic resources that are useful
for counting may lead to errors or confusion in more complex calculations
but do not make them inaccessible. Recursive numerical sequences and
recursive operations are retained in the form of schemata or constructions.
Some patterns of linguistic and arithmetic expressions have similari-
ties, such as recursiveness and structure dependency. A moderate aphasic
condition exhibits strong limitations in those linguistic (primarily syntac-
tic and lexical) capacities, but arithmetical operations show a much better
state preserving basic operations. This provides arguments for a model in
which linguistic and arithmetic processes are separated, and counting may
be kept separate from language in adult age. In this model recursive arith-
metical operations can be carried out inspite of linguistic impairments.
Our results support the model proposed by Zimmerer and Varley
(2010) that posits a module of recursive operations in the human mind
that are shared (among others) by linguistic and arithmetical performance.
This common recursion module may be accessible for representations of
arithmetical constructions, whereas the representations of linguistic con-
structions may be detached from it in the case of Broca’s aphasia. Varley
et al. (2005) point out that in adult age3 arithmetic can be sustained with-
out the grammatical and lexical resources of the language.
3 Varley et al. (2005, 6) state: “Number words may be important in children’s acquisi-
tion of numerical concepts and their digital, orthographic, phonological, and sensory
representations. Similarly, language grammar might provide a ‘bootstrapping’ tem-
plate to facilitate the use of other hierarchical and generative systems, such as math-
ematics. However, once these resources are in place, mathematics can be sustained
without the grammatical and lexical resources of the language faculty. […] grammar
may thus be seen as a co-opted system that can support the expression of mathe-
matical reasoning, but the possession of grammar neither guarantees nor jeopardizes
successful performance on calculation problems”.
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Appendix
Aphasic participant: some examples
I. Estimation tasks
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II. Basic operations: addition, subtraction, multiplication, division tasks
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III. Addition of fractional numbers, ﬁnding their common denominators
IV. “Inversion” tasks
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V. Single bracketing tasks
VI. Double bracketing tasks
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VII. Generation of bracketing tasks
VIII. “Inﬁnity” task
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Normal participant: some examples
IX. Generation and resolution of bracketing task
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X. “Inﬁnity” task
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ABSTRACT
We give a definition of morphism from one context-free grammar to
another. Thinking of a context-free grammar as the presentation of an
algebraic structure (a context-free language) by generators and rela-
tions, a morphism of context-free grammars is analogous to a homo-
morphism from one group (specified by generators and relations) to
another. A morphism of grammars induces a mapping between parse
trees; for unambiguous context-free grammars, it induces a mapping
between well-formed words. This captures the notion of translation
scheme familiar from the theory of compilers. The composite of two
morphisms is a morphism, and context-free grammars and their mor-
phisms form a category. The proof of this – the verification of associa-
tivity – is combinatorially quite intricate. We close with some thoughts
on syntax-driven translations that are not defined by morphisms in the
sense given in this paper.
1. Introduction
Let me begin with a little known comment by Noam Chomsky (see
Chomsky 1982, 15 or Chomsky 2004, 42), made in response to a question
on the signiﬁcance of automata theory for linguistics and mathematics:
“This seems to me what one would expect from applied mathematics, to see if
you can ﬁnd systems that capture some of the properties of the complex system
that you are working with, and to ask whether those systems have any intrinsic
mathematical interest, and whether they are worth studying in abstraction. And
that has happened exactly at one level, the level of context-free grammar. At
any other level it has not happened. The systems that capture other properties
of language, for example, of transformational grammar, hold no interest for
mathematics. But I do not think that is a necessary truth. It could turn out
that there would be richer and more appropriate mathematical ideas that would
capture other, maybe deeper properties of language than context free grammars
do. In that case you have another branch of applied mathematics which might
have linguistic consequences. That would be exciting.”
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Let me hasten to say that I do not wish to argue with Chomsky’s assess-
ment. It would be hard to do, at any rate, since he leaves room for both
possibilities: that there is no linguistic theory beyond context-free gram-
mars that is of interest to mathematics; or perhaps there is. But I was par-
ticularly struck by the sentence The systems that capture other properties
of language, for example, of transformational grammar, hold no interest
for mathematics. From the 1970’s on, transformational grammar has been
responsible, directly on indirectly, for much research on generalizations of
automata that, instead of transforming strings to strings, transform trees
to trees. Rational transducers, for example, gave rise to a variety of tree
transducers (deterministic, nondeterministic, top-down, bottom-up), in no
small part motivated by the desire to ﬁnd a compact mathematical for-
malism underlying transformational grammar. In fact, transformations of
parse trees, called translations in the computer science literature, are cen-
tral to the contemporary theory of compilers. There has been a subtle
change of perspective, though. Transformational grammar, motivated by
examples such as the English passive, seeks to understand operations on
tree-like structures within one given language. Compilers translate from
source code to object code: from one (typically context-free) language to
another.
One can appeal to an algebraic analogy at this point. If context-free
languages are like algebras, then context-free grammars are like presen-
tations of algebras via generators and relations. One can map one set of
generators into another in a way that preserves relations; such a mapping
induces a homomorphism of algebras. So there ought to be such a thing as
mapping one context-free grammar into another in a ‘structure-preserving’
way, and this should induce a homomorphism between languages.
The goal of this note is to give one possible deﬁnition of morphism
of context-free grammars. This notion will organize context-free gram-
mars into a category (Mac Lane 1978) in such a way that the eﬀects of
morphisms on parse trees – these are, more or less, the ‘translations’ of
computer science – become functorial. The appearance of these category-
theoretic concepts is somewhat auxiliary, however, to the main enterprise,
which is to understand what it means to map one grammar into another
‘in a grammatical way’.
We will be guided by four examples of grammatical operations. Keep-
ing in mind Chomsky’s dictum, each of them arises naturally within some
body of formalized mathematics – algebra or logic. Going through the mo-
tivating examples, the reader is invited to play with the following questions:
Which levels of the Chomsky hierarchy do the source and target languages
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belong to? Which family of transformations (translations? transductions?)
does the operation belong to? Each of the motivating examples is given by
an explicit formal recipe. Isn’t that recipe an outright ‘morphism’?
Motivating examples.
(a) In a (non-commutative) ring, the commutator [x; y] of two elements
x; y is deﬁned by
[x; y] = x  y   y  x
Let L0 be the language of well-formed iterated commutators of ele-
ments, and let L1 be the language of well-parenthesized terms in the
function symbols  and   . Consider the operation that associates
to an expression in L0 its equivalent in L1 (prior to expansion and
simpliﬁcation). For example, [[x; y]; z] is to be mapped to
(((x  y)  (y  x))  z)  (z  ((y  x)  (x  y))) :
(b) Consider the language L0 of (ambiguous) parenthesis-free terms
formed from a set of variables with the binary operators ~ and .
Let L1 be the language of terms, with the same operators, in preﬁx
form. Consider the multi-valued mapping that associates to a term
in L0 its preﬁx forms, under all possible parses. For example, the
possible parses of x~ y  z are (using parentheses, informally)
(x~ y) z resp. x~ (y  z)
or ~ xyz resp. ~x yz in preﬁx form.
Can this multi-valued mapping be described without mentioning pre-
ﬁx and inﬁx traversals of binary trees?
(c) Fix a ﬁrst order signature, and consider the language L of well-formed
formulas of ﬁrst order logic. Let x be a variable, t a term and  a
formula in L. Deﬁne the result x!t() of replacing the free occur-
rences of x in  by t by the usual set of rules. (These rules will not
be recalled here; see e.g., Mendelson 2010 or any careful textbook of
logic.) Fix x and t, and consider the map from L to itself sending 
to x!t().
K + K = 120 / p. 82 / May 3, 2019
82 Tibor Beke
(d) Consider again the language L of ﬁrst order logic. The negation nor-
mal form, NNF() of a formula  is deﬁned by the rewrite rules
qq) 
q( ^  ) )q_ q 
q( _  ) )q^ q 
q8x) 9xq 
q9x) 8xq 
Iterated application of these rules transforms any well-formed for-
mula into a logically equivalent one where the targets of negation
symbols (if any) are atomic formulas. Does the operation sending 
to NNF() belong in the same family as any of (a), (b) or (c)?
Notation.We will consider alphabets A and context-free grammars G with
productions written x! s where x 2 A and s is a string in A. Neither A
nor G is assumed ﬁnite. An element x of A is non-terminal if it occurs on
the left-hand side of some production, and is terminal otherwise. N and T
will denote the set of non-terminal and terminal symbols, respectively; so
A = N t T . For u; v 2 A, write u ) v if v is immediately derivable from
u; let )+ denote the transitive and ) the reﬂexive-transitive closure of
the relation ).
We will ﬁnd it convenient to consider each non-terminal as a possible
start symbol, and to consider strings both in the full alphabet A and in
the set of terminals T . For x 2 N , deﬁne
L^G(x) = fu 2 A j x) ug
and
LG(x) = fu 2 T  j x) ug
Thus, for non-terminal x, L^G(x) is the set of sentential forms that can be
generated from x (considered as a start symbol), and LG(x) is the usual
language generated from x.
Let us recall the notion of unambiguous grammar in the form that
will be most useful to us:
Deﬁnition 1.1. The context-free grammar G is unambiguous if for every
non-terminal x and u 2 A with x )+ u there exists exactly one pair of
k-tuples
s1; s2; s3; : : : ; sk; u1; u2; u3; : : : ; uk
where si 2 A and ui 2 A, such that
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• x! s1s2s3 : : : sk is a production
• u = u1u2 : : : uk, and
• si ) ui for each 1 6 i 6 k.
This is equivalent to the requirement that the parse tree of every sentential
form u 2 L^G(x) be unique; or, equivalently, that there exist a unique
leftmost derivation, starting from x, for each u 2 L^G(x). If every non-
terminal is productive, that is, LG(x) is non-empty for all non-terminals
x, then Def. 1.1 is equivalent to the unambiguity of the LG(x) in the
classical sense. However, Def. 1.1 makes sense even if some or all of the
LG(x) are empty.
Deﬁnition 1.2. For x 2 N , let treeG(x) denote the set of parse trees of
sentential forms from L^G(x), with root x. (One could just as well consider
the set of leftmost or rightmost derivations, or other representatives of
equivalence classes of derivations, but the formalism of trees is the handi-
est.) The depth of a tree is the number of nodes on the longest path from
root to any leaf, minus 1. Thus, for T 2 treeG(x), depth(T ) = 0 if and
only if T consists solely of the root (which is also a leaf) x. Note that
depth(T ) = 1 if and only if T equals some production x ! s 2 G. Let
NT(T ) denote the set of leaves of T labeled by non-terminal symbols; for a
node t of T , let label(t) denote the label (i.e., element of the alphabet A)
at t.
Let T1 2 treeG(x) and let T2 be a tree with a leaf t such that label(t) =
x. We will skip the deﬁnition of the horticultural maneuver of grafting T1
onto T2 at the location t. It is the same as the composition of (chains of)
productions, as the illustration(s) below will make it clear.
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2. Morphisms of grammars
Let G0 and G1 be context-free grammars in the alphabets A0 and A1, with
terminals T0, T1 and non-terminals N0, N1 respectively.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A morphism from G0 to G1 consists of the following data:
• a mapping  : N0 ! N1
• a mapping  that assigns to each production x! s 2 G0 an element
of treeG1((x))
• for each production p 2 G0, a function (p; ) from NT((p)) to
NT(p), with the property that for all t 2 NT((p)),

 
label((p; t))

= label(t) :
More plainly,  gives the translation of lexical categories.  speciﬁes, for
each production p : x! s in the source grammar, a parse tree in the target
grammar, with root (x). Productions of the form x! s will be translated
to trees of the form (x ! s). The re-indexing map (p; ) associates to
the location of each non-terminal symbol r occurring as a leaf in (x! s)
the location of a non-terminal symbol s in s such that  will translate s to
r. This permits translation of the input parse tree by either top-down or
bottom-up recursion.
Let us make this more concrete by a formalization of our motivating
example (a). For the sake of readability, we will depart from the BNF
convention of enclosing names of non-terminals in angle brackets; strings
typeset in sans serif font, such as var and expr, should be considered as
stand-alone symbols. Also, we will drop commas separating elements of a
set being listed. Dots ‘: : :’ indicate a (potentially inﬁnite) set indexed by
the natural numbers.
Example 2.2. Consider the source alphabet
N0 = f var expr g
T0 = f [ ; ]x1 x2 : : : xi : : : g
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Let the grammar G0 consist of the productions
var ! x1 j x2 j : : : j xi j : : :
expr ! [var; var]
expr ! [var; expr]
expr ! [expr; var]
expr ! [expr; expr]
Now consider the target alphabet
N1 = f var expr g
T1 = f ( )   x1 x2 : : : xi : : : g
Let the grammar G1 consist of the productions
var ! x1 j x2 j : : : j xi j : : :
expr ! var  var j var  var
expr ! var  (expr) j var  (expr)
expr ! (expr)  var j (expr)  var
expr ! (expr)  (expr) j (expr)  (expr)
There is a morphism from G0 to G1 with components ; ;  deﬁned by
• ( expr ) = expr and ( var ) = var
• ( var ! x ) = x for any variable x; note that (var ! x; ) has
empty domain
• ( expr ! [var; var] ) is
expr
ggggg
ggggg
ggggg
ggg
kkkk
kkkk
kk
xx
xx
x
FF
FF
F
SSSS
SSSS
SS
WWWWW
WWWWW
WWWWW
WWW
( expr
www
ww GGG
GG
)   ( expr
www
ww GGG
GG
)
var  var var  var
generating the string (var  var)  (var  var). Let us refer to the leaves
of the above tree via their location in ‘(var  var)  (var  var)’; so the
leaves labeled with non-terminals occur at f2; 4; 8; 10g. Similarly, let
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us refer to the leaves in NT( expr ! [var; var] ) through their location
in the string ‘[var; var]’, i.e., f2; 4g. Then deﬁne
(expr ! [var; var]; 2) = 2
(expr ! [var; var]; 4) = 4
(expr ! [var; var]; 8) = 4
(expr ! [var; var]; 10) = 2
Visually, the re-indexing map (expr ! [var; var]; ) is indicated by
the dotted and broken arrows
Continuing with the next production, deﬁne
( expr ! [var; expr] ) = (var  (expr))  ((expr)  var)
(Since G1 is unambiguous, we will identify sentential forms with their
parse trees.) Using the same coding of locations as above, deﬁne
(expr ! [var; expr]; 2) = 2
(expr ! [var; expr]; 5) = 4
(expr ! [var; expr]; 10) = 4
(expr ! [var; expr]; 13) = 2
The treatment of the other two productions, and re-indexing of non-
terminals therein, is analogous.
How does translation from L^G0(expr) to L^G1(expr) actually work? Consider
a sentential form generated by G0 from expr, say,
[x7; [var; x3]]
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with parse tree
expr
lll
lll
lll
ll
xx
xx
x
HH
HH
H
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
[ var
}}
}}
}}
; expr
lll
lll
lll
lll
xxx
xxx DD
DD
D
PPP
PPP
PPP
P ]
x7 [ var ; var ]
x3
Since G1 is unambiguous, the process is easiest to describe by bottom-up
induction. Starting from the leaves, associate to each non-terminal symbol
t in the input tree a string (t) from L^G1((x)):
• If t is a leaf, let (t) = (t).
• If t is var, with descendant var ! x, set (var) = x.
• Suppose t is a node expr with descendants, say, [var; var]. Let s1 =
(var) for the ﬁrst occurrence of ‘var’ in [var; var], and s2 = (var)
for the second occurrence. ( is supposed to be deﬁned on those two
symbols by induction.) Then set
(expr) = (s1  s2)  (s2  s1)
The idea is analogous for the other productions with source expr.
To see what is going on, let us aﬃx subscripts to the non-terminals of the
above parse tree:
expr0
kkkk
kkkk
kkkk
uu
uu
u
JJJ
JJJ
TTTT
TTTT
TTTT
TT
[ var0
{{
{{
{{
; expr1
jjjj
jjjj
jjjj
jj
uuu
uuu HHH
HHH
QQQ
QQQ
QQQ
QQ
]
x7 [ var1 ; var2 ]
x3
Then
(var1) = var (var0) = x7 (var2) = x3
(expr1) = (var  x3)  (x3  var)
(expr0) = (x7  ((var  x3)  (x3  var)))  (((var  x3)  (x3  var))  x7)
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For the parse tree
expr0
kkkk
kkkk
kkkk
uu
uu
u
JJJ
JJJ
TTTT
TTTT
TTTT
TT
[ var0
{{
{{
{{
; expr1
jjjj
jjjj
jjjj
jj
uuu
uuu HHH
HHH
QQQ
QQQ
QQQ
QQ
]
x7 [ var1 ; var2 ]
x5 x3
a moment’s thought conﬁrms that
(expr0) = (x7  ((x5  x3)  (x3  x5)))  (((x5  x3)  (x3  x5))  x7)
respecting all long-distance dependencies.
Above, G0 was an unambiguous grammar, hence one could talk of the
translation of a string or of a parse tree interchangeably. The next propo-
sition deﬁnes the eﬀect of a morphism of grammars in general. We retain
the notation of Def. 2.1.
Proposition 2.3. A morphism of grammars from G0 to G1 induces, for
each x 2 N0, a mapping
 : treeG0(x) ! treeG1((x)) :
Indeed, for T 2 treeG0(x), deﬁne (T ) 2 treeG1((x)) by induction on the
depth of T :
• If depth(T ) = 0, then T must be x itself, and (T ) is deﬁned to be
(x).
• If depth(T ) > 0, let x! s 2 G0 be the top production in T . Write p
for x! s for brevity. Note that NT(p) can be identiﬁed with a subset
of s, namely, the locations of the non-terminal symbols in s. Since
G0 is context-free, each s 2 NT(p) induces a subtree Ts of T with s
as root. For each t 2 NT((p)), graft the tree (T(p;t)) on (p) with
t as root. (T ) is deﬁned to be the resulting tree.
The deﬁnition makes sense: since depth(Ts) < depth(T ) for any s 2 NT(p),
(Ts) is deﬁned by the induction hypothesis. Note that (Ts) belongs to
treeG1((label(s)) by the induction assumption, and 
 
label((p; t))

=
label(t) by Def. 2.1. That is, the non-terminal symbol at the root of
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Figure 1: Computing (T ). Above, p is a production (i.e., tree of depth 1), (p)
is a tree, s and t are leaves labeled with non-terminal symbols such that
s = (p; t). x and (x) are the labels of the roots.
(T(p;t)) coincides with the non-terminal symbol at the location t. Since
G1 is a context-free grammar, the graft is well-deﬁned, and (T ) will be-
long to treeG1((x)) as desired.
Obviously, one can rewrite the above recursive deﬁnition into an algo-
rithm to compute (T ) by bottom-up induction on T , from leaves toward
the root. Note that if depth(T ) = 1, that is, T is a production x ! s in
G0, then (T ) ends up being the same as (T ).
We will sometimes consider the induced translation  as a multi-valued
mapping
L^G0(x) ! L^G1
 
(x)

:
Indeed, for each u 2 L^G0(x), there is a value for each parse tree T of u,
namely, the string in L^G1
 
(x)

generated by (T ).
Proposition 2.4. For any x 2 N0 and u 2 LG0(x) with parse tree T , (T )
generates a string in LG1
 
(x)

.
Proof. By induction on the depth of T . depth(T ) = 0 is impossible, since
x is assumed non-terminal and u is a string of terminals. If depth(T ) =
1, then T consists of the single production x ! u 2 G0. The leaves of
(x ! u) = (x ! u) must consist of terminals. Indeed, if there was a
leaf labeled with a non-terminal, then (x! u; ) would need to map its
location to the location of some non-terminal in u, but u does not contain
any non-terminals. So (T ) = (x! u) generates a string in LG1
 
(x)

.
If depth(T ) > 1, then (T ) is, by the deﬁnition, the result of grafting
trees of the form (Ts), for subtrees Ts of T , onto those leaves of (x! s)
that contain non-terminals. Using the induction hypothesis, all leaves of
(Ts) are labeled with terminal symbols; hence (T ) generates an element
of LG1
 
(x)

as well.
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Let us summarize the discussion so far:
Corollary 2.5. A morphism (; ; ) of context-free grammars from G0
to G1 induces a function, for each x 2 N0, from treeG0(x) to treeG1((x)).
This induces, in turn, a multi-valued function from L^G0(x) to L^G1
 
(x)

,
which restricts to a multi-valued function from LG0(x) to LG1
 
(x)

. If G0
is an unambiguous grammar, then the latter two maps are single-valued.
Example 2.6. Returning to our motivating example (b), consider the
source alphabet
N0 = f expr g
T0 = f ~  x1 x2 : : : xi : : : g
Let the grammar G0 consist of the productions
expr ! x1 j x2 j : : : j xi j : : :
expr ! expr~ expr
expr ! expr expr
Now consider the target grammar G1 with identical alphabet N1 = N0,
T1 = T0 but productions
expr ! x1 j x2 j : : : j xi j : : :
expr ! ~ expr expr
expr !  expr expr
There is a morphism from G0 to G1 with components ; ;  deﬁned by
• ( expr ) = expr
• ( expr ! x ) = x for any variable x; note that (expr ! x; ) has
empty domain
• ( expr ! expr~ expr ) = ~ expr expr with (2) = 1 and (3) = 3
• ( expr ! expr expr ) =  expr expr with (2) = 1 and (3) = 3
(Since G1 is unambiguous, there is no loss in writing the values of  as
strings, as opposed to parse trees. The ﬁrst argument of  is suppressed for
the sake of readability; numbers refer to locations of non-terminal symbols,
as before.) For any u 2 LG0(expr), the values of (u) will be the preﬁx forms
of the parses of u.
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Before moving on to compositions of morphisms and the rest of our
motivating examples, let us make a series of remarks.
The deﬁnition of morphism of grammars, as given above, appears out
of the blue, and in somewhat austere generality. Admittedly, the deﬁni-
tion, like most in the realm of algebra, is ‘experimental’, and driven by
several, not easily formalizable criteria. It should cover enough cases of
interest, seemingly not otherwise connected; it should possess good struc-
tural properties; and should have a family, or conceptual resemblance to
other notions that have proved useful. As for the instances of morphisms
of grammars in mathematical syntax, I am hopeful this article provides
quite a few. The desired structure theory is phrased in the language of
categories; see below. As for family resemblances, there exist signiﬁcant
overlaps between the formalisms of tree transducers, term rewrite systems
and context-free language transformations, discussion of which would take
us far aﬁeld. Suﬃce it to say that the notion of morphism of grammars
is most similar to (and in fact, properly contains) synchronous context-
free grammars (SCFG); see e.g., Chapter 23 of Atallah & Blanton (2010).
SCFG are themselves notational variants of the syntax-directed translation
schemata of Aho & Ullman (1972). The diﬀerences are quite signiﬁcant:
– unlike SCFG, morphisms assume the existence of source and target
grammars, their alphabets linked by a map 
– SCFG pair rules with rules; morphisms associate to each rule in the
source grammar a parse tree in the target grammar
– in a SCFG, each re-indexing map is a permutation of non-terminal
symbols; in a morphism, the re-indexing datum (x ! s; ) is a
map from the locations of non-terminal symbols in (x ! s) to the
locations of non-terminal symbols in s.
Thus, because of the presence of repeated variables, our motivating exam-
ple (a) could not be handled by a SCFG. Nonetheless, it is fair to think of
morphisms of grammars as syntax-directed translation schemes, boosted
to their ‘natural level of generality’.
Recall that our grammars do not contain preferred start symbols; a
morphism of grammars induces a multi-valued map
L^G0(x) ! L^G1
 
(x)

for each non-terminal x in the alphabet A0 of G0. It may well happen that
for some u 2 A0, there exist distinct x0; x1 2 N0 such that u 2 L^G0(x0) and
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u 2 L^G0(x1), and the translation(s) into L^G1 diﬀer when u is considered
as a descendant of x0 from when it is considered a descendant of x1.
The language of iterated commutators, cf. Example 2.2, could be more
succinctly deﬁned with the help of a single non-terminal symbol expr and
productions
expr ! x1 j x2 j : : : j xi j : : :
expr ! [expr; expr]
However, as long as one prefers to put parentheses around compound ex-
pressions, but not around individual variables in the language of terms
with inﬁx operators   and , one needs both of the syntactic categories var
and expr in the target language. This, in turn, necessitates that the source
language should distinguish variables from compound expressions; hence
the more labored grammar G0 of Example 2.2. This observation highlights
that our morphisms are deﬁned between context-free grammars, and are
sensitive to the choice of grammar, even for unambiguous languages.
What seems to be conspicuously missing from the deﬁnition of mor-
phism is how the terminal symbols get translated. Indeed, the function 
that is part of the morphism data goes from non-terminal symbols to non-
terminal symbols. Of course, the function  is responsible for the transla-
tion of terminals, since terminals occurring in the language can be reached
from the source non-terminal via productions. In fact, the reader may en-
joy working the following out. Let T0, T1 be alphabets. Recall that any
map h : T0 ! T 1 induces a semigroup homomorphism h : T 0 ! T 1 . (The
reuse of the letter ‘h’ should cause no confusion.) For a language L  T 0 ,
h restricts to a map h : L ! T 1 . Maps of this type are called literal
homomorphisms.
Exercise. Let G0 be a context-free grammar in the alphabet N0 t T0 and
T1 another set of terminals. Let h : T0 ! T 1 be a map, inducing a literal
homomorphism h : LG0(x) ! T 1 for each x 2 N0. Show that there exists
a context-free grammar G1 in the alphabet N0 t T1 and a morphism of
grammars G0 ! G1 whose associated translation  : LG0(x) ! LG1(x)
is single-valued and satisﬁes (u) = h(u) for all u 2 LG0(x), any x 2 N0.
(Hint: extend h to a semigroup homomorphism (N0tT0) ! (N0tT1) by
setting h(x) = x for x 2 N0.  is the identity. Now let (x! s) = h(s).)
That is, any literal homomorphism can be induced by a morphism of
grammars. Similarly, any rational transducer (thought of as a multi-valued
mapping from its domain to its range, both being rational languages) can
be encoded via a morphism of grammars. The details of this encoding are
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Figure 2: Deﬁning (T; ). Above, p is a production (i.e., tree of depth 1), (p)
is a tree, s1; s2; t1 and t2 are leaves labeled with non-terminal symbols
such that s1 = (p; t1) and s2 = (p; t2).
straightforward, but will be skipped here. It is unlikely that the notion of
morphism of grammars will have anything to add to the very ﬁne-tuned
theory of rational transducers.
The next proposition is a simultaneous extension of Prop. 2.4 and
of the deﬁning property of the re-indexing map  from the deﬁnition of
morphism.
Proposition 2.7. Let (; ; ) be a morphism of context-free grammars
from G0 to G1, x 2 N0 and T 2 treeG0(x). There is a natural map (T; )
from NT((T )) to NT(T ) such that for any t 2 NT((T )),

 
label((T; t))

= label(t) :
Proof. By induction on the depth of T . If depth(T ) = 0 then T consists
of just the root x 2 N0, and (T ) is the tree containing only the root
(x) 2 N1. So NT(T ) = fxg and NT((T )) = f(x)g; (T; ) is uniquely
determined.
If depth(T ) > 0, recall how (T ) is deﬁned. Let p 2 G0 be the top
production in T . As before, this induces subtrees Ts of T with roots s 2
NT(p). For each t 2 NT((p)), graft the tree (T(p;t)) on (p) with t as
root. (T ) is deﬁned to be the resulting tree.
Consider any t 2 NT((p)) and let s = (p; t). Since depth(Ts) <
depth(T ), by the induction hypothesis there is a map (Ts; ) from
NT((Ts)) to NT(Ts), with  as left inverse to the action of (Ts; ) on
labels. When grafting (Ts) to (p), the domain of (Ts; ) can be shifted
with it, to become a subset of NT((T )).
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However, NT((T )) is the disjoint union of the various NT((Ts))
grafted to (p), with s = (p; t), as t ranges over NT((p)). (T; ) can
thus be deﬁned as the disjoint union of the (appropriately shifted) maps
(Ts; ).
Note that if T is a production x! s 2 G0 then (T; ), as constructed
above, coincides with (x! s; ) that is part of the morphism data; there
is thus no conﬂict of notation.
Observe also that when T is a parse tree of some string u containing
only terminal symbols then the leaves of (T ) cannot contain non-terminals
either (since no map (T; ) with the properties above could exist); so we
indeed have an extension of Prop. 2.4.
Our choice of terminology insinuates that morphisms can be com-
posed, and, with context-free grammars as objects, form a category. We
will treat this next.
Deﬁnition 2.8. LetG0; G1; G2 be context-free grammars, and let (01; 01;
01) be a morphism from G0 to G1, and (12; 12; 12) a morphism from
G1 to G2. Deﬁne their composite
(02; 02; 02) = (01; 01; 01) ? (12; 12; 12)
a morphism from G0 to G2, as follows:
02 is the composite N0 01  ! N1 12  ! N2.
Let x ! s (abbreviated as p) be a production in G0. Set 02(p) =
12
 
01(p)

, where 12 is the induced translation from treeG1(y) to
treeG2
 
12(y)

, for y 2 N1. Note that 02(x ! s) is an element of
treeG2(12(01(x))), i.e., of treeG2(02(x)), as required.
02(p; ) is to be a map from NT(02(p)) to NT(p). It is deﬁned as the
composite
NT
 
12(01(p))
 12(01(p); )        ! NT(01(p)) 01(p; )     ! NT(p)
More plainly, a production p 2 G0 is translated by 01 into a parse tree
T1 formed with G1, which 12 translates into a parse tree T2 formed with
G2. The re-indexing map 12(01(p); ) goes from leaves of T2 labeled with
non-terminal symbols to leaves of T1 labeled with non-terminal symbols,
followed by the re-indexing map 01(p; ) from leaves of T1 labeled with
non-terminal symbols, to leaves (i.e., letters on the right-hand side) of the
production p that are non-terminal symbols.
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As a continuation of Example 2.6, it is instructive at this point
to construct grammars G0, G1, G2 for preﬁx resp. postﬁx resp. fully
parenthesized inﬁx terms of binary function symbols ~ and , and mor-
phisms Gi ! Gj (i; j 2 f0; 1; 2g) that form a commutative diagram of
isomorphisms. Of course, one expects more: a commutative diagram of
(iso)morphisms of grammars should induce a commutative diagram of (bi-
jective) mappings between the associated languages. That is indeed so. To
prove it, we need a key structural property of  . By deﬁnition, the transla-
tion (T ) of a parse tree T can be generated by attaching to the translation
of the top production in T the translations of the sub-trees of the top pro-
duction – appropriately re-indexed. The next lemma states that the same
recipe applies if one separates any top segment, not necessarily just the
top production, of the input tree. The necessary re-indexing is supplied by
Prop. 2.7.
Lemma 2.9. Let x 2 N0 and T 2 treeG0(x). For each s 2 NT(T ), suppose
given Us 2 treeG0(label(s)). Let TU 2 treeG0(x) be the result of grafting
each Us to s as root. Now, for each t 2 NT((T )), graft (U(T;t)) to (T )
with t as root. Let (T )(U) 2 treeG1((x)) be the resulting tree. Then
(TU ) = (T )(U).
Figure 3: Modularity of (T ). s and t are leaves labeled with non-terminal sym-
bols such that s = (p; t). x and (x) are labels of the roots. Note the
similarity with Fig. 1.
Proof. By induction on depth(T ). When depth(T ) = 0, the lemma is a
tautology. When depth(T ) = 1, it is the inductive step in the deﬁnition of
 (applied to the tree TU , whose top production is T ).
If depth(T ) > 1, let p 2 G0 be the top production in T . As before, this
induces subtrees Tr of T with roots r 2 NT(p). The set of leaves of T with
non-terminal labels, NT(T ), is the disjoint union of NT(Tr) as r ranges over
NT(p). For each r 2 NT(p), let Tr;U be the tree that results from grafting
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Us to s for each s 2 NT(Tr). Tr;U is thus the same as the subtree of TU
with r as root.
(TU ) (by the inductive step in the deﬁnition of ) is the result of graft-
ing (T(p;v);U ) to v, for v ranging over NT((p)). Pick such a v 2 NT((p))
and let r = (p; v). Since depth(Tr;U ) < depth(T ), by the induction hy-
pothesis (Tr;U ) is the same as the result of grafting, for each t 2 NT((Tr)),
(U(Tr;t)) to t as root. As v ranges over NT((p)), this assembles to the
same tree as (T ) with (U(T;t)) grafted to t for each t 2 NT((T )).
But that is the same as (T )(U) by deﬁnition, completing the induc-
tion step.
Proposition 2.10. If G0, G1, G2 are context-free grammars and (01; 01;
01) : G0 ! G1 resp. (12; 12; 12) : G1 ! G2 morphisms of grammars,
with composite (02; 02; 02) : G0 ! G2 and associated translation func-
tions 01; 12 and 02. Then for all x 2 N0 and T 2 treeG0(x),
12
 
01(T )

= 02(T ) in treeG2(02(x)) :
Proof. When depth(T ) = 0, this reduces to 12
 
01(x)

= 02(x). When
depth(T ) > 0, let p be the top production in T , inducing subtrees Ts
with roots s 2 NT(p) as before. 01(T ), by deﬁnition, is the result of
grafting 01(T01(p;t)) to t for each t 2 NT(01(p)). 12 of that compos-
ite tree, by Lemma 2.9, is the result of grafting 12
 
01(T01(p;t))

, with
t = 12(12(01(p)); r), to r 2 NT(12(01(p))). But that is the same as
the translation of T under 02, by deﬁnition of the composite of two mor-
phisms.
Proposition 2.11. The composition of morphisms of context-free gram-
mars is associative. That is, if Gi (i = 0; 1; 2; 3) are context-free gram-
mars, and i;i+1 = (i;i+1; i;i+1; i;i+1) morphisms from Gi to Gi+1 (here
i = 0; 1; 2) then
01 ? (12 ? 23) = (01 ? 12) ? 23 :
Proof. The component 03 of G0 ! G3 is the composite
N0
01  ! N1 12  ! N2 23  ! N3 :
As regards 03 : given p 2 G0, 01 ? (12 ? 23) associates to it 13
 
01(p)

,
while (01 ? 12) ? 23 sends it to 23
 
02(p)

. But both of those equal
23
 
12(01(p))

, by Prop. 2.10.
Finally, 03(p; ), computed either way, is the composite
NT 23 12(01(p)) 23(12(01(p)); )              ! NT 12(01(p)) 12(01(p); )          ! NT(01(p)) 01(p; )      ! NT(p)
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Deﬁnition 2.12. Let CFG be the category whose objects are context-free
grammars, with morphisms deﬁned by Prop. 2.1 and composition deﬁned
by Prop. 2.8. The identity morphism on G is given by (idN ; idG; idNT(p)),
i.e., identity maps.
We are now ready to assemble Prop. 2.3, Cor. 2.5, Prop. 2.10 and
Prop. 2.11 into the main theorem of this paper. Intuitively, it says that
tree is a functor from CFG to the category of sets. However, since we did
not include a preferred start symbol in the data for context-free grammars
(and much less did we assume that any such symbol would be preserved by
morphisms), the target category is slightly more complicated. Let Mor(Set)
be the category of maps of sets. An object of Mor(Set) is thus a function
f : X ! Y between arbitrary sets; a morphism from f1 : X1 ! Y1 to
f2 : X2 ! Y2 consists of maps u : X1 ! X2 and v : Y1 ! Y2 such that
X1
f1 
u // X2
f2
Y1
v // Y2
commutes. Morphisms are composed ‘horizontally’. Mor(Set) is an example
of a diagram category (see e.g., Mac Lane 1978), but an alternative way to
think of it is as the category of sets ﬁbered over a base: f : X ! Y can be
thought of as the family of sets f 1(y) with y 2 Y . Morphisms are then
ﬁberwise maps.
Theorem 2.13. (a) tree is a functor CFG! Mor(Set). It associates to
a context-free grammar G the family of sets ftreeG(x) j x 2 Ng. To
a morphism of grammars G0 ! G1 it associates the map of families
 : N0 ! N1 and  : treeG0(x) ! treeG1((x)), where x 2 N0.
(b) Let UCFG be the full subcategory of CFG whose objects are the unam-
biguous context-free grammars. L^ is a functor UCFG! Mor(Set). It
associates to a context-free grammar G the family of sets fL^G(x) j x 2
Ng. To a morphism of grammars G0 ! G1 it associates the map of
families  : N0 ! N1 and f : L^G0(x) ! L^G1((x)) with x 2 N0,
that sends u 2 L^G0(x) to the sentential form generated by (T (u)),
where T (u) is the (unique) parse of u.
(c) L, sending G to the family fLG(x) j x 2 Ng, is a subfunctor of L^.
There exists a well-understood interplay between rational languages, ﬁnite
state automata, and monoid objects in categories; the canonical reference
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is Arbib (1969). Category-theoretic properties of CFG (for example, the
existence of pullbacks, ﬁltered colimits or coproducts) as well as the roles
that morphisms, functors, natural transformations etc. may play in formal
language theory at higher levels of the Chomsky hierarchy, are much less
explored.
3. Looking ahead
We have only dealt with two of the motivating examples. Neither of the
other two can be described by a morphism G ! G where G is any of
the usual unambiguous context-free grammars for ﬁrst order logic, or, I
suspect, any context-free grammar for it. It should come as no surprise
that there are limitations to the ‘word processing power’ of morphisms,
as deﬁned above. One expects that there exists a hierarchy of mappings
between context-free grammars, just as there are hierarchies of languages,
complexity classes, and so on. The goal of this ﬁnal – much more specula-
tive – section is to sketch further levels of this hierarchy. But ﬁrst, here is
one expression of the structural limitations of morphisms.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose (; ; ) : G0 ! G1 is a morphism of grammars
with the property that for some constant K,
depth((p)) 6 K
for all p 2 G0. Then for all x 2 N0 and T 2 treeG0(x),
depth((T )) 6 K  depth(T ) :
The proof is by induction on depth(T ). Note that such a bound K
always exists if G0 is ﬁnite; however, our grammars (and alphabets) were
not assumed to be so by default.
Example 3.2. Let L be the language of function terms for an associa-
tive binary operation (denoted by juxtaposition), fully parenthesized, with
inﬁnitely many variables available. The alphabet is
N = f expr g
T = f ( )x1 x2 : : : xi : : : g
with unambiguous grammar
expr ! x1 j x2 j : : : j xi j : : :
expr ! (expr expr)
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Let  : L ! L be the mapping that sends an expression to its leftmost-
parenthesized equivalent. For example,
((x5x3)((x1x3)x2))
is to be sent to
((((x5x3)x1)x3)x2)
If there was a morphism of grammars (; ; ) : G ! G inducing  , it
would have to satisfy
(expr ! xi) = xi
for all i = 1; 2; : : : . Since there is only one other production in the grammar,
namely,
expr ! (expr expr)
Prop. 3.1 would apply. However, for any positive integer d, let T be the
term in variables x1; x2; : : : ; x2d whose parse tree (ignoring parentheses) is
the complete binary tree of depth d; e.g., for d = 3:
(((x1x2)(x3x4))((x5x6)(x7x8)))
(T ) is a left-branching tree, with depth 2d.
depth((T ))
depth(T ) j T 2 treeG(expr)
	
is thus unbounded, and the mapping  cannot correspond to any morphism
of grammars.
This argument does not apply to our motivating example (c), replace-
ment of free occurrences of a variable x in the input formula  by some
term t, since
depth
 
x!t()

6 depth() + depth(t)
always. (We have silently ﬁxed an unambiguous context-free grammar G
for ﬁrst order logic.) However, no morphism G! G induces x!t(). The
recursive rules
x!t( ^  ) ) x!t() ^ x!t( )
x!t(8y) ) 8yx!t()
showing that replacement descends the parse tree along boolean connec-
tives and quantiﬁcation with respect to variables other than x, conform
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perfectly to the combinatorial possibilities of a self-morphism of G. How-
ever, one has
x!t(8x) ) 8x ()
since all free occurrences of x in  become bound in 8x. x!t(8x) is thus
not a function of x!t(), since  cannot in general be reconstructed from
x!t(). So x!t cannot be computed by bottom-up induction, whereas
translations induced by morphisms can always be.
Intuitively, a morphism of grammars applies the same functional
transformation (itself!), iteratively, to subtrees of the input tree, whereas
() calls on a diﬀerent transformation (namely, the identity) when the
input has the form 8x. Recall that two functions f; g : N ! N are de-
ﬁned by simultaneous recursion if f(0) and g(0) are given, and there exist
functions F and G such that for n > 0,
f(n) = F
 
n; f(n  1); g(n  1)
g(n) = G
 
n; f(n  1); g(n  1) :
In the presence of a pairing function that codes the ordered pair hf(n); g(n)i
as a single natural number, simultaneous recursion can be replaced by ordi-
nary recursion. However, for tree transformations, simultaneous recursion
on syntax has more expressive power than simple recursion.
Deﬁnition 3.3. Let G0 and G1 be context-free grammars in the alphabets
N0; T0, N1; T1 as usual, and k a positive integer. A k-morphism from G0
to G1 deﬁned by simultaneous recursion consists of the following data:
• mappings i : N0 ! N1 for i = 1; 2; : : : ; k
• mappings i, for i = 1; 2; : : : ; k, assigning to each production x !
s 2 G0 a parse tree from treeG1(i(x))
• for each i = 1; 2; : : : ; k and each production p 2 G0, a function
i(p; ) from NT(i(p)) to NT(p) and a function i(p; ) from NT(i(p))
to f1; 2; : : : ; kg, with the property that for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; k and all
t 2 NT(i(p)), writing j = i(p; t),
j
 
label(i(p; t))

= label(t) :
A k-morphism is, roughly, a k-tuple of grammatical transformations that
are intertwined via the function : the i-th transformation can call on the j-
th transformation to act on a subtree of the input tree. The maps i provide
the initial values. There is no circular dependency, since each recursive call
applies to a lower-level subtree of the input tree. More precisely,
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Proposition 3.4. A k-morphism of grammars from G0 to G1 induces, for
each i = 1; 2; : : : ; k and x 2 N0, a mapping
i : treeG0(x) ! treeG1(i(x)) :
Proof. For T 2 treeG0(x), deﬁne the i(T ) 2 treeG1(i(x)) simultaneously
by induction on the depth of T :
• If depth(T ) = 0, then T must be x itself, and i(T ) is deﬁned to be
i(x).
• If depth(T ) > 0, let x ! s 2 G0 be the top production in T . Write
p for x ! s for brevity. As usual, NT(p) can be identiﬁed with a
subset of s, the locations of the non-terminal symbols in s. Since G0
is context-free, each s 2 NT(p) induces a subtree Ts of T with s as
root. For each i = 1; 2; : : : ; k and t 2 NT(i(p)), writing j = i(p; t),
graft the tree j(Ti(p;t)) on i(p) with t as root. i(T ) is deﬁned to
be the resulting tree.
Since depth(Ts) < depth(T ) for all s 2 NT(p), j(Ts) is deﬁned by the in-
duction hypothesis. Note that j(Ts) belongs to treeG1(j(label(s)) by the
induction assumption, and j
 
label(i(p; t))

= label(t) by Def. 3.3. That
is, the non-terminal symbol at the root of j(Ti(p;t)) coincides with the
non-terminal symbol at the location t. Since G1 is a context-free gram-
mar, the graft is well-deﬁned, and i(T ) will belong to treeG1(i(x)) as
desired.
When ﬁnding i(T ) by recursion from root to leaves on T , one can
restrict to computing j(Ts) only for those subtrees Ts of T and values
j 2 f1; 2; : : : ; kg that are called for by the indexing function . When using
bottom-up induction, the entire k-tuple of values
 
1( ); 2( ); : : : ; k( )

needs to be computed for all subtrees of T .
Mutatis mutandis, the results of the previous section, from Prop. 2.3 to
Prop. 3.1, remain valid for morphisms deﬁned by simultaneous recursion.
The composition of a k-morphism from G0 to G1 and n-morphism from G1
to G2 will be a k n-morphism from G0 to G2. Composition is associative,
and treeG becomes a functor from CFG to tuples of functions of sets. The
details, while not conceptually complicated, are quite tedious (largely for
notational reasons) and will not be needed here.
The reader is invited to deﬁne the pair of transformations (x!t; id) by
simultaneous recursion on the syntax of ﬁrst order logic. x!t calls itself
and id, while the identity transformation calls itself only. The fact that
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the treatment of descendant nodes is inherited from their parent nodes is
reminiscent of attribute grammar.
Note that x!t, replacing all free occurrences of the variable x in the
formula  by the term t, is the least complicated of the multitude of oper-
ations involving variable replacement and binding. If a free variable in t is
captured by a quantiﬁer in , then  will no longer imply its instance x!t;
to preserve the intended logical meaning, the dummy variable appearing
in the capturing quantiﬁer in  should be renamed ﬁrst, to a variable not
occurring in  or t. However, the function that returns a variable not oc-
curring in a given formula does not have a canonical value, and is not
easily describable in terms of language operations. A related, and much
researched, issue is the formalization of explicit substitution in lambda cal-
culi (Abadi et al. 1990): under explicit substitution, the operation x ! t
does not belong to the meta-language, but is part of the language itself.
On the other hand, there seem to exist few studies, from the viewpoint of
mathematical linguistics, of the syntax of substitutions through de Bruijn
indices or Bourbaki’s variable-free notation (Mathias 1999).
Prop. 3.1 does not apply either to our fourth (and last) motivating ex-
ample, transforming ﬁrst order formulas  to negation normal form NNF(),
since depth(NNF()) 6 depth() always. But NNF cannot be induced by a
morphism, or in fact k-morphism. The standard context-free grammars of
ﬁrst order logic contain the production
expr ! q expr
But (expr ! q expr) cannot contain any terminal symbols; any non-
terminal other than ‘expr’; or more than one copy of ‘expr’: each of those
possibilities would be inconsistent with the fact that NNF(qq) = NNF().
So (expr ! q expr) is forced to be ‘expr’, which of course is incompatible
with the negation normal form of q for atomic .
Intuitively, the issue is that the rewrite rules
qq ) 
q( ^  ) ) q_ q 
q( _  ) ) q^ q 
q8x ) 9xq 
q9x ) 8xq 
may introduce new instances of the negation symbol on their right hand
sides. It requires a moment of thought to verify that this set of rules is
noetherian (starting with any formula, they cannot be applied inﬁnitely
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often) and many more moments of thought to verify that they are conﬂuent
(every formula has a unique negation normal form, even if the above rewrite
rules are applied to arbitrary subformulas ﬁrst, in any order, until no rule
applies anywhere).
Recall that a term rewrite system (TRS) is an unordered set of rewrite
rules acting on function terms in some ﬁxed signature. A TRS is called
convergent if it is both noetherian and conﬂuent (Baader & Nipkow 1998).
All four motivating examples, and Example 3.2 as well, belong to the family
of convergent TRS, adapted from the unambiguous grammar of function
terms to the general setting of context-free grammars. The fact that the
eﬀect of morphisms on parse trees can be computed by both bottom-up
and top-down recursion, as well as Lemma 2.9, can be seen as corollaries
of conﬂuence.
It is quite challenging, however, to fashion a category out of convergent
TRS. To begin with, neither the conﬂuence nor the noetherianness of TRS
is, in general, decidable (though, curiously, the conﬂuence of noetherian
TRS is decidable). Secondly, a famous example due to Toyama shows that
the disjoint union of two convergent TRS need not be convergent. Thus the
composite of two TRS cannot, in general, be deﬁned as the disjoint union
of their underlying rules. There exist, however, suﬃcient conditions for
the modularity of convergence for TRS. Alternatively, one can experiment
with ordered (prioritized) rewriting rules.
In a diﬀerent direction, the notion of morphism of context-free gram-
mars could be broadened to allow for non-determinism: several right-hand
sides of the component . Finally, the focus on parse trees is, to some
extent, restrictive: the domain of these transformations could be any set
of node-labeled rooted trees closed under taking subtrees.
I hope to elaborate some of these ideas in later publications. In clos-
ing, let me return to the quote from Chomsky that opened this article.
Suppose that the only gift linguistics ever gave mathematics was, indeed,
the notion of context-free grammar. Let’s play with this present: expand
the focus from context-free grammars to maps of context-free grammars
(from objects to morphisms) and I think we will agree that linguistics has
given mathematics a gift that keeps on giving.
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ABSTRACT
Our goal is to compare Optimality Theory (OT) to Harmonic Grammar (HG)
with respect to simulated annealing, a heuristic optimization algorithm.
First, a few notes on Smolensky’s ICS Architecture will bridge the gap
between connectionist HG and symbolic HG. Subsequently, the latter is
connected to OT via q-HG grammars, in which constraint Ci has weight
qi. We prove that q-HG converges to OT if q! +1, even if constraint
violations have no upper bound. This limit shall be referred to as the
strict domination limit. Finally we argue that q-HG in the strict domina-
tion limit shareswith OT a remarkable feature: simulated annealing does
not always converge to 100% precision, even if the algorithm is offered
ample time. Globally non-optimal local optima produced at slow pace
will be viewed as irregular forms.
There were three greengrocers in Sziget street. Kardos, the ﬁrst
owner, put a sign in his window: “Best vegetables in town!”.
Then Kerekes, the owner of the second shop, raised the bid by
posting: “Best vegetables of the world!” The third owner, Kohn,
had a hard time. What should he do now? He ﬁnally decided to
write on his door: “Best vegetables of the street!”
“Errare humanum est”, said the hedgehog when he climbed down
the wire brush.
1. Do grammars count?
Well, we all are linguists, and so grammars do matter to us. And yet,
it has become common wisdom in our profession that “grammars don’t
count”. To quote Kornai (2008, 250): “the heavy emphasis on noncounting
languages originates in an apocryphal remark of John von Neumann: ‘The
brain does not use the language of mathematics’ ”.
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This maxim has been used in several ways. Whether counting is le-
gitimate or mistaken in language description, whether languages count
segments, syllables or words (e.g., among many others, McCarthy 2002;
González 2005; Watanabe 2009; Graf 2017), has been a long debate that
shall not be our concern here. Our question is whether language models
should make use of counting. More precisely: what is the consequence of
the fact that Optimality Theory (Prince & Smolensky 1993; 2004) avoids
counting, whereas Harmonic Grammar (Smolensky & Legendre 2006)
does count?
Even within Optimality Theory, “to count or not to count” is a question
raised multiple times. Apropos constraint violations, we all know that the
violation level Ck(x) assigned by constraint Ck to candidate x is usually a
number of “stars”. Yet, some constraints are simply categorical, binary, with
range f0; 1g or ftrue; falseg, fsatisfies; violatesg: the last syllable
of a word is either parsed into a foot or it is not, Wh-movement either has
taken place or has not, the meaning is either faithfully expressed in the
form or it is not, and so forth. Many other constraints are binary within
some “locus”, but the candidate itself is composed of several such “loci”, and
so they can be violated multiple times. These constraints count the number
of marked segments or disfavored foot types or unfaithful features in the
candidate. Some other constraints again may be violated to several degrees:
for instance, the larger the distance of the head foot to some word edge
(measured as the number of intervening syllables), the graver the violation
of this alignment constraint by the candidate. Finally, some constraints
can be gradually violated by several loci, and a non-trivial axiom of OT
is that these constraints simply sum up the violations by the loci. Which
of these constraints should and which should not be used is again a long
story (McCarthy 2002; 2003; Bíró 2003; Eisner 1997).
In standard OT, the counting by a constraint Ck is usually only a
technicality, which boils down to the question which of Ck(x) and Ck(y) is
greater (a more severe case of constraint violation). The speciﬁc numerical
values actually only matter in Harmonic Grammar. Thus we arrive at the
question that shall concern us here: is counting involved when constraints
are combined into a single architecture?
Thus, given is a set fC1; C2; : : : ; Cng of constraints. Of these con-
straints, both Harmonic Grammar (HG) and Optimality Theory (OT)
build up an objective function (target function) H(x) to be optimized.
While HG uses a weighted sum of the violations Ck(x) (refer to equation
(6) later), OT creates a vector, best known as the row corresponding to
candidate x in an OT tableau (cf. (9)). Both approaches postulate the
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output (e.g., surface form) SF(u) corresponding to input (e.g., underlying
form) u to be the most harmonic element of the candidate set Gen(u):
SF(u) = arg opt
x2Gen(u)
H(x) (1)
In Harmonic Grammar, optimization is simply minimization in terms of
the arithmetic greater than relation. Whereas in OT, it is the lexicographic
order on a set of real-valued vectors: you compare the ﬁrst components of
the two vectors (the violations of the highest ranked constraint); if they
are equal, then you proceed with comparing their second components; and
so forth (Eisner 2000; Jäger 2002; Prince 2002).
The output SF(u) can be conceived of as the grammatical form,
that is, the form predicted by the grammar, the model of human linguis-
tic competence (Newmeyer 1983). The next step is to ﬁnd the candidate x
that optimizes the objective function H(x), a procedure that has been com-
pared to linguistic performance (Smolensky & Legendre 2006; Biró 2006).
What procedure shall we use to ﬁnd the optimal candidate? Similarly
to the third greengrocer in Sziget street, we shall optimize locally. But
as the hedgehog warns us, local optimization can go wrong. We discuss
simulated annealing, a probabilistic hill climbing algorithm that performs
local search, comparing its behavior with OT to its behavior with HG.
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the link be-
tween connectionist Harmonic Grammar and symbolic Harmonic Gram-
mar, also summarizing Smolensky’s ICS Cognitive Architecture in passing.
Subsequently, section 3 stretches the connection to Optimality Theory by
introducing the concept of q-HG, a variant of Harmonic Grammar with
exponential weights. As a new mathematical result, we show that q-HG
converges to OT as the base of the exponents q grows inﬁnite, even if no
upper bound exists on the number Ck(x) of violation marks. Then, sec-
tion 4 introduces simulated annealing, before section 5 elaborates on why
it works in most cases. In contrast to that, section 6 explains the main
message of this paper: simulated annealing can fail in the strict domina-
tion limit (q ! +1). This point is illustrated by computer experiments
in section 7, before drawing the conclusions in section 8.
2. From connectionist HG to symbolic HG
In order to understand why the optimization technique called simulated
annealing is relevant for Optimality Theory, let us ﬁrst recapitulate the
connectionist idea behind OT. This section can also be read as an intro-
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Figure 1: A Boltzmann machine with twelve nodes, an input layer and an output
layer
duction to Paul Smolensky’s Integrated Connectionist/Symbolic Cognitive
Architecture (ICS) (Smolensky & Legendre 2006).
A Boltzmann machine (Fig. 1) is a set of N nodes
 
ai
N
i=1
, each with
activation value ai, a real number. It also includes, for each i and j, the
connection strength Wij of the arc from node i to node j, a real number
again. Skipping some technical details often included in the literature on
Boltzmann machines, let the energy E of the Boltzmann machine – the
negative of the Harmony mentioned earlier and to be introduced soon –
be simply the following sum of multiplications, over the connections i to j:
E =
NX
i;j=1
ai Wij  aj : (2)
In connectionist HG, a constraint Ck is a set of partial connection strengths:
some W kij for each arc (i; j) in the network (Fig. 2). If the weight of Ck is
wk, and there are n constraints, then the total connection strength for arc
(i; j) in the ensuing network is
Wij =
nX
k=1
wk W kij : (3)
The notion of candidate in symbolic OT and HG, introduced in the pre-
vious section, corresponds to an activation pattern in connectionist HG.
Some of the nodes describe the input (e.g., underlying representation),
and are clamped (set) during computation. Some other nodes encode the
output by the end of the computation. The rest of the nodes are “hidden”.
They may correspond to hidden (or covert) information, not present either
in the input or in the output, but encoded in the candidate, as it plays
some role in linguistic theory: syllable structure (Soderstrom et al. 2006),
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C1: C2:
3  C1: 3  C1 + 2  C2:
Figure 2: Examples of two constraints as partial connection strengths (upper
row), and their weighted sums (linear combinations) (lower row).
A missing arc means strength 0.
prosodic and syntactic parsing brackets, correspondence relations between
input and output (cf. McCarthy & Prince 1995), intermediate levels of
representations (e.g., Boersma 2011), and so forth.
During computation, the Boltzmann machine moves toward a (locally)
minimal energy state, with its input nodes clamped and its output nodes
eventually encoding the optimal output. The candidate set Gen(u) for
input u is thus formed by the possible states of the network, with its input
nodes ﬁxed to encode u.
From (2) and (3), we get the energy of a connectionist HG model in
state A =
 
ai
N
i=1
:
E[A] =
NX
i;j=1
ai Wij  aj =
NX
i;j=1
ai 
nX
k=1
wk W kij  aj =
nX
k=1
wk 
NX
i;j=1
ai W kij  aj : (4)
We may now identify Ck[A] =
PN
i;j=1 ai W kij  aj as the violation of con-
straint Ck by the activation pattern (i.e., candidate) A =
 
ai
N
i=1
. In turn,
E[A] =
nX
k=1
wk  Ck[A]: (5)
This is the equation that creates the bridge between connectionist HG and
symbolic HG.
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For instance, the violation of constraint C1 in Fig. 2 is a1  a5 + 0:5 
a5  a6 + 1:5  a2  a6 + : : : Similarly, the violation of C2 turns to be  0:5 
a1  a5   a5  a6 + a1  a6 + 0:5  a2  a6 + : : : As a result, a connectionist
harmonic grammar with weights w1 = 3 and w2 = 2 corresponds to the
linear combination 2  a1  a5   0:5  a5  a6 + 2  a1  a6 + 5:5  a2  a6 + : : :
To summarize, a candidate x in symbolic HG corresponds to an ac-
tivation pattern A of the Boltzmann network. A constraint Ck is a set
of partial connection strengths W kij , and its violation Ck(x) by candidate
x turns into the sum PNi;j=1 ai W kij  aj . Hereby, the energy E[A] of the
Boltzmann network will map to the (negative) Harmony H(x) of the HG
grammar. Boltzmann machines, as a connectionist technique, minimize
their energy, and so symbolic HG linguistic models also ought to optimize
their harmony.
3. From symbolic HG to symbolic OT, via q-HG
To summarize, we have derived the connection between minimizing the
energy E[A] in connectionist HG and maximizing the harmony H(x) in
symbolic HG. The opposite directions of optimization can be taken care
of with a negative sign, and it has historical reasons. To tell the truth,
I personally prefer the minimization perspective even in OT, since the
best candidate is the one that violates the constraints the least. We will
nevertheless have to introduce that negative sign in order to maintain the
view according to which the best candidate maximizes its harmony, given
constraint weights wk:
H(x) =  
nX
k=1
wk  Ck(x) (6)
Now we proceed further towards Optimality Theory. It has become custom-
ary, especially in the literature on learning, to assign a real-valued rank rk
to each constraint Ck (Boersma 1997; Boersma & Hayes 2001). The higher
its rank, the higher the constraint will be ranked in OT. The most direct
connection between weights and ranks is identifying them: wk = rk (“linear
HG”). A less self-evident connection, exponential HG (Boersma & Pater
2008), has however been more frequently employed: wk = exp(rk), with
some base larger than 1 (such as 2 or 10 or e = 2:71 : : :). Exponentiat-
ing the ranks has the advantage that learning will never produce negative
weights (Pater 2009), as well as that it also makes learning more eﬃcient
(cf. the ineﬃciency of learning linear HG, as demonstrated by Magri 2016).
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Earlier, I have introduced an approach called q-Harmonic Grammar in
which wk = qrk (Biró 2009). Having the value of q > 1 ﬁxed, we may deﬁne
a 2-HG grammar, a 10-HG grammar or a 1:23-HG grammar, if q = 2 or 10
or 1:23, respectively. But we can also change the value of q. The diﬀerence
between exponential HG and q-HG is a question of perspective: the former
sets the base of exponentiation, and considers it merely as a technical
detail, whereas the latter views it as an interesting tunable parameter.
On the one hand, a change of the basis q from q1 to q2 is technically
equivalent to multiplying all ranks by the factor log q2log q1 . On the other hand,if the ranks are kept ﬁxed, then increasing q is how we can get HG to turn
into OT: we are demonstrating momentarily that under certain conditions
an OT grammar and a q-HG grammar with the same constraint ranks
deﬁne the same language in the q ! +1 limit.
Parameter q becoming inﬁnitely large will be called the strict domi-
nation limit. The motivation of the expression is that the key diﬀerence
between HG and OT is strict domination: if the two approaches predict
diﬀerent language typologies, then it is because HG, but not standard
OT, allows counting cumulativity and ganging-up cumulativity (Jäger &
Rosenbach 2006).
Table 1: Counting cumulativity: [y] is more harmonic than [x] if q = 3
/u/ C2 C1 3-HG 5-HG OT
r2 = 2 r1 = 1
q = 3 w2 = 3
2 = 9 w1 = 3
1 = 3
q = 5 w2 = 5
2 = 25 w1 = 5
1 = 5
[x]   12 F 20 F
[y]  F 9  25
Table 2: Ganging-up cumulativity: [y] is more harmonic than [x] if q = 3
/u/ C3 C2 C1 3-HG 5-HG OT
r3 = 3 r2 = 2 r1 = 1
q = 3 w3 = 27 w2 = 9 w1 = 3
q = 5 w3 = 125 w2 = 25 w1 = 5
[x]    30 F 70 F
[y]  F 27  125
Tableaux 1 and 2 illustrate the point. The best candidates, shown by the
pointing hand, are calculated with respect to the hierarchy (C3 )C2 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C1 in OT; and as the weighted sum of the violations in q-HG, the weights
being wi = qri . In both tableaux, candidate [x] is more harmonic than
[y] for OT and 5-HG. However, for 3-HG, tableau 1 shows how multiple
violations of the lower ranked constraint C1 can turn the candidate [y]
more harmonic. Similarly, in tableau 2, the lower ranked two constraints,
C2 and C3, gang up: while neither of them alone could make [x] worse than
[y], taking them together results in [y] winning over [x].
In both cases, 5-HG behaves like OT, and any q-HG would do so if
q  5. It has been long known (Prince & Smolensky 2004, 236) that a
suﬃcient criterion for a harmonic grammar with an exponential weight
system to display OT-like behavior is that the base of the exponential
weights be not less than the highest amount of stars in a cell (which is 4 in
our example) plus 1. This is why 5-HG is equivalent to OT, but not 3-HG.
(For a reversed approach, refer to Prince 2002.)
Let us now formalize this observation. U shall be the set of underlying
forms – the domain of the universal Gen function – which is postulated
to be universal by the Richness of the Base principle (Prince & Smolen-
sky 2004, 225). Moreover, let us posit that our n constraints take non-
negative integer values: for k = 1; : : : ; n, the constraint Ck is a mapping
from Su2U Gen(u) to N0. This last requirement will play a crucial role
in the proof to be presented. While it certainly applies to most linguis-
tic models in the OT and HG literature, it poses some limitations to the
generalizability of the framework.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that the indices of the
constraints reﬂect their ranking. Consequently, our OT grammar shall be
Cn  Cn 1  : : : C1 (7)
This OT grammar can be matched to the q-HG grammar with rk = k and
wk = q
k (remember that q > 1). The point of interest is whether these two
grammars generate the same language. Put it diﬀerently, the following two
Harmony functions are compared:
Hq(x) =  
nX
k=1
qk  Ck(x) (8)
HOT(x) =

  Cn(x); Cn 1(x); : : : ; C1(x)

(9)
Equation (1), reformulated here, deﬁnes a grammar for either kind of Har-
mony functions:
SF(u) = arg max
x2Gen(u)
H(x) (10)
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(for all u 2 U). Such a grammar maps an underlying form u to a surface
form s, if and only if H(s)  H(x) for all x 2 Gen(u). SF(u) is the
set of these optimal candidates. In the case of q-HG, the values of Hq
are compared using the arithmetic greater than or equal to relation ,
whereas in OT, the lexicographic order lex compares the HOT vectors. In
the former case, the set of optimal candidates will be denoted as SFq(u),
and in the latter case, as SFOT(u).
We now prove a theorem that guarantees that the OT grammar (7)
and the corresponding q-HG grammar (8) map any u 2 U to the same
surface form(s), if q is suﬃciently large. This fact has been long known
(Prince & Smolensky 2004, 236), but only if the number of violations ad-
mitted by the constraints were limited. We now show that no such upper
limit is required, if the constraints take integer values.
Theorem 1. Given are non-negative integer constraints Cn; Cn 1; : : : ; C1
(ordered by their indices) and a Generator function Gen. Then, for any
underlying form u 2 U there exists some threshold q0  1 such that for all
q > q0, SFOT(u) = SFq(u).
Proof. For any given u 2 U , we shall construct such a q0. In this proof,
the symbols s, s1, s2 and x will always denote elements of Gen(u).
First, observe that if s1 2 SFOT(u) and s2 2 SFOT(u), then from the
deﬁnition of the optimal set SFOT(u), we obtain HOT(s1) lex HOT(s2)
and HOT(s2) lex HOT(s1); from which it follows that they share the
same violation proﬁle. That is, they violate each constraint to the same
level: Ck(s1) = Ck(s2) for all k.
In turn, it is well-founded to introduce the threshold q0 as
q0 = 1 + max

Ck(s); Ck 1(s); : : : ; C1(s)
	
for whichever s 2 SFOT(u). Since the constraints are postulated to have
a non-negative range, q0  1 follows. Now we have to show SFOT(u) =
SFq(u) to hold for all q > q0.
If s1 2 SFOT(u) and s2 2 SFOT(u), then they violate each constraint to
the same level, and so Hq(s1) = Hq(s2), for any q. In order to complete our
proof, it remains to be shown that if q > q0, s 2 SFOT(u) and x /2 SFOT(u),
then Hq(s) > Hq(x). Candidates that are suboptimal for HOT are also
suboptimal for Hq.
Since s 2 SFOT(u) and x /2 SFOT(u), the vector HOT(s) is strictly
lexicographically greater than the vector HOT(x). This means that there
exists some “fatal constraint” Cf such that for all k > f , Ck(s) = Ck(x),
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and  Cf (s) >  Cf (x). Since our constraints take integer values, we con-
clude that Cf (s)  Cf (x)   1.
Moreover, observe that for any k, Ck(s) Ck(x) < q 1. This inequality
holds because by the above deﬁnition of q0, Ck(s)  q0 1 < q 1, whereas
by the non-negativity of all constraints, Ck(x)  0.
These two inequalities on the diﬀerences of the violations yield, for all
q > q0  1,
Hq(x) Hq(s) =
nX
k=1

Ck(s)  Ck(x)
  qk =
=

Cf (s)  Cf (x)
  qf + f 1X
k=1

Ck(s)  Ck(x)
  qk <
<  1  qf +
f 1X
k=1
(q   1)  qk =  qf + (q   1) 
f 1X
k=1
qk =
=  qf + (q   1)  q
f   q
q   1 =  q < 0:
That is, Hq(s) > Hq(x) indeed holds. To summarize, for each u 2 U , we
have proposed a q0  1 such that for all q > q0, the elements of SFOT(u)
are equally harmonic in q-HG; but they are more harmonic with respect
to Hq than the candidates not in SFOT(u). Thus, OT and q-HG map u to
the same optimal subset SFq(u) = SFOT(u)  Gen(u).
Obviously, nothing requires that a single q0 work for all elements of
U ; rather q0 is dependent on u. But as q grows, more and more underlying
forms will be mapped to the same surface forms by OT and by q-HG. Let
q0(u) be some threshold q0 for u, such as the one constructed in the proof of
Theorem 1. Since U is most often a countable set, we can sort its elements
by q0(u). Let the q0(u) value of the kth element of U in this list be q0[k].
Now, if you wish your q-HG grammar to map at least k elements of U to
the same output as the corresponding OT grammar does, then you should
have q > q0[k].
As an example, remember tableaux 1 and 2. We have seen that q0 = 5
is a good threshold: for all q > q0 = 5, the q-HG grammar corresponding
to the OT grammar will yield the output that is also most harmonic in the
OT approach. But imagine now a diﬀerent input, /u0/, whose OT winner
[x0] incurs 6 violations by constraint C1. This second input will require
q0(u0) = 7, a higher threshold. And yet, you can set q to 7:1, and your q-
HG grammar turns equivalent to OT for both inputs. And so forth. Even
if you do not have an a priori upper bound of the number of stars assigned
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by C1, and even if you do not want to restrict the input set arbitrarily, you
will know: whenever you are about to compute the most harmonic element
of a candidate set, you can have a value of q such that q-HG may be used
instead of OT.
If a language is the way it maps inputs (underlying forms) onto out-
puts (surface forms), then the functions (set of mappings) SFOT and SFq
are simply the languages generated by an OT grammar and by a q-HG
grammar, respectively. Alternatively, the Chomskyan E-languages would
be the ranges of SFOT and of SFq, respectively.
The theorem just proven can be reformulated as follows: the language
generated by q-HG converges to the language generated by OT, as q grows
inﬁnitely large; that is,
Corollary 2.
lim
q!+1 SFq = SFOT pointwise:
Here the pointwise convergence of a sequence of functions on U is under-
stood as follows: for any u 2 U there exists some q0 such that for all
q > q0, SFq(u) = SFOT(u). The limit q ! +1 has been called the strict
domination limit (Biró 2009).
Before proceeding, a remark is in order. The proof crucially relied
on the constraints taking non-negative integer values. In the general case,
however, Corollary 2 might still hold, even if in a weaker sense.
Take the following HG and OT grammars: candidates are non-negative
real numbers (Gen(u) = R+0 ), while the two constraints are C2(x) = (x 
1)2 and C1(x) = x. In OT, the single best candidate for the highest ranked
constraint C2 is xOT = 1. All other candidates incur more violations by C2,
and so C1 plays no role. In q-HG, however, Hq(x) =  q2  (x  1)2   q  x,
which takes its maximum at xq = 2q 12q . For no real q will xq = xOT; and
so no q0 exists such that SFq(u) = SFOT(u) for all q > q0.
Observe, though, that limq!+1 xq = xOT. In a weaker sense, Corol-
lary 2 still holds, at least for this speciﬁc example: for all u 2 U and all
 > 0, there exists some q0 such that for all q > q0, the distance of SFq(u)
and SFOT(u) is less than . Readers worried about the linguistic relevance
of this example should note that the factorial typology includes candidates
1 and 0, and so it can be seen as a model of how a continuous phonetic
feature maps to categorical phonology: it is either present or absent from
a language. And yet, for candidates that are symbols or objects without a
meaningful distance metric, it would be hard to formulate a similar con-
jecture of convergence.
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4. Simulated annealing for symbolic Harmonic Grammars
Once we have deﬁned how our grammars map an input (or underlying
form) onto an output (or surface form) as an optimum deﬁned by eq. (1) or
eq. (10), in the second half of this paper we turn to the next question: how
to ﬁnd this optimum? The Boltzmann machines underlying connectionist
HG immediately come with an answer: simulated annealing.
In the case of symbolic OT, the answer may be much less obvious,
and even ‘hard’. While most of our colleagues happily rely on their intu-
itions, Lauri Karttunen (2006) demonstrated “the insuﬃciency of paper-
and-pencil linguistics”, arguing for ﬁnite-state implementations of OT.
Finite-state OT, however, imposes requirements that are met by many, but
not all linguistic models (cf. e.g., Eisner 1997, Jäger 2002 and Bíró 2003,
and references therein). Further approaches include dynamic programing
(or chart parsing; Tesar & Smolensky 2000) and genetic algorithms (Turkel
1994; Pulleyblank & Turkel 2000). It used to be a consensus in the ﬁeld
that the generation problem of OT is NP-hard in the size of the grammar
(e.g., Eisner 1997; 2000; Idsardi 2006a;b). This consensus was challenged
by András Kornai in two squibs (2006a;b) that probably made one of the
liveliest moments in the history of the Optimality List and the ROA Rut-
gers Optimality Archive (and see also Heinz et al. 2009).
Heuristic optimization algorithms, including simulated annealing and
genetic algorithms, have been successfully deployed to ﬁnd an approxi-
mately good solution for NP-hard problems (Reeves 1995, pp. 6–11). While
they do not guarantee to always return the best solution, they do so rea-
sonably well, returning the optimum pretty often, and otherwise returning
a solution almost as good as the best one. Whether the generation problem
in OT is NP-hard, or it is not, two further arguments can also be given
for the use of heuristic optimization: similar trends in the cognitive sci-
ences in general, beyond linguistics (e.g., Gigerenzer et al. 1999), and the
very fact that our human speech production is also known to be prone to
errors. Hence our interest in “less perfect” approaches and the motivation
to employ simulated annealing for Optimality Theory (Bíró 2005a;b; Biró
2006).
Let me now summarize simulated annealing (in a way that is based
on Biró 2007). Equations (1) and (10) deﬁne Optimality Theory as an
optimisation problem. The task is to ﬁnd the candidate x that optimizes
H(x).
Many heuristic algorithms do not always ﬁnd the (globally) optimal
candidate, but are simple and still eﬃcient because they exploit the struc-
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ture of the search space, which is the candidate set in our case. This struc-
ture is realized by a neighborhood relation: for each candidate x there ex-
ists a set neighbors(x), the set of the neighbors of x. It is often supposed
that neighbors diﬀer only minimally, whatever that means. The neighbor-
hood relation is usually symmetric, irreﬂexive and results in a connected
graph-like structure: any two candidates are connected by a ﬁnite chain
of neighbors. More details of this relation should depend on the speciﬁc
linguistic phenomenon under discussion.
The neighborhood structure – also called the topology – invites for a
random walk in the search space, that is, on the candidate set. This walk
can be conceived of as a series x0; x1; x2; : : : ; xL of candidates. Candidate
xi, to be also referred to as the position of the random walker at time
i, must be either identical to, or a neighbor of the candidate xi 1, the
previous position of the random walker. Position x0 will be called the
initial position (xinit), and xL shall be the ﬁnal position (xﬁnal) of the
random walk, whose length is L, the number of “steps”.
ALGORITHM Gradient Ascent: OT with restricted GEN
x := x_init;
repeat
x_prev := x;
x := most_harmonic_element( {x_prev} U neighbors(x_prev) );
until x = x_prev
return x # x is an approximation to the optimal solution
Figure 3: Gradient Ascent: iterated Optimality Theory with a restricted GEN
(Do-)
ALGORITHM Randomized Gradient Ascent
x := x_init ;
repeat
Randomly select x' from the set neighbors(x);
if (x' not less harmonic than x) then x := x';
until stopping condition = true
return x # x is an approximation to the optimal solution
Figure 4: Randomized Gradient Ascent
A random walker, such as a hedgehog, will walk in a landscape. The land-
scape’s horizontal map is provided by the neighborhood structure, whereas
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its vertical dimension is the objective function H to be optimized. The
hedgehog’s goal is to climb the highest point in this landscape.
The simplest algorithm, gradient ascent, comes in two ﬂavors. The ver-
sion in Fig. 3 deﬁnes xi+1 as the best element of the set fxig[neighbors(xi).
The hedgehog walks as long as xi+1 diﬀers from xi, and the algorithm is
deterministic for each xinit. This kind of optimization has been known in
Optimality Theory since 1993 (Prince & Smolensky 1993; 2004) as serial
evaluation (McCarthy 2007) or harmonic serialism (McCarthy 2010): xinit
is the underlying form, Do- (a restricted version of Gen) creates the set
fxg [ neighbors(x), whereas the Eval module ﬁnds its best element in
each iteration.
The second version of gradient ascent is stochastic (Fig. 4). In step
i, the hedgehog chooses a random x0 2 neighbors(xi), using some pre-
deﬁned probability distribution on this set (often a uniform distribution). If
neighbor x0 is not worse than xi, then the next element xi+1 of the random
walk will be x0; otherwise, xi+1 is xi. The stopping condition requires the
number of iterations to reach some suﬃciently large value, or the average
improvement of the objective function in the last few steps to drop below
a threshold (usually zero). Then the algorithm returns the output xﬁnal,
which is likely to be a local optimum.
Simulated annealing (Fig. 5) plays with this second theme to increase the
hedgehog’s chances of ﬁnding the global optimum and avoid being trapped
in unwanted local optima. The idea is the same, but if x0 is worse than
xi, then there is still a chance to move to x0. Importantly, however, this
probability is reduced to 0, as the algorithm proceeds. (In some versions of
simulated annealing, which we ignore here, if x0 is better than xi, the chance
of moving to x0 is less than 1, with this probability gradually converging
to 1.)
The transition probability of moving to x0 depends on the objective
function H at points xi and x0, as well as on a parameter of the algorithm,
T > 0, called temperature for historical reasons (Metropolis et al. 1953;
Kirkpatrick et al. 1983; Černý 1985):
P (xi ! x0jT ) = e
H(x0) H(xi)
T : (11)
(Note that usually an energy function E is minimized, and not a harmony
function H maximized, and therefore the standard formula also includes a
negative sign in the exponent.) If the randomly chosen neighbor x0 is less
harmonic than x (if H(x0) < H(x)), then a random number r is generated,
and we move to x0 if and only if r < P (xi ! x0jT ).
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ALGORITHM: Simulated Annealing
Parameters: x_init # initial state (often randomly chosen)
T_max # initial temperature > 0
alpha # temperature reduction function = cooling schedule
x := x_init ;
T := T_max ;
Repeat
Randomly select x' from the set neighbors(x);
Delta := H(x') - H(x) ;
if ( Delta > 0 ) # neighbor is more harmonic than current position
then
x := x' ;
else
# move to x' with transition probability P(Delta;T)=exp(Delta/T):
generate random r uniformly in range (0,1) ;
if ( r < exp ( Delta / T ) )
then x := x' ;
end-fi
end-fi
T := alpha(T) # decrease T according to cooling schedule
Until stopping condition = true
Return w # w is an approximation to the optimal solution
Figure 5: Maximizing a real-valued harmony function H(x) with simulated
annealing
Temperature T is gradually decreased following a cooling schedule,
a decreasing series of values for T , so that in step i, the value of the
temperature is Ti:
Tmax = T0 > T1 > T2 > : : : > Ti > : : : > TL = Tmin > but close to 0: (12)
Some allow the same Ti value to be re-employed a ﬁnite number of times
rep, independent of (Reeves 1995, 26), or dependent on (Henderson et al.
2003) Ti.
As the temperature T decreases, the exponent in (11) becomes an
increasingly low negative number, and the transition probability P (xi !
x0jT ) converges to zero. With very low temperatures, the hedgehog would
not move towards lower harmony anymore.
The ﬁnal position of the random walker will be returned as the output
of simulated annealing. It is a stochastic algorithm without the guarantee
of always ﬁnding the global optimum. In fact, the hedgehog may be stuck
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in a local optimum, having climbed a hill that is not the highest in the
landscape, but the temperature being too low already for the hedgehog
to take a counter-optimal step. The probability of returning the global
optimum will be referred to as the precision of the algorithm.
An important fact about simulated annealing is that precision can be
made to converge to 1 as the number of iterations L grows (Reeves 1995;
Henderson et al. 2003). The next section illustrates why this happens so.
Smolensky & Legendre (2006) repeatedly refer to this fact as an advan-
tage of their proposal: if the language model is given ample time, it will
almost certainly ﬁnd the most harmonic, that is, the grammatical form.
(Note, though, that both the formal analysis and the practice of simulated
annealing know of cases that require very long running times; cf. Reeves
1995, 63.) Biró (2006) takes a diﬀerent approach: the language model un-
able to ﬁnd the grammatical form makes a performance error, similarly to
the human brain. Moreover, if the algorithm is given less time, it makes
more errors, like a fast speaking human. Speed can be traded for precision,
and fast speech can be modeled with simulated annealing (Bíró 2005b).
So far, we have only discussed simulated annealing with a real-valued
harmony function. However, I have earlier proposed a way to adopt sim-
ulated annealing (Fig. 5) to OT; in particular, I had to adapt the expo-
nential expression in (11) to the non-real valued objective function in (9)
(Bíró 2005a;b; Biró 2006). While I have presented various mathematical
arguments that lead to the same Simulated Annealing for Optimality The-
ory (SA-OT) Algorithm (Biró 2006, chapters 2 and 3; and a diﬀerent train
of thought in Biró 2013 that could also be applied to SA-OT), critics may
still argue that the SA-OT Algorithm is removed from “real” simulated
annealing.
Figure 6: V landscape, with three candidates in a row. [B] in the center is worse
than the two candidates on the peripheries. [A] is the global optimum,
while [C] is locally optimal.
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Table 3: A possible tableau for the asymetrical V shaped landscape. Note symbol
 marking the local optimum.
C2 C1
F [A]
[B] 
 [C] 
In particular, SA-OT lacks the above mentioned property of simulated an-
nealing: in some cases increasing the number of iterations did not improve
the precision of the algorithm (refer to Biró 2006, sections 2.3.2 and 6.4, as
well as Biró 2009). It has been argued that the reason is strict domination.
Look at the landscape in Fig. 6 with tableau 3. This toy grammar includes
two local optima separated by the suboptimal candidate [B]. [A] is the
global optimum, better than [C] due to low ranked constraint C1. How-
ever, in simulated annealing, non-adjacent candidates are not compared
directly, and their frequencies in production emerge as a consequence of
the landscape. (This is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between SA-OT and Maxi-
mum Entropy OT, cf. Goldwater & Johnson 2003.) Both [A] and [C] defeat
[B] by the highly ranked constraint C2, and strict domination requires that
lower ranked constraints do not play any role. Consequently, as shown in
Biró (2006, section 2.3.2), SA-OT will return both [A] and [C] with a
probability of 50%, independently of the speed of the algorithm.
Without entering further details of the SA-OT Algorithm, the main
thrust of the current paper is to explain that this non-convergence property
is intrinsic to Optimality Theory: it appears not only in the SA-OT Al-
gorithm, which adopts strict domination a priori, but also in the strict
domination limit of applying simulated annealing to symbolic HG. In
other words, strict domination grammars, which practically do not count,
will make errors, even if ample time is available for them to perform
computations.
5. Why does simulated annealing work?
5.1. A simple model and its dynamics
First, let us try to understand why standard simulated annealing is suc-
cessful as an optimization algorithm: why its precision converges to 100%
if the length of the random walk is increased. The key will be that in a
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certain phase of the algorithm (the “second phase”) hedgehogs can escape
local optima and be attracted to the global optimum.
Let us return to the simplest search space with a global optimum and
another local optimum (Fig. 6), which will be referred to henceforth as an
‘asymmetric V landscape’. Our randomly walking hedgehog in state [B] has
two neighbors to choose from. Suppose that both neighbors have a chance
of 0:5 to be picked. Then, either [A] or [C] is chosen, and the hedgehog
will move there with a transition probability P (B ! A;CjT ) = 1, because
H(B) is lower than bothH(A) andH(C). If the random walker is, however,
in state [A] or [C], the only neighbor has a reduced probability of being
moved to. Following eq. (11), the chances are:
pA(T ) := P (A! BjT ) = e
H(B) H(A)
T
pC(T ) := P (C ! BjT ) = e
H(B) H(C)
T (13)
Since H(A) > H(C), we can easily see that pA(T ) < pC(T ) at any time,
at any temperature T . As a side remark, this inequality does not hold in
SA-OT in the case presented by tableau 3, and that is why the global
optimum [A] is not able to attract the random walker away from the other
local optimum. Hence, the 50% precision of SA-OT.
Now suppose that many hedgehogs walk simultaneously. The average
number of hedgehogs moving from state x to a neighboring state x0 in
some iteration of the algorithm is the product of the number of hedgehogs
in state x, the probability of choosing neighbor x0 when at x, and the
transition probability P (x! x0jT ). At time step i, let ai, bi and ci denote
the number of random walkers in states [A], [B] and [C] respectively. By
using the above probabilities to calculate the ﬂows from and into each
state, we obtain:
ai+1 = ai   ai  pA(Ti) + 1
2
bi
bi+1 = bi   1
2
bi + ai  pA(Ti)  1
2
bi + ci  pC(Ti)
ci+1 = ci   ci  pC(Ti) + 1
2
bi (14)
As expected, the number of hedgehogs ai+ bi+ ci = N is constant in time.
The precision of the algorithm is the probability that a random walker
ﬁnishes the walk in the globally optimal state [A], which is a1/N . In what
follows we discuss the mechanisms that increase this precision.
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5.2. Extreme temperatures, and in between
Let us now consider two extreme cases. First, we suppose that temperature
is very low from time step i = 0 onwards, that is, T  H(C) H(B). Then,
according to (13), pA  0 and pC  0. In this case, the poor hedgehogs
are unable to escape from the local optima. The initial population b0 in
state [B] is distributed within one step between the two local optima, and
from this point onwards ai = a0 + 0:5b0 and ci = c0 + 0:5b0 for all i > 0.
In brief, the random walkers are frozen into the local optima at very low
temperatures.
In the second extreme case, temperature is very high: T  H(A)  
H(B), resulting in pA  1 and pC  1, from time step i = 0 onwards.
Then the random walkers oscillate between the central and the peripheral
positions. Since the random walkers are equally distributed by position [B],
the whole system itself oscillates between two states. At odd time steps
a2i 1 = c2i 1 = 0:5b0 and b2i 1 = a0 + c0, whereas at even time steps
a2i = c2i = 0:5b1 = 0:5(a0 + c0) and b2i = b0 (i  1). Even if initially
a0 6= c0, a short period with extremely high temperatures will result in
ai = ci.
In the practice of simulated annealing, temperature T drops from a
very high to a very low value in many steps. In the ﬁrst phase, T 
H(A)   H(B), while in the third phase T  H(C)   H(B). In what I
shall call the second phase, temperature T is, informally speaking, “in the
magnitudes of” H(A) H(B) and H(C) H(B).
We have just seen that by the end of the ﬁrst phase aI = cI . The
precision of the algorithm will be determined by aII cII at the end of the
second phase, since in the third phase the states get frozen. If aII , bII and
cII denote the population in each of the states after the second and before
the third phase, then the precision of the algorithm is aII+0:5bIIN . Obviously,
here the phases are idealized, and in reality their boundaries are not so
clear. Yet, this idealization will contribute to our better understanding of
simulated annealing.
Next, observe that from equations (14):
ai+1   ci+1 = (ai   ci) + (ci  pC(Ti)  ai  pA(Ti)) (15)
At the beginning of the second phase aI = cI , and therefore:
aI+1   cI+1 = (aI   cI) + aI(pC(TI)  pA(TI)) (16)
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Population ai and ci will begin to diverge if and only if there is a period
during the simulation when pA(Ti) 6= pC(Ti). Otherwise, ai   ci remains
constantly zero.
For instance, if H(A) = H(C), then pA(Ti) = pC(Ti) at all times.
Therefore, independently of the original distributions, simulated annealing
will return both states [A] and [C] in 50% of the cases.
Even if H(A) > H(C), SA-OT oﬀers no such period in Fig. 6 and
tableau 3: due to reasons related to strict domination, the transition prob-
abilities only depend on the fatal constraint (called the “highest uncanceled
violation mark” by Prince & Smolensky 1993; 2004), which does not distin-
guish between pA(Ti) and pC(Ti). On the contrary, when standard simu-
lated annealing is applied to symbolic harmonic grammar, eqs. (13) ensure
that pC(T ) > pA(T ). So ai   ci can turn positive at the beginning of the
second phase. The higher pC(Ti)  pA(Ti), the quicker the divergence be-
tween ai and ci. Moreover, the longer this period, the higher the precision
of the algorithm. These are the two mechanisms that contribute to the
success of simulated annealing, to its high precision.
By way of example, let us suppose that there is a period when H(A) 
H(B)  T  H(C)   H(B), that is when pA(T )  0 and pC(T )  1.
Then, state [A] acts as a trap for the hedgehogs, while it is still possible to
escape from [C]. A hedgehog will end up in state [C] only if whenever he is
in [B], he decides to move to [C], and not to [A], which has a probability of
0:5 each time. Provided that this period of the algorithm lasts 2k iterations,
our hedgehog ends up in [C] with a probability of 0:5k, and in [A] with a
probability of 1   0:5k. Consequently, the more iterations in this crucial
phase of the simulation, the higher the precision of the algorithm. The
precision converges to 100% as 2k grows.
This is the main idea behind simulated annealing, even if details are
more complicated, even for this simple landscape. For instance, after ai and
ci have diverged, cipC(Ti) aipA(Ti) does not need to stay positive in (15),
and so ai   ci will not necessarily grow forever. If simulated annealing is
very (“inﬁnitely”) slow, the system may reach an equilibrium in which
ai  pA(Ti) = ci  pC(Ti). That will be the topic of the next subsection.
To summarize, in the ﬁrst and second phases, the hedgehogs can es-
cape local optima. In the second and third phases, the hedgehogs are at-
tracted by the global optimum. The longer the second phase (that is, the
more iterations are available in the second phase), the greater the chance
that a random walker will end up in the global optimum.
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5.3. Equilibrium of our system
Candidates [A], [B] and [C] have been called states, in which each of the
N hedgehogs can be found. As opposed to these states, the whole system
can be characterized with some macrostate: following the physical anal-
ogy, a macrostate of the whole system is a distribution (ai; bi; ci) of the
random walkers. Diﬀerent random walkers can change their state, hence
the microstate of the whole system can change (a third concept); yet,
the macrostate does not alter as long as the overall distribution remains
the same.
A macrostate is an equilibrium state if it does not change in time, that
is, ai+1 = ai, bi+1 = bi and ci+1 = ci. Maybe no random walker moves:
the system is frozen, thus the microstate is also invariable. But it can very
much be the case that individual hedgehogs move from one state to another
one, but the distribution remains the same. From eqs. (14) and (15) we
conclude that the system is in equilibrium if and only if
ai  pA(T ) = ci  pC(T )
bi = ai  pA(T ) + ci  pC(T ) (17)
If enough iterations are performed, then the system can converge to this
state. Decreasing the temperature very (“inﬁnitely”) slowly allows the sys-
tem to stay in this macrostate of equilibrium. Then
ci
ai
=
pA
pC
= e
H(B) H(A)
T
 H(B) H(C)
T = e
H(C) H(A)
T (18)
will steadily hold true. Gradually decreasing T to zero, results in ciai alsoconverging to zero. The larger the diﬀerence H(A) H(C), the faster this
convergence. In sum, an “inﬁnitely slow” annealing (parameter T decreased
to zero in many-many steps) is characterized by a precision of 1: it will only
return the global optimum [A], and never the other local optimum, [C].
As a side note, solving the equation system (14) in the ﬁxed point –
that is, for ai+1 = ai = a, bi+1 = bi = b and ci+1 = ci = c – with
N = a + b + c leads us to
a(T ) = N
pc
pc + 2pcpc + p+ a
b(T ) = 2N
papc
pc + 2pcpc + p+ a
c(T ) = N
pa
pc + 2pcpc + p+ a
(19)
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In turn, inserting the transition probabilities (13) into (19) yields a Boltz-
mann distribution (in fact, a Boltzmann distribution in which [B] corre-
sponds to a degenerate state, that is, to two states that have the same
harmony and have been collapsed into one) as the state of equilibrium:
a(T ) =
N
Z(T )
e
H(A)
T
b(T ) = 2
N
Z(T )
e
H(B)
T
c(T ) =
N
Z(T )
e
H(C)
T (20)
where N is the number of random walkers run in parallel, whereas
Z(T ) = e
H(A)
T + 2  eH(B)T + eH(C)T (21)
is called the partition function. As T ! +0, the largest term (the ﬁrst
one) will dominate the partition function, and therefore lim a(T ) = N ,
but lim b(T ) = 0 and lim c(T ) = 0.
Observe that Maximum Entropy OT (Goldwater & Johnson 2003)
postulates a distribution similar to (20) (ignoring the factor 2 in b and
Z), as if annealing stopped at a positive value of temperature T .
The next section derives the main result of this paper. It shows that
strict domination – postulated by Optimality Theory, and an asymptotic
case in q-HG – allows cases in which pC(T )  pA(T ) is 1 in a crucial phase
of the simulation (hence, simulated annealing is maximally eﬃcient); but
also cases in which pC(T ) pA(T ) is constantly 0, and therefore simulated
annealing produces irregular forms.
6. Simulated annealing in the strict domination limit
6.1. Simulated annealing for q-HG
The present section contains the core message of this paper by asking what
the consequences are of the q ! +1 strict domination limit for simulated
annealing when it is applied to a q-HG grammar. We shall observe that
strict domination can lead to very eﬃcient computation, but also to severe
errors.
Increasing q will increase the range of the objective function H(w).
It will also magnify the diﬀerences H(x0)   H(x) in the equation of the
transition probability (11).
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It follows that the cooling schedule must also be adapted. If the cooling
schedule remained the same, even the highest temperatures would become
very low compared to the diﬀerences in the objective function at high
q values. In the strict domination limit, the algorithm would therefore
miss its crucial ﬁrst two phases, and start immediately with randomized
gradient descent (Fig. 4), instead of simulated annealing (Fig. 5).
Therefore, the cooling schedule should be made a decreasing series of
functions of q:
Tmax[q] = T0[q]; T1[q]; T2[q]; : : : ; Ti[q]; : : : ; TL[q] = Tmin[q] > 0 (22)
Additionally, a cooling schedule will satisfy two requirements: ﬁrst, we
require that for some reasonable q0 and for any q > q0: Ti[q] > Ti+1[q].
Second, we also posit limq!+1 Ti[q] = +1 for any i.
More speciﬁcally, the cooling schedule should be such that the three
phases discussed in the previous section should be discernible. For any q,
the ﬁrst values in the series should be “much greater” than any possible
diﬀerence in harmony of two neighboring candidates; which, based on (8),
is in the order of magnitude of qn. Similarly, the last values in the series
should be for any q “much smaller” than the smallest possible diﬀerence
in harmony, which is q, one violation diﬀerence of the lowest ranked con-
straint.
Biró (2006) suggested using Ti[q] = ti  qKi , where Ki was decreased
in an outer loop (from Kmax to Kmin, using Kstep), and for each Ki, ti
was decreased from tmax to tmin by tstep. For instance, the case Kmax = 4,
Kmin = 0, Kstep = 1, tmax = 3, tmin = 0:5 and tstep = 0:5 would look like:
3  q4; 2:5  q4; 2  q4; : : : ; 0:5  q4; 3  q3; : : : ; 0:5  q3; 3  q2; : : : ; 0:5  q0 (23)
This kind of cooling schedule will be referred to as linear. Another option
is to diminish the temperature exponentially (Biró 2009):
Ti = (c  qn)
m i
m (24)
where n is the number of constraints in the q-HG grammar (the exponent
of the highest ranked constraint). As one violation of the highest ranked
constraint contributes qn to the harmony function in (8), a large c (e.g.,
c = 100 – supposing that neighbors diﬀer in only a few violations of con-
straint Cn) guarantees that initially the random walker will move freely:
for any x and x0, the transition probability P (x! x0jT0)  1. At the same
time, parameter m determines the speed of the cooling schedule: a large
m diminishes the temperature only slowly. By the mth step, temperature
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is reduced to Tm = 1. The smallest possible diﬀerence in harmony – cor-
responding to a single violation of the lowest ranked constraint C1 – is q.
Therefore, if q is large, then jH(x) H(x0)j  Tm, which means that after
m steps the system will have been frozen, the algorithm will have reached
its third phase.
6.2. The V landscape: the good case
In order to understand the behavior of simulated annealing applied to q-
Harmonic Grammar in the strict domination limit, let us return to the
V landscape (Fig. 6). Recall equation (15), repeated here:
ai+1   ci+1 = (ai   ci) + (ci  pC(T )  ai  pA(T ))
= (ai   ci)(1  pA(T )) + ci(pC(T )  pA(T )) (25)
Remember that at the beginning of the second phase ai = ci. The speed at
which the number of random walkers in states [A] and in [C] will diverge
during the second phase therefore depends on pC(T ) pA(T ). If this value is
close to zero, then the divergence will be very slow, and only an extremely
large number of iterations can guarantee ﬁnding the globally optimal state
with a high probability. If, however, there is a phase in the simulation
(there is a value T ) when pA(T ) and pC(T ) are very diﬀerent, then the
algorithm will be eﬃcient.
The conclusion thus has been that the eﬃciency of simulated annealing
depends crucially on the phase in which pA(T ) is low and pC(T ) is high.
Is there such a phase in the strict domination limit? We shall see that
in certain cases the strict domination limit makes simulated annealing
extremely eﬃcient, but not in other cases.
Let us start with the good case. Consider the following tableau for the
V landscape (Fig. 6;  > , and both are positive integers):
C C
[A] 
[B]  
[C] 
(26)
Suppose that all other constraints do not distinguish between the three
candidates, and so they contribute the same constant term  to the har-
mony. The harmony of the states are as follows: H(A) =    q, H(B) =
   q   q, and H(C) =    q. Consequently:
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pA(T ) = P (A! BjT ) = e 
q
T
pC(T ) = P (C ! BjT ) = e 
q
T (27)
What we need is a cooling schedule with a second phase in which pC(T ) 
pA(T ) is large. A useful cooling schedule will start with Tmax[q] q and
end with Tmin[q] q. By having a suﬃcient number of intervening steps,
there will be some Ti[q] = q where  >  > . Such a cooling schedule
can easily be constructed. In the case of a linear cooling schedule (23),
use tmax = tmin = 1, Kmax =  + 0:5 and Kstep = 1. Alternatively, use
Kstep <   , to make sure some Ti[q] = ti  qKi falls between q and q.
If you prefer the exponential cooling schedule scheme (24), then m > n
will make the exponent of q take some value between any two adjacent
integers.
In turn, employing any of these cooling schedule schemes, let i be such
that Ti[q] = ti  q with  >  > . In this case,
lim
q!+1
pA(Ti[q]) = lim
q!+1
e
  q
tiq = 0
lim
q!+1
pC(Ti[q]) = lim
q!+1
e
  q
tiq = 1 (28)
Consequently, pC(Ti[q]) pA(Ti[q]) converges to 1 in the strict domination
limit. For large q, at iteration i, our random walking hedgehog is free to
leave the locally optimal state [C], but is stuck in the global optimum [A].
This situation was already discussed in section 5.2, and we saw that
the probability of ending up in [A] could be made to converge to 1 by
increasing the number of steps in this phase of the algorithm. This can be
achieved, for instance, by reducing the value of the tstep parameter in a
linear cooling schedule (23), or by increasing m in an exponential cooling
schedule (24). If tstep < tmax tmin2k , or if m > 2kn  , then the algorithm will
spend at least 2k iterations such that q > O(Ti[q]) > q, corresponding
to a precision of at least 1  0:5k in the strict domination limit.
Strict domination in this case has proven to be an asset. Increasing q
also increases pC(Ti[q]) pA(Ti[q]), and so simulated annealing is expected
to work better.
6.3. The V landscape: the bad case
The situation will be very diﬀerent with the following tableau (again,  >
, and both are positive integers):
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C C
[A]
[B] * *
[C] *
(29)
This time, H(A) =  +0, H(B) =    q  q and H(C) =    q, whence
pA(T ) = P (A! BjT ) = e 
q+q
T
pC(T ) = P (C ! BjT ) = e 
q
T (30)
What is pC(T )  pA(T ) in the strict domination limit?
lim
q!+1
(pC(T )  pA(T )) = lim
q!+1
e 
q
T

1  e  q

T

=
= lim
q!+1
e 
q
T  lim
q!+1

1  e  q

T

(31)
This limit is always zero. Namely, if T [q] < O(q), that is, if lim qT [q] =1,
then the ﬁrst limit is zero and the second limit is less than or equal to 1.
If, on the other hand, T [q] > O(q) (that is, lim qT [q] = 0), than the second
limit is zero and the ﬁrst limit is less than or equal to 1.
Thus, when simulated annealing is applied to a V landscape with
tableau (29), the diﬀerence pC   pA stays zero in the strict domination
limit, at any temperature. The consequence of this fact for the dynamics
in eq. (25) is that the probability of a hedgehog to be in state [A] or in state
[C] will never diverge, yielding a 50% precision for all cooling schedules.
In summary, we have analyzed two variants of the asymmetric V land-
scape, displaying diﬀerent behaviors in the strict domination limit. As the
parameter q of a q-HG grammar is gradually increased, so does the behav-
ior of simulated annealing approach the behavior of SA-OT. In the case of
tableau (26), the precision converges to 100% as the number of iterations
grows in the second phase; but it stays 50%, independently of the cooling
schedule, for tableau (29). Next, we conﬁrm this analysis with computer
experiments.
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7. Experiments with the V landscape
It is always good practice to also support the conclusions of an analytical
discussion with computer experiments. Therefore, this section reports the
results of simulations run in a V landscape with three states (candidates),
as shown in Fig. 6. Can we conﬁrm the above analyses of the grammars in
tableaux (26) and (29)?
For the sake of concreteness, the two constraints were assigned weights
q2 and q respectively (i.e.,  = 2 and  = 1). Note that in both tableaux,
the relative harmony of the three candidates are independent of q (viz.,
Hq([A]) > Hq([C]) > Hq([B]) for all q), not displaying any kind of cumu-
lativity. Thus, the grammatical output is always [A].
The Java implementation of the simulated annealing algorithm in
Fig. 5 was run on the Atlasz HPC cluster of the ELTE university. For each
parameter combination discussed below, 106 random walks were launched,
so that we could measure the precision of the algorithm by counting the
frequency of returning the globally optimal candidate. With such a large
sample size, the standard error of the population proportion (i.e., the pre-
cision) is below 10 3. We also measured the distribution – mean and stan-
dard deviation – of the length of the random walk, that is, the number of
iterations until convergence.
The three candidates were used by turns as the initial position of
the random walk. The exponential cooling schedule followed (24), with
variable i (initially 0) increased by 1 in each iteration. Parameters c and n
were ﬁxed: c = 100, to ensure a very high initial temperature, and n = 2,
corresponding to the two constraints in the grammar. A step by the random
walker increasing the violation of the higher ranked constraint decreases
the harmony by q2; when the temperature is initially T0 = c  q2, even such
a step has a probability of exp( 1/c)  1. After m steps, temperature
dropped to Tm = 1; this point in time can be roughly seen as the beginning
of the third phase, when temperature has become much lower than the
smallest possible diﬀerence in harmony, q. Increasing parameter c increases
how many of the ﬁrst m iterations “kind-of” belong to the ﬁrst phase,
whereas decreasing parameter c increases the number of iterations in the
“second phase”. Remember that the success of the algorithm depends on
the number of iterations in this second phase. In accordance with our
prediction, simulations conﬁrm that choosing a smaller c slightly improves
the precision of the algorithm.
The stopping condition required the random walker not to move for
` = 60 iterations. Recall that if the random walker is in position [B], it
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will always move to one of its neighbors. It will not move if it is in a local
optimum, and the random number generated is higher than the transition
probability (11). For this to happen 60 times, we must be extremely un-
lucky, unless the transition probability is already extremely low, as the
consequence of a very low temperature. Reducing parameter ` to 40 or
20 will marginally decrease the precision of the algorithm and the aver-
age length of the random walk. Reducing it further to 10 will result in
a more signiﬁcant loss in precision, accompanied by an average length of
the random walk diminished by a few steps. Indeed, given the very large
sample size, it is not unexpected that a few times the random number
generator will produce ten consecutive large values, stopping the algorithm
prematurely.
For each of the two grammars analyzed above, the “good case” and the
“bad case”, we report in details the eﬀect of tuning the two most interesting
parameters: the base q, and m, the speed of simulated annealing. Tables 4
and 6 in the Appendix present the precision for each parameter combina-
tion. Given the sample size of 106 for this binary process (the output being
either “correct” or “incorrect”), the standard error of the sample proportion,
but also the error bar for the estimated proportion is below 0:1%.
Tables 5 and 7 present the speed of convergence: for each parame-
ter combination, the mean and standard deviation of the 106 simulation
lengths. Simulation length refers to the number of iterations until the ran-
dom walker got stuck in the global or another local optimum: the value
of the variable i in the cooling schedule (24) when the stopping condition
becomes true minus `, the number of iterations the random walker has
been stuck here. Again due to the large sample size, the standard error
of the mean in each cell is smaller by three orders of magnitude than the
reported standard deviation.
The number of iterations is comparable to m, while it signiﬁcantly
decreases as q increases. An empirical law of the form nr of iterations =
m  (ln q) approximates the observed data reasonably well, even though
a closer look at the tables reveals a more complex behavior. Fitting the
output of a separate set of experiments, we obtained  = 0:954 and
 =  0:351 for the “good case”, and  = 0:945 and  =  0:361 for the
“bad case” (the diﬀerence between the two cases is highly signiﬁcant). The
conclusion is clear: simulated annealing with a given cooling schedule – in
our case, a speciﬁc value of the parameters c and m – becomes faster in
the strict domination limit.
Returning to precision, the plots in Fig. 7 present the results of yet an-
other set of simulations, each data point measured with 106 runs. Similarly
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Figure 7: Precision of simulated annealing q-HG, as a function of parameters m
and q, for the two grammars discussed: (26) shown on the left panels,
and (29) on the right panels. For a given q, increasing m always im-
proves precision. However, as q grows from 1:1 to 1000 (on a logarithmic
scale), the two grammars display opposite behaviors.
to Tables 4 and 6, we can observe how for a given q, increasing the number
of iterations (increasing m) improves precision. This behavior is not at all
surprising, as a q-HG grammar is a real-valued optimization problem. From
the general convergence properties of “standard” simulated annealing, we
know that a suﬃciently slow cooling schedule will produce high precision.
Mathematically speaking, I conjecture that for any q and all  > 0 there
exists an m such that a speciﬁc q-HG grammar will yield a precision higher
than 1  .
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Yet, this statement with a reversed scope is not necessarily true. Ob-
serve the plots as q grows. In the case of the “good grammar” on the left
panels, the strict domination limit corresponds to some precision between
50% and 100%, depending on m. It reminds us of the precision of SA-OT
with the same tableau, which also depends on the cooling schedule. A
large q paired with a large m easily yields a precision suﬃciently close to
1. But such is not the case on the right panels, corresponding to the “bad
grammar”.
The formal analysis in the previous section and the current experi-
mental results both suggest that no cooling schedule is good enough for all
q-HG grammars based on the “bad case” tableau (29). In fact it seems that
for any cooling schedule – probably even beyond the exponential cooling
schedule scheme (24) – a suﬃciently large q will yield a precision close
enough to the exactly 50% precision observed for the SA-OT Algorithm:
Conjecture 3. For any cooling schedule and for all  > 0, there exists a
q0 > 1 such that for all q > q0 the precision of a q-HG grammar with (29)
is less than 0:5 + .
8. Summary: why is it human to err?
From the old joke with the three greengrocers we learn that optimizing
locally is more convenient for the human brain than optimizing globally.
But then, the hedgehog in the optimization procedure may climb the wrong
hill, producing an error. Therefore, we conclude that to err is human.
We have compared simulated annealing with a real-valued harmony
function, as it happens in connectionist and symbolic harmonic grammars,
to simulated annealing with strict domination. In the former case, one
can choose a suﬃciently slow cooling schedule so that the precision of the
algorithm (the probability of returning the global optimum) be greater
than 1   : the precision can be made to converge to 100%. This is not
the case with strict domination, however. With some grammars – i.e.,
constraint hierarchies, and candidate sets with neighborhood structures –
the precision of the Simulated Annealing for Optimality Theory Algorithm
(SA-OT) does not converge to 1. The same applies to q-HG: if q is large
enough, the precision can be far away from 100%.
Encouraged by Newmeyer (1983) and slightly diverging from standard
terminology, I suggest using the phrase grammatical form for linguistic
forms predicted by a grammar, such as the global optimum in OT-style
frameworks (1). A grammar is a model of the native speaker’s linguistic
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competence, “the speaker-hearer’s knowledge of [their] language” (Chomsky
1965); whereas the implementation of this grammar should mirror the
speaker’s linguistic performance (Smolensky & Legendre 2006; Biró 2006).
Jackendoﬀ (2007, 27) explains Chomsky’s “knowledge” as “whatever is
in speaker’s heads that enables them to speak and understand their native
language(s)”. But what is in one’s head? A network of neurons. Hence, the
motivation to bridge connectionist harmonic grammars to symbolic ones,
and then to OT grammars, via q-HG. Now, should a grammar be an ad-
equate description of the speaker’s knowledge, the grammar will correctly
predict the forms produced and judged as acceptable – provided a perfect
implementation thereof.
In an imperfect implementation, however, errors occur: forms that are
not grammatical, but are nevertheless produced. These could be called
performance errors. Yet, this term has been employed diﬀerently, and so
let me suggest two alternatives. Some of the erroneous forms occur more
frequently if the production algorithm is run more quickly: these could be
seen as fast speech forms in a broad sense. Whereas other forms emerge
independently of the production speed, at least in OT and in the strict
domination limit of q-HG: these can be identiﬁed as irregular forms. An
example is progressive voice assimilation in some special cases in Dutch, a
language which otherwise displays regressive voice assimilation exclusively,
“as a rule” (Biró 2006).
The moral is that linguists need not struggle to have their grammars
encompass each and every form accepted by the native speaker. It might
be a more fruitful strategy to discount some forms, and to aim at a simpler
grammar. Then, the irregular forms contravening the general “rules” may
simply turn out to be errors made by the grammars that do not count.
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Appendix: Numerical results of the computer experiments
Table 4: Precision of the good case grammar (26)
m = 10 20 50 100 200 500 1000 2000 5000
q =1.1 0.518 0.527 0.541 0.555 0.568 0.589 0.612 0.642 0.682
1.2 0.534 0.550 0.578 0.601 0.627 0.665 0.705 0.753 0.815
1.5 0.572 0.607 0.665 0.711 0.758 0.822 0.881 0.933 0.975
2.0 0.612 0.669 0.757 0.821 0.877 0.937 0.975 0.994 0.999
3.0 0.659 0.739 0.850 0.918 0.962 0.991 0.999 1.000 1.000
5.0 0.705 0.803 0.920 0.972 0.994 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
10 0.751 0.860 0.965 0.994 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
20 0.780 0.894 0.983 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
50 0.810 0.922 0.993 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
100 0.826 0.934 0.995 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
200 0.836 0.942 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
500 0.842 0.950 0.998 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1000 0.849 0.955 0.998 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Table 5: Number of iterations in the good case grammar (26)
m = 10 20 50 100 200 500 1000 2000 5000
q =1.1 10.98 22.01 56.65 116.55 239.70 614.41 1232.45 2450.88 6046.75
1.59 2.43 4.59 7.70 13.22 26.14 43.56 73.90 152.49
1.2 10.69 21.38 54.96 113.01 232.27 595.35 1194.37 2374.62 5854.86
1.56 2.39 4.52 7.60 13.13 26.27 43.96 74.55 153.41
1.5 10.02 19.95 51.01 104.57 214.35 548.75 1099.99 2184.72 5379.69
1.51 2.33 4.46 7.58 13.26 27.16 45.28 75.08 148.67
2.0 9.31 18.37 46.58 94.94 193.73 494.83 991.84 1970.70 4857.47
1.49 2.32 4.50 7.70 13.32 26.78 42.77 67.90 132.46
3.0 8.50 16.56 41.36 83.56 169.50 432.51 869.48 1732.28 4277.83
1.49 2.36 4.58 7.60 12.45 23.34 36.09 58.21 116.03
5.0 7.71 14.76 36.13 72.24 145.99 373.31 753.75 1505.55 3723.11
1.51 2.42 4.53 7.00 10.68 19.48 31.07 51.08 102.70
10 6.92 12.92 30.77 60.94 122.96 315.16 638.67 1279.13 3168.20
1.56 2.48 4.31 6.09 8.87 16.69 27.16 44.74 89.88
20 6.35 11.55 26.82 52.77 106.34 272.64 553.96 1111.90 2758.20
1.61 2.52 4.06 5.41 7.86 14.86 24.46 40.24 80.46
50 5.76 10.18 23.00 44.91 90.26 231.19 470.90 947.91 2355.86
1.65 2.53 3.78 4.86 7.00 13.14 21.77 35.78 70.99
100 5.43 9.40 20.83 40.42 81.00 207.30 422.72 852.58 2122.12
1.67 2.54 3.65 4.58 6.51 12.12 20.16 33.13 65.46
200 5.18 8.77 19.07 36.77 73.50 187.85 383.30 774.45 1930.45
1.69 2.55 3.54 4.39 6.14 11.30 18.83 30.92 60.88
500 4.91 8.09 17.21 32.89 65.49 167.04 341.04 690.54 1724.52
1.72 2.55 3.44 4.17 5.75 10.38 17.31 28.44 55.81
1000 4.73 7.68 16.05 30.50 60.52 154.14 314.71 638.14 1595.72
1.75 2.55 3.38 4.06 5.50 9.81 16.35 26.91 52.61
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Table 6: Precision of the bad case grammar (29)
m = 10 20 50 100 200 500 1000 2000 5000
q =1.1 0.621 0.679 0.762 0.824 0.877 0.938 0.976 0.994 0.999
1.2 0.611 0.666 0.745 0.806 0.858 0.922 0.966 0.990 0.999
1.5 0.589 0.634 0.704 0.760 0.811 0.878 0.931 0.971 0.993
2.0 0.567 0.601 0.658 0.706 0.752 0.814 0.871 0.927 0.972
3.0 0.544 0.568 0.608 0.642 0.678 0.728 0.778 0.836 0.903
5.0 0.526 0.539 0.565 0.587 0.611 0.644 0.678 0.722 0.785
10 0.513 0.518 0.532 0.542 0.555 0.574 0.591 0.614 0.653
20 0.506 0.509 0.514 0.520 0.527 0.536 0.545 0.557 0.576
50 0.502 0.504 0.506 0.508 0.510 0.513 0.517 0.522 0.529
100 0.500 0.502 0.502 0.504 0.505 0.507 0.508 0.511 0.514
200 0.500 0.500 0.501 0.502 0.502 0.503 0.504 0.506 0.508
500 0.501 0.500 0.500 0.502 0.501 0.501 0.502 0.502 0.503
1000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.501 0.501 0.500 0.500 0.501 0.502
Table 7: Number of iterations in the bad case grammar (29)
m = 10 20 50 100 200 500 1000 2000 5000
q =1.1 10.14 20.22 51.71 105.81 216.63 552.39 1103.37 2186.02 5373.92
1.69 2.68 5.26 9.03 15.74 31.23 49.89 80.05 157.94
1.2 9.85 19.61 50.16 102.73 210.45 537.24 1073.91 2128.33 5232.02
1.64 2.59 5.06 8.70 15.16 30.37 48.89 78.65 154.65
1.5 9.16 18.21 46.57 95.50 195.92 501.70 1005.05 1993.59 4901.74
1.54 2.39 4.59 7.86 13.76 28.10 46.17 75.06 147.26
2.0 8.41 16.66 42.58 87.41 179.55 461.50 927.14 1842.21 4533.82
1.43 2.19 4.13 7.01 12.19 25.14 42.06 69.73 137.79
3.0 7.56 14.86 37.90 77.84 160.10 413.03 833.04 1659.85 4092.47
1.32 1.98 3.67 6.12 10.56 21.79 36.52 61.44 123.89
5.0 6.70 13.07 33.20 68.14 140.28 362.96 734.92 1468.62 3629.50
1.21 1.80 3.27 5.39 9.17 18.78 31.33 52.62 107.00
10 5.83 11.22 28.32 58.05 119.51 309.87 629.85 1262.57 3128.02
1.11 1.62 2.90 4.73 7.94 16.23 26.94 44.85 90.77
20 5.17 9.83 24.63 50.42 103.75 269.27 548.93 1103.20 2738.12
1.06 1.50 2.63 4.26 7.10 14.46 24.16 40.01 80.23
50 4.50 8.45 20.98 42.85 88.11 228.78 467.81 943.04 2345.53
0.96 1.37 2.37 3.80 6.29 12.75 21.47 35.44 70.64
100 4.12 7.65 18.86 38.43 78.99 205.15 420.16 848.85 2114.38
0.88 1.29 2.22 3.52 5.81 11.74 19.87 32.77 65.13
200 3.84 7.00 17.13 34.83 71.53 185.80 381.02 771.42 1924.41
0.84 1.23 2.09 3.30 5.41 10.88 18.51 30.52 60.45
500 3.54 6.30 15.28 30.98 63.56 165.08 338.97 687.90 1719.52
0.86 1.15 1.94 3.05 4.98 9.95 17.01 28.17 55.43
1000 3.33 5.88 14.13 28.58 58.59 152.17 312.68 635.62 1591.19
0.86 1.11 1.85 2.89 4.71 9.38 16.07 26.62 52.31
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ABSTRACT
Vector representations ofwords, after decades of being at the periphery
of computer linguistics, are today widely used and researched. Accord-
ing to our terminology, representing aword involves a function assigning
a vector to each word from a finite set (vocabulary). In this paper we
investigate certain properties and limitations of word vectors with the
aim of improving them. We also present a novel method for learning not
vector, but matrix representation of words. The matrices are the re-
sult of gradient descent learning where the objective function rewards
the presence of a word in its neighboring context, similar to language
modeling.
1. Preliminaries
Vector representations of words, after decades of being at the periphery of
computer linguistics, are today widely used and researched.
According to our terminology, representing a word involves a function
which assigns a vector (in Rd) to every word from a ﬁnite set (vocabu-
lary) V .
v : V 7! Rd
Early experiments focused on language modeling with neural architectures
(Xu & Rudnicky 2000 and Bengio et al. 2003) instead of n-gram models
(Kneser & Ney 1995). Referred to as distributional vector semantics, word
embeddings, or word vectors, they are now oﬀ-the-shelf tools in the ﬁeld
of natural language processing (NLP) as of Mikolov et al. (2013a) and
Pennington et al. (2014). In case of these tools the function v is learned
from a corpus of monolingual, unlabeled, tokenized text. Their learning
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objective is similar to that of language modeling in the sense that they
maximize the likelihood of a word in its neighboring context.
Word vectors have proven useful in several applications: e.g., sentiment
analysis Socher et al. (2013), diachronic semantics change Hamilton et al.
(2016), zero-shot learning Dinu et al. (2015), neural dependency parsing
Dozat et al. (2017), and have also been scientiﬁcally investigated, e.g., in
Arora et al. (2016).
In this paper we investigate certain properties and limitations of word
vectors with the aim of improving them. We also present a novel method
for learning not vector, but matrix representations of words.
In sections 2 and 3 we provide some theoretical background. Section 4
presents the actual training objectives and models. Some numerical results
are provided in section 5.
2. Vector space structure
As seen in Mikolov et al. (2013b) and in Mikolov et al. (2013c) the linear
structure of trained vector models is undeniable, meaning that the semantic
structure is well represented by vector operations (linear combination and
dot product). From analogy questions (king-man+woman=queen) through
word similarity (angle of word vectors) and translation (vdog  T eng to ger =
vHund) to even some phrases (Chinese+river=Yangtze), linear vector space
structure seems to be empirically justiﬁed.
However, word vectors alone are not suitable for composing phrases
or sequences of words. In the example above Chinese+river is not the
same as ‘Chinese river’, at least not more so than ‘river Chinese’. Vector
addition is commutative, i.e. results are independent of the order of the
operands. This is why the vector addition itself is not suited for modeling
composition. The sum of words may be used to represent a phrase, but
tackling compositionality in general is a demanding task.
In Socher et al. (2013) parse trees were used to recursively process
phrases to create sentence representations. In Hill et al. (2016) the LSTM
architecture (Long Short-Term Memory, Hochreiter & Schmidhuber 1997)
was used to represent phrases. Learning compositional mechanisms to em-
bed entities of various length (words, phrases and sentences) are of central
interest to modern neural language processing.
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3. Algebras
The question arises naturally: which are the appropriate mathematical
structures (and composition rules) for a word embedding. The performance
of vector models suggests that vector space structure is a good starting
point. We also mentioned that beside the useful + operation, words tend
to require an additional operation, which composes them, and this com-
position is non-commutative. An algebra over the real ﬁeld is a reasonable
choice Rudolph & Giesbrecht (2010).
C;+
V; 
A
R; 
Figure 1: Algebras versus other structures
In Figure 1 the symbols C, V , R and A represent commutative groups,
vector spaces, rings, and algebras, respectively. Commutative groups have
a commutative addition operator (among others), vector spaces also have
dot product (and also scalar multiplication). A ring has addition and (non-
commutative) multiplication and an algebra is equipped with all of these
operations.
Note that in a group, in theory, one can compute elements like
Chinese+river or even subtract: Volga   Russia, but there is no way of
comparing the result to existing vocabulary entries. In a vector space, the
dot product can be used to measure similarities between elements, while
scalar multiplication allows us to calculate averages over certain elements.
In a ring, one can use the multiplication operator to model composition,
but it still lacks some properties of the vector space. Algebras meet all of
these requirements.
As a special case of algebras, matrix algebras consist of square matri-
ces, which are central to our investigations. Hence the name matrix em-
bedding: we want to train square matrices for each word in a vocabulary,
given a corpus of sentences.
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The algebra operations would look something like this:
green+ orange  yellow-ish color or a team with these colors
green  orange  “green orange” like an unriped fruit
4. Learning matrices
Let V be our vocabulary: a ﬁnite set of symbols (words). Let C  V  be
a collection of sentences, i.e., a corpus. We seek a map which assigns a
matrix to each word: M : V 7! Rdd. The size of matrices (d) is a model
parameter.
In order to train such a map we must impose an objective function
that measures how good a sentence is.
f : V  7! R
We wish to ﬁnd an appropriate f and optimize it with respect to M given
the corpus of sentences.
First we make some restrictions on the function f . Since we want to
model composition via matrix multiplication, f will be evaluated solely on
matrices, not on series of matrices. The score of a sentence should be the
score of the product of its words.
f(“the dog barks”) = f(Mthe Mdog Mbarks)
Note that compositionality takes place in the matrix product, the product
of three matrices is also a matrix, which is in the same vector space as its
components, although not necessarily in the vocabulary.
As in Pennington et al. (2014), we choose the scoring function to be
linear in its components. In the example above, it is linear in all of its
inputs: “the”, “dog” and “barks”.
f(Mthe Mdog Mbarks)  logP(“the dog barks”)
In our work we choose f in a way similar to Rudolph & Giesbrecht (2010):
f(M) = v> M  w
f(Mthe Mdog Mbarks) = v> Mthe Mdog Mbarks  w
where v and w are column vectors, depending on the model which will be
speciﬁed later.
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In the following subsections we introduce various models which imple-
ment the above ideas. All of them are suitable for optimization and indeed
train the embedding M but with diﬀerent approaches. Numerical results
are presented in section 5.
4.1. Neural network model
The following model one does not make predictions about the probabilities
of full sentences, but only about probabilities of individual words appearing
in a given context. f shall be such that
f(contextbefore;word; contextafter) = P(wordjcontext)X
w2V
f(contextbefore; w; contextafter) = 1:
Our architecture consists of an embedding layer M , a composition layer
using matrix dot product, and a readout layer that is a softmax function
over the vocabulary (given a ﬁxed context).
1>
the dog
...
cat
has
...
|{z}
softmax over V
barks
1
Figure 2: Neural architecture of the matrix embedding model
In formulas, the objective is to minimize the entropy in every context, like:
  log exp
 
1> Mthe Mdog Mbarks  1
P
v2V exp (1> Mthe Mv Mbarks  1)
! min
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Or, more precisely, to maximize the following in M .
X
(cb;w;ca)2C
240@1> 
0@Y
b2cb
Mb
1A Mw  Y
a2ca
Ma
!
 1
1A 
log
X
v2V
exp
0@1> 
0@Y
b2cb
Mb
1A Mv  Y
a2ca
Ma
!
 1
1A35
where cb and ca are the context before and after the word w and the
products are ordered (non-commutative) matrix dot products. Contexts
are not required to be symmetric or of constant width, an empty product
yields the identity matrix, which can be used as a placeholder.
Note that this model does not assign probabilities to a whole sentence,
only to certain choices of words. The probability of a sentence is hard
to measure (see Kornai 2010), therefore we do not require the model to
calculate them.
4.2. Direct probabilistic model
We modify the above model in a way that the probability of every sen-
tence, phrase, and word is calculated directly. To obtain a full probabilistic
model we eliminate the softmax in the neural model, this is achieved by
constraining the matrices Mw to ensure they have a total probability of
1. Then the probability of the skip-gram “the »anything« barks” in the
corpus can be deﬁned as X
w2V
P(the w barks) =X
w2V
1> Mthe Mw Mbarks  1 =
P(the »anything« barks)
Since the above formula is linear in the middle matrix, we can calculate a
placeholder
M :=
X
w2V
Mw
which does not change the probability of any sequence, no matter where
it is inserted. We also require that P(»anything«) = 1.
In this model matrices have an inevitable probabilistic interpretation.
We postulate the following constraints over M :
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• positivity of the elements: (Mw)i;j  0,
• right-stochastic sum:X
w2V
Mw is a right-stochastic matrix
i.e., its rows sum up to 1.
Under these conditions we can state the following:
• 1d  1>  (M)n  1 = 1 for n = 0; 1; 2 : : :
• If v 2 R1d has non-negative entries and sums up to 1, then vM also
has non-negative entries and sums up to 1 (i.e., keeps the probabilistic
row vectors).
• (M)n is also a right-stochastic matrix, thereforeX
w12V
: : :
X
wn2V
1
d
1>Mw1   Mwn1 =
1
d
1>(M)n1 = 1:
In this setup we can simply calculate the probability of any phrase or series
of words as
P(w1w2 : : : wn) =
1
d
1>Mw1Mw2   Mwn1:
This model can be trained on a weighted corpus, where every sentence
has an empirical probability p, in this case we must minimize the KL
divergence.
argmin
constraints on M
X
c2C
P(c)=p
p  log
 
p
1
d1
>  Q
w2cMw

1
!
If the corpus has no weights then we assume p  1.
The models so far were discriminative models.
4.3. Continuous WFSA
We can generalize weighted ﬁnite state automata by modifying the above
model, and we can optimize a continuous ﬁnite state automaton to ﬁt a
weighted language. Similar connections between WFSAs and matrix rep-
resentations of words can be found in Asaadi & Rudolph (2016). We also
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introduce a learning algorithm to obtain our matrix embeddings, which in
turn can help us learn automata. As future work, these techniques may be
relevant in MDL (Minimum Description Length) learning of automata, as
in Kornai et al. (2013).
In the previous model the left-hand-side of the product can be con-
sidered as a context or state vector.
1
d
1> Mthe Mdog| {z }
previous state
Mbarks
| {z }
the state after ”barks”
1
| {z }
probability of the whole outcome
In a way, the initial row vector 1d1> is carried through the sentence and
we can obtain the probability of the current state by applying the column
vector 1.
Some modiﬁcation is needed to justify this intuition and introduce
WFSA. We change the constraints on the embedding M , since the state of
an automaton should always sum up to 1. In the previous model the sum of
the earlier mentioned row vector decreases as the sentence spans. Let Mw
be a right-stochastic matrix for every word w 2 V . Then the automaton
starts from the uniform state 1d1> and every word acts as a transition on
this state.
v|{z}
state
action of wz}|{! v Mw| {z }
new state
(1)
Some additional action is required, since the sum of every state is now
1 and we want to obtain meaningful probabilities. Let R 2 RdjV j be a
matrix of non-negative entries which is responsible for emissions. In neural
network terminology we would call this the readout layer.
At every state v the columns of the matrix R determine which word
should follow.
P(next word is wj state v) = v  R;w|{z}
wth column
(2)
Constraints on R and M are listed below.
• Mw is a right-stochastic matrix 8w 2 V .
• The rows of R sum up to 1 (and R has non-negative entries).
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Under these constraints an automaton arises:
• The states are 1; 2 : : : d.
• The initial state is uniform over the states: 1d1>.
• A word w acts as a transition function on the states as in (1).
• The outcomes (or emissions) at a given state (probabilistic row vec-
tor) v follow as in (2).
Finally, the probability of an emission sequence is the following product:
P(w1w2 : : : wn) =1
>R;w1| {z }
P(w1)
1>Mw1R;w2| {z }
P(w2jw1)
  
1>
n 1Y
i=1
MwiR;wn| {z }
P(wnjw1w2:::wn 1)
Given a corpus or a weighted language, we can use the same objective
function as in the previous section and train M and R.
Note that, unlike in the previous two models, this model is not sen-
sitive to future words. The next emission and state does not depend on
following words. In contrast to the previous one, this is a generative model.
5. Results
Our experimental setup used the UMBC gigaword corpus (Han et al. 2013)
which was tokenized and split at sentence boundaries (punctuation part-
of-speech tag). The words were not converted into lowercase. It contains
about 3.338G words, the average length of a sentence is about 24 with stan-
dard deviation 15. For computational reasons, we excluded long sentences,
leaving 126.7M sentences to work with.
Words with frequency below 52 were replaced with a unique symbol
<UNK>, leaving roughly 100k types in the vocabulary (precisely 100147).
The implementation is not detailed herein, but the code is available.1
We encountered some serious numerical obstacles in case of model
4.1. We are not certain whether these numerical issues are caused by the
1 https://github.com/hlt-bme-hu/lm_me, see C++ code for neural model, python
(theano) implementation for the other two models.
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implementation or by the mathematical model, but the problem occurs if
the stochastic gradient descent encounters the same token several times
in the same sentence. Nevertheless, this problem did not occur in models
4.2 and 4.3. The ﬁrst model diﬀers from the others in several aspects: im-
plementation language, mathematical model, and also in gradient descent
strategy.
The performance of each model was measured on Google Analogy
questions Mikolov et al. (2013a), see evaluation code below.2 Cosine simi-
larity was used on the ﬂattened matrices. The third model did not achieve
meaningful quality within reasonable computation time, here we only
present results of the second model.
The table below shows the number of correctly answered questions of
each trained model. Commutative means that the matrices were 100 100
diagonal matrices; they form a commutative algebra. This can be consid-
ered as a fallback to word vectors. The dense models consist of 10  10
dense matrices.
Algebra Model Nr. correct
commutative 4.2 555
dense 4.2 81
The model 4.3 could answer 1 or 2 questions after equal amount of training.
6. Outlook
We introduced several techniques to train matrix embeddings of words
with various numerical eﬃciency and quality.
Training high quality embeddings and/or automata is our future in-
terest. There are some obvious obstacles in computation time, since the
training of a well tuned embedding usually takes days and matrix models
are expected to require even more computation time.
A possible computational enhancement is the use of structured, sparse
matrices, of which we train only certain elements, hence taking a sub-
algebra of the full matrix algebra. This hastens some calculations but keeps
the desired algebra properties intact. To this end, further studies of matrix
algebras and their sub-algebras are considered.
2 https://github.com/hlt-bme-hu/eval-embed
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Currently these experiments are in a preliminary state, but many im-
provements and applications are possible. As my supervisor, András Kor-
nai, has once described it, “Like socialism; appealing idea, but not working
in practice”.
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ABSTRACT
Dataflow matrix machines (DMMs) generalize neural nets by replacing
streams of numbers with linear streams (streams supporting linear
combinations), allowing arbitrary input and output arities for activation
functions, countable-sized networks with finite dynamically changeable
active part capable of unbounded growth, and a very expressive self-
referential mechanism.
DMMs are suitable for general-purpose programming, while retaining
the key property of recurrent neural networks: programs are expressed
viamatrices of real numbers, and continuous changes to thosematrices
produce arbitrarily small variations in the associated programs.
Spaces of V-values (vector-like elements based on nested maps) are
particularly useful, enabling DMMswith variadic activation functions and
conveniently representing conventional data structures.
1. Introduction
András Kornai wrote his Mathematical Linguistics book (Kornai 2008)
while he and the ﬁrst author of the present paper were working in the
same oﬃce at MetaCarta during the previous decade and sharing many
fruitful moments. The book published ten years ago was written as an
introduction to the mathematical foundations of linguistics for computer
scientists, engineers, and mathematicians interested in natural language
processing.
Dataﬂow matrix machines emerged two years ago (see Bukatin &
Matthews 2015b) and a series of technical papers have been written on
the subject since then (Bukatin et al. 2016a;b;c;d; Bukatin & Anthony
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2017). The present paper is meant to be an introduction to the subject
for researchers and engineers working in other ﬁelds. We tried to keep the
style of chapters and sections of Mathematical Linguistics in mind while
writing this article.
[ [ [
Artiﬁcial neural networks are a powerful machine learning platform
based on processing the streams of numbers.
It is long known that recurrent neural networks are expressive enough
to encode any algorithm, if they are equipped with a reasonable form of
unbounded memory (McCulloch & Pitts 1943; Pollack 1987; Siegelmann &
Sontag 1995). There is a long history of synthesis of algorithms expressed
as neural networks both by compilation and by machine learning methods.
However, conventional neural networks belong to the class of esoteric
programming languages and do not constitute a convenient platform for
manual software engineering.
In particular, there is a considerable history of using neural net-
works to synthesize and modify other neural networks, including self-
modiﬁcation. However, the limitations of conventional neural networks as
a software engineering platform make eﬀorts of this kind quite challenging.
The main key point of the approach of dataﬂow matrix machines is
that the natural degree of generality for the neural model of computations
is not the streams of numbers, but arbitrary linear streams.
The other enhancements dataﬂow matrix machines make to the neu-
ral model of computations are neurons of variable input and output ar-
ity, novel models of unbounded memory based on countable-sized weight-
connectivity matrices with ﬁnite number of non-zero weights at any given
time and, more generally, on streams of countable-dimensional vectors,
and explicit self-referential facilities.
This results in a more powerful and expressive machine learning plat-
form.
When one considers dataﬂow matrix machines as a software engineer-
ing framework, it turns out that the restriction to linear streams and to
programs which admit continuous deformations is less severe than one
could have thought a priori given the discrete nature of conventional pro-
gramming languages.
Dataﬂow matrix machines are considerably closer to being a general-
purpose programming platform than recurrent neural nets, while retaining
the key property of recurrent neural nets that large classes of programs
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can be parametrized by matrices of numbers, and therefore synthesizing
appropriate matrices is suﬃcient to synthesize programs.
Linear streams. Dataﬂow matrix machines are built around the notion
of linear streams. Generally speaking, we say that a space of streams is
a space of linear streams, if a meaningful notion of linear combination of
several streams with numerical coeﬃcients is well-deﬁned.
The simplest example of a space of linear streams is the space of
sequences of numbers. A slightly more complicated example comes from
considering a vector space V and the space of sequences of its elements,
(v1; v2; : : :).
In the ﬁrst few sections of this paper, this simple version of the notion
of linear streams would be suﬃcient. The discrete time is represented by
non-negative integers, a particular vector space V is ﬁxed, and the space
of functions from time to V forms the space of linear streams in question.
To distinguish between streams based on diﬀerent linear spaces, e.g.,
V1 and V2, we talk about diﬀerent kinds of linear streams.
In section 5, we describe a suﬃciently general notion of linear streams
which includes, for example, streams of samples from sequences of proba-
bility distributions over an arbitrary measurable spaceX. All constructions
in the present paper work in this degree of generality.
Neuron types. The originally developed formalism of dataﬂow matrix
machines was heavily typed (Bukatin et al. 2016b). One considered a di-
verse collection of kinds of linear streams, and a diverse collection of types
of neurons with explicit ﬁxed input and output arities.
The more recent version is close to being type free. It uses a single
kind of linear streams based on a “suﬃciently universal” space of elements
we call V-values. V-values enable the use of variadic neurons which have
arbitrary input and output arities, eliminating the need to keep track of
input and output arities. The neuron types still exist in that they have
diﬀerent activation functions.
Structure of this paper. We start with an informal introduction to
recurrent neural networks and to the typed version of dataﬂow matrix
machines (DMMs) in section 2. In section 3, we present the theory of V-
values. In section 4, we describe DMMs based on V-values and variadic
neurons. We discuss linear streams in section 5. In that section we also
discuss embeddings of discrete objects into vector spaces, and into spaces
of linear streams.
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Programming patterns in DMMs are presented in section 6. A very ex-
pressive self-referential mechanism which is a key element of our approach
is presented in section 7.
The issues related to expressing the network topology are the subject
of section 8 and the issues related to subnetworks and modularization are
the subject of section 9.
We discuss some of the potential approaches to using DMMs in ma-
chine learning in section 10. The concluding section 11 contains historical
remarks and discussion of related work.
2. From recurrent neural networks to dataflowmatrix machines
The essence of artiﬁcial neural architectures is that linear and nonlinear
transformations are interleaved. Then one can control neural computations
by only modifying the linear part and keeping the non-linear part ﬁxed.
Therefore, neural architectures such as recurrent neural networks
(RNNs) can be viewed as “two-stroke engines” (Figure 1), where the “two-
stroke cycle” of a linear “down movement” followed by a typically non-linear
“up movement” is repeated indeﬁnitely.
The network consists of the weight matrix W and the neurons. The
neuron k has input and output streams of numbers, xtk and ytk, associated
with it, where t is discrete time. The network also has streams of numbers
itm representing external inputs, and streams of numbers otn representing
external outputs.
imi1
x1
f1
y1
xk
fk
yk
o1 on
W
Figure 1: “Two-stroke engine” for an RNN. Figure from Bukatin & Anthony
(2017).
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On the “down movement”, neuron inputs and network external outputs are
computed by applying linear transformationW to the neuron outputs and
network external inputs: (xt+11 ; : : : ; xt+1k ; ot+11 ; : : : ; ot+1n )> =W(yt1; : : : ; ytk;
it1; : : : ; i
t
m)
>. On the “up movement”, the neurons calculate their outputs
from their inputs using activation functions fk which are built into each
neuron k and are usually non-linear: yt+11 = f1(xt+11 ); : : : ; yt+1k = fk(xt+1k ).
Note that the computations during the “up movement” are local to the
neuron in question, while the computations during the linear “down move-
ment” are potentially quite global, as any neuron output might potentially
be linked to any neuron input by a non-zero element of W.
Now, moving from RNNs to dataﬂow matrix machines (DMMs), con-
sider a ﬁnite or countable collection of kinds of linear streams, a ﬁnite
or countable collection of neuron types, with every neuron type specify-
ing non-negative integer number of inputs, non-negative integer number
of outputs, the kind of linear streams associated with each input and each
output, and an activation function transforming the inputs to the outputs.
Take a countable collection of neurons of each type, so that we have a
countable-sized overall network. However, we’ll make sure that only a ﬁnite
part of this network is active at any given time (similarly to only a ﬁnite
part of the Turing machine tape having non-blank symbols at any given
time), and that processing time and memory are only spent on working
with the currently active part, while the rest exists simply as potentially
inﬁnite address space.
The network consists of a countable-sized connectivity matrix W and
a countable-sized collection of neurons described in the previous paragraph.
The connectivity matrix W depends1 on discrete time t.
The matrix element wt(i;Ck);(j;Cl) is the weight linking the output j ofthe neuron Cl to the input i of the neuron Ck at the moment t. We impose
the condition that at any given moment of time t only ﬁnite number of
matrix elements wt(i;Ck);(j;Cl) are non-zero. Hence the connectivity matrix isinherently sparse, and the structure of its non-zero weights determines the
actual connectivity pattern of the network at any given moment of time.
The DMM “two-stroke engine” in a fashion similar to that of RNNs
has a “two-stroke cycle” consisting of a linear “down movement” followed
by an “up movement” performed by the activation functions of neurons
(Figure 2). This “two-stroke cycle” is repeated indeﬁnitely.
1 When W changes with time, this change can be controlled from the outside or by
the network itself via the self-referential mechanism described in section 7.
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y2;C1y1;C1
x1;C1 x2;C1
fC1
x3;C1 x1;C2
fC2
x2;C2
y1;C2
y2;C2 y3;C2
W
Figure 2: “Two-stroke engine” for a standard DMM (Bukatin & Anthony 2017).
Two of its neurons, C1 and C2, are explicitly shown.
“Down movement” is deﬁned as follows. For all inputs xi;Ck where there is
a non-zero weight wt(i;Ck);(j;Cl):
xt+1i;Ck =
X
f(j;Cl)jwt(i;Ck);(j;Cl) 6=0g
wt(i;Ck);(j;Cl)  ytj;Cl : (1)
Note that xt+1i;Ck and y
t
j;Cl
may no longer be numbers, but elements of linear
streams xi;Ck and yj;Cl , so in order for Equation 1 to be well-deﬁned we
impose the type correctness condition which states that wt(i;Ck);(j;Cl) isallowed to be non-zero only if xi;Ck and yj;Cl belong to the same kind of
linear streams.2
We call a neuron C active at the time t, if there is at least one non-zero
connectivity weight from W associated with one of its inputs or outputs.
Since W has only a ﬁnite number of non-zero weights at any given time,
there are only a ﬁnite number of active neurons in the network at any
given time.
“Up movement” is deﬁned as follows. For all active neurons C:
yt+11;C ; :::; y
t+1
n;C = fC(x
t+1
1;C ; :::; x
t+1
m;C): (2)
Here m is the input arity of neuron C and n is its output arity, so fC has
m inputs and n outputs. If m = 0, then fC has no arguments. If n = 0,
then the neuron just consumes data, and does not produce streams on
2 Recall that the number of inputs and outputs of a neuron C, the kind of linear
streams associated with each particular input or output of this neuron, and the built-
in activation function fC of this neuron are determined by the type of the neuron in
question.
K + K = 120 / p. 159 / February 1, 2020
Dataflowmatrix machines and V-values 159
the “up movement”. Given that the input and output arities of neurons
are allowed to be zero, special handling of network inputs and outputs
which was necessary for RNNs (Figure 1) is not needed here. The neurons
responsible for network input and output are included on par with all other
neurons.
The resulting formalism is very powerful, and we discuss what can be
done with it later in the paper. However, its complexity is a bit unpleasant.
The need to keep track of various kinds of linear streams and of the details
of various neuron types is rather tiresome. It would be great to have only
one suﬃciently expressive kind of linear streams, and, moreover, to avoid
the need to specify the arity of activation functions, while still enjoying
the power of having multiple inputs and outputs within a single neuron.
The spaces of V-values discussed in the next section allow us to achieve
just that, while further increasing the power of a single neuron.
3. V-values
In this section, we deﬁne vector space V which is suﬃciently rich to rep-
resent vectors from many other spaces encountered in practice.
In section 5.3, we show how to enrich this construction in those situ-
ations where it is not suﬃciently universal, resulting in a family of vector
spaces.
We call both the elements of these vector spaces and the hash-map-
based representations of those elements V-values. In our context, V-values
play the role somewhat similar to the role of S-expressions in the context
of Lisp.
Implementation-wise, we create a version of S-expressions which is
dictionary-based, rather than list-based. In this section, we require all
atoms of those dictionary-based S-expressions to be numbers. A more gen-
eral form of leaves in V-values is considered in section 5.3.
Speaking more formally, we start with a ﬁnite or countable alpha-
bet L of labels (which we sometimes call tokens or keys). One can think
about elements of L as words from some language deﬁned over some other
alphabet, which allows us to think about meaningful languages of labels.
We are going to consider several equivalent ways to deﬁne tree-like
structures with intermediate nodes labeled by elements of L and with
leaves labeled by numbers. Some of these ways are “depth-ﬁrst”, and they
are easier to present mathematically, and some are “breadth-ﬁrst”, and
they are more fundamental to us, as we use them in our implementation
and as they enable the use of variadic neurons.
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These tree-like structures can be viewed as
– Finite linear combinations of ﬁnite strings;
– Finite preﬁx trees with numerical leaves;
– Sparse “tensors of mixed rank” with ﬁnite number of non-zero ele-
ments;
– Recurrent maps from V = R (L! V ) admitting ﬁnite descriptions.
3.1. Finite linear combinations of finite strings
To start with “depth-ﬁrst” methods, consider space L of ﬁnite sequences
of elements of L (including the empty sequence), and construct V as the
vector space of formal ﬁnite linear combinations3 of the elements of L
over R.
We denote the empty sequence of elements of L as ", and we denote
non-empty sequences of elements of L, (l1; : : : ; ln), as l1  : : : ln. Since
we are talking about formal ﬁnite linear combinations of elements of L,
we need a notation for the multiplication of real number  and generator
l1  : : : ln,   (l1  : : : ln).
For reasons, which become apparent in the next subsection, it is con-
venient to denote   (l1  : : : ln) as l1  : : : ln  .
3.2. Finite prefix trees with numerical leaves
One can think of l1  : : :  ln as a path in a preﬁx tree (trie), with
intermediate nodes being labeled by letters from L. So when one considers
 2 R, one can express the presence of term   (l1  : : :  ln) in our
linear combination as presence of path with the intermediate nodes labeled
by l1; : : : ; ln and the leaf labeled by . We denote this path as l1  : : : 
ln  . Because we have ﬁnite linear combinations (terms and paths
corresponding to  = 0 tend to be omitted), we are talking about ﬁnite
preﬁx trees with numerical leaves.
Example. The linear combination 3.5  (") + 2  (:foo) + 7  (:foo :bar)
  4  (:baz :foo :bar), i.e., ( 3.5) + (:foo  2) + (:foo  :bar  
7) + (:baz  :foo  :bar   4).
3 the space of functions f : L ! R such that f(w) 6= 0 for no more than ﬁnite
number of w 2 L; the operations are pointwise: (f + g)(w) = f(w) + g(w) and
(f)(w) = f(w)
K + K = 120 / p. 161 / February 1, 2020
Dataflowmatrix machines and V-values 161
3.5
:foo
:bar
7
2
:baz
:foo
:bar
 4
Figure 3: The preﬁx tree for this example
The empty string " with non-zero coeﬃcient , written as   (") or simply
 , corresponds to the leaf with non-zero  attached directly to the root
of the tree.
The preﬁx tree (trie) for this example is shown in Figure 3. In this
particular example, we label intermediate nodes with Clojure keywords,
which start with “:” character. This example reminds us about the earlier
remark that one can often think about letters from alphabet L as words
from some language deﬁned over some other, more conventional alphabet,
and that this allows us to think about meaningful languages of labels.
3.3. Sparse “tensors of mixed rank”
Yet another “depth-ﬁrst” way of looking at this situation is to consider
l1  : : : ln   to be an element of sparse multidimensional array with
n dimensions. E.g., l1  l2   is an element of a sparse matrix with its
row labeled by l1 and its column labeled by l2 and  being the value of
the element.
The non-zero leaf attached directly to the root of the tree, (") = ,
is considered to be a scalar with value .
Each string of length one with non-zero coeﬃcient , that is l  
(the leaf with non-zero  attached to the end of the path of length one
with the intermediate node in the path labeled by l), is considered to be a
coordinate of a sparse array, where the coordinate is labeled by l and has
value .
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Each string (path) of length three with non-zero coeﬃcient  0, written
as l1  l2  l3   0, is considered to be an element of sparse three-
dimensional array, etc.
The standard convention in machine learning is to call multidimen-
sional arrays with n dimensions “tensors of rank n”. Because our linear
combinations generally include sequences from L of diﬀerent lengths, we
have to talk about sparse “tensors of mixed rank”. For example, the vector
( 3.5) + (:foo  2) + (:foo  :bar  7) + (:baz  :foo  :bar
  4) from the previous subsection is the sum of scalar 3.5, sparse array
with one non-zero element d1[:foo] = 2, sparse matrix with one non-zero
element d2[:foo, :bar] = 7, and sparse three-dimensional array with one
non-zero element d3[:baz, :foo, :bar] = -4, so it is a typical “tensor
of mixed rank”.
Therefore all usual vectors, matrices, and tensors of any dimension
can be represented in V . This is convenient from the viewpoint of machine
learning as multidimensional tensors often occur in the machine learning
practice.
The space V is a direct sum of the one-dimensional space of scalars and
spaces of n-dimensional arrays: V = V0  V1  V2 : : : Since L is countably
inﬁnite, V1; V2; : : : are inﬁnite-dimensional vector spaces. If L is ﬁnite and
consists of Card(L) elements, then the dimension of Vi as a vector space
is Cardi(L).
This is also a good point to transition to “breadth-ﬁrst” representa-
tions. A sparse matrix can also be viewed as a map from elements of L
labeling its non-zero rows to the sparse vectors representing those rows
(these sparse vectors are maps from elements of L labeling columns of the
matrix to the values of the actual non-zero matrix elements; zero elements
are omitted, as usual).
3.4. Recurrent maps
To obtain a “breadth-ﬁrst” representation for a general element v 2 V , we
ﬁrst note that there is a possibility that the   (") =  belongs to v with
non-zero coeﬃcient , in which case the corresponding coordinate of v is
a non-zero “tensor of rank 0”, i.e., the scalar with value .
Then for each letter l1 2 L, such that some non-zero term l1  l2  
: : :  ln   belongs to v, we consider all terms from v which share the
same ﬁrst letter l1, namely l1  l2  : : :  ln  ; l1  l02  : : :  
l0m  ; : : :, and consider vl1 2 V consisting of those terms with the ﬁrst
letter removed, namely l2  : : : ln  ; l02  : : : l0m  ; : : :
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We map each such letter l1 to vl1 , and we map each letter l 2 L for
which v does not have a non-zero term starting from l to zero vector (zero
element of V). The ﬁnite description of our map only needs to include the
ﬁnite set of hl1; vl1i pairs, and pairs hl; 0i and hl1; 0i can all be omitted.
An element of v is then a pair consisting of a scalar and a map from
L to V admitting a ﬁnite description. Either or both elements of this pair
can be zero.
As a vector space, V satisﬁes the following equation:
V = R (L! V ): (3)
Here L! V is a space of such maps from L to V that only a ﬁnite number
of elements of L map to non-zero elements of V . Let us call such maps
ﬁnitary. This equation is an isomorphism of vector spaces. It reﬂects the
fact that every element v 2 V can be represented as a pair of  2 R and
ﬁnitary map l 7! vl, as was shown earlier in the present subsection, and
vice versa every pair consisting of  2 R and a ﬁnitary map L ! V is
obtained in this fashion.
We would like to be able to represent elements of V not by pairs of a
number and a map, but simply by maps. To include numbers  into the
map itself, we would need a separate label for them that does not appear
in L. Thus we take a new key n 62 L and L0 = L [ fng, then represent
h; fhl1; vl1i; : : : ; hln; vlnigi as fhn; i; hl1; vl1i; : : : ; hln; vlnig.
Since R is embedded into V via representation of  2 R as h; 0i, space
V is isomorphic to a subspace of L0 ! V . This isomorphism is why we call
this space a space of recurrent maps: every element of V is represented as
a ﬁnitary map from extended alphabet L0 to the space V itself.
This representation of V via ﬁnitary maps to V is fundamental to our
constructions in the present paper, because it translates directly to our
Clojure implementation of core DMMs primitives (DMM 2016–2017) and
because it allows us to introduce variadic neurons.
Implementation.We implement elements v 2 V as recurrent maps. Usu-
ally, programming languages provide dictionaries or hash-maps suitable for
this purpose. In our Clojure implementation, elements v 2 V are repre-
sented by hash-maps, which map elements of L0 to V .
Typically, L will be the set of all legal hash-map keys available in
our language with the exception of a few keys reserved for other purposes.
In particular, we reserve Clojure keyword :number to be mapped into
the scalar component of a pair h; fhl1; vl1i; : : : ; hln; vlnigi. So, in our case
L0 = L [ f:numberg.
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Therefore, h; fhl1; vl1i; : : : ; hln; vlnigi is represented in Clojure by the
hash-map {:number ; l1 vl1 ; : : : ; ln vln}.
Here vl1 ; : : : ; vln are represented by similar hash-maps themselves re-
sulting in nested hash-maps, and keys from L can have rather complex
structure, if desired, taking advantage of great variety of hash-map keys
allowed in Clojure.
When element v 2 V is simply a scalar (the pair h; 0i), the imple-
mentation is allowed to simply use number  instead of the hash-map
{:number }.
Example from section 3.2. The sum ( 3.5) + (:foo  2) + (:foo
 :bar  7) + (:baz  :foo  :bar   4) is represented as Clojure
hash-map {:number 3.5, :foo {:number 2, :bar 7}, :baz {:foo
{:bar -4}}}.
Variadic Neurons. We use the formalism of V-values to eliminate the
need to keep track of the number of input and output arguments of the
activation functions. We describe variadic neurons and DMMs based on
variadic neurons in section 4.
To conclude the present section, V-values are essentially a dictionary-
based version of S-expressions. Section 5.3 removes the restriction that all
atoms must be numbers and allows to incorporate complex objects under
reserved keywords.
4. Variadic neurons
The activation functions of variadic neurons transform a single stream of
V-values into a single stream of V-values.
However, the labels at the ﬁrst level of those V-values are dedicated
to serve as the names of input and output arguments. Therefore, a neuron
is a priori variadic and can potentially handle a countable collection of
inputs and produce a countable collection of outputs (although our usual
restrictions of keeping the active part of the network ﬁnite would in practice
limit those collections to ﬁnite at any given moment of time).
Here is an example of an activation function for neuron with two
arguments, x and y, outputting two results, diﬀerence (x y) and negative
diﬀerence (y x). This and all subsequent code examples in this paper are
written in Clojure.4 Assume for the purpose of this example that my-minus
4 https://clojure.org
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function is available to compute these subtractions of one V-value from
another V-value:5
(defn symmetric-minus [input]
(let [x (get input :x {})
y (get input :y {})]
{:difference (my-minus x y)
:negative-difference (my-minus y x)}))
The input is a hash-map, representing a V-value. The arguments are sub-
trees of input corresponding to :x,:y 2 L. These subtrees are computed
by the expressions (get input :x {}) and (get input :y {}). If the
subtree in question is not present, the empty hash-map {} is returned.
The empty hash-map represents zero vector (zero element of V ) in our
implementation. The function outputs a V-value with two subtrees corre-
sponding to :difference,:negative-difference 2 L.
So, the arguments are combined into a single V-value, input, and the
outputs are combined into a single return V-value.
The non-trivial aspect of this approach is that instead of mapping
neuron outputs to neuron inputs, the network matrix W now maps sub-
trees at the ﬁrst level of the neuron outputs to subtrees at the ﬁrst level
of the neuron inputs. We shall see in the present section that the network
matrixW naturally acquires a structure of multidimensional tensor under
this approach.
4.1. Space U
Because we are going to use the keys at the ﬁrst level of V-values as names
of inputs and outputs, we do not want any top-level leaves, that is we
do not want non-zero scalars (“tensors of rank 0”) in our V-values. Hence
we will be using space U = L ! V , namely we’ll use values u 2 U as
inputs and outputs of the neuron activation function (which will always
have arity one), and those values u will contain actual inputs and outputs
of the neuron at their ﬁrst level.
Observe that V = R(L! V ) = RU , and that U therefore satisﬁes
the equation U = L! (R U).
5 Generally, one would want to deﬁne my-minus in terms of DMM core primitives for
V-values implemented in DMM (2016–2017): (defn my-minus [x y] (rec-map-sum
x (rec-map-mult -1 y))).
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The activation functions of the neurons map U to U , transforming
single streams of elements of U . The labels at the ﬁrst level of the elements
of U serve as names of inputs and outputs.
4.2. Multidimensional structure onW
The network matrixW must provide a linear map from the concatenation
of the ﬁrst levels of elements of U which are the outputs of all neurons, to
the concatenation of the ﬁrst level of elements of U which are the inputs
of all neurons. In our example above, a neuron with symmetric-minus
activation function would have two V-values at its input, one labeled by :x
and one labeled by :y, assembled into one input map. Such a neuron would
also have two V-values at its output, one labeled by :difference and
one labeled by :negative-difference, assembled into one output map.
However, we consider an inﬁnite collection of V-values on input of
each neuron, with V-values labeled by all elements of L, and an inﬁnite
collection of V-values on output of each neuron, with V-values labeled by
all elements of L, since nothing restricts activation functions from using
any of those labels.
Now we want to take inﬁnite collections of V-values on output of each
neuron for all neurons and join those inﬁnite collections together into a
single inﬁnite collection of V-values, and we shall apply matrix W to this
uniﬁed inﬁnite collection (imposing the usual condition about only a ﬁnite
number of relevant elements or vectors being non-zero at any given moment
of time).
We also want to take inﬁnite collections of V-values on input of each
neuron for all neurons and join those inﬁnite collections together into a
single inﬁnite collection of V-values, and matrix W will produce this uni-
ﬁed inﬁnite collection each time it is applied to the collection described in
the previous paragraph.
Below we follow closely the material from section 3.2 of Bukatin &
Anthony (2017).
Consider one input situated on the ﬁrst level of the element of U
serving as the argument of the activation function for one neuron, and the
row of the network matrix W responsible for computing that input from
the concatenation of the ﬁrst levels of elements of U which are the outputs
of all neurons.
The natural structure of indices of this row is not ﬂat, but hierarchical.
At the very least, there are two levels of indices: neurons and their outputs.
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We currently use three levels of hierarchy in our implementation: neu-
ron types (which are Clojure vars referring to implementations of activa-
tion functions U ! U), neuron names, and names of the outputs. Hence,
matrix rows are three-dimensional sparse arrays (sparse “tensors of rank
3”) in our current implementation.
The natural structure of indices of the array of rows is also not ﬂat,
but hierarchical. At the very least, there are two levels of indices: neu-
rons and their inputs. We currently use three levels of hierarchy in our
implementation: neuron types, neuron names, and names of the inputs.
Hence, the network matrixW is a six-dimensional sparse array (sparse
“tensor of rank 6”) in our current implementation.
4.3. DMMs based on V-values and variadic neurons
The DMM is a “two-stroke engine” similar to that of section 2, and consists
of a linear “down movement” followed by an “up movement” performed by
the activation functions of neurons. This “two-stroke cycle” is repeated
indeﬁnitely (Figure 4).
xf;nf
f
yf;nf
xg;ng
g
yg;ng
W
Figure 4: “Two-stroke engine” for a DMM based on variadic neurons. Two neu-
rons, nf and ng, are explicitly pictured. Their inputs and outputs,
xf;nf ; xg;ng ; yf;nf ; yg;ng , are depicted as trees belonging to U . W is a
linear map from the concatenation of the ﬁrst levels of all yh;nh trees
to the concatenation of the ﬁrst levels of all xh;nh trees (Equation 4).
We allow names for neurons and their inputs and outputs to be any ele-
ments of L. The address space is such that the network is countably-sized,
but since the network matrix W has only a ﬁnite number of non-zero ele-
ments at any given time, and elements of U have only a ﬁnite number of
K + K = 120 / p. 168 / February 1, 2020
168 Michael Bukatin – Jon Anthony
non-zero coordinates at any given time, we are always working with ﬁnite
representations.
The network matrix W (sparse “tensor of rank 6”) depends on t, and
its element wtf;nf ;i; g;ng ;o is non-zero, if the output o of neuron ng with the
built-in activation function g is connected to the input i of neuron nf with
the built-in activation function f at the moment of time t, with number
wtf;nf ;i; g;ng ;o being the non-zero weight of this connection.
On the “down movement”, the network matrix (wtf;nf ;i; g;ng ;o) is applied
to an element of U which contains all outputs of all neurons. The result
is an element of U which contains all inputs of all neurons to be used
during the next “up movement”. Each of those inputs is computed using
the following formula:
xt+1f;nf ;i =
X
g2F
X
ng2L
X
o2L
wtf;nf ;i; g;ng ;o  ytg;ng ;o: (4)
Indices f and g belong to the set of neurons types F , which is simply
the set of transformations of U . Potentially, one can implement countable
number of such transformations in a given programming language, but at
any given time only ﬁnite number of them are deﬁned and used. Indices nf
and ng are the names of input and output neurons, and indices i and o are
the names of the respective input and output arguments of those neurons.
In the formula above, wtf;nf ;i; g;ng ;o is a number (the connection weight),
and xt+1f;nf ;i and y
t
g;ng ;o are elements of V (not necessarily of U , since the
presence of scalars is allowed at this level). The product wtf;nf ;i; g;ng ;oytg;ng ;o
multiplies vector ytg;ng ;o by real number wtf;nf ;i; g;ng ;o.
This operation is performed for all f 2 F , all nf 2 L, all input names
i 2 L, such that the corresponding three-dimensional row of W has some
non-zero elements at time t.
The result is ﬁnitely sized map ff 7! fnf 7! xt+1f;nf gg, where each x
t+1
f;nf
is a ﬁnitely sized map from the names of neuron inputs to the values of
those inputs, fi 7! xt+1f;nf ;ig.
On the “up movement”, each f is simply applied to the elements of U
representing the single inputs of the activation function f . This application
is performed for all neurons hf; nf i which are present in the ﬁnitely sized
map described in the previous paragraph:6
6 The neuron is fully determined by a pair hf; nf i. For each f 2 F , there can be many
active neurons hf; nf i with diﬀerent nf . For each nf 2 L, there can be many active
neurons hf; nf i with diﬀerent f .
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yt+1f;nf = f(x
t+1
f;nf
): (5)
An example of an activation function of a variadic neuron was given in
the beginning of the present section. For more examples of this kind see
section 6.1 and section 6.3.
We gave the construction for the space V , but similar constructions
also work for more general variants described in section 5.3.
5. Linear streams
Informally speaking, we say that a space of streams is a space of linear
streams, if a meaningful notion of linear combination of several streams
with numerical coeﬃcients is well-deﬁned.
We would like to formalize this notion, while keeping the following
examples in mind:
– The space of sequences of numbers;
– For a vector space V , the space of sequences of its elements, (v1; v2; : : :);
– For a measurable spaceX, spaces of samples and signed samples drawn
from X.
We consider linear streams in somewhat limited generality here. First of
all, we consider discrete sequential time, while other models of time, e.g.,
continuous, are also potentially of interest.7 We consider linear streams
over real numbers, while other systems of coeﬃcients (especially, com-
plex numbers) can also be quite fruitful. Finally, we ground each space
of linear streams in a vector space, while one could consider a more ab-
stract approach to the notion of linear combination, where one works solely
with streams of abstract representations without grounding them in a vec-
tor space.
To deﬁne a particular kind of linear streams k in a more formal man-
ner, we specify background vector space Vk and streams of approximate rep-
resentations of the underlying vectors from Vk. The approximate represen-
tations provide some information about the underlying vectors. Moreover,
for every kind of linear streams k, we specify a procedure computing an ap-
proximate representation of a linear combination 1v1;k+ : : :+nvn;k from
7 We understand streams as functions from time to a set of objects, so that an object
corresponds to any given moment of time. In our paper, time tends to have a starting
point, to be discrete, and to continue indeﬁnitely, so we usually model time by non-
negative integers starting from 0 or 1.
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approximate representations of vectors v1;k; : : : ; vn;k. We say informally
that the approximate representations in question belong to a vector-like
space and we call them vector-like elements.
5.1. Streams of samples and signed samples
First, let us consider streams of samples from sequences of probability
distributions over an arbitrary measurable space X and their linear com-
binations with positive coeﬃcients.
A sequence of probability distributions, (1; 2; : : :), can be repre-
sented by a sequence of elements of X sampled from those distributions,
(x1; x2; : : :). Note that X is not required to be a vector space. Consider
0 <  < 1 and sequences of probability distributions (1; 2; : : :) and
(1; 2; : : :) represented by streams of samples (x1; x2; : : :) and (y1; y2; : : :).
Produce a stream of samples representing the sequence of probability dis-
tributions ( 1+(1 )  1;  2+(1 )  2; : : :) as follows. Sample
a random number uniformly from [0,1], and if this number is smaller than
, pick x1 as the ﬁrst element of our stream, otherwise pick y1. Repeat this
procedure for x2 and y2, and so on. Let us call this procedure a stochastic
linear combination of the streams of samples.
To include this example into our framework, we need a background
vector space, and we need stochastic linear combinations with positive and
negative coeﬃcients to be well-deﬁned.
Let us observe that probability distributions over some measurable
space X belong to the vector space of ﬁnite signed measures8 over X. Let
us consider signed samples, that is, samples marked as being positive or
negative.
Streams of signed samples are mentioned in section 1.2 of Bukatin &
Matthews (2015c). Here we follow a more detailed treatment of them given
in Appendix A.1 of Bukatin & Anthony (2017). The underlying vector
space is the space of all ﬁnite signed measures over arbitrary measurable
space X, and samples are pairs hx; si, with x 2 X and ﬂag s taking values
 1 and 1.
One considers streams of ﬁnite signed measures over X, 1; : : : ; n,
and streams of corresponding samples, hx1; s1i; : : : ; hxn; sni.
The procedure of computing a sample representing a signed measure
1  1 + : : : + n  n is as follows. We pick index i with probability
j i j /
P
j j j j using the absolute values of coeﬃcients , and we pick
8 measures which can take any ﬁnite real values, including negative values
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the sample hxi; sign(i)  sii (reversing the ﬂag if the selected value i is
negative) to represent the linear combination 1  1 + : : :+ n  n.
For further discussion of expressive power of signed measures and
signed samples see section 1.2 of Bukatin & Matthews (2015c). Issues re-
lated to missing samples and zero measures are mentioned in Appendix
A.2 of Bukatin & Anthony (2017). A generalization to complex-valued
measures and linear combinations with complex coeﬃcients is considered
in the design notes for DMM project (see DMM 2016–2017).9
5.2. Embedding
The ability to represent characters, words, and other objects of discrete
nature as vectors is one of the cornerstones of success of modern neural
networks.
The embedding of characters into a vector space generated by the
alphabet (“one-hot encoding”) is a basis for rather spectacular results ob-
tained by modern forms of recurrent neural networks, such as LSTMs
(Karpathy 2015). The ability to learn an optimal embedding of words into
vectors is an integral part of a number of applications of recurrent neural
nets to linguistics (Mikolov et al. 2013).
When it comes to representing compound structures in vector spaces,
there is obviously a lot of freedom and variety. Throughout this paper, we
work with embeddings of classes of dataﬂow matrix machines (considering
each time a class of DMMs over some signature of neuron types) into
corresponding vector spaces. One can argue that a class of dataﬂow matrix
machines forms a suﬃciently rich space of objects, and that since one ﬁnds
a meaningful natural embedding of such a space into a vector space, one
should expect to be able to ﬁnd meaningful natural embeddings for a large
variety of spaces of objects.
As the previous subsection indicates, the notion of embedding into
linear streams is more general than the notion of embedding into vector
spaces. As long as one is willing to consider a stream of objects of arbi-
trary nature as drawn from some sequence of probability distributions over
those objects, this stream belongs to a space of linear streams of samples
equipped with the stochastic version of linear combination.
Hence one is able to obtain an embedding of a stream of objects into
a space of linear streams without embedding individual objects into a
vector space.
9 https://tinyurl.com/y8bfwmre
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5.3. A family of spaces of V-values
The space V is very expressive, but sometimes it is not enough. If one wants
to accommodate vectors from some other vector space V 0, a convenient way
to do so is to allow elements of V 0 in the leaves of the preﬁx trees. Usually
one still wants to be able to have just numbers inside the leaves as well, so
one uses V = R V 0 for the space of leaves.
This means that elements of V are now used as coeﬃcients  instead
of real numbers in (l1 : : : ln) = l1  : : : ln  . Considering a basis in
V, one can see that this whole construction corresponds to tensor product
V 
 V.
Elements of V are also used as elements of sparse “tensors of mixed
rank”. The equation V = R (L! V ) becomes V = V (L! V ).
Implementation-wise, if, for example, V = R V 0 V 00 V 000, then in
addition to the reserved key :number, one would reserve additional keys for
each of the additional components V 0; V 00; V 000 to incorporate the non-zero
instances of those components into leaves (and into hash-maps).
For example, Appendix A.3 of Bukatin & Anthony (2017) shows how
to accommodate signed samples discussed in section 5.1 above within this
framework. One considers V = R  M , where M is the space of ﬁnite
signed measures over X, and one uses the reserved keyword :sample to
incorporate signed samples into the leaves as necessary.
So, in this fashion a space V = V (L! V ) will still be represented
by nested hash-maps, and we are still going to call those nested hash-maps
V-values.
6. Programming
Here we discuss some of the programming patterns in dataﬂow matrix
machines. Further programming tools come from the presence of self-
referential mechanism (section 7) and from modularization facilities (sec-
tion 9).
6.1. Linear and multiplicative constructions
Linear and multiplicative constructions in dataﬂow matrix machines are
well-covered in Bukatin et al. (2016d). The most fundamental of them
is a neuron with identity activation function. Consider some argument
name, e.g., :accum. If we connect output :accum of such a neuron to its
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input :accum with weight 1, this neuron becomes an accumulator. It adds
together and accumulates in its :accum arguments the contributions to
its input :accum made during each “two-stroke cycle” by all other outputs
in the network connected to the input :accum of our neuron by non-zero
weights.
Among multiplicative constructions, the most fundamental one is mul-
tiplication of an otherwise computed neuron output by the value of one of
its scalar inputs. This is essentially a fuzzy conditional, which can selec-
tively turn parts of the network on and oﬀ in real time via multiplication
by zero, attenuate or amplify the signal, reverse the signal via multiplica-
tion by  1, redirect ﬂow of signals in the network, etc. For further details
see Bukatin et al. (2016d).
xaccum;:my-neuron
accum
yaccum;:my-neuron
1.0
:delta :accum
:single
Figure 5: Connectivity of a neuron [accum :my-neuron] with activation function
accum, neuron name :my-neuron, and input arguments :accum and
:delta, when this neuron is used as an accumulator
These facilities are quite powerful even for scalar ﬂows of reals, and even
more so for vector ﬂows. The lack of these facilities hinders the approaches
which insist on only having non-linear activation functions, or on only
having neurons with a single input.
Sometimes, it is convenient to take advantage of having multiple in-
puts and use a neuron with + activation function, y = x + x, as an
accumulator, connecting y to x with weight 1 and accepting contributions
from other outputs in the network on input x (Bukatin et al. 2016c). For
details of this connectivity pattern in the current DMM architecture with
variadic neurons see Figure 5 .
The code for the activation function accum of this accumulator looks
as follows (DMM 2016–2017):
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(defn accum [input]
{:single (rec-map-sum (input :accum) (input :delta))})
The function accum takes a V-value input as argument, then it adds to-
gether the values of the two neuron inputs,10 (input :accum) and (input
:delta), obtaining the desired result, and then returns {:single result}
as the output. It can add together arbitrary elements of V .
In this example, the :accum name for a neuron input stands for x, the
:delta name for a neuron input stands for x, and the :single is the
name of the only output this particular neuron has.
If we want a particular neuron :my-neuron with built-in activation
function accum to work as an accumulator, then the element of the network
matrix connecting the output [accum :my-neuron :single] together with
the input [accum :my-neuron :accum] should be 1 (see Figure 5). The
corresponding matrix element waccum;:my-neuron;:accum; accum;:my-neuron;:single is
expressed as
{v-accum {:my-neuron {:accum
{v-accum {:my-neuron {:single 1}}}}}}
in our current Clojure implementation, where v-accum is deﬁned as
(def v-accum (var accum))
because the value of accum itself used as a hash-key is not stable from
recompilation to recompilation, whereas (var accum) is stable.
The contributions from other neurons are accepted on the input
:delta.
6.2. Sparse vectors
The ability to handle sparse vectors in a straightforward manner is not
available in scalar-based neural networks. One has to allocate a neuron for
every coordinate, and there is no straightforward way to avoid processing
those coordinates which happen to be zero at the moment.
In DMMs one can handle compact sparse vectors of very high, or
even inﬁnite dimensions, and the network size does not depend on those
dimensions. An example of a compact DMM built around an accumulator
10 rec-map-sum is one of DMM core primitives for V-values implemented in DMM
(2016–2017) which performs addition of V-values
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of sparse vectors in the vector space generated by a given alphabet in
order to keep track of the number of occurrences of each character in a
given string is studied in detail in Bukatin et al. (2016d). The savings can
be drastic, as, for example, Unicode alphabet exceeds 100,000 characters,
and with sparse representation only the actually occurring characters are
stored and processed.
The same technique can be applied to keeping track of the number of
occurrences of each word in the text, where the underlying vector space
generated by all possible words is inﬁnitely-dimensional.
6.3. Data structures
An earlier paper (Bukatin et al. 2016d) focuses on allocating data struc-
tures in the body of the network itself, an approach encouraged by the
network’s potentially inﬁnite size and powerful self-modiﬁcation facilities.
However, with the ability to process complicated vectors such as V-
values, it is natural to encode and process data structures on that level. The
use of structure sharing immutable data structures, the default in Clojure,
should make passing complicated structures through “up movements” and
“down movements” reasonably eﬃcient, as seen in our own preliminary
explorations.
For example, a list can be encoded by using :this and :rest keys
on the same level of a V-value, and having neurons with first, rest, and
cons activation functions. The only decision one needs to make is whether
to consider all lists as having inﬁnite sequences of zeros at the tail, or
whether to incorporate an explicit list terminator (e.g., a keyword :end
mapped to 1) in the formalism.
For example, the following activation function for the neuron used to
accumulate a list of “interesting” events is similar to the function used in
our example of a DMM accumulating a list of mouse clicks:11
(defn dmm-cons [accum-style-input]
(let [old-self (get accum-style-input :self {})
new-signal (get accum-style-input :signal {})]
(if (interesting? new-signal)
{:self {:this new-signal :rest old-self}}
{:self old-self})))
In order to maintain the accumulator metaphor, the :self output and the
:self input of the corresponding neuron are connected with weight 1.
11 https://tinyurl.com/yxgagfjl
K + K = 120 / p. 176 / February 1, 2020
176 Michael Bukatin – Jon Anthony
Any linked structures which can be encoded inside the network matrix,
can be encoded inside a similar matrix not used as the network matrix (the
only diﬀerence is that data structures encoded within the network matrix
tend to be “active”, as they are built over actively working neurons; this
diﬀerence can potentially be profound).
6.4. From programming via composition of transformers of streams
of V-values to Dataflow Matrix Machines
There is a rather long history of programming via composition of trans-
formers of linear streams. In each of those cases, linear streams can be
represented as suﬃciently general streams of V-values.
Perhaps the most well known example is the discipline of audio synthe-
sis via composition of unit generators, which are transformers of streams of
audio samples (streams of numbers, if one considers a single monophonic
channel). That discipline was created by Max Mathews in 1957 at Bell
Labs (Mathews 1963). It is typical for a modern audio synthesis system
to be crafted along those lines, even though the syntax can diﬀer greatly.
One of the classical textbooks in that discipline is Farnell (2010). We found
the tutorial (Merz 2011) on Beads, a realtime audio and music library for
Java and Processing, to be a convenient introductory text.
In this cycle of studies we explored a number of diﬀerent exam-
ples of programming via composition of linear streams, starting from
dataﬂow programming of animations via composition of transformers of
image streams (Bukatin & Matthews 2015a). During that series of exper-
iments we discovered that if one does not want to impose the condition
of the dependency graph being acyclic, then one needs to maintain two
elements of each stream at any given time, the “current” element, used by
the transformers depending on that stream in their computations, and the
“next” element, the element which is being computed. Then, after trans-
formers computed their respective “next” elements, there is a shift operation
which makes all the “next” elements current.
This cycle “transform-shift” is a version of the two-stroke cycle used
in this paper, and the shift operation is what the “down movement” of a
DMM would look like, if all non-zero matrix rows would only have a single
non-zero element in each of them, and that element would be 1. In fact,
any program built as a composition of transformers of linear streams can
be converted into an equivalent DMM by inserting a linear transformation
described by a matrix row with one non-zero element with weight 1 at each
connection.
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A number of examples of DMMs we explored in this cycle of studies,
such as the character-processing DMM described in section 3 of Bukatin
et al. (2016d) or the DMM accumulating a list of mouse clicks mentioned in
section 6.3 of the present paper, come from programs built as compositions
of transformers of linear streams converted to DMMs by inserting weight
1 connectors.
One aspect which used to be somewhat limited within the discipline of
programming via composition of transformers of linear streams was higher-
order programming, i.e., transforming the transformers. In particular, the
higher-order constructions themselves were not expressed as transforma-
tions of linear streams.
Dataﬂow matrix machines allow to continuously transform any com-
position of stream transformers into any other composition of stream trans-
formers, and we present one way to do so within the discipline of trans-
forming linear streams and in a self-referential manner in the next section.
7. Self-referential mechanism
The ability to handle arbitrary linear streams implies the ability to handle
streams of vectors shaped like network connectivity matrices (be those ﬂat
two-dimensional matrices, or sparse multidimensional tensors described in
section 4). This enables a rather straightforward mechanism to access and
modify the network matrix W. We designate a neuron Self emitting a
stream of such matrices, and use the most recent value from that stream
as W for the purpose of the next “down movement” step.
We currently prefer to use an accumulator with + activation function
y = x+x as Self following Bukatin et al. (2016c) (see section 6.1). Self
takes additive updates from other neurons in the network on its x input,
and other neurons can take the stream of the current values of W from
the output of Self making them aware of the current state of the network
connectivity.
Network self-modiﬁcation based on the streams of network matrices
was ﬁrst introduced in Bukatin et al. (2016b), and the principle of “self-
referential completeness of the DMM signature relative to the language
available to describe and edit the DMMs” was formulated there. That prin-
ciple states that it is desirable to have a suﬃcient variety of higher-order
neurons to perform updates of the network matrix, so that any modiﬁca-
tions of a DMM (understood as a network or as a program) can be made
by triggering an appropriate higher-order neuron.
K + K = 120 / p. 178 / February 1, 2020
178 Michael Bukatin – Jon Anthony
Paper Bukatin et al. (2016d) explored ways for the network to modify
itself by making deep copies of its own subgraphs. The possibility of using
self-referential matrix transformations as a new foundation for program-
ming with linear streams, somewhat similarly to lambda-calculus being
a foundation for symbolic programming, was studied in Bukatin et al.
(2016c).
Also, it was demonstrated in Bukatin et al. (2016c) that this self-
referential mechanism together with a few constant update matrices gives
rise to a wave pattern dynamically propagating in the network matrix;
this result was also veriﬁed in computer experiments (see Appendix B of
Bukatin & Anthony (2017) for a more polished presentation).
However, all these studies were so far merely scratching the surface
of what is possible with this mechanism. In principle, it should allow the
network to maintain an evolving population of its own subnetworks, to
maintain an evolving population of network update methods, to train net-
work update methods as a linear combination of available network update
primitives, etc.
We hope that some of this potential will be explored in the future.
8. Network topology
The network topology, such as layers, is deﬁned by the pattern of sparsity
of W: some of the connectivity weights are kept at zero, and some are
allowed to deviate from zero, and the network topology comes from that.
However, in the model of synchronous time we follow in this paper, all
layers still work simultaneously. If it is desirable for layers to work strictly
in turn, one can use multiplicative mechanisms described in section 6.1
to orchestrate the computations by turning oﬀ the layers at the appro-
priate moments of time using zero multiplicative masks, and then by fur-
ther optimizing implementation to save processing time in such situations.
Not all weights which are non-zero need to be variable weights. It is
often the case that some of the non-zero weights are set to 1, and then it is
the user’s choice which of those should be allowed to vary. The particularly
frequent are the cases when the weight 1 in question is the only non-zero
element of its matrix row. The examples of cases where weights set to 1
occur naturally include
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– accumulators (sections 6.1, 6.3);
– cases when a program expressed as composition of V-value transform-
ers is translated into a DMM (section 6.4);
– special neural network topology.12
9. Subnetworks and modularization
The modern trend in artiﬁcial neural nets is to build the networks not
from a large number of single neurons, but from a relatively small number
of modules such as layers, etc.
In this sense, it is convenient that neurons in DMMs are powerful
enough to express the “up movement” action of whole subnetworks. This
allows to build DMMs from a relatively small number of powerful neurons,
if so desired.
In the old style DMMs (Bukatin et al. 2016a;b;c;d), the neurons had
ﬁxed arity and were powerful enough to express the “up movement” action
of the subnetworks of ﬁxed size. However, the networks themselves became
variadic networks of unbounded size, so the gap between single neurons and
general subnetworks remained.
With variadic neurons this particular gap is eliminated.
In 2016, Andrey Radul formulated a principle stating that there is
no reason to distinguish between a neuron and a subnetwork, and that
it is a desirable property of a model to not have a diﬀerence between a
generalized neuron and a subnetwork.
The formalism of V-values and variadic neurons allows DMMs to fulﬁll
this principle in the following limited sense: single neurons are powerful
enough to express one “up movement” action of any subnetwork as one “up
movement” action of an appropriately crafted single neuron.
12 For example, let us express LSTMs and Gated Recurrent Unit networks as networks
built from sigmoid neurons, linear neurons, and neurons performing multiplication for
gating following Appendix C of Bukatin et al. (2016c), and let us assume that we are
writing this in terms of neurons processing scalar streams (streams of numbers). Then
each of the two inputs for each neuron performing multiplication of scalar streams is
connected with weight 1 from a single output of an appropriate neuron.
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10. Learning
There are various indications that dataﬂow matrix machines have strong
potential for future machine learning applications.
DMMs contain well-known classes of neural networks with good ma-
chine learning properties, such as LSTM and Gated Recurrent Unit net-
works (Appendix C of Bukatin et al. 2016c).
At the same time, they allow to naturally express a number of various
algorithms within a formalism which allows arbitrarily small modiﬁcations
of programs, where one can transform programs continuously by continu-
ously transforming the matrices deﬁning those programs.
The presence of well-developed self-referential facilities means that
network training methods can be made part of the network itself, making
this a natural setting for a variety of “learning to learn” scenarios.
DMM architecture is conductive to experiments with “fast weights”
(e.g., Ba et al. 2016).
Recently, we have been seeing very interesting suggestions that synthe-
sis of small functional programs and synthesis of neural network topology
from a small number of modules might be closely related to each other
(Olah 2015; Nejati 2016). The ability of single DMM neurons to repre-
sent neural network modules suggests that DMMs might provide the right
degree of generality to look at these classes of problems of network and
program synthesis.
We are seeing evidence that syntactic shape of programs and their
functionality provide suﬃcient information about each other for that to be
useful during program synthesis by machine learning methods (e.g., Murali
et al. 2017). If a corpus of human-readable programs manually written in
the DMM architecture emerges eventually, this should be quite helpful for
solving the problem of synthesis of human-readable programs performing
non-trivial tasks.
Given that DMMs form a very rich class of computational models, it
makes sense to search for its various subclasses for which more specialized
methods of machine learning might be applicable.
11. Historical remarks and related work
There are two ways one can arrive at the dataﬂow matrix machines. One
can focus on programming with linear streams and then notice that by
interleaving linear and non-linear transformations of those streams, it is
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possible to obtain parametrization of large classes of programs by matrices
of numbers.
Another way is to focus on recurrent neural networks as a program-
ming platform and to try to generalize them as much as possible while
retaining their key characteristic, which is parametrization by connectiv-
ity matrices of network weights.
In this section of the present paper we discuss some of the related
work under both of these approaches.
11.1. Recurrent neural networks as programs
It was recognized as early as 1940s, that if one provides a neural net-
work with a suitable model of unbounded memory one obtains a Turing-
universal formalism of computations (McCulloch & Pitts 1943). Research
studies formally establishing Turing-universality for neural networks pro-
cessing streams of reals include Pollack (1987); Siegelmann & Sontag
(1995).
More recent studies include such well-known approaches as Graves
et al. (2014); Weston et al. (2014), which are currently under active devel-
opment.
Yet, as these approaches are gradually becoming more successful at
learning neural approximations to known algorithms, they do not seem to
progress towards human-readable programs. In fact, it seems that while
the expressive power of scalar-based neural networks is suﬃcient to create
Turing-complete esoteric programming languages, they are not expressive
enough to become a pragmatic programming platform. The restriction to
scalar ﬂows seems to either necessitate awkward encoding of complex data
within reals (as in Siegelmann & Sontag 1995, where binary expansions of
real numbers are used as tapes of Turing machines), or to force people to
create networks depending in their size on data dimensionality and with
any modularization and memory capabilities being external to the network
formalism, rather than being native to the networks in question.
The awkward encodings of complex data within reals hinder the abil-
ity to use self-modiﬁcation schemas for scalar-based neural networks. E.g.,
a remarkable early paper (Schmidhuber 1993) has to use such encodings
for addresses in the network matrix, and such encodings lead to very high
sensitivities to small changes of numbers involved, while the essence of cor-
rect neural-based computational schemas is their robustness in the pres-
ence of noise.
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Even such natural constructions within the scalar ﬂow formalism as
neurons with linear activation functions, such as identity, and neurons
performing multiplication of two arguments, each expressing a diﬀerent
linear combination of neuron outputs, encounter resistance in the ﬁeld.
The power of linear and multiplicative neurons was well understood at
least as early as 1987 (Pollack 1987). Yet, when the LSTMs were invented
in 1997 (Hochreiter & Schmidhuber 1997), the memory and gating mecha-
nisms were understood as mechanisms external to neural networks, rather
then the mechanisms based straightforwardly on neurons with linear ac-
tivation functions for memory and neurons performing multiplication for
gating, which provide a natural way to express memory and gating mech-
anisms in neural nets (see Appendix C of Bukatin et al. 2016c).
Recently, the power of having linear activation functions, in particular
identity, in the mix together with other activation functions is ﬁnally get-
ting some of the recognition it deserves (the paper, He et al. 2016, is now
a well-cited paper). However, the explicit activation functions of arity two,
such as multiplication, are still quite exotic and often diﬃcult to explicitly
incorporate into existing software frameworks for neural networks.
We think that dataﬂow matrix machines as presented here, with their
vector ﬂows and multiple arities for activation functions, provide the nat-
ural degree of generality for neural networks.
11.2. Programming with linear streams
Continuous computations (which tend to be computations with linear
streams) have a long history, starting with electronic analog computers.
The programs, however, were quite discrete: a pair of single-contact sock-
ets was either connected with a patch cord, or it was not connected with
a patch cord.
More modern dataﬂow architectures focusing on work with linear
streams representing continuous data include, for example, LabVIEW
(Johnston et al. 2004) and Pure Data (e.g., Farnell 2010). The programs
themselves are still quite discrete.
To incorporate higher-order programming methods within the para-
digm of programming with linear streams, the space of programs them-
selves needs to become continuous. Neural networks represent a step in
this direction. While the network topology itself is discrete (the connection
between nodes is either present, or not), when one expresses the network
topology via its weight-connectivity matrix, the degree to which any par-
ticular edge is present (the absolute value of the weight associated with
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it) can be made as small as desired, and this provides the continuity we
are after.
The particular line of work we are presenting in this paper emerged
in 2012–2013, when it was recognized by our group that the approxima-
tion domains providing continuous denotational semantics in the theory of
programming languages can acquire the structure of vectors spaces, when
equipped with cancellation properties missing in the standard theory of
interval numbers. Namely, there must be enough overdeﬁned (partially
inconsistent) elements in those spaces to produce zero on addition by the
mechanism of cancellation with underdeﬁned (partially deﬁned) elements.
For interval numbers, this corresponds to introduction of pseudosegments
[a; b] with the contradictory property that b < a, following Warmus (1956).
For probabilistic spaces, this corresponds to allowing negative values of
probabilities in addition to usual non-negative values. The mathematics
of the resulting partial inconsistency landscape is presented in section 4 of
Bukatin & Matthews (2015c).
By 2015 it became apparent to our group that programming with
linear streams was a rich formalism which included programming with
streams of probabilistic samples and programming with generalized anima-
tions. This framework seemed to provide methods for continuous higher-
order programming, and, moreover, it had good potential for obtaining
more eﬃcient schemas for genetic programming by allowing to introduce
the motives similar to regulation of gene expression into genetic program-
ming frameworks (Bukatin & Matthews 2015c). Crucially, it also became
apparent at that time that if one introduced the discipline of interleav-
ing linear and non-linear transformations of linear streams, then one could
parametrize large classes of programs by matrices of numbers (Bukatin &
Matthews 2015b;c).
The ﬁrst open-source software prototypes associated with this ap-
proach also appeared in 2015 (Fluid 2015–2017).
In 2016 we understood that the resulting formalism generalized recur-
rent neural networks, and the term dataﬂow matrix machines was coined
(Bukatin et al. 2016a). The modern version of the self-referential mech-
anism in DMMs and the ﬁrst precise description of how dataﬂow ma-
trix machines function, given that their matrices can be dynamically ex-
panded, appeared in Bukatin et al. (2016b). The programming patterns for
the resulting software framework were studied in Bukatin et al. (2016d).
A more theoretical paper (Bukatin et al. 2016c) explored the possibility
of using self-referential matrix transformations instead of lambda-calculus
as the foundation in this context and established further connections
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between neural networks and the mathematics of the partial inconsistency
landscape.
The formalism of ﬁnite preﬁx trees with numerical leaves (the vector
space of recurrent maps) was introduced in the Fall of 2016. This formalism
was inspired by our work with Clojure programming language (Hickey
2018). The ﬁrst open-source implementation of a version of DMMs based
on that formalism and written in Clojure was produced in that time frame
(DMM 2016–2017), and a research paper based on this architecture was
presented recently at LearnAut 2017 (Bukatin & Anthony 2017).
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ABSTRACT
This paper is a survey of two kinds of “compressed” proof schemes, the
matrix method and proof nets, as applied to a variety of logics rang-
ing along the substructural hierarchy from classical all the way down to
the nonassociative Lambek system. A novel treatment of proof nets for
the latter is provided. Descriptions of proof nets and matrices are given
in a uniform notation based on sequents, so that the properties of the
schemes for the various logics can be easily compared.
1. Introduction
This paper provides a survey of two kinds of “compressed” proof schemes,
the matrix method and proof nets, as applied to a variety of logics ranging
along the substructural hierarchy (Restall 2000) from classical all the way
down to the nonassociative Lambek system. There appears to be a paucity
of survey literature that discusses proof nets for a variety of logics in a uni-
form notation, and even less which discusses matrix methods in relation to
proof nets. It is the author’s hope that this paper can provide in one source
a host of information and methodology for proof nets and matrices, which
could allow further research extending and using these techniques to be
more easily conducted. There are few new results presented here, but the
available literature provides treatments of various logics which are incom-
mensurate; we hope to rectify this situation by unifying the presentation
to a common framework.
Section 2 provides the necessary background, reviewing Gentzen-type
sequent calculi for a variety of logics. Section 3 introduces the approaches
to “proof compression” which are the main subject of the paper. Section
4 presents the matrix method, which works for both classical and linear
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logic, in some detail. As background, we also rehearse Smullyan’s “unify-
ing notation” (Smullyan 1963) of signed formulae which is central to the
present paper. Section 5 describes proof nets for a variety of logics, begin-
ning with the canonical case of multiplicative linear logic (Girard 1987).
The proof nets are deﬁned in a two-sided framework that can be directly
applied to two-sided sequents, so that proof nets for the various logics can
be readily compared. From here it is possible to go both up and down
the substructural hierarchy; after also considering proof nets for classical
logic, two versions of the Lambek calculus are treated. It is observed how
the Lambek systems, with their increasingly rigid structural requirements
on the layout of the formulae in a sequent, require more strictly geometri-
cal conditions on correct proof nets. The nonassociative Lambek calculus
is here provided with a two-sided proof net system and a geometric cor-
rectness condition for the ﬁrst time. The last sections of the paper brieﬂy
discuss complexity of proof procedures and the general problem of “identity
of proofs”.
2. Sequent systems
2.1. Classical propositional logic
We begin the discussion with Gentzen’s Gentzen (1934) sequent calcu-
lus for classical logic. This deductive system permits the proof of special
sequent statements of the form   ) . In a typical notation, A;B; : : :
stand for proposition occurrences, while ; ; : : : stand for sequences of
proposition occurrences. A sequent in classical logic is often interpreted
metalogically as a statement that the (possibly empty) formula sequence
, the succedent, follows from the (possibly empty) formula sequence  ,
the antecedent, in a natural deduction or axiomatic system of classical
logic. To permit this interpretation, the succedent must be understood as
a disjunction of its formulae, while the antecedent must be understood
as a conjunction of its formulae. The standard (after Gentzen) presenta-
tion of the classical sequent calculus involves sequents, as just described,
which may have formulae on either side of the arrow; such a presentation
is known as a two-sided sequent calculus. Gentzen’s rules of inference for
the classical sequent calculus may be presented as follows:
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Deﬁnition 1 (Classical sequent calculus, Gentzen 1934).
The above gives the so-called logical rules which show how the operators
work. Because the left and right sides of a sequent are considered as se-
quences, to obtain classical logic one also requires Gentzen’s structural
rules – which are no less logical, in spite of the terms.
Deﬁnition 2 (Structural rules for the left side).
There are mirror-image structural rules for the right side of sequents also,
which are omitted for space reasons here. A sequent calculus proof is then
a tree-like ﬁgure with initial sequents (possibly axioms) at the top and
a conclusion at the bottom called the endsequent. To prove a single for-
mula of classical logic, the initial sequents must be axioms, and the endse-
quent must have this formula as the succedent with an empty antecedent.
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Some variations of the sequent calculus have been deﬁned in which the
antecedent and succedent are sets rather than sequences of formulae (e.g.,
Wallen 1990); in such a presentation the structural rules are “compiled
in” to the deﬁnition of a sequent, and are not explicitly stated or used.
The only other rule permitted in a sequent calculus is known as “Cut”,
which certiﬁes a kind of transitivity for sequents:
 ) ; D D;) 
 ;) ;
Gentzen’s important result was his “Hauptsatz” stating that the Cut rule
can be eliminated with no loss of logical power for the system. The resulting
Cut-free sequent system then enjoys the subformula property,meaning that
“the formulae occurring in any [Cut-free] proof of a given endsequent are all
subformulae of the endsequent” (Wallen 1990; using an obvious deﬁnition
of subformula). It is plain from inspecting the Cut rule that this cannot
be a property of proofs which use it. Thanks to the subformula property,
a classical sequent proof search can be “goal-directed”, working upward
from the endsequent whose proof we seek by applying the inference rules
in reverse. Of course, only Cut-free proofs can ever be discovered in this
fashion.
A goal-directed deduction system is often called analytic, highlighting
the idea that one analyzes the goal sequent to construct (or fail to con-
struct) its proof. The opposite of this is then called a synthetic system,
in which one works from the premisses to the proven expression. A natu-
ral deduction system (e.g., Gentzen 1934) is one example which is usually
thought of as synthetic, since it is not generally used to construct a natural
deduction proof “upwards” from the conclusion. It is worth noting, how-
ever, that natural deductions in the logics considered here can normally
enjoy the subformula property, and so natural deduction can be regarded
as closer to an analytic system than it is sometimes given credit for be-
ing. All of the proof methods discussed in this paper are analytic because
our focus is on “compressed” goal-directed proof schemes, and so the logi-
cal systems to be discussed will be limited to their Cut-free versions. It is
somewhat ironic that, as a referee pointed out, cut-free proofs are generally
longer than proofs with cuts, so in one sense the compression of proofs is
more diﬃcult in the mathematically more pleasant realm of goal-directed
theorem proving.
Smullyan (1968) developed a classical deductive system called analytic
tableaux based upon foundations laid by Beth (1959). It is deﬁnitionally
equivalent to a Cut-free sequent calculus handling sets of formulae (thus
doing without structural rules), but the inference rules are explicitly turned
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upside-down, highlighting the analytic approach by placing the desired goal
expression at the top of the proof (called a tableau).
2.2. Multiplicative linear logic
Linear logic was introduced by Girard (1987), and has since been the object
of much study. For our discussion of compressed proof objects, only selected
fragments will be used. We present a two-sided sequent formulation of the
unit-free multiplicative fragment. It is two-sided in the previously used
sense that the derivable sequents have possibly nonempty antecedent and
succedent. This logic is commonly named MLL .
Deﬁnition 3 (Sequent calculus for MLL  Moot 2002).
Linear logic is substructural, which means that some of Gentzen’s struc-
tural rules for classical logic are not allowed. The only one of Gentzen’s
structural rules that is allowed now is Exchange, so the sequents in essence
keep track of formula occurrences, meaning each side of the sequent con-
stitutes eﬀectively a multiset of occurrences. We also have the Cut rule
allowed, but it is eliminable as before, and we focus only on the Cut-free
version. There follows an example proof of a sequent in MLL :
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2.3. Associative Lambek calculus
Now, we discuss other substructural logics which take away more of the
structural rules, both explicit and implicit. An important motivation for
these logics is found in linguistics, where they serve as fundamental systems
within theories of “categorial grammar” and its extension to “type-logical
grammar” (Morrill 1994; Fulop 2004). Our ﬁrst example is a logic that was
ﬁrst introduced as a “syntactic calculus” operating on formulae that were
interpreted as linguistic parts of speech (Lambek 1958). In this guise it is
known as the (associative) Lambek calculus.
Deﬁnition 4 (Lambek sequent calculus, Lambek 1958).
Lambek calculus (notated simply L, or L when empty antecedents are
permitted) is a positive logic in which none of Weakening, Contraction, or
Exchange are permitted, so the logical consequence relation involves se-
quences of formulae. Thus we introduced the standard notation  [], which
means a formula sequence with a place identiﬁed for substitution which
is matched by another use of the similar notation in the same inference
rule. Once again, the logic enjoys Cut elimination so we deal solely with
the Cut-free version. Associativity of the sequences is assumed, as a kind
of implicit structural rule; we show what happens next when even this is
removed.
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2.4. Nonassociative Lambek calculus
The last system to be introduced is a version of Lambek calculus from
which even the implicit structural rule of associativity is taken away. This
nonassociative Lambek system NL was ﬁrst described in 1961 (Lambek
1961) where it was motivated by linguistic applications, and it has since
been recognized as fundamental within the area of type-logical grammars
for linguistics (Moortgat 1997; Fulop 2004). This system is especially use-
ful for grammatical deductions because, without associative sequences, the
sequent calculus handles binary trees of formulae that can be used to repre-
sent the syntactic structures of languages. The sequent presentation below
does without the product operator ‘’, because this is logically superﬂuous
in a sequent formulation (as it is even in the associative system L above).
The nonassociativity of the sequents is here emphasized by replacing the
usual comma with the sequent-level operator ‘’. The sequent system en-
joys Cut-elimination and is single-conclusion, so that all provable sequents
have a single succedent formula.
Deﬁnition 5 (NL sequent calculus, Lambek 1961).
3. Proof compression
A key application of analytic deductive methods has been automated de-
duction. A signiﬁcant problem for the sequent/tableau systems in this
arena is the ineﬃciency resulting from a large search space. Much progress
has been made in the development of eﬃcient proof search by applica-
tion of goal-directed logic programming methods such as resolution (e.g.,
Gabbay & Olivetti 2000). The primary focus here will not be on eﬃcient
search for complete proofs, but rather on the question of how can an ana-
lytic proof be compressed, and thereby become a fundamentally diﬀerent
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sort of object that can be viewed in a new way, and possibly constructed
more eﬃciently.
It has been explained many times in the literature (e.g., Dyckhoﬀ &
Pinto 1999) that, even restricting attention to Cut-free proofs, the sequent
and tableau calculi may validate numerous proofs of a given sequent. These
several proofs may diﬀer either “trivially” or non-trivially in the order of
application of some of the rules. The propensity for the sequent/tableau
systems to suﬀer from spurious ambiguity caused by trivial rule permu-
tation has been explained in detail elsewhere (Wallen 1990), so here we
simply note the fact and consider its ramiﬁcations and proposed remedies.
In this paper, we will consider two kinds of “compressed proof objects”,
which diﬀer philosophically with respect to the spurious ambiguities just
mentioned. The ﬁrst of these, the matrix method, constructs a minimal
compressed proof object that is really nothing beyond a provability test.
There is a compelling argument that a matrix proof of a sequent is not re-
ally a proof anymore, because not only trivially diﬀerent, but also nontriv-
ially diﬀerent sequent/tableau proofs are all collapsed. A provable sequent
has, by deﬁnition, exactly one matrix demonstrating its validity.
The second kind of compressed proof object to be considered here is
the proof net. Proof nets were originally described for linear logic (Girard
1987), and it has been claimed for that system that they compress proofs
to “just the right extent”, in the sense that any two sequent/tableau proofs
which are nontrivially diﬀerent will have distinct corresponding proof nets,
while any two sequent/tableau proofs which diﬀer only spuriously (i.e., by
“harmless” permutations of the rules) will have the same proof net cor-
responding (Straßburger 2006). The philosophy behind proof nets is to
always seek, if not achieve, this correspondence for the logic at hand, be-
cause a proof net is supposed to be something beyond a minimal provability
test – proponents think of it as “the essence of a proof.” There is, however,
no current consensus among logicians as to what precisely should count as
a nontrivial diﬀerence between two proofs.
4. Matrix methods
In classical and intuitionistic logic, the redundancies and other diﬃcul-
ties with standard proof calculi led to the matrix methods, independently
invented by Bibel (1980) and Andrews (1981), but perfected by Wallen
(1990). Here we follow Wallen’s exposition, and the unifying notation of
Smullyan’s signed formulae will be of utmost importance.
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4.1. Unifying notation of signed formulae
It would be redundant to present the inference rules of Smullyan’s tableau
calculus for classical logic, since they are essentially the same as those of
Gentzen’s sequent calculus. One important element of Smullyan’s treat-
ment that will be important for our discussion throughout, however, is
his “unifying notation” which uses signed formulae classiﬁed into two ba-
sic varieties Smullyan (1963). A signed formula is just a formula P which
is annotated by a sign, or polarity, which we will show as either P+ or
P . The sign is used to indicate the “negation environment” of the for-
mula occurrence within a sequent, so that negative formula occurrences
are all those that are within the scope of an explicit or implicit negation.
An “implicit negation” environment is always (and only) the antecedent
of a conditional or of a sequent. This deﬁnition comes from the truth-
functional equivalence between formulae A ! B and :A _ B. Smullyan
used signed formulae to avoid writing sequents directly with the sequent
arrow; his rules for positive formulae exactly mirror the succedent (R) rules
in the sequent calculus, while tableau rules for negative formulae mirror
antecedent (L) rules in the sequent calculus.
Signed formulae are then classiﬁed by Smullyan into two fundamental
kinds, which can be determined by inspecting the sequent rules shown
above. The key question is whether the inference rule “branches”, having
two premisses. A branching rule governs a “signed formula of type B”,
which we may call disjunctive, after the canonical example of the rule
(_ L). A rule with only one premiss, on the other hand, governs a “signed
formula of type A”, which we may term conjunctive. The conjunctive signed
formulae in classical logic are these:
(A ^B) ; (A _B)+; (A! B)+; (:A)+; (:A) 
The disjunctive formulae are the others:
(A _B) ; (A ^B)+; (A! B) 
4.2. Classical logic matrices
Step one of the matrix method, and also ultimately of the proof net
method, is to decompose the target sequent or formula into a tree of its
subformulae that keeps track of the signs.
K + K = 120 / p. 196 / May 3, 2019
196 Sean A. Fulop
Deﬁnition 6 (Wallen 1990). A formula tree for a signed formula Ag; g 2
f+; g is a tree of subformulae of A together with an assignment of a
sign to each position k of the formula tree. Each position k then contains
a signed formula occurrence from within A; the formula occurrence apart
from its sign at k is called the label of k. Let lab(k) and sgn(k) denote
the label and sign of position k respectively. For each position k, if lab(k)
occurs positively in Ag, then sgn(k) = g. If lab(k) occurs negatively in Ag,
then sgn(k) is the opposite sign from g.
Deﬁnition 7 (Wallen 1990). A path through formula Ag is a subset of
the positions of its formula tree, deﬁned inductively:
1. fk0g, the root position, is a path.
2. If s;  is a path, so is (s   fg); 1; 2, for conjunctive  having
1; 2 as immediate subformulae.
3. If s;  is a path, so is (s fg); 1, for conjunctive  having 1 as its
sole immediate subformulae (this is the case where  is a negation).
4. If s;  is a path, so is (s   fg); 1, and so is (s   fg); 2, for
disjunctive  having 1; 2 as immediate subformulae.
The second through fourth clauses above can be regarded as path reduction
steps. A completely reduced path will consist entirely of (signed) positions
labeled by atoms, and is called an atomic path.
The above formulation can be easily extended from signed formulae to
two-sided sequents of signed formulae. The simplest way is to decompose
each of the antecedent formulae and succedent formulae separately. The
antecedent formulae are negatively signed, while the succedent formulae
are positively signed, and one decomposes the whole set of signed formulae
into a set of formula trees as above, treating the compound tree as a single
graph with “multiple roots.” The above deﬁnitions of a path through the
tree and an atomic path can then be applied mutatis mutandis.
Deﬁnition 8 (Matrix representation Wallen 1990).
1. If signed formula Ag is conjunctive, its matrix representation is a
row matrix having as element(s) the signed component(s) found im-
mediately below in its formula tree.
2. If signed formula Ag is disjunctive, its matrix representation is a
column matrix having as elements the signed components found im-
mediately below in its formula tree.
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3. If signed formula Ag is atomic, it is its own matrix representation.
A completed matrix for a signed formula must have every subformula in
every submatrix converted to matrix representation; matrices are to be
nested as needed. The matrix representation extends to signed two-sided
classical sequents by a simple adaptation of the procedure described above
for sequent trees. The matrix of a sequent is then simply a “row matrix”
whose elements are the respective matrices of the constituent formulae.
This fact can be related to the “metalogical” view of a sequent in which
the antecedent formulae are conjoined while the succedent formulae are
disjoined; observe that a conjunction in the antecedent and a disjunction
in the succedent are each formulae of conjunctive type, and so a row matrix
is the correct form for each.
Every atomic path through a signed formula (or sequent) is now repre-
sented by the sequence of signed atoms encountered on a left-right sequence
of steps through the columns in its completed matrix – submatrices are to
be stepped through as well in this procedure Wallen (1990). When a step
enters a column matrix, only one row is selected (nondeterministically) for
the atomic path, while the other is ignored.
The key idea at the core of the matrix method is that of a spanning
set of connections.
Deﬁnition 9. A connection is a pair of atomic positions in some path
through Ag, which have the same label but opposite signs. A given set of
connections is said to span Ag iﬀ every atomic path through Ag contains
a connection from the set.
Theorem 10 (Wallen 1990). For signed propositional formula A+, the
existence of a spanning set of connections for it ensures its provability in
classical logic, and vice versa.
The above deﬁnition and theorem concerning a spanning set of connections
also extends in a simple fashion mutatis mutandis to signed two-sided
sequents. For clarity, this may be stated as follows:
Corollary 11. For signed sequent    ) +, the existence of a spanning
set of connections for it ensures its provability in classical sequent calculus,
and vice versa.
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An example sequent provable in classical logic is shown in (1); the corre-
sponding matrix of the sequent is shown in (2).
:A; B ! A) :B (1)"
[A+]
"
B+
A 
##
[B ] (2)
This matrix presents two atomic paths: (A+; B+; B ) and (A+; A ; B ).
The spanning set of connections is then fhA+; A i; hB+; B ig, the exis-
tence of which shows the sequent to be provable in classical logic. Any
sequent of classical propositional logic can be tested for provability using
our adaptation of Wallen’s matrix method to two-sided sequents. The se-
quent calculus (or tableaux method) can now be regarded as extremely
ineﬃcient methods of checking that every atomic path through the goal
sequent tree contains a connection from a spanning set!
4.3. MLL 
The matrix method for linear logic was presented by Galmiche (2000). The
matrix representation of a sequent is obtained from the signed sequent
tree just as with classical logic. The matrix for the sequent proven above
in subsection 2.2 is shown in (3); a spanning set of connections for this
matrix is given in (4).
"
A 
B 
# "
B+
C+
# h
C  A+
i
(3)
fhA+; A i; hB+; B i; hC+; C ig (4)
Reﬂecting the diﬀerences between MLL  and classical logic, it is no longer
suﬃcient that the sequent matrix possesses a spanning set of connections,
however. Galmiche stated the additional requirements for the set S of
connections to linearly span a matrix in the following way: (1) All atomic
occurrences in the matrix occur exactly once with each polarity in S; (2) no
pair of connections in S has overlapping elements; (3) S is a minimal span-
ning set. It is easy to see that the set of connections in (4) does linearly
span the above matrix for the sequent. Galmiche stated the theorem that
a sequent of MLL  is provable just in case its matrix possesses a set of
connections which linearly spans it. It is notable that, despite present-
ing this as a proven fact, Galmiche never really proved it in his paper.
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It is nevertheless possible for us to appreciate, at a glance at least, how
the additional conditions deﬁning a linearly spanning set derive from the
characteristic that MLL handles multisets of formulae (cf. condition 1),
eﬀectively keeping track of formula occurrences and not allowing contrac-
tions of repeated formulae (cf. condition 2) or extraneous formulae (cf.
condition 3) into a proof.
Having discussed the matrix method and signed formulae, it will be
much easier to understand proof nets, a subject to which we turn next.
5. Proof net methods
The sequent and tableau methods yield too many possible proofs of a
given sequent, and have an undesirable amount of notational redundancy
for automated theorem proving applications. The matrix method described
above has certainly eliminated the redundancy, but now there are in a sense
too few proofs of a given sequent for some applications; in fact, each prov-
able sequent has precisely one matrix. This may be acceptable for theorem
proving, but there are theoretical reasons to desire a proof representation
that captures “the essence of a proof.” This notion is related to the general
problem of the identity of proofs (Došen 2003), and the compressed proof
objects known as proof nets have been put forth as solving this problem
for MLL, at least Straßburger (2006).
5.1. MLL 
Our discussion of proof nets must begin with MLL , since Girard (1987)
developed linear logic and proof nets at the same time. The proof nets are
in fact a subclass of the decomposition graphs known as proof structures.
Just as the matrix of a sequent is produced from the decomposition of the
signed formulae while distinguishing conjunctive from disjunctive formulae,
a proof structure is a special graph that is drawn from a formula or sequent
decomposition, also keeping track of the polarities and the conjunctive or
disjunctive nature of the signed formulae. The subgraphs which are drawn
for each type of formula decomposition are traditionally called links; to
complete the proof structure, pairs of atoms having opposite polarity are
linked together by edges called axiom links.
The MLL  link schemata which may be used to decompose formulae
in a proof structure are shown below. It should be mentioned that these
link drawings are to be viewed as representing graphs without further
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geometric properties, so that the speciﬁc orientation of a link drawing or
whether edges cross is unimportant. A complete proof structure for the
provable MLL sequent already studied above follows the link presentation
below. The resulting graph has two sorts of edges, which serve to dis-
tinguish the conjunctive from the disjunctive binary formula occurrences
(negation is excluded from the conjunctive/disjunctive dichotomy for this
purpose). The binary links shown with solid lines are the disjunctive for-
mulae, traditionally called times links (typiﬁed by the link for the times
connective 
 in a positive context), while the dotted lines show the con-
junctive formulae, traditionally called par links (and typiﬁed by the link
for the par   connective in a positive context). Axiom links are shown
with curved lines in the proof structures. Some formal deﬁnitions follow.
MLL  links:
[A?]
A
[A B] 
A  B 
 ;
;;
;;
[A B]+
A+ B+
[A
B] 
A  B 
[A
B]+
A+ B+
 ;
;;
;;
[A( B] 
A+ B 
 ;
;;
;;
[A( B]+
A  B+
A+ A 
Formula(e) on top of each link are called conclusion, and formulae on the
bottom of a link are called premiss. The axiom link is unique in having no
premisses and two conclusions.
MLL  proof structure:
Deﬁnition 12 (Moot 2002). A proof structure hS;Li consists of a set S of
signed formulae and a set L of links over S (from the above possibilities).
A proof structure must also satisfy the conditions:
• Every formula in S is at most once the premiss of a link;
• Every formula in S is exactly once the conclusion of a link.
K + K = 120 / p. 201 / May 3, 2019
A survey of proof nets andmatrices for substructural logics 201
[A B]  [(B 
 C)?]  ) [C ( A]+
[B 
 C]+
A  B 
B+ C+
C  A+






33
33
33
33
33
3






33
33
33
33
33
3
The proof structure exempliﬁed above is two-sided, because it can be cre-
ated for a sequent with formulae on both sides of the arrow ). It is pos-
sible to enumerate all possible proof structures for any sequent now by
decomposing all connectives until we reach the atomic formulae, and then
connecting positive to negative atoms using axiom links (Moot 2002). The
two-sided means of presenting a proof structure is, however, not common
in literature on linear logic, and has never been fully described in published
literature.1 In the literature, MLL proof structures are almost invariably
one-sided – meaning they can be constructed only for a one-sided sequent
calculus with empty antecedents. Moreover, such structures cannot involve
the implication or negation operators overtly as above, because they fur-
thermore do not keep track of the polarities of formulae. For our purposes,
the usual one-sided proof structures for MLL obscure the fundamental
relationship with matrix methods and the unifying notation of signed for-
mulae, so here we stick with the two-sided dialect.
Completing a proof structure for an MLL sequent is an important step
toward demonstrating provability of the sequent, but it is not yet suﬃcient.
A proof structure for a provable sequent is known as a proof net, and
only those structures which satisfy an additional correctness condition are
indeed proof nets. An impressive list of alternative correctness conditions
for MLL proof nets has arisen from years of research on the topic, beginning
with the original “long trip” condition of Girard (1987). This condition is
somewhat cumbersome for our purpose here, so we will ﬁrst describe a
popular correctness condition due to Danos and Regnier (1989).
1 The presentation here is derived from class lecture notes Straßburger (2006).
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Take a proof structure as a graph; let us call it P. Now, let (P) be a
new graph derived from P by deleting some edges. Speciﬁcally,  acts to
delete one edge nondeterministically from each par link in P, and is called
a DR switching.
Theorem 13 (Danos–Regnier correctness condition). A proof structure
P is a proof net if and only if every DR switching (P) of it yields a
connected acyclic graph.
The Danos–Regnier switching condition is easy to apply to small proof
structures – the structure presented above is easily seen to satisfy it – but
has exponential complexity because of the need to check the result of every
DR switching of a proof structure for acyclicity and connectedness Moot
(2002).
A more eﬃcient condition was ﬁrst presented in the PhD dissertation
of Danos (1990), and involves transforming a candidate proof structure by
graph contractions (v. Gross & Tucker 1987 for a formal deﬁnition of graph
contraction). The two Danos contraction rules are presented as follows in
Moot (2002):
y
x
:::::::
:::::::
2 !
y
x
1 ! x
The basic idea is that two ‘par’ edges transform to a single ‘times’ edge just
if they connect the same two vertices (this can only result from previous
contractions), and any two vertices linked by a ‘times’ edge contract to
one vertex.
Theorem 14 (Danos contraction condition). A proof structure is a proof
net if and only if it contracts to a single vertex by successive application
of the Danos contraction rules above.
The ﬁgure sequence below shows the successive contraction of the
proof structure presented above; formulae are irrelevant for this condition,
and are replaced by simple vertex labels. The equivalence between the
Danos–Regnier switching condition and the Danos contraction condition
was proven very simply in Straßburger (2006).
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a d h
e
b c
f g
i j






33
33
33
33
33
3






33
33
33
33
33
3
1 ! 3 times
a d h
c g i j
33
33
33
33
33
3






33
33
33
33
33
3
1 !
d h
a g i j






33
33
33
33
33
3
1 ! 3 times
h
i j
1 !
h
j
:::
:
:::
::
:
::
2 !
h
j
1 ! j
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5.2. Intuitionistic MLL
We refer back to the sequent calculus rules for MLL ; this system is ren-
dered intuitionistic by endowing it with the single-conclusion property, by
which all sequents must have just one succedent formula (Moot 2002). The
positive fragment of this system with only 
 and( is known in the liter-
ature as multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic (MILL), and it has some
thinly disguised early roots.
A kind of decomposition graph for MILL formulae was published by
Kelly and Mac Lane in 1971 in their study of coherence in categories, and
is possibly the ﬁrst work on a compressed proof object showing aspects
of the matrix and proof net methods. The Kelly–Mac Lane graph of a
MILL formula shows its decomposition to signed atoms; if linking atoms
in opposite polarity pairs can be achieved, then one has essentially a proof
structure, but a correctness criterion is still required for such a structure
to be a proof net (Moot 2002).
To build a proof structure in MILL, one begins as in MLL by decom-
posing the sequent into subformulae down to the atoms while keeping track
of the polarities and the conjunctive/disjunctive property of the formula
at each stage. The antecedent formulae are ﬁrst given a negative sign while
the succedent formula is given a positive sign. Beyond this there are just
two operators, and the decomposition proceeds so that [X 
 Y ] yields
X; Y , while [X ( Y ] yields X; Y , as above in MLL. Signed formu-
lae of the form [X 
 Y ] ; [X ( Y ]+ are the conjunctive ones as in MLL,
which are assigned a par link. The formal deﬁnition of a proof structure
in MILL (without units) is the same as the above for MLL  mutatis mu-
tandis, and either of the above correctness conditions for MLL proof nets
carries over to the case of MILL (Moot 2002).
Below we show two proof structures for posited sequents of MILL; only
the ﬁrst one is a correct proof net, in which each DR switching yields a
connected acyclic graph. The second proof structure has a cycle following
removal of the right branch of the par link, demonstrating the posited
sequent to be underivable in MILL. We see that MILL proof nets are
merely a subspecies of MLL nets, however, one reason to discuss this logic
separately here is to highlight the much earlier literature (Kelly & Mac
Lane 1971) that ﬁrst deﬁned proof structures for this system, and was
also ﬁrst to make use of signed formulae in a linear logic system. MILL
is in a sense also the archetypal logic in this family possessing the single-
conclusion property.
K + K = 120 / p. 205 / May 3, 2019
A survey of proof nets andmatrices for substructural logics 205
X  ) [Y ( (X 
 Y )]+
Y   [X 
 Y ]+
X+ Y +
 ;
;;
;;
X  ) [(Y ( X)
 Y ]+
[Y ( X]+ Y +
Y   X+



SSSS
SSSS
SS
5.3. Classical logic
Classical (propositional) logic is actually quite similar to linear logic; all
of the diﬀerences derive from the presence of Gentzen’s structural rules
of Weakening and Contraction. It is interesting to see how the deﬁnition
of a proof net carries over to this case. Proof nets for classical logic have
been developed by Robinson (2003) following the two-sided paradigm given
above for linear logic, in which there are distinct links for decomposing each
connective in a positive versus a negative context. The system therefore
derives naturally from Smullyan’s unifying notation for classical logic, al-
though Robinson did not cite this prior literature. The conjunctive and
disjunctive links for the decomposition of signed formulae are very similar
to the ones needed for MLL, and are presented below with adjustments
to suit our notation here (leaving aside the degenerate links which would
handle the true and false units, not used here).
Classical logic links:
[:A]
A
[A _B] 
A  B 
 ;
;;
;;
[A _B]+
A+ B+
[A ^B] 
A  B 
[A ^B]+
A+ B+
 ;
;;
;;
[A! B] 
A+ B 
 ;
;;
;;
[A! B]+
A  B+
A+ A 
K + K = 120 / p. 206 / May 3, 2019
206 Sean A. Fulop
As Robinson showed, more is needed to obtain a kind of proof net that
enjoys the same correctness conditions which govern MLL. Speciﬁcally,
Robinson added links corresponding to the structural rules of Contraction
and Weakening; the former are conjunctive while the latter are disjunctive.
Once again our presentation changes the link notation somewhat to make
it uniform with the presentation of MLL.
Structural links:
[Cont]
A
A A
[Weak]
B
B A
;;
;;
; 
With these additions, a proof structure can be constructed for a classi-
cal sequent, relying on Deﬁnition 12 from the MLL case. The correctness
conditions it must meet to be a proof net for a provable sequent are also
carried over from MLL with no changes. An example is now shown.
Classical proof net:
C  [:A]  [B ! A]  ) [:B]+ D+
A+Weak
A+
B+ A  B  Weak
B 

  ;
;;
;; 2222
This classical proof net turns out to have no conjunctive links, so it has to
be a connected acyclic graph as it is shown according to the Danos–Regnier
condition, and indeed it is. Robinson also gave an elegant, simple expla-
nation connecting this correctness condition to the unifying notation, to
be restated now. If a proof net comes from a proof, the graph must be
simply connected, which forces the switching condition in the following
way. A disjunctive (‘times’) signed subformula A  B for any operator 
has “branched” premisses which come from separate subproofs, and so are
not yet connected, so the occurrence of A B must be joined to both pre-
misses otherwise the proof net would end up disconnected. On the other
hand, a conjunctive (‘par’) signed subformula C D has premisses coming
from the same subproof, so they are already connected. The formula C D
must then be joined to exactly one premiss or the graph will contain a
cycle. This explanation is also applicable to the linear logic cases. It is
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interesting that the only real diﬀerence between the MLL  and classical
proof net systems is the addition of the special links for Contraction and
Weakening.
5.4. Associative Lambek calculus
So far we have discussed classical logic, which in essence handles formulae
in sets, and two varieties of linear logic, which remove the Weakening and
Contraction rules, and thereby keep track of occurrences of formulae. It
is useful to note at this juncture that these logics have both matrix and
proof net methods available for checking provability of sequents, neither of
whose correctness conditions refer crucially to the geometrical arrangement
of the proof object. It is apparent that a matrix of a sequent does not have
any interesting geometrical properties; moreover, although a proof net is a
kind of graph, there is nothing very “geometrical” about these proof nets
so far. It is unimportant whether the link lines in a drawing of the graph
cross, for example.
In fact, L is basically MILL without Exchange. The lack of Exchange
(or “commutativity”) has eﬀectively split the linear implication into a pair
of directionally sensitive implications notated with the slash operators.
Each slash is interpreted as saying that the formula on top of the slash
results when the formula under it is adjacent on that side. The newfound
sensitivity of the logic to the arrangement of formulae in a sequence has a
profound eﬀect on the deﬁnition of a compressed proof procedure. Below,
the binary links for proof nets in the Lambek system L are provided, follow-
ing Roorda (1991; 1992); this time, however, the geometry of the drawings
as shown provides important information. The left-right arrangement of
the subformulae in a decomposition link is now critical; one must swap the
order of the subformulae with respect to the parent formula in the positive
links only.2
2 One of the very few sources to provide these link drawings for Lambek proof nets
(Moot 2002) has got this condition backwards, unfortunately.
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Links for L:
[B/A] 
B  A+
;;;;;


[AnB] 
A+ B 
 ;
;;
;;
[B/A]+
A  B+
[AnB]+
B+ A 
[A B]+
B+ A+
;;;;;


[A B] 
A  B 
A+ A 
L proof structure. It seems that the formal deﬁnition of a proof
structure in L can be kept the same as for the systems above. An example
is now shown.
[C  (CnA)/B]  B  ) A+
C  [(CnA)/B] 
[CnA]  B+
C+ A 
 3
33
33
33
33
33
 3
33
33
33
33
33
This example is in fact also a proof net for the provable sequent. This proof
net satisﬁes the Danos–Regnier condition plus an additional requirement
of planarity which was ﬁrst proven necessary by Roorda (1991); each DR-
switching graph is not only acyclic connected, but also planar as shown in
the drawing.
Although this treatment here applies generally to the system L al-
lowing empty antecedents, it has been shown (Lamarche & Retoré 1996)
that we may exclude all sequents with empty antecedent by an additional
requirement about subnets of a proof net. A subnet is, in our notation, a
down-closed subset of the nodes such that axiom links stay inside the sub-
structure. Then, to exclude sequents with empty antecedent, it is suﬃcient
to require that every subnet of a proof net possess at least two conclusions
(i.e., local root formulae at the top).
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A diﬀerent presentation of a noncommutative linear logic was also
shown to require planar proof nets (Abrusci 1991), around the same time as
Roorda’s result about the Lambek system. The NCMLL system described
in the reference is equivalent in its multiplicative fragment to another non-
commutative logic (Pentus 1997), which in turn is a conservative extension
of L (Abrusci 1997). Thus it is beginning to look as if noncommutativ-
ity of the logic (i.e., lack of Exchange) leads directly to a new geometric
requirement of planarity of the proof net. It is also not at all obvious
that a version of the matrix method could somehow be formulated for this
kind of logic, for now the speciﬁc arrangement of the formulae is critical.
5.5. Nonassociative Lambek calculus
Despite having been discussed many times in the literature, the system NL
has never had a proof net scheme deﬁned for it in a way that relates clearly
with the other proof net schemes presented here.3 It turns out to be quite
easy to adapt the proof nets for associative L, but an additional correctness
condition is required that has never been developed in literature, and which
makes the resulting nets even more “geometrical.” This is the only novel
result to be introduced in the present survey.
Let us discuss several examples of NL proof structures to develop the
additional correctness condition. Example 1 shows the basic kind of struc-
ture for a provable sequent, which is planar just as in system L. A further
correctness condition is needed in order to account for the eﬀects of the
parentheses, which govern the nonassociative structure of the antecedent.
To develop this extra condition, we draw dotted boundaries from each
pair of parentheses in the antecedent, extending around the ﬁrst decom-
position link whose active conclusion subformula is governed by that pair.
Such boundaries in our proof nets will be called parenthetical boundaries.
Examining the axiom links in the ﬁnal structure, observe that only the
link coming from the negative B atom, which connects to the succedent,
crosses the parenthetical boundary that contains it.
3 A proof net system for “classical” NL was provided in de Groote & Lamarche (2002),
but these authors used a quite diﬀerent formulation whose deﬁnition and correctness
condition bears little obvious resemblance to the proof nets so far discussed.
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Example 1
A  ([(AnB)/C]  C ) ) B+
[AnB]  C+
A+ B 
 3
33
33
33
33
33
 3
33
33
33
33
33
::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::
::::
:::
:::
::
::
::
::
::
::
::
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: : : : : : : : : : :
: : :
: : :
: :
: :
:::
:::
:::
:::
::
::
::
::
::
::
:
::
::
:
Example 2, by contrast, shows a similar proof structure for a non-provable
sequent whose antecedent has the parentheses wrong. The structure is
indeed planar, so the sequent would be provable in system L by invoking
associativity, but observe that now both of the antecedent axiom links
cross the ﬁrst boundary (the outer boundary is not shown). The problem,
in reality, is the C-link, because the link from the positive atom crosses the
parenthetical boundary which contains it. We therefore state this as part
of the correctness conditions.
Theorem 15. An NL-proof structure is a proof net for the decomposed
sequent just in case:
• the Danos–Regnier switching condition, or other equivalent condition,
holds of the structure;
• the structure is planar;
• no axiom link from a positive atom crosses the parenthetical boundary
which contains it.
Example 3 illustrates the structure for a more complicated provable se-
quent, and we observe that two axiom links cross boundaries, but neither
involves a link from a positive atom crossing the boundary which con-
tains it.
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Example 2
(A  [(AnB)/C] ) C  ) B+
[AnB]  C+
A+ B 
 3
33
33
33
33
33
 3
33
33
33
33
33
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
::::
:::
:::
::
::
::
::
::
::
::
:
Example 3
(D  [DnA] ) ([(AnB)/C]  C ) ) B+
D+ A 
[AnB]  C+
A+ B 
rrrrrrr MM
MMM
MM  3
33
33
33
33
33
 3
33
33
33
33
33
:::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::: :
: :
::
::
::
::
::
::
::
: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
::::
:::
::
::
::
::
::
::
::
::
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: : : : : : : : ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
:::::
::::
:::
:::
::
::
::
::
::
::
::
::
::
::
::
::
::
::
It is quite easy to see the necessity of this correctness condition, so a brief
explanation should suﬃce here. Note ﬁrst that for each slash operator in
a provable NL sequent, there must be a pair of parentheses surrounding a
formula which contains it, and also surrounding the neighboring occurrence
of the subformula under the slash. Every atomic subformula under a top-
level slash (i.e., one not itself within a proper subformula) in the antecedent
of the sequent will decompose to a positive signed atom in the proof net,
while the neighboring atom of the same label will show the opposite sign
(cf. Example 1). With the parentheses in the right place, an axiom link
connecting the two atoms will not cross a boundary determined by them;
with parentheses in the wrong places, the positive atom will be contained
within a boundary which does not contain its counterpart negative (cf.
Example 2). This argument extends by a structural induction to more
complicated formulae. In essence, the device of the boundaries is a way of
checking the grouping action of the parentheses in the proof net.
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Example 4 shows that care must be taken to draw the parenthetical
boundaries when subformulae involving “useless types” occur in the se-
quent. Observe that the subformula C/D has types C and D which are
“useless”, in that they do no work in reducing the sequent. When this is
the case, we must draw the boundary all the way around the axiom links
which connect the decompositions of the occurrences of C/D. After draw-
ing the boundaries appropriately, we observe that once again no axiom
link coming from a positive atom crosses a boundary which contains it.
The proof structure for this provable sequent is then a proof net, under
our newly formulated condition.
Example 4
A  ([(AnB)/(C/D)]  [C/D] ) ) B+
[AnB]  [C/D]+
C  D+
A+ B 
D  C+
 3
33
33
33
33
33
 3
33
33
33
33
33
rrrrrrr MM
MMM
MM
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :::::::::
::::::
:::::
::::
::::
:::
::
::
::
::
::
:::
:::
:::
:::::::::::::::::::
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
:::::
::::
::::
:::
:::
:::
:::
:::
::
:::
:::
:::
::
::
::
::
::
:::
::
We have at last descended all the way down the substructural hierarchy.
As the logics became more stringent in dealing with a speciﬁc arrange-
ment of formulae, the conditions on proof nets became accordingly more
geometrical. Moreover, we noted that for those logics that do not deal with
a speciﬁc arrangement of the formulae, it was possible to invoke the ex-
tremely compressed proof format of the matrix method. It is the author’s
hope that this uniﬁed discussion has illuminated the ways in which the
“geometry” required of formulae in a logical consequence relation ends up
being encoded into the “geometry of proofs” validating sequents for the
logic. There are probably also some connections that could now be made
with work that has explicitly represented proof nets topologically as cell
complexes (e.g., Métayer 2001).
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6. Complexity issues
While complexity of proof methods is not our focus here it must at least be
mentioned, since the improvement in eﬃciency oﬀered by compressed proof
objects is a major reason for their promotion and study. The complexity of
the decision problem in MLL has been shown to be NP-complete (Kanovich
1991), so no theorem-proving scheme can ever really be tractable. The best
that can be hoped for is minimal intractability. Proof nets have mostly
been studied for the time complexity of the proof veriﬁcation problem, and
along these lines, the Danos contraction condition as described above has
complexity O(n2) in the size of the proof structure Moot (2002). Guerrini
(1999), however, showed how to convert the contraction algorithm into one
with linear complexity. Another way of developing a linear time correctness
check was shown by Murawski and Ong (2000). Given the existence of
linear-time algorithms to check correctness of a proof structure, the origin
of the overall NP complexity is therefore the proof construction due to the
sheer number of possible proof structures to be checked, because how to
create axiom links can be indeterminate after expanding the formula tree.
Turning to the matrix method, the way to check correctness of a ma-
trix involves traversing all paths through it to see whether there exists a
(linearly) spanning set of connections for it. Now, while a matrix appears
to be a proof object of a truly minimal size and graphic intricacy, the
worst-case complexity of checking a matrix would seem to be exponential,
on the order of 2n in the length of the formula. This can happen in the
case of a formula that involves nested disjunctive subformulae, which will
yield nested column matrices through which all paths must be traversed.
For this reason, the matrix method was dismissed out of hand by Hughes
(2006) as not even a “proof system”, which has occasionally been deﬁned
(Cook & Reckhow 1979) as a system in which proofs can at least be veri-
ﬁed, if not constructed, in polynomial time. The matrix method does bear
the singular feature that actually constructing the proof object is deter-
ministic and linear-time. But, to borrow a common adage, if logic were
that easy everyone would be doing it. The matrix method’s powerfully
simple proof construction leaves a large debt to be paid on the other end
of the deal, when the time comes to check it. So in rough terms, matrices
are easy to build but potentially hard to verify (not unlike the case of
truth tables),4 while the opposite is true for proof nets. In practical ap-
plications, of course, all these considerations are less important than the
4 Thanks to the referee for pointing out this similarity.
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ultimate competition among the average-case complexities, and discussing
that is beyond our scope here.
7. Identity of proofs
The identity of proofs problem remains a signiﬁcant open research ques-
tion in logic and proof theory (Došen 2003).5 Simply put, for any given
logical system this is the question of when two apparently diﬀerent proofs
(of the same formula) ought to be regarded as fundamentally “identical.”
While at ﬁrst glance this issue appears tangential to the main track of
the present paper, it has to be addressed because it has so often been a
central concern in the community researching proof nets for the system
MLL, among others. Proof nets have usually been promoted as addressing
this question directly (Girard 1987), and have sometimes been claimed to
actually solve the issue (Straßburger 2006). It will now be explained how
such claims should be viewed as exaggerated.
There may in general be more than one proof net for a provable se-
quent, however there can often be fewer possible proof nets than possible
sequent proofs, even in a Cut-free system. Each proof net has often been
viewed as representing an equivalence class of sequent proofs modulo “spu-
rious ambiguity”, while distinct proof nets will sequentialize respectively to
full sequent proofs which are “nontrivially” distinct (Straßburger 2006). In
lecture notes (op.cit.), Straßburger goes so far as to claim a theorem stat-
ing that two sequent calculus proofs in MLL translate to the same proof
net iﬀ they can be transformed into each other using only “trivial rule per-
mutations.” Yet, such a theorem seems to be circular, for in order to have
this result one must assert in advance precisely what kinds of sequent rule
permutations are held to be trivial and which are nontrivial. But it is this
last issue that remains fundamentally a matter of debate!
Moreover (as Došen pointed out to me), on Straßburger’s analysis,
two sequent proofs which diﬀer only by the presence of a useless Cut rule
must be held to be nontrivially distinct, because the one with Cut will
translate to a proof net involving a Cut link. Yet there is broad agreement
among logicians that a sequent proof involving Cut should be regarded as
“identical” to its Cut-free variant. Proof nets, therefore, should not be seen
to have solved the identity of proofs question for any logical system. As for
the matrix of a sequent, there can be only one, so as a proof-theoretical
5 This section owes a great debt to personal communications with Kosta Došen, and I
herein communicate some of his arguments.
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object it does not address the fundamental question of “identity of proofs”
other than to trivialize it.
8. Concluding remarks
Past literature has rarely, if ever, connected all the topics and treatments
touched on in the present paper. It is in the spirit of a new synthesis that
the paper is oﬀered, with the hope of a more complete understanding. We
observe many connections between eﬀorts to compress proof schemata,
where the geometrical requirements of the compressed proof object arise
out of the substructural nature of the logic. We also observe the connection
between signed subformulae, which arise out of the concept of negation
and the duality therefrom, and the “link” or “connection” notions which
are central to the compressed proof objects, whether matrix or proof net.
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ABSTRACT
We examine the impact of the recent phenomenon of digital writing, es-
pecially on minority languages that are thriving orally. It appears that
successful literacy in minority languages formerly needed a strong in-
stitution, ideally supportingwidespread education, in order forwriting to
be sustained. However, with web-based interaction, community norms
andpractices can spread andbe sustained by informal interaction online
and in text messaging. Examples from three language varieties (Rangi,
Tunisian Arabic and Sheng) are given, where the main model for writing
is not derived from a formal institution. This leads us to propose amodi-
fication of the interpretation of the EGIDS scale, such that EGIDS Level 5
may be a sustainable level for literacy rather than merely a step towards
sustainability.
The future of many, or indeed most, of the world’s languages is endangered;
this is not a matter of debate. What is genuinely hard to predict is the
trajectory of each language – which ones will be passed on to the next
generation, and to the one after that. There is agreement on some general
factors involved in language maintenance, shift and death: attitudes both
internal and external; changes in lifestyle; contact and relationship with
other groups; patterns of multilingualism etc. But how these factors play
out in individual cases does not leave us with predictive power of what the
precise future of each language is.
A related question is what the literacy status of a language is – some
language varieties are used exclusively for oral communication, while others
are used for writing, and for a variety of purposes. Just as there are social
factors that inﬂuence the transmission of a language from one generation
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to another, so there are other factors which help the continued use of a
language in a written form. The central question of this paper is whether
the conditions which sustain literacy have changed with the advent of writ-
ing on digital platforms – more speciﬁcally, whether digital writing means
that social institutions are no longer strictly necessary for the maintenance
of community’s use of the written form of the language.
On this topic of digital writing, Professor Kornai has written what
has proved to be the seminal work: his 2013 paper Digital language death.
In it he demonstrates that most languages have failed to ascend digitally,
that is, to become vehicles of written digital expression, whether on a
computer or phone. One of the key questions for linguists is whether dig-
ital writing presents an opportunity for minority languages to be used in
new sociolinguistic domain (Fasold 1984, 60), or whether the digital envi-
ronment is another factor in the decrease of prestige, and shift to another
language. It seems clear that texting, messaging and the internet in general
are something of both an opportunity and a danger to minority languages,
depending on a wide variety of factors.
One of Kornai’s key observations is that for digital language use to
be vital, it must involve “active use in a broad variety of two-way contexts
such as social networks, business/commerce, live literature, etc.” (2013, 3).
With this comment he rightly dismisses the presence of dictionaries and the
like as suﬃcient conditions of digital vitality – interaction is the key, rather
than the mere existence of the documentation, as important and laudable
task as it is. We can build on this observation by recalling Abercrombie’s
(1963, 14) comment that “writing is a device developed for recording prose,
not conversation” – digital writing is, on the other hand, often conversa-
tional, as it shares with conversation the in-the-moment interactivity that
other forms of writing, ﬁxed on paper, do not. As such, we can make the
case that messaging has opened the door to genuinely conversational writ-
ing. And it seems to be the case that in writing, conversation makes the
use of any vernacular more likely – whether an endangered, minoritised,
or non-standard, variety of language.
Conversation is where most minority languages survive – in discus-
sions at home, in informal gatherings, in the ﬁelds or bars. In multilingual
societies one often ﬁnds languages of higher prestige used in education, for-
mal writing and so on, but in general the vernacular or the non-standard
is the appropriate variety to use when the communication is interactive.
These conversations disappear from record the moment after utterance
(interestingly enough, a practice shadowed by some messaging apps such
as Snapchat). When used for in-the-moment person-to-person interaction,
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digital writing can mirror these spoken practices, and thus we see an impe-
tus around the world to use non-standard or vernacular forms of writing,
from textspeak (Crystal 2008) in English, to a multilingual situation where
speakers write in a language normally reserved for speech. Digital writing
is a more natural domain for the writing of otherwise rarely written lan-
guages. It seems reasonable to suggest that this use may then, at the very
least, serve as a model for other writing, showing that writing the vernac-
ular is a possibility.
We also note that the internet can increase exposure to other lan-
guages, and in some cases may be part of the hastening of a shift to a
language which is perceived as having richer beneﬁts (Karan 2011). But
in this paper we have decided to focus on opportunities rather than the
threats, which can look after themselves.
Just as it is easier to work on preventing a village from falling into
a river rather than reconstructing it after it has fallen in (‘a stitch in
time saves nine’), so the most eﬀective strategies of language preservation
are those where the language is still vital, rather than cases where the
language has already mainly been lost. The analogy applies also to digital
engagement with minority languages – it is more likely to take root where
the language has not yet started to fall into the river, that is, it is still used
within all generations of the community in daily spoken communication.
In order to be able to address the question of whether digital media
have introduced a new opportunity for communities to use their languages
in written form, we introduce parts of the two frameworks that help raise
the issue of what constitutes sustainable, vital use of language in written
form, EGIDS and Kornai’s measure of digital vitality.
EGIDS
In order to be able to talk of language endangerment and revitalisation
with greater precision, we introduce a part of EGIDS (Lewis & Simons
2010; Simons & Lewis 2016) – an extension of Fishman’s (1991) Graded
Intergenerational Disruption Scale. Unlike the UNESCO framework of lan-
guage vitality (Brenzinger et al. 2003) which views a language as vulnera-
ble if it is not used in education, EGIDS’ central question is whether “The
language is used for face-to-face communication by all generations and the
situation is sustainable” (Lewis & Simons 2016, 80). If this is the case, the
language use is classed as Vigorous, and assigned at the very least a Level
6a (the lower the number, the higher the level of vitality). This is distin-
guished from Level 6b, Threatened, deﬁned as “The language is used for
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face-to-face communication within all generations, but it is losing users”
(ibid., 81), which is the case when not all children within the language
community are acquiring the communal language. For EGIDS the primary
question for the future of the language is whether it is currently being
transmitted orally to children, rather than questions of use in literacy or
education, important as these can be. It is only once it is established that
the language is at a minimum level of 6a, Vigorous, that other factors such
as use of the language in writing are considered. Overall a language which
does have written presence, but is losing speakers, is regarded as being
less vital than one where oral transmission continues, but without literacy.
The next two levels, above 6a, do take into account the status of
literacy in the language, and are:
– 5, Developing, “The language is in vigorous use, with literature in
a standardized form being used by some, though this is not yet
widespread or sustainable”,
– 4, Educational, “The language is in vigorous use, with standardiza-
tion and literature being sustained through a widespread system of
institutionally supported education” (Simons & Lewis 2016, 80).
Level 4, Educational, shares with Level 6a the fact that it is a sustainable
level – in contrast to 6b, where the loss of some speakers, will, without
eﬀective intervention, lead to a further degradation of the vitality status
of the language. At Level 4, as long as an educational system is being
sustained (with not just funding for the schools, but also some system for
training teachers), the level is expected to be stable. In most cases the
institution will have government backing, but other possibilities for sus-
tainability exist, such as religious institutions, community organisations, or
NGOs. In these cases, the level will be stable only as long as the institution
sees the value of continuing the education in this language.
Level 5, Developing, is a natural stage on any transition from a lan-
guage used purely for oral expression to one used in a sustainable educa-
tional system. There needs to be some development of literacy in a language
used only orally before it can be used in education, such as developing a
writing system, agreeing the vocabulary to be used, and developing mate-
rials. And a body of users (e.g., of those who will teach the language) must
also develop. However, an insight of the EGIDS model is that this level,
without a sustainable institution, is not stable. If there is activity at this
level which does not continue, the language will naturally slip back to level
6a; even to sustain this level needs constant activism. This is an important
observation, which can guard against the false optimism of developing a
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writing system which a few people use, under the assumption that these
practices will spread themselves. In most cases, unless there is a cham-
pion within the community who then is key in establishing an institution,
literacy will not be more widely adopted.
A diagram showing the relevant part of the “language mountain” is
shown below. The full diagram of the whole EGIDS scale is shown in
Simons & Lewis (2016, 116). A ﬂat area represents an EGIDS level which
is sustainable. In the diagram we see that this is the case for levels 4 and
6a. Level 6b is a situation which is inherently unstable – without communal
intervention, the language is likely to move eventually to a level where the
youngest generation of speakers has reached adulthood (Level 7). Moving
up to 6a would require substantial eﬀort, signiﬁed by the steep gradient.
In the same way, Level 5 is seen as a level where without institutional
support in teaching the language, the language will most likely revert to
use only in oral domains. We argue here in this paper that the gradient is
perhaps not so steep at Level 5, if a community starts writing its language
in digital media.
Figure 1: Levels 4–6 in the EGIDS, adapted from Simons & Lewis (2016, 116)1
Measuring digital vitality
EGIDS was not designed with digital writing in mind, though in their later
work, Lewis and Simons (2016, 195) do mention that “mobile telephones,
text messaging, and the worldwide web, can also be identiﬁed as venues for
local-language use and sharing of identity-re-enforcing knowledge”. Kornai
1 Used by permission, © SIL International (Simons & Lewis 2016), further redistribu-
tion prohibited without permission.
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(2013) is to some extent an attempt to apply the principles behind EGIDS
to digital writing, backed up with empirical evidence of the digital presence
of diﬀerent languages obtained through web crawling. The resulting scale
is much simpler than EGIDS, of which we have presented only a part.
Kornai presents four categories of digital vitality. I refer the reader to
his work for a fuller account.
Thriving T
Vital V
Historical/Heritage H
Still S
Thriving and Still are somewhat self-explanatory; the key distinction for
our purposes in this paper is the diﬀerence between Vital and Heritage. In
both cases the language is present on the internet in some form, but with
the Vital category it is used between speakers for two-way communication,
as opposed to Heritage (or Historical), in which case the “ language is not
used by native speakers (L1) for communication in the digital world” (2013,
2). At the Heritage level there may be documentation, or even Wikipedia
entries, or a dictionary, but the two-way interaction, also key for Level
6a Vigorous in EGIDS, is absent. Further categories of digital vitality,
Emergent and Latent, are proposed by Gibson (2015; 2016), primarily to
help identify which activities may be useful to enable digital ascent, in
much the same way as the Sustainable Use Model (Lewis & Simons 2016)
is focused on helping communities identify useful activities for securing the
future of their language. EGIDS, which it builds upon, is primarily a tool
of description and analysis.
It is evident that if a language is classiﬁed as being Vital in digi-
tal vitality, then it will be normally at the very least at EGIDS Level 4,
i.e., supported by a sustainable institution. In fact, for the Vital category,
Kornai (2013:9) states “This group contains about two thirds (66%) of the
EGIDS 1 languages; less than half (46%) of EGIDS 2; 13% of EGIDS 3; 8%
of EGIDS 4; 2% of EGIDS 5; and less than 1% of all higher classes.” We see
that in fact most languages at the lower end of sustainable literacy are not
judged to be digitally vital – some may well be borderline between vital
and still. But the presence of even some languages below EGIDS Level 4 at
the digital Vital level demonstrates that these language communities have
found ways to use the language in written communication with each other,
without a sustainable institution. In cases where this use is marginal (e.g.,
only a small portion of the community uses the language in written com-
munication), and EGIDS level 5 would seem appropriate. EGIDS ﬁgures
K + K = 120 / p. 225 / May 3, 2019
Does literacy no longer need an institution to remain sustainable? 225
listed in Simons & Fennig (2017) are not the ﬁnal word, and are subject
to change in the presence of new data – that Kornai has found digital
presence of a language at the Vital level is surely suﬃcient to recategorise
these languages as at 5 at the very least, with the possible exceptions of
where the digital usage is not matched by oral communal usage.
Some examples of digital writing
We now report on three examples of digital writing in language varieties
which do not have any signiﬁcant institutional support. In each case we
give but a brief example, and discuss the context in which this use is
found. The examples give but a small ﬂavour of this kind of interaction,
and are here to demonstrate that digital writing can exist where there is
no institution which teaches people how to read and write the language va-
riety, or decrees which is the correct way of writing it. Rather than giving
detailed documentation of multiple examples, or rates of use, we demon-
strate usage, that is, however, not isolated, but reﬂective of broader trends.
For people to be able to write to each other eﬀectively, there do need
to be some conventions – an agreement on which script or scripts are
appropriate, for example, and which letters are appropriate to represent
which sounds. Total agreement on these issues is not necessary – just as
in oral communication, we can eﬀectively communicate where there is a
diﬀerence in dialect, but there are also limits to eﬀective communication
where divergence increases. In each of the cases the language users have
learnt to read and write in other language varieties, and have transferred
this skill to a variety not taught at school. However, the development of
orthographic conventions – normally the role of an institution, is arrived
at by some level of negotiation, whether overt or developmental.
Under Kornai’s paradigm these three cases can be described as Vital,
with evidence of two-way communication going on between community
members. In two of the three cases there is a question over whether the
target variety is in fact an independent language, but in some ways this
is also a moot question – we will see that conventions for writing a lan-
guage variety have come into play without signiﬁcant intervention from
an institution – the community of web users can be said to have taken
over this function more often performed by an institution. The deﬁnition
of what constitutes separate languages is notoriously diﬃcult and contro-
versial (e.g., see Simons & Fennig 2017 on The problem of language iden-
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tiﬁcation),2 so we have chosen to remain non-dogmatic here – the issue is
broadly similar, whether the variety is deﬁned as a separate language, or
as a non-standard variety of another language. We will start by looking
at the case which is indisputably a separate language, Rangi of Tanzania.
Rangi (ISO 639-3: LAG) is listed in Simons & Fennig (2017) as at
6a on EGIDS, and is spoken by over 400,000 people, but not used in the
education system. There are some Biblical and other texts – the Bible
uses barred vowels in addition to the typical Latin ﬁve vowels, the result
of careful phonological analysis being applied to an orthography. There is
however no agreed standard orthography, but the most available model
is that of the Bible. As for all of Tanzania, the media of instruction in
school are Swahili and English. However, there is a Facebook page,3 which
is for community members to use the language. The page does not function
exclusively in Rangi, with Swahili also present, in line with the multilingual
practices of the community. It is important to note that the page is focused
on the use of the language by the community, and as such is less of strong
example of vital digital use than the other two cases below, where the
name of the language variety is not on the page – the interaction in those
cases has no tinge of language activism –, the message is clearly of more
importance than the medium. In the case of Rangi, unlike the two that
follow, we are unable to conﬁrm that what is observed on a Facebook page
is reﬂective of broader communal practices commonly found elsewhere.
I will quote a couple of texts on the site, merely to demonstrate usage
related to the barred vowels of the Biblical text. The ﬁrst example (dated
5 December 2017), contains the following text: “Kei sɨ kwa mɨrɨmo yaanyu
tʉkʉ, sa mʉʉntʉ yoyoosi adɨɨre kwiivaa kɨpeembe”. The reader will note
the use of barred vowels – this is a Bible verse, which is then repeated in
both Swahili and English. However other posts do not demonstrate these
barred vowels (e.g., a post from 30 December 2017 has “Kalarira saka eeeh
mukulu mikate yosi jei na ndii wuuuu kibirya mpia sana”). We can assume
that the Bible passage was copied and pasted from a soft version of the
Bible. However, other online use has eschewed the symbols that are not
used in Swahili (the barred vowels), and which are also more of a challenge
to ﬁnd on a phone or computer keyboard. This is a tendency which seems
quite common when community members write minoritised languages –
making do with simpler solutions, and not necessarily making an eﬀort
to reﬂect a standard form of the language. This demonstrates that even
2 https://www.ethnologue.com/about/problem-language-identiﬁcation
3 https://www.facebook.com/groups/TuluusikeKilaangi/
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where there is a model (in this case the Bible) where phonemes are ortho-
graphically distinguished, speakers do not always adopt these solutions,
often adopting solutions which are easier to implement, or conform more
closely to orthographic models already available. In this case, both factors
might be at play in the lack of uptake of the barred vowels. Overall, the
language may have reached the Vital (or at the very least a Borderline)
level in the digital sphere, through the presence of the Facebook group, and
this should also qualify the language to be deemed at Level 5 on EGIDS,
and that this level may be sustainable. How much deliberate eﬀort is be-
ing made by those promoting the written use of the language is not clear.
There is less evidence of more widespread use of the language than in the
following two examples. The conventions followed seem to be as close a
match to Swahili as possible.
Tunisian Arabic (ISO 639-3: AEB, also listed as part of the Arabic
macrolanguage ARA), is spoken by over 11 million people (Simons & Fen-
nig 2017). Formal writing in Tunisia is generally either in Standard Arabic
or French, and there is no oﬃcial standard for Tunisian Arabic. However
many advertising slogans are written in the variety, and there has been an
increased use of the oral variety in broadcast media over the last twenty
years. In general the spoken norms of the capital Tunis are followed in such
writing. Children are not taught to read and write in this variety, despite
its being the home variety of over 99% of the population. It is listed at
level 3 on EGIDS, as it functions as the vehicular language outside for-
mal domains, even if without any formal status, or a standardised variety.
I will present just one piece of data which is demonstrative of how
the variety is used in writing: “N3ichou elwahm w msad9inou”. This is
found on the public page of a Tunisian Facebook user, written by another
user in response to a post. Such usage is extremely common on Facebook,
not restricted to pages which mention Tunisia or Tunisian Arabic. Here
we ﬁnd Tunisian Arabic written in an adapted form of Latin script, with
numbers added to this to represent sounds for which there is no good
Latin equivalent. In this case “3” stands for the voiced pharyngeal fricative
[ʕ], which in Arabic is written ع, which looks like a laterally inverted 3.
Likewise “9” represents a voiceless uvular plosive /q/, which is written with
the Arabic letter ق. Again, the reader can see the similarity. In Tunisia,
normal Latin transcription of Arabic names (for example on road signs)
uses “k” for this sound, which is ambiguous as it also represents /k/. This
system, which can also use 2, 5 and 7 as letters, is sometimes known as
Arabizi (e.g., Darwish 2013). This comment, which means “We are living
the illusion and believing it”, is followed by a comment from another user,
K + K = 120 / p. 228 / May 3, 2019
228 Maik Gibson
written in Standard Arabic, and in Arabic script. Many other comments
are written in Tunisian Arabic, but in Arabic script. The conventions for
writing Arabizi (or the Arabic chat alphabet) are not taught in school, but
learnt through interaction with others online. The form represented is also
clearly non-standard, representing Tunisian speech.
We are not claiming that Tunisian Arabic is a separate language from
Standard Arabic, as that is not how most Tunisians view their language
practices. The innovative choices that are made draw on general education,
including learning to read and write in French, but do not reﬂect any prac-
tice taught at any formal institution: speciﬁcally writing the Tunisian form
of Arabic; writing it in Latin characters; and using numbers to represent
certain sounds. These conventions are however shared across the commu-
nity of Tunisian web users. While certain conventions exist, we cannot talk
of an enforced standard, but rather a few parameters which are shared and
aid eﬀective written digital communication. A more detailed coverage of
this phenomenon would show a great amount of variation in written forms
– we cannot say that there is a standardised variety of written Tunisian
Arabic, but there are nevertheless some shared practices which have been
adopted by a wide community. So we can say here that the institutions
of Tunisia are what have taught people to read and write – in Arabic
and French, but that there are some orthographic conventions which have
developed (not just in Tunisia, but throughout the Arab World) through
communal use. These conventions are normally promoted by an institu-
tion, but here the institution, if any, is that of the body of the internet
users. This reﬂects spoken norms, in that what is deemed appropriate for
many spoken language varieties is not decided by an institution, but by an
aggregate of the speakers themselves. An example is that the Tunis vari-
ety of Tunisian Arabic functions as a de facto prestige variety of Tunisian
Arabic, without any institutional support (Gibson 2002).
Our ﬁnal example is Sheng, an urban variety of Swahili spoken in
Nairobi featuring much lexical innovation and language mixing, or translan-
guaging. Some scholars (e.g., Bosire 2006; Rudd 2008) in fact claim that
it is an independent language – in any case, this question of the status
of Sheng does not impact our judgement as to whether users of digital
media are able to establish some level of orthographic conventions among
themselves without intervention by an oﬃcial body. Sheng does not have
an ISO 693-3 code, as it has not met the criteria for inclusion as a sep-
arate language from Swahili. Sheng usage in written communication is
also found widely on platforms such as Facebook, and has a lot of use in
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written advertising slogans, a trait it shares with Tunisian Arabic. In such
cases it is sometimes referred to as Kenyanese (Erastus 2013), to avoid the
sometime negative associations of the term Sheng.
The example given here is perhaps not of quite the same nature as
those for Rangi and Tunisian Arabic, as it is taken from the Facebook
page of “DJ Boyie”, a ﬁctional character who is part of the Shujaaz.FM4
multimedia platform. An example sentence is Nadai ku’get the best hustlas
ii mwaka, which demonstrates some of the features of Sheng, in that it uses
innovative lexis (dai for ‘to want’) and English expressions (in this case a
whole noun phrase). Note the spelling of hustlas, presumably inﬂuenced by
African American norms also found in the z of the Shujaaz ‘heroes’ in the
platform’s name. We also have the English root ‘get’ used with a Swahili
inﬁnitive marker, with the convention of using an apostrophe to separate
the English root from the Swahili aﬃxation. And then we have ii mwaka
‘this year’, where ii is the Swahili hii ‘this’ with the h dropped, and the
standard Swahili order of the modiﬁer and head inverted. Shujaaz.FM has
also used hyphens (such is in ku-come ‘to come’) to separate Swahili aﬃxes
from English roots – in this case, the hyphen helps with recognising that
the pronunciation of the root should follow English and not Swahili pro-
nunciation rules. We also ﬁnd no marking from DJ Boyie nlibuy ‘I bought’,
along with a contributor using imeneglect ‘It has neglected’. However users
of the website do not seem to have adopted either the convention of the
hyphen or apostrophe. Instead strategies include leaving a space between
the Swahili morphology and English root wana stay ‘they stay’, nisha cheki
‘I already checked’.
While we might consider that Shujaaz.FM is some sort of institution,
even its conventions do not yet seem to have been adopted. But written
communication proceeds nonetheless. Again we see that the educational
institutions of Kenya have eﬀectively introduced literacy in Swahili and
English, and this knowledge has been used in writing this non-standard,
mixed, variety. But when confronted with cases which are somewhat alien
to either language – using an English verbal root with Swahili verbal mor-
phology, users resort to a variety of strategies, the dominant ones seeming
to be either splitting the morphology from the root or combining them
with no marking. The solution primarily followed by Shujaaz.FM, using
an apostrophe (or a hyphen) to mark the boundary between forms origi-
nating in diﬀerent languages, despite its rationale, does not seem to have
been adopted by the broader community. Thus, as with Rangi and Tunisian
4 https://www.facebook.com/DJBoyie/
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Arabic, the usage of the broader community has not been ﬁxed by an
institution, but is negotiated among the community, thus circumventing
one of the functions of the institution.
Is digital writing creating a new kind of sustainability for literacy?
Kornai’s paradigm of digital endangerment and death has driven us to
ask questions which bring us back to evaluate more closely EGIDS, and
the eﬀect that digital writing has on the broader context of the use of a
language variety in writing. In each of the cases we have seen, there is
no institutional support for the conventions that speakers appear to be
using. As previously noted, these conventions are loose, with much room
for latitude, but the very fact that people continue to use these forms of
writing shows that eﬀective communication is taking place – otherwise it
would not be sustained. The case for this claim is the strongest in the case
of Tunisian Arabic – using Arabizi is a widespread phenomenon, seen even
in advertising in Lebanon. Interestingly, all three cases are to some extent a
challenge to Kornai’s (2013, 4) statement that “languages without mature
writing systems are unlikely to digitally ascend”. In each case we note that
the writing system is not mature, as it is not standardised, and conventions
are still being negotiated, akin to the negotiation and valorisation of social
norms for speech. However, it would seem sensible to concede that the
challenges for digital ascent of non-standardised varieties might well be
greater than those of languages with an accepted standard version, due to
extended use.
Now, in no case am I arguing that there is no institutional support for
writing – we can safely assume that all the people using these varieties have
had an education, but one which taught them how to write another lan-
guage or languages. Conventions for those languages were learned, some-
times fully, sometimes imperfectly perhaps, and some of those conventions
have been drawn into their literacy practices when writing other varieties.
There is obviously a feeling that at least one of the scripts that has been
learnt is an appropriate vehicle for writing something other, at least on
social media. While Rangi exhibits some greater phonological complexity
than Swahili, with a seven- rather than ﬁve-vowel system, as well as distinc-
tive tone, this has not been an insurmountable barrier to eﬀective writing
in a system more closely aligned to Swahili phonology. However, where
tone bears a heavier load, and the language of education does not use it,
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we can imagine greater challenges in successful community-led orthogra-
phy construction. Even though Tunisians often use Latin script (alongside
Arabic script) to write their vernacular, the system also references Ara-
bic script in a way that formal transcription standards do not – in fact
their use shows the deﬁciencies of the Latin transcription system used for
signage in Tunisia.
We note that the formal education system has its role to play in the
implementation of vernacular writing, probably along with some level of
linguistic similarity between what is learnt at school and what is spoken at
home or on the street (and all our cases have been at the less challenging
end of the spectrum in this respect). We suggest that at the very least,
where these conditions have been met, literacy may take hold without
the involvement of a sustainable institution. Again, we have demonstrated
this only for limited domains, with limited examples, and have not yet
demonstrated that this use eﬀectively spreads to more formal domains –
there is much room for further study. But we would like to ask the question,
in the environment of widespread digital literacy, whether incipient use of
a language for writing might now in some cases be sustainable without
an institution behind it. And we ask the question with an idea of the
answer – that, yes, there is evidence of digital writing practices establishing
themselves without systematic institutional support. We might expect the
use of the vernacular in writing to be even more widespread in private
messaging, including texting, but we have more of a challenge in observing
this, as opposed to the semi-public domain of Facebook which have been
used for this paper. Therefore Level 5 in EGIDS should no longer be so
hard to climb up in the language mountain as in the picture shown above.
Having addressed a question of theory, we are driven to ask what
diﬀerence this might make in practice. If, as seems to be the case, digi-
tal spaces are places where orthographic innovations can take root, then
there are implications for those of us concerned with applying our linguis-
tic knowledge for the beneﬁt of minority ethnolinguistic communities. We
may wish to work with them in identifying which activities are the most
likely to be eﬀective in helping them meet their own goals for the uses
of their language. From the evidence presented here, it would seem that
messaging using mobile phones will be a fruitful, or perhaps essential, step
for languages which are at EGIDS levels 6a or 5 – more considerations
for eﬀective engagement are suggested in Gibson (2015; 2016). Digital lit-
eracy seems to present an opportunity for further written development
of varieties which employ it; how eﬀective this may be is yet to be seen.
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ABSTRACT
Euclidean Automata have been introduced in Kornai (2014a) to model a
phenomenon known as “being in conflicted states”. This brief note gives
a further look on Euclidean Automata and takes the first steps in study-
ing skeleta and representability and the logical characterization of lan-
guages accepted by Euclidean Automata.
1. Introduction
Euclidean Automata (EA) has been introduced, motivated and further
studied in Kornai (2014a) and Kornai (2014b). EA are slight generaliza-
tions of the classical ﬁnite state automata: EA can take continuous param-
eters as input and are used in Kornai (2014a) to analyze the situation of
being in a conﬂicted state. Intuitively, being in a conﬂicted state is mod-
eled by an EA not as a single state (of the EA) but rather as a set of
“nondeterministic” states that are represented as overlapping parts of the
input parameter space. Let me recall the precise deﬁnition of Euclidean
Automata.
Deﬁnition 1.1 (Kornai 2014b). A Euclidean automaton (EA) over a pa-
rameter space  is deﬁned as a 4-tuple (Q; I; F; ) where Q  2 is a ﬁnite
set of states given as subsets of ; I  Q is the set of initial states; F  Q
is the set of accepting states; and  : Q! Q is the transition function
that assigns for each parameter setting v 2  and each state q 2 Q a next
state (v; q) that satisﬁes v 2 (v; q). 
In Kornai (2014a) the EA is called deterministic if q \ s = ; for dif-
ferent q; s 2 Q and complete if [q2Qq = . Throughout we will work with
complete EA’s only, the reason is that for v 2    [q2Qq the condition
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v 2 (v; q) does not make sense, hence either one keeps  to be undeﬁned
on certain input parameters v or switches to an equivalent EA with pa-
rameter space [q2Qq. For simplicity we assume throughout that the set of
initial states I contains a unique state which we denote by start. If one
permits several initial states he needs to complicate the results accord-
ingly. In applications drawn in Kornai (2014a;b) the alphabet  consists
of vectors from a continuous parameter space, typically Rn, however it
also makes sense to consider the deﬁnition of an EA when  is a ﬁnite set,
especially if one considers skeleta of EA’s, as we do in section 2.
A typical application in Kornai (2014a) is the heap (Sorites paradox)
presented in the Sainsbury & Williamson (1997) manner: Consider the
line segment [0; 1] colored so that the left-hand region is red, and there is
a very ﬁne, continuous, gradual change of shades reaching the right-hand
side region that is colored yellow. The line is covered by a tiny window that
exposes only a small region. We move the window very slowly starting from
the left-hand side towards right and after each move one is asked about the
color of the segment exposed by the window. But the window is so small
relative to the line segment that in no position can you tell the diﬀerence
in color between what you can see at the two sides of the window. It seems
that you must call every region red after every move, and thus you ﬁnd
yourself in the paradoxical situation calling a yellow region red.
2. Skeleta and representability
Kornai modeled the heap paradox by an EA in a similar manner as we do
below (to make life easier we give a somewhat simpliﬁed model, but the
diﬀerences are inessential for the sake of the example). Let’s say [0; 13 ] is
“clearly red”, [23 ; 1] is “clearly yellow” and [13 ; 23 ] is this “hard to tell, orange”
range. Our EA will have 2 states: red (R) and yellow (Y ) respectively with
R = [0; 23 ] and Y = [13 ; 1]. Note that the two states overlap exactly in the
“problematic” region. Starting from the red state the machine gets input
from the continuous parameter space  = [0; 1]. The machine is deﬁned as
follows:
(v;R) =
(
R if v 2 [0; 23 ]
Y otherwise. ; (v; Y ) =
(
Y if v 2 [13 ; 1]
R otherwise.
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In ﬁgure:
R Yv 2 [0; 2/3]
v 2 [2/3; 1]
v 2 [0; 1/3]
v 2 [1/3; 1]
In the entire fuzzy orangish region [13 ; 23 ] the model shows hysteresis: if it
came from the red side it will output red, if it came from the yellow side
it will output yellow. To get a better understanding of how EA works,
Kornai hints at skeletonizing EA’s. The skeleton of an EA is deﬁned in
Kornai (2014b) as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Kornai 2014b). The skeleton of an EA is a standard
FSA whose alphabet corresponds to canonical representatives from each
Boolean atom of Q. 
In the deterministic case (where all the states of the EA are disjoint)
there is a correspondence between input letters and automaton states.
However, in the nondeterministic case (where states are not necessarily
disjoint) we may not be able to select distinct canonical representatives
for each state (or for the Boolean atoms). In this case skeleta should be
understood as “subjective EA” (cf. Kornai 2014b). The deﬁnition seems a
bit vague as it is not completely clear how to chose the so called canonical
representatives (or the subjective representatives), moreover, Q may have
no Boolean atoms (cf. Example 2.4 below). A key for the clariﬁcation is
the observation that some inputs are totally indistinguishable no matter
what state the machine is in. To obtain a deﬁnition for the general case,
ﬁx an EA  : Q! Q and for v; w 2  write
v  w () (8q 2 Q) (v; q) = (w; q) (1)
Then  is an equivalence relation on . Moreover it is a congruence of 
as for any input sequences hv1; : : : ; vni and hw1; : : : ; wni, vi  wi implies
(v1; : : : ; vn; start) = (vn;(vn 1(   ;(v1; start)))) (2)
= (vn;(vn 1(   ;(w1; start)))) (3)
=    (4)
= (w1; : : : ; wn; start) (5)
After this preparation we can redeﬁne the concept of skeleta as follows.
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Deﬁnition 2.2. The skeleton of the EA  :   Q !  is the standard
FSA  : / Q! Q deﬁned by the equation
(v/; q) = (v; q)
Since  is a congruence,  is well-deﬁned. 
If we apply Deﬁnition 2.2 to the heap example given above we end up in
the ﬁnite state machine ﬁgured below, which, unsurprisingly, is exactly the
FSA sketched in Kornai (2014a). (Here the input letters r, y and o stand
for red, yellow and orange, respectively)
R Y
r
y
r
o
y
o
Observe that / is always ﬁnite. This is because the original EA has
ﬁnitely many states only, hence we can have a ﬁnite number of possibilities
not to fulﬁll (v; q) = (w; q) for input letters v; w. This results in a ﬁnite
number of equivalence classes of . Unfortunately,  is no longer an EA
as Q 6 2/ . It would be handy to deﬁne the skeleton of an EA as another
EA over the ﬁnite alphabet / by letting Q/ = fq/ : q 2 Qg where
q/ = fv/ : v 2 qg. However, the automaton  : /  Q/ ! Q/
deﬁned in the obvious manner (v/; q/) = (v; q)/ is not always well
deﬁned as the next examples show.
Example 2.3. Below we give an example for an EA the skeleton of which
can be represented as an EA. Let the alphabet (parameter space) be  = R
and the set of states is Q = fR; [0; 1]g. Let  be the EA ﬁgured below
deﬁned by the equations
(x;R) = R; (x; [0; 1]) =
(
[0; 1] if x 2 [0; 1]
R otherwise.
R [0; 1]x 2 R
x /2 [0; 1] x 2 [0; 1]
The equivalence relation  will have two classes: / = f[0; 1];R [0; 1]g =
fa; bg and the skeleton  looks like
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R [0; 1]a; b
b
a
Since R/ = fa; bg and [0; 1]/ = fag, the skeleton is a EA over Q/ =
fa; bg:
fa; bg faga; b
b
a
Example 2.4. A small modiﬁcation on Example 2.3 prevents the skeleton
to be represented by an EA. Here  is as before but Q = fR; [0; 1]; [0; 2]g.
The EA  is as ﬁgured below on the left-hand side.
R
[0; 1]
[0; 2]x 2 R
x /2 [0; 1]
x 2 [0; 1]
x /2 [0; 1]
x 2 [0; 1]
R
[0; 1]
[0; 2]a; b
b
a
b
a
The equivalence relation  has two classes again: / = f[0; 1];R  
[0; 1]g = fa; bg (note that elements of [0; 2]   [0; 1] behave exactly the
same way elements of R   [0; 1] do). Thus the skeleton can be ﬁgured as
above on the right-hand side. Note, however, that Q/ = ffa; bg; fagg,
hence the “EA representation”
fa; bg
fag
fa; bga; b
b
a
b
a
does not make sense as one cannot use the same state diﬀerently.
The previous two examples raise the question of representability. In
this paper we could only give a suﬃcient condition, the general case deﬁ-
nitely would require non-trivial extra work.
K + K = 120 / p. 238 / May 3, 2019
238 Zalán Gyenis
Deﬁnition 2.5. The EA  : Q! Q is said to be localizable if for every
state q 2 Q there is a parameter v 2  such that v 2 q   [r2Q;r 6=qr (that
is, v belongs only to the state q). Localizability means that every state has
an eigenparameter, a parameter which is characteristic of the state. 
In general, a state of a localizable EA can have many diﬀerent eigen-
parameters, thus one rather speaks about the set of eigenparameters asso-
ciated with a given state.
Proposition 2.6. Skeleta of localizable EA are isomorphic to EA.
Proof. The idea is that if  is localizable, then  extends to a congruence
of the state space Q. That is, if we let Q/ = fq/ : q 2 Qg where
q/ = fv/ : v 2 qg, then the automaton  : / Q/ ! Q/ deﬁned
by the equality
(v/; q/) = (v; q)/
will be well-deﬁned. As Q/  2/ ,  will be an EA.
By localizability for every state q there is a parameter vq, an eigenpa-
rameter of q. For two distinct states q and r the corresponding eigenparam-
eters cannot be -congruent, because (vq; q) = q but q does not contain
vr, hence (vr; q) 6= q. The same argument show that (vq; s) = q for
every state s 2 Q. Therefore all eigenparameters associated with a given
state are equivalent, and each state can be identiﬁed with that equiva-
lence class, that is, there is a bijection between Q and Q/. It follows
that (v/; q/) = (v/; q). Finally,  is deﬁned in such a manner that
(v; q) = (w; q) whenever v  w. Thus (v/; q) is well-deﬁned, hence 
is well-deﬁned, too. 
Example 2.3 shows an EA which is not localizable (the state [0; 1] does
not have an eigenparameter), still its skeleton can be represented by an
EA. This means that localizability is not necessary for being representable
by an EA.
Representation of standard ﬁnite state automata can be understood
(at least) in two diﬀerent ways.
Deﬁnition 2.7. Let 
 be a ﬁnite alphabet and R a set of states. The FSA
 : 
R! R is representable by an EA if there is EA  over 
 such that
 and  are isomorphic.
We say that  is representable in the general sense by an EA if there
is a parameter space   
 and an EA  over  such that   
 is
isomorphic to . 
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For an FSA  : 
  R ! R and a state s 2 R let us denote by [s]in
the set fv 2 
 : (9p 2 R)(v; p) = sg.
Proposition 2.8. Let  : 
 R ! R be an FSA with the property that
there are no distinct states s1; s2 2 R such that [s1]in = [s2]in. Then  is
representable by an EA.
Proof. The mapping s 7! [s]in is an isomorphism. 
Example 2.9. Consider the following FSA over the alphabet fv; w; xg.
s1 s2
v
w
v
x
w
x
The sets of incoming edges [s1]in = fv; xg and [s2]in = fw; xg are diﬀerent,
thus after replacing si by [si]in we get an isomorphic Euclidean automaton.
Unfortunately, the condition in Proposition 2.8 is not necessary: one
can construct an EA that does not satisfy that condition. Here is an easy
example. Take a set S and a partition of S into non-empty sets S1 and S2.
Take S to be the alphabet and put Q = fS; S1; S2g as the set of states.
The automaton is deﬁned by (v; q) = S for any v 2 S and q 2 Q. Then
[S1]in = [S2]in = ;.
Connections with homomorphisms. In automata theory several dif-
ferent types of homomorphisms between automata are deﬁned such as
state-homomorphism, alphabet-homomorphisms, etc. Since states of Eu-
clidean automata are subsets of the alphabet, there is a natural way to
generalize these concepts: homomorphisms between Euclidean Automata
was deﬁned in Kornai (2014b) as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.10. A homomorphism from EA  : Q ! Q to another
EA  : 
  S ! S is a mapping h :  ! 
 such that the following
stipulations hold.
• h(start) = start;
• h extends to a mapping h : Q! S in the natural way;
• h
 
(v1; : : : ; vn; start)

= (h(v1); : : : ; h(vn); start).

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By Proposition 2.6 skeleta of localizable EA remain Euclidean: For a
localizable EA  : Q! Q the congruence  deﬁned by (1) extends to
a congruence of the state space Q. That is, if we let Q/ = fq/ : q 2 Qg
where q/ = fv/ : v 2 qg, then the automaton  : /  Q/ ! Q/
deﬁned by the equality
(v/; q/) = (v; q)/
is an EA. Let us denote this  by ~. It is very easy to check (cf. the proof of
Proposition 2.6), that ~ and the skeleton  deﬁned in 2.2 are isomorphic.
Therefore we will call ~ also a skeleton of .
Now, if  is localizable, then ~ is a homomorphic image of . For, write
h(v) = v/, where  is the congruence deﬁned by (1). The ﬁrst two items
of Deﬁnition 2.10 follows from the proof of Proposition 2.6 and the third
item is the very deﬁnition of ~ as h
 
(v; q)

= (v; q)/ = ~(v/; q/).
An important consequence is that localizable EA’s are categorical ob-
jects in the sense that the class of all such automata is closed under the
homomorphism introduced in Deﬁnition 2.10, and skeleta form a closed
subcategory of the category of all localizable EA.
3. Languages accepted by EA
In this section we turn to a logical characterization of the languages that
can be accepted by EA. Let  : 
  R ! R be a standard FSA. The
language of  is the set L  
 deﬁned as
L = fw 2 
 : (w; start) = finalg:
This deﬁnition clearly makes sense even if 
 is inﬁnite. Therefore one can
deﬁne without any diﬃculty when a Euclidean automata  :   Q ! Q
accepts a language L  : if and only if L = L.
This deﬁnition, however, may not be satisfactory enough when  is
inﬁnite. The reason is that one might like to say that the skeleton of an
EA accepts the same language as the original EA when restricted to the
language of the skeleton. More precisely one can consider the skeleton
acting on a subset of the original alphabet: pick a representative from each
of the equivalence class of the alphabet of the skeleton. Then the skeleton
and the original EA shows the same behavior on each input string. This
motivates the next deﬁnition.
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Deﬁnition 3.1. Suppose  :   Q ! Q is an EA, where  is allowed
to be inﬁnite. Let 
   be a ﬁnite subalphabet and L  
 a language.
Then  is said to accept L in the general sense if L  
 = L. 
Proposition 3.2. Each regular language can be accepted in the general
sense by an EA.
Proof. Let L be a regular language over 
 and  : 
  R ! R the FSA
that accepts L. By adding new letters to 
 one can reach that in this
expanded language (denote it by ) the FSA satisﬁes [s]in 6= [s0]in for all
states s; s0 2 R by deﬁning the action of the new letters carefully. The
resulting FSA is representable by an EA  applying Proposition 2.8. It is
clear that L  
 = L. The proof reveals that more is true: any language
accepted by an FSA over a possibly inﬁnite alphabet can also be accepted
in the general sense by an EA. If 
 is ﬁnite then  can be chosen to be
ﬁnite; otherwise they can have the same inﬁnite cardinality. 
It is obvious that every language accepted by an EA is regular (because
EA are special FSA), thus the question of which languages are accepted
in the general sense is settled. The cheat here is that we are allowed to
enlarge the alphabet. Is it true that keeping the same alphabet, for every
FSA  : R! R there is a EA  : Q! Q such that L = L? If the
alphabet is ﬁnite, then the answer obviously is “no”. This is because over
a ﬁnite alphabet  one can deﬁne at most ﬁnitely many EA as the set of
states Q should be a subset of 2 which is still ﬁnite. But what about the
inﬁnite case where one can have any ﬁnite number of states? The answer is
still “no” but for diﬀerent reasons: the language that contains words having
odd length (over any alphabet ) can be accepted by an FSA but cannot
be accepted by any EA.
Example 3.3. No EA can accept the language containing words having
odd length.
Proof. The language L = fw 2  : jwj is odd g is accepted by the FSA
ﬁgured below.
start
8a 2 
8a 2 
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Suppose there is an Euclidean automaton (Q; I; F;) that accepts L.
The ﬁrst input letter v1 can be any letter from , hence after the ﬁrst
transition (v1; start) = q1, the resulting state q1 should contain v1 by
Euclideanity. This means q1 = . The second letter v2 is also arbitrary,
hence after the second transition (v2; q1) = q2 we get similarly that q2 =
. This means q1 = q2 and in fact continuing the argument one gets the
conclusion that there can be only one state Q = fg. But such an EA
accepts all strings and not just the ones having odd length. 
It is known that regular languages are exactly the languages that can
be deﬁned in monadic second order logic (Büchi 1960; Elgot 1961). Let
us recall some of the basic deﬁnitions to make everything clear. Let  be
an alphabet (possibly inﬁnite) and let w = hw1; : : : ; wni be a word in .
Such a word can be represented by the relational structure
w =
 f1; : : : ; ng; <w; (Qwv )v2
called the word model for w, where <w is the usual ordering on the domain
of w and Qwv are unary predicates collecting for each letter v 2  those
letter positions of w which carry v:
Qwv = fi : wi = vg
The corresponding ﬁrst-order language FO() has variables x; y; : : : and
built up the grammar
' ::= Qv(x) j x < y j :' j ' _  j 9x'
The language deﬁned by a formula ' is L' = fw 2  : w j= 'g, where
the satisfaction relation j= is deﬁned in the usual way. For example the
language where “every a is immediately followed by a b” can be deﬁned by
the formula
8x Qa(x) ! 9y(y = x+ 1 ^ Qb(y))
where y = x + 1 has the usual deﬁnition x < y ^ :9z(x < z ^ z < y).
A non-example could be L = fa2n : n 2 Ng which is not expressible by a
ﬁrst order formula (Esparza 2012).
Monadic second order logic MSO() is an extension of ﬁrst order
logic with variables X;Y; : : : ranging over sets of elements of models. The
corresponding atomic formulas X(x) are also introduced with the intended
meaning “x belongs toX”. ClearlyMSO() is more expressive than FO()
but not vice-versa as the next theorem shows:
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Theorem 3.4 (Büchi 1960; Elgot 1961). A language (over a ﬁnite al-
phabet) is recognizable by a ﬁnite state automaton if and only if it is
MSO()-deﬁnable, and both conversions, from automata to formulas and
vice versa, are eﬀective.
Thus, regular languages are exactly the monadic second order deﬁn-
able languages. However, examples suggests that languages accepted by
Euclidean automata are ﬁrst order deﬁnable:
Example 3.5. For  = fag we must have Q  f;; fagg and thus there
are exactly two non-isomorphic EA, ﬁgured below
fagstart a ;start faga a
The languages accepted by the automata are L1 = fan : n  0g and
L2 = fan : n  1g. Both languages are deﬁnable in the language FO(),
respectively by the formulas 8xQa(x) and 9xQa(x) ^ 8xQa(x).
Example 3.6. For  = fa; bg the number of variations is larger than
before as Q  f;; fag; fbg; fa; bgg gives more possibilities. We will not
draw all the non-isomorphic EA’s here, but one can check easily that the
languages that can be accepted by EA over  are of the form “all sequences
of a’s and b0s + if we wish we can prescribe the ﬁrst and last letter”.
For example such an L can contain all words starting with an a. In any
case a FO()-characterization can be easily given. (As we prove next that
languages accepted by EA are ﬁrst order deﬁnable, we omit the details of
the rather painstaking checking of this claim).
Indeed, we prove that languages accepted by Euclidean automata are
FO-deﬁnable.
Proposition 3.7. For every ﬁnite alphabet  there is a corresponding
ﬁrst order language FO such that each language accepted by an Euclidean
automaton can be deﬁned by a FO-formula.
Proof. Assume (Q; I; F;) is a Euclidean automaton over the ﬁnite pa-
rameter space . Take the ﬁrst order language FO() described above
and expand this language by new unary predicates Ri for i < 2jj. We
have to ﬁnd a ﬁrst order formula that expresses in any given word model
w that  accepts w. The formula in question will state the existence of a
successful run of the EA. As  has ﬁnitely many state, we can enumerate
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them by Q = fqi : i < 2jjg. Each state qi of the EA will be encoded by
the predicate Ri. We need to express the followings: (1) in each turn the
machine can be only in one state; (2) the starting state is q0; (3) if we are
in position x and the next position is y, then we applied one of the letters,
i.e. for one of the v 2  we have Qv(x), and thus the next state should be
the one prescribed by (v; qi) = qj ; (4) the last position is a ﬁnal state.
Thus  accepts w if and only if
w j=   ^
i 6=j
8x:(Ri(x) ^Rj(x))

(6)
^ 8x(first(x)! R0(x)) (7)
^ 8x8y(x = y + 1 !
_
(v;qi)=qj
(Ri(x) ^Qv(x) ^Rj(y))) (8)
^ 8x(last(x)!
_
(9q2F )(v;qi)=q
(Ri(x) ^Qv(x))) (9)
Since the empty word satisﬁes this sentence, if  does not accept the
empty word, then a corresponding clause such as 9x(x = x) should be
added. first(x) and last(x) are respectively the formulas :9y(y < x)
and :9y(x < y). 
If the alphabet  is not ﬁnite, then a similar argument shows that
languages accepted by EA can be deﬁned by ﬁrst order formulas that are
allowed to contain inﬁnite disjunctions having an inﬁnite vocabulary (i.e.
we use the logic FO1!).
Recall that ﬁniteness is a property that cannot be expressed in ﬁrst
order logic. Indeed, by the compactness theorem if a formula holds in all
ﬁnite models, then it should also hold in an inﬁnite model. This can be
seen as one of the main reasons why languages that can be accepted by
ﬁnite state automata cannot be deﬁned in ﬁrst order logic (and one needs
monadic second order logic). Even if the alphabet is ﬁxed, an FSA can
have an arbitrary ﬁnite number of states and we do not have any control,
in terms of ﬁrst order logic, over the number of states. As we have already
seen, there are only ﬁnitely many EA over a ﬁnite alphabet. That is, if we
ﬁx the alphabet, then there is a ﬁxed upper bound on the possible number
of states, depending only on the size of the alphabet. This allows us to
bypass the problem of non-deﬁnability of ﬁniteness: using ﬁrst order logic
it is easy to deﬁne models having size at most n, for a ﬁxed ﬁnite number
n. This is the key for Proposition 3.7.
As we already mentioned, there are only ﬁnitely many EA over a ﬁ-
nite alphabet. Therefore not every ﬁrst order deﬁnable language can be
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accepted by an EA (there are inﬁnitely many ﬁrst order deﬁnable lan-
guages). Then what is the logic that is exactly as expressible as Euclidean
automata? As the number of states is limited, the set of EA do not have
any extensive closure property (such as closed under direct product, unions,
etc). This suggests us the vague idea that EA are not logical in the sense
of expressibility. Of course it is not clear how to deﬁne “logicality” in a
precise manner.
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ABSTRACT
The paper looks at the interpretation of a construction type in the Hun-
garian language referred to as rise-fall declarative, which is used to en-
code biased questions. Its felicity conditions are compared to those of
rising declaratives in English, based on several recent accounts of the
latter. It is argued that the theory proposed by Gunlogson (2003), com-
plemented with two further conditions, can capture the licensing condi-
tions of rise-fall declaratives in Hungarian correctly.
1. Introduction
Kálmán (2001, 101) discusses the interpretation of a type of “polar ques-
tion” in Hungarian that bears a speciﬁc prosody, characterized by a rise-fall
melody on all constituents in the comment part of the sentence (i.e., the
part following the constituents in the topic ﬁeld):1
1 Cf. Kálmán (2001) and É. Kiss (2002) for a discussion of the syntactic structure
of the Hungarian sentence. In the examples cited from Kálmán (2001) the original
notation is retained. In the latter work, “ ” marks a rise-fall contour, and “?” what the
authors call a “pre-tone” on unstressed deﬁnite articles and relative pronouns, which
do not constitute part of the preceding character-tone. The latter phenomenon will
not be discussed in what follows. The last peak within the multiple rise-fall melody
falls on the penultimate syllable of the sentence, just as it does in ordinary rise-fall
interrogatives, illustrated below.
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(1) Bekapcsolva hagytad a mobiltelefont a színházban?
switched.on left.2SG the mobile.ACC the theatre.in
‘You left the mobile phone switched on in the theatre?’ (Kálmán 2001, 101, (8))
Kálmán (2001, 101)2 argues that as compared to ordinary “polar ques-
tions”, this construction carries an interpretational surplus: “it suggests
that the speaker, who presumably already knows the answer, only expects
acknowledgement or explanation”.3 It is noted that this construction usu-
ally encodes echo questions uttered with a “disapproving attitude”.4
It is claimed about a diﬀerent example, shown in (2), that it illustrates
a special case: the aim of the question is to help ﬁnd out whether some state
of aﬀairs that the conversational participants can observe in the situation
was brought about by the event described in the question.5
(2) Felhívtad ?a takarítónőt, ?akit ajánlottam? (Azért van ilyen rend?)
called.2SG the cleaner.ACC who.ACC recommended.1SG that.for be such order
‘You called the cleaner I recommended? (Is that why it looks so orderly here?)’
(Kálmán 2001, 27, (8))
Often, the speaker asks these questions to express her surprise:
(3) A Lajos berakta ?a kefírgombát ?a mélyhűtőbe?
the Lajos VM.put.3SG the keﬁr.grains.ACC the freezer.into
‘Lajos put the keﬁr grains into the freezer?’ (Kálmán 2001, 27, (9))
A further illustration of the use of the same prosodic pattern is provided
in (4), which appears to be an echo-question, repeating an utterance made
before:6
2 This publication was the output of a seminar taught by László Kálmán at the The-
oretical Linguistics Program at ELTE Budapest. He contributed signiﬁcantly to the
individual chapters both in the course of the discussion and as editor of the volume.
The examples cited here are from the chapters entitled Kérdések ‘Questions’ (pp.
98–135), written by Viktor Trón, and from the one entitled A topik és a kontrasztív
topik ‘The topic and the contrastive topic’ (pp. 24–53), by Attila Novák and the
present author.
3 “…azt sugallja, hogy a beszélő, aki már feltételezhetően tudja a választ, csak
megerősítésre, magyarázatra vár”.
4 “A konstrukciót általában rosszalló visszakérdezésként használjuk.” (ibid., 101)
5 An analogous proposal about the use of the same prosody was previously made in
Kálmán & Nádasdy (1994, 456).
6 The conjecture about the context is mine, the authors supply no information about
contexts in general.
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(4) Gyanútlanul ment át ?az utcán, ?amikor egyszer csak
unsuspectingly went across the street.on when once only
?a fejére esett ?egy ablaktábla?
the head.his.onto fell.3SG an window.pane
‘He was crossing the street unsuspectingly, when suddently a window pane fell onto
his head?’ (Kálmán 2001, 27, (10))
Varga (2010, 4) also discusses questions with a similar prosodic realisation,
which he characterizes as follows: “each accent in the comment is retained,
and the rise-fall can appear at every accented syllable, thus forming a
sequence of repeated rise-falls”. These forms encode, in his opinion, “a
strongly incredulous, disbelieving yes-no question, which we ask in order
to get some clariﬁcation of an unbelievable statement or experience”. His
example is shown in (5). (The prosodic notation follows that of Beckman
& Pierrehumbert 1986.)
(5) L* H – L% L* H – L% L* H-L%
"Meghívták a "Melindát a "bulira?
VM.invited.3PL the Melinda.ACC the party.onto
‘They have invited Melinda to the party? (How come?)’ (Varga 2010, 4, (3b))
Both publications cited above are primarily concerned with the prosody
and the felicity conditions of the construction under consideration, and do
not go into issues of formal categorization. They both refer to the relevant
construction as a type of “question”.7
Our ultimate aim is to formally describe the felicity conditions of the
construction type illustrated above. This paper wishes to contribute to
7 Regarding the prosodic form of the construction, an anonymous reviewer of the cur-
rent paper makes the observation that the pitch can either stay in the same range
throughout the whole utterance or it can drift down with each phrase that is pro-
nounced with a rise-fall. In the reviewer’s opinion, the latter case seems to be charac-
teristic of incredulous questions in general. My present suggestion is that it is not the
downdrift that induces the appearance of incredulity. Instead, I assume that both
phenomena are the result of information structural properties. Questions encoded
by utterances containing multiple rise-falls tend to contain a lot of given material.
(A question intended to ask for a speciﬁc piece of information in Hungarian can often
take the form of a one-constituent utterance). One well-known reason for repeating
given information is to call attention to some problem with it, e.g., the speaker’s
dissatisfaction. Given information tends to be pronounced with falling pitch cross-
linguistically, which might explain the downdrift in this case. Although I consider
these problems worthy of further attention, I will mostly disregard the issue of the
downdrift in what follows.
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this aim by looking at its formal properties, by comparing the contexts
where it can appear to contexts where the construction referred to as
rising declarative in Germanic and Romance languages is licensed, and by
discussing to what extent the formal proposals that were put forward to
capture the interpretation of the latter can be used to capture the felicity
conditions of the Hungarian construction type under consideration. Section
2 ﬁrst looks at the issue of how the sentence type of this prosodically
marked construction can be determined.
2. On formal category membership
The construction type illustrated in (1)–(5) is used to encode question
acts, which, as a default, is done by means of interrogatives in human
languages. In Hungarian there are two ways of formally marking polar
interrogatives: (i) by means of the -e particle, attached to the verb as a
default (“-e-interrogatives”), illustrated below in (6a), and (ii) by means
of a ﬁnal rise-fall intonation (“/n-interrogatives”), whose peak falls on the
penultimate syllable, illustrated in (6b). At ﬁrst sight, it appears to be the
case that the multiple rise-fall tones constitute an additional intonational
“colouring” on ordinary /n-interrogatives and encode the emotional compo-
nents of incredulity, disbelief, disapproval, or the fact that the questioner
asks for acknowledgement, conﬁrmation, or for an explanation for some
state of aﬀairs. In what follows, we will argue against such an approach,
and for formally characterizing the sentence type under consideration as a
declarative.
First, as noted in Gyuris (2017), whereas the polar interrogatives in
(6a)–(6b) are perfectly grammatical if they contain negative polarity items
(NPIs) like valahol is ‘anywhere’, the form with the multiple rise-fall tones
is incompatible with NPIs, as shown in (6c):8
a.(6) Esik-e valahol is az eső?
falls-E anywhere too the rain
‘Is it raining anywhere?’ (Gyuris 2017, 5, (7b))
8 An anonymous reviewer notes that (6c) is only ungrammatical on the non-
downdrifted pronunciation of the utterance (cf. fn. 7). She/he considers all NPIs
compatible with the downdrifted version of utterances bearing the multiple fall-rise
prosody. Although a thorough discussion of the phenomenon has to wait for another
occasion, it seems to me that the downdrifted version of (6c) should be analysed as an
echoic /n-interrogative. Naturally, the validity of this suggestion can only be proven
if the diﬀerent pronunciations of (6c) are considered in the appropriate contexts.
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b. Esik valahol is az eső/n?
‘Is it raining anywhere?’ (ibid., 5, (7a))
c. *Esik valahol is az eső? (ibid., 6, (9))
Second, as also argued in Gyuris (2017), the Hungarian construction is
incompatible with the pragmatic marker vajon ‘I wonder’, which both Ke-
nesei (1992, 691) and Kálmán (2001, 99) claim to be restricted to the
interrogative sentence type, and which therefore oﬀers itself as a diag-
nostic property of interrogatives. The following examples illustrate the
phenomenon:
a.(7) Have you been in touch with Mary lately?
b. Not at all.
a.0 Vajon talált-e már állást?
vajon found-E already job.ACC
‘Has she already found a job, I wonder.’
a.00 Vajon talált már állást/n?
‘Has she already found a job, I wonder.’
a.000 *Vajon talált már állást? (Gyuris 2017, 6, (10))
Third, as shown in Gyuris (2016; 2017), negative /n-interrogatives are
ambiguous between so-called “inside” and “outside” negation readings (re-
ferred to as IN and ON readings in what follows), which were ﬁrst discussed
for English in Ladd (1981). (Cf. Büring & Gunlogson 2000, van Rooij &
Šafářová 2013, Romero & Han 2004, Sudo 2013 for further analysis.) As
also argued in Gyuris (2016; 2017), there are certain morphosyntactic fea-
tures that are either only compatible with ON or only with IN readings of
/n-interrogatives. If the construction type under consideration here were
a /n-interrogative with an additional intonational marking, we would ex-
pect /n-interrogatives with an obligatory ON reading to have alternative
pronunciations using the multiple /n-contour (abstracting away from con-
textual licensing conditions for a moment). This is not the case, however.
(8)–(9) show that, as opposed to ordinary negative /n-interrogatives, ques-
tions encoded by the multiple rise-fall forms are not compatible with an is
‘also’ phrase, or with lack of inversion between preﬁx and verb following a
negative particle nem ‘not’, which are both considered diagnostics of ON
readings in Gyuris (2016; 2018):
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a.(8) Nem ment el János is moziba/n?
not went VM János also movies.into
‘Didn’t John go to the movies too?’
b. *Nem ment el János is moziba?
a.(9) Nem elment moziba/n?
not VM.went movies.into
‘Isn’t it the case that he went to the movies?’
b. *Nem elment moziba?
Furthermore, (10a) and (10b) illustrate that whereas vala-indeﬁnites can
have both a speciﬁc and a non-speciﬁc reading in /n-interrogatives, in
multiple rise-fall constructions they can only give rise to the former inter-
pretation, just as they do in ordinary falling declaratives. (The relevant
observation on the latter was made in Szabolcsi 2002, 220.)
a.(10) János nem hívott fel tegnap valakit/n?
John not called VM yesterday somebody.ACC
i. ‘Didn’t John call a particular person yesterday?
ii. ‘Didn’t John call some person yesterday?’
(Gärtner & Gyuris 2012, 401, (25), translations amended)
b. János nem hívott fel tegnap valakit?
i. ‘John didn’t call a particular person yesterday?’
ii. *‘John didn’t call some person yesterday?’
Fourth, we can see an interesting contrast between the compatibility of
/n-interrogatives versus the multiple rise-fall constructions with certain
speaker-oriented adverbs. (The observations were inspired by suggestions
made by Abeillé et al. 2014 about adverbials in French rising declara-
tives.) (11a)–(11b) show that the adverb esetleg ‘perhaps’ is grammatical
in the multiple rise-fall construction, but it is ungrammatical in an ordi-
nary /n-interrogative:
a.(11) Esetleg bekapcsolva hagyta a mobiltelefont a színházban?
perhaps switched.on left.3SG the mobile.ACC the theatre.in
‘He left perhaps the mobile phone switched on in the theatre.’
K + K = 120 / p. 253 / January 25, 2020
The semantics and pragmatics of rising declaratives and rise-fall declaratives 253
b. *Esetleg bekapcsolva hagyta a mobiltelefont a színházban/n?
c. Esetleg bekapcsolva hagyta a mobiltelefont a színházban.
The falling declarative in (11c) is also compatible with esetleg, which points
to a similarity between multiple rise-fall constructions and declaratives.9
As far as the adverb talán ‘perhaps’ is concerned, the situation is even
more interesting: it is compatible with both structures, but it leads to a
rhetorical question interpretation in the case of ordinary /n-interrogatives
(which the corresponding -e-interrogatives also share):
a.(12) Talán bekapcsolva hagyta a mobiltelefont a színházban?
perhaps switched.on left.3SG the mobile.ACC the theatre.in
‘He left perhaps the mobile phone switched on in the theatre?’
b. Talán bekapcsolva hagyta a mobiltelefont a színházban/n?
‘Did he perhaps leave his mobile phone switched on in the theatre?’
Intended meaning: ‘He did not leave …’
The formal and interpretational diﬀerences between /n-interrogatives and
the multiple rise-fall-constructions encoding questions that we reviewed
above indicate that the latter do not belong to the interrogative sentence
type but to the declarative one. Therefore, in what follows, the form type
under discussion here will be referred to as rise-fall declarative, abbreviated
as /n-declarative.
In the next section we take a closer look at an intonationally marked
declarative sentence type that is referred to in Germanic and Romance
languages as rising declarative. We will contrast the felicity conditions
of rising declaratives, discussed in the literature, to those of Hungarian
/n-declaratives, make some observations on the validity of the theoretical
proposals concerning the former, and put forward a modest proposal on
how the licensing conditions of the latter can be modelled formally.
9 An anonymous reviewer, while acknowledging the validity of the data in (11), notes
that the negative counterpart of (11b), Esetleg nem hagyta bekapcsolva a mobiltelefont
a színházban/n? is felicitous in Hungarian. Besides noting that the above structure
can only give rise to an ON reading, I have no explanation for the phenomenon at
the moment.
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3. Formal analyses of rising declaratives
and their possible applications to /n-declaratives
3.1. Gunlogson (2003) and a proposal for extending it
Gunlogson (2003) provides a range of new observations and a formal ac-
count in terms of context update semantics regarding the use of (rising and
falling) declaratives and interrogatives to encode questions in English. For
the sake of brevity, in what follows, we will focus on her claims concern-
ing the contrasts between polar interrogatives (with inversion) and rising
declaratives only.
The ﬁrst among them is that whereas interrogatives are generally
available to ask a question in an unbiased context, declaratives are not, as
(13) illustrates:
(13) At a committee hearing:
a. Are you a member of the Communist party?
b. #You are a member of the Communist party? (Gunlogson 2003, 1–2, (5ab))
As (14) shows, a /n-declarative is unacceptable in Hungarian in the same
context, too:
(14) At a committee hearing:
#Maga tagja volt a kommunista pártnak?
you member.its was the communist party.DAT
‘You were a member of the communist party?’
Second, similarly to ordinary interrogatives, rising declaratives do not com-
mit the speaker to the descriptive or propositional content of the declara-
tive. They are felicitous even if the speaker is skeptical about the truth of
the latter, as the following, echoic use illustrates:
(15) A and B are looking at a co-worker’s much-dented car.
A: His driving has gotten a lot better.
B’s response:
a. Has it? I don’t see much evidence of that.
b. It has? I don’t see much evidence of that. (Gunlogson 2003, 21, (44a–b))
The next example shows that a /n-declarative is also acceptable in the
same context:
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(16) A and B are looking at a co-worker’s much-dented car.
A: His driving has gotten a lot better.
B’s response:
B: Már sokkal jobban vezet? Nem sok jelét látom.
already much better drive.3SG not much sign.its.ACC see.1SG
‘His driving has gotten a lot better? I don’t see much evidence of that.’
The following example also illustrates lack of commitment by the speaker,
but here it is not the propositional content, but the presuppositions of the
interlocutor’s utterance that are challenged:
(17) A: The king of France is bald.
B’s response:
a. Is France a monarchy?
b. France is a monarchy? (Gunlogson 2003, 2, (7a–b))
Hungarian /n-declaratives are equally ﬁne in the same context:
(18) A: The king of France is bald.
B’s response:
Franciaország királyság?
France monarchy
‘France is a monarchy?’
To account for these and analogous data, Gunlogson derives the mean-
ing and use of rising declaratives compositionally by proposing that the
declarative/interrogative form and the rising/falling intonation introduce
diﬀerent types of context change potentials (CCP), which are then com-
bined compositionally. According to this, whereas the declarative form
marks the presence of commitment to the descriptive content of the sen-
tence, the ﬁnal rise signals that this commitment is attributed to the ad-
dressee and the fall signals that it is attributed to the speaker.
The formal model of the proposal uses, in addition to the concept of
the Common Ground (Stalnaker 1978), the set of propositions representing
the public beliefs or discourse commitments (DC) of the individual partici-
pants, referred to as DCX for participant X, and the context set associated
with each discourse commitment set, referred to as csX , which consists of
the set of possible worlds compatible with the propositions in DCX . Thus,
the CCP of a declarative sentence is deﬁned with respect to an individual
csX , independently of the identity of X, as in (19), and the CCPs associ-
ated with rising and falling locutions as in (20)–(21), respectively, where
C stands for the input and C0 for the output context:
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(19) csX + Sdecl = {w 2 csX : the descriptive content of Sdecl is true of w}
(Gunlogson 2003, 33, (74a–b))
(20) C + "S = C0 such that:
a. csAddr(C0) = csAddr(C) + S
b. csSpkr(C0) = csSpkr(C) (ibid., (75))
(21) C + #S = C0 such that:
a. csSpkr(C0) = csSpkr(C) + S
b. csAddr(C0) = csAddr (C) (ibid., (76))
Unifying the contributions of the declarative form and of the rise, the CCPs
of rising declaratives look like as follows:
(22) C + "Sdecl = C0 such that:
a. csSpkr(C0) = csSpkr(C)
b. csAddr(C0) = csAddr(C) + Sdecl (ibid., (77))
(22) means that as a result of the utterance of a rising declarative, the con-
text set of the speaker does not change, but that of the addressee does: only
those possible worlds remain in it that are compatible with the descriptive
content of Sdecl.
Based on the above assumptions about the contribution of the declar-
ative form and the rising tone, Gunlogson oﬀers the following Contextual
Bias Condition on declarative questions, which proposes that rising declar-
atives are only compatible with contexts where the addressee is publicly
committed to the proposition expressed:
(23) Contextual Bias Condition
An utterance of Sdecl with descriptive content p is interpretable as a polar question
in C only if csAddr(C)  p. (Gunlogson 2003, 49, (105))
Let us now consider how the above proposal accounts for the examples il-
lustrated above. First, the theory can easily predict why echoic (a.k.a. re-
iterative) uses of rising declaratives, as in (15), are felicitous: the inter-
locutor’s previous utterance (echoed by the relevant Sdecl) explicitly indi-
cates commitment to the descriptive content of Sdecl. Echoic uses of rising
declaratives also subsume cases where the descriptive content of the Sdecl
corresponds to presuppositions of the addressee’s previous utterance, as
in (17), or to entailments of the proposition that the addressee has indi-
cated commitment to. Both presuppositions and entailments are assumed
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to automatically enter the relevant interlocutor’s cs. The following exam-
ple appears problematic for this view since the proposition ‘A talked to
Helena’ does not appear to be an entailment of the propositional content
of A’s utterance:
(24) A: Mark and Helena are leaving for Japan this week.
B: Oh …
a. Did you talk to Helena?
b. You talked to Helena? (Gunlogson 2003, 56, (120))
Gunlogson argues, nevertheless, that (24b) can be accounted for along
the same lines as the previous examples. If p is the descriptive content of
the declarative question, and q is “a relevant public commitment of the
Addressee’s that serves as the basis for the inference” that p (op.cit., 58),
what is required additionally for this is that q ! p be accommodated as a
joint commitment of the participants.
Let us turn to rising declaratives that are used to encode veriﬁcation
questions. Whereas in a neutral context, illustrated in (25), only interroga-
tives but no rising or falling declaratives seem to be felicitous in English, in
a context displaying evidence for the positive answer, as in (26), all these
forms are acceptable.
(25) Robin is sitting in a windowless computer room with no information about current
weather conditions when another person enters. Robin says to the newcomer:
a. Is it raining?
b. #It’s raining?
c. #It’s raining. (Gunlogson 2003, 60, (126))
(26) Robin is sitting, as before, in a windowless computer room when another person
enters. The newcomer is wearing a wet raincoat and boots. Robin says:
a. Is it raining?
b. It’s raining?
c. (I see that/So) It’s raining. (Gunlogson 2003, 61, (128))
The Hungarian counterparts of (25)–(26), illustrated in (27)–(28), respec-
tively, show that /n-declaratives have a distribution parallel to that of
rising declaratives:
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(27) Robin is sitting in a windowless computer room with no information about current
weather conditions when another person enters. Robin says to the newcomer:
#Esik az eső?
falls the rain
‘It’s raining?’
(28) Robin is sitting, as before, in a windowless computer room when another person
enters. The newcomer is wearing a wet raincoat and boots. Robin says:
Esik az eső?
falls the rain
‘It’s raining?’
Gunlogson accounts for the felicity of (26b) by saying that it satisﬁes the
Contextual Bias Condition. There is public evidence that proposition p, de-
noted by the declarative, is true, which is thus accessible to the addressee.
In her opinion, however, the addressee does not base his commitment to
the truth of p on this evidence but on some other information he possesses
due to his position, which he came by before the evidence became available
to the speaker. The role of the public evidence for the addressee is that “it
enables the Addressee to recognize that the Speaker is being intentionally
uninformative”, that is, that the speaker knows that the addressee knows
that p is true (p. 62). The infelicity of (25b) is in turn attributed to the
absence of publicly available evidence for the propositional content of the
declarative. Gunlogson argues that even if Robin had access to information
about the current weather conditions, unbeknownst to the newcomer, and
“has good reason to be biased herself, together with the assumption that
the Addressee is knowledgeable and may be presumed to have the same
bias”, this would not by itself improve (25b) (p. 82).
Interestingly, Gunlogson also adds the following remark to the discus-
sion: “I want to deny that reiterative questions generally, and rising intona-
tion speciﬁcally, are inherently associated with ‘surprise’ or ‘incredulity’,
as is sometimes casually assumed.” (p. 82) There is, however, one major
problem, noted by Šafářová (2007, 305), which Gunlogson’s account runs
into. This concerns the apparent contradiction between the assumption
that rising declaratives commit the addressee to the truth of the propo-
sition in question and the fact that they normally still expect a response
from the addressee. This problem will be addressed by the theories dis-
cussed below.
Let us now consider the possibility of adopting Gunlogson’s theory
for /n-declaratives in Hungarian. Echoic uses, like the one in (16), satisfy
the Contextual Bias Condition (referred to as CBC in what follows). The
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addressee is committed to the propositional content of his utterance, as
well as to the latter’s presuppositions and entailments, thus, if the descrip-
tive content of the echoic /n-declarative is identical to one of these, the
utterance of the declarative is licensed.
I want to propose, however, that in addition to the satisfaction of the
CBC, there is a further necessary condition on the use of /n-declaratives,
which is based on the following intuition: although the speaker must (sim-
ilarly to the addressee) be committed to the publicly available evidence,
she cannot have a commitment to p before the evidence became available
in the context. This is based on a general requirement on question acts,
captured in Searle’s Preparatory Condition 1 (Searle 1969, 66), which also
plays a role in later studies of rising declaratives, discussed below. The new
set of felicity conditions of /n-declaratives are shown below in (31).10 The
formula uses the abbreviation csSpkr(C 1), which refers to the context set
of the speaker in the stage of the context that preceded the one in which
the /n-declarative was uttered.
(29) Felicity conditions of /n-declaratives in Hungarian (to be revised)
A /n-declarative Sdecl with propositional content p is felicitous in a context C only if
a. csAddr(C)  p. (Contextual Bias Condition, Gunlogson 2003, 49, (105))
b. csSpkr(C 1) * p.
(29) thus proposes that the utterance of /n-declaratives is only felicitous
if they satisfy the CBC, and if the speaker was not committed to the
propositional content of the /n-declarative before.
As far as /n-declaratives used as veriﬁcation questions, as in (27)–(28),
are concerned, felicitous occurrences also obey the conditions in (29). In the
case of (28), there is publicly available evidence (which the addressee is thus
supposed to be committed to) that supports the truth of the propositional
content p of the declarative, the speaker appears to utter the question as a
reaction to this evidence, and she is not assumed to be committed to the
proposition ‘It is raining’ before. In the context of (27), the ﬁrst condition
is not satisﬁed, which explains it infelicity.
Let us consider now the Hungarian counterpart of (24), encoded by a
/n-declarative:
10 The assumption that /n-declaratives are only licensed if the speaker is not committed
independently of the evidence to the propositional content is also inspired by the
deﬁnition of compelling contextual evidence in Büring & Gunlogson (2000). Cf. Gyuris
(2017) for further discussion of the role of compelling contextual evidence in the
licensing of polar interrogatives available for encoding question acts in Hungarian.
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(30) A: Mark and Helena are leaving for Japan this week.
B: Ó, …
Beszéltél Helénával?
talked.2SG Helena.with
‘You talked to Helena?’
I believe that the acceptability of the /n-declarative in (30) can be ex-
plained if we assume that, other things being equal, whenever there is pub-
lic commitment to a proposition q that entails, on the speaker’s judgment,
proposition p, a /n-declarative with propositional content p is licensed.
This condition can be integrated into (29) as illustrated in part (a-ii) of
(31a), where BSpkr(') is a shorthand for ‘Speaker believes that '’. The
resulting criterion for the felicitous occurrence of /n-declaratives will be
referred to as the Interlocutor Bias Condition (IBC) in what follows. This
replaces the condition proposed in (29):
(31) Interlocutor Bias Condition (IBC)
A /n-declarative Sdecl with propositional content p is felicitous in a context C only if
a. there is a proposition q such that
(i) csAddr(C)  q, and
(ii) BSpkr (q ! p)
b. csSpkr(C 1) * p.
(31) states that the necessary conditions for the licensing of a /n-declar-
ative in a context C include the following: there should be a proposition
q that the addressee is committed to (clause a-i), which, according to the
speaker’s beliefs, entails p (clause a-ii), and the speaker was not previously
committed to p (clause b). Let us consider how (31) accounts for the fe-
licity of (30). At ﬁrst sight, it seems reasonable to assume that q equals
the propositional content of A’s utterance, ‘Mark and Helena are leaving
for Japan this week’. However, I do not think that B could be attributed
a belief according to which the latter entails the proposition ‘A talked to
Helena’. What the proposition ‘A talked to Helena’ can be assumed to fol-
low from is the proposition q = ‘A made an assertion whose propositional
content equals ‘Mark and Helena are leaving for Japan this week’ ’. Since
this q describes a publicly available evidence, B has to be committed to
it, and she can reasonably attributed the belief that q ! p, on the basis
of Searle’s Preparatory Condition 1 of Assertions (Searle 1969, 66), and
on the basis of the fact that A observes Grice’s Communicative Principle.
Note that as opposed to Gunlogson’s comments on (24), q ! p does not
have to be a joint belief of speaker and addressee (since the addressee does
not have to have a belief that q ! p), which is reﬂected in (31).
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I want to turn back to echoic uses of /n-declaratives and show that
they can be assimilated to veriﬁcation questions. This is based on the strat-
egy we applied in the case of (30) above. Instead of taking the q in (31)
to be the propositional content of the utterance made by the addressee,
we take it to be identical to the following proposition: ‘Hearer made an
utterance of an assertion/question/etc. using sentence S with descriptive
content '’. Then, (31) amounts to saying that there is a belief by the
speaker that the previous utterance, based on the felicity conditions of the
respective speech acts entail the propositional content of the /n-declara-
tive.11
The last example by Gunlogson discussed here (translation of the
corpus example of Beun 2000 from Dutch) is shown below in (32). Here
the last question by B is considered felicitous by the author:
(32) A: Schiphol Information
B: Hello, this is G.M. I have to go to Helsinki, from Amsterdam. Can you tell me
which ﬂights leave next Sunday?
A: Just a moment.
A: Yes, there are several ﬂights. One leaves at 9.10, one at 11.10, and one at 17.30.
B: The ﬂight takes about three hours? (Gunlogson 2003, 58, (123))
Gunlogson claims that in spite of the fact that the CBC does not seem to
be fulﬁlled in the context of (32) (since the propositional content of the
rising declarative is not logically entailed by the public commitments of
the addressee), the felicity of the last utterance of B can be accounted for
by assuming that the rising declarative is accommodated as a question, “by
making the necessary contextual adjustment to meet the Contextual Bias
Condition”. Since “[t]here is no particular commitment of the Addressee’s
from which the content of the declarative is taken to follow”, the author
suggests that there is “a kind of blanket accommodation available for any
declarative content presented by B that pertains to A’s acknowledged area
of expertise, i.e., airport information”.12 As a result, “when B presents p to
A declaratively, it can be taken to follow from mutual assumptions that A
already knows, or is in a position to conﬁrm, p” (p. 59).
11 Note that taking q to be identical to the proposition ‘Hearer made an utterance
of an assertion/question/…using sentence S with descriptive content '’ does not
inﬂuence clause (a-i) of (31), since the former describes contextual evidence, which
both interlocutors, including the addressee, must be committed to.
12 According to her, the accommodation relies (i) on A being “mutually understood to
be possessed of facts about some particular domain” (i.e., airport operations), and
(ii) on the fact that “B has reason to believe that some proposition p is a fact and that
A knows it by virtue of” (i) (i.e., “B believes p to be a fact about airport operations”).
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Independently of whether this account correctly captures the facts
pertaining to English, the Hungarian counterpart of (32) containing a
/n-declarative is not licensed in the relevant context:
(33) Same context as in (32)
B: #Három órás az út?
three hourly the way
‘The ﬂight takes three hours?’
The infelicity of (33) suggests to me that what Gunlogson refers to as
the “blanket accommodation” does not apply in the case of the Hungarian
construction. Clause (a) of the IBC, however, does predict that (33) is not
felicitous in the context: the hearer is not publicly committed to the truth
of any proposition q about which the speaker could believe that it entails
the proposition ‘The ﬂight takes three hours.’
In the next section we look at Poschmann (2008), which raises several
points of criticism against Gunlogson’s proposal.
3.2. Poschmann (2008)
Poschmann (2008) disagrees with the approach proposed in Gunlogson
(2003), according to which declaratives used as questions uniformly involve
a commitment shift from speaker to addressee. She proposes instead that
the two classes of declarative questions that Gunlogson accounts for in
a uniform fashion, namely, echo questions, in (15) and (17) above, and
veriﬁcation questions, referred to by Poschmann as conﬁrmative questions,
in (26b), should be given diﬀerent treatments.
Poschmann (2008, 252) argues that whereas “utterers of echo ques-
tions can easily dissociate themselves from the content of their utterance,
utterers of conﬁrmative questions obviously cannot” . The contrast can be
illustrated with the help of (34) vs. (35):
(34) Echo question:
A: Don’t worry. The manager has of course been informed.
B: The manager has of course been informed? I wouldn’t expect that.
(Poschmann 2008, 252, (9))
(35) Conﬁrmative question:
At Tim’s graduation. Tim’s standing next to Sophie, a woman in her sixties.
Jack to Sophie: You’re Tim’s mother? (*I don’t believe so.)
(Poschmann 2008, 257, (19), context description slightly amended)
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As the following examples show, judgments are similar concerning the
Hungarian counterparts of the examples above:
(36) A: Ne aggódj. Az igazgatót már természetesen tájékoztatták.
not worry.SUBJ.2SG the director.ACC already naturally informed.3PL
‘Don’t worry. The manager has of course been informed.’
B: Az igazgatót már természetesen tájékoztatták? Nem hiszem.
the director.ACC already naturally informed.3PL not believe.1SG
‘Themanager has of course beeninformed? I don’t believe it.’
(37) At Timi’s graduation. Timi’s standing next to Sophie, a woman in her sixties.
Jack to Sophie:
Ön a Timi édesanyja? (*Nem hiszem.)
you the Timi mother.her not believe.1SG
‘You’re Timi’s mother? (*I don’t believe so.)’
Poschmann proposes that “[i]n contrast to echo questions, conﬁrmative
questions seem to convey speaker commitment even though they certainly
do not express the speaker’s full beliefs” (op.cit., 252). This observation
is supported by the fact that conﬁrmative questions seem to be possi-
ble both with rising and falling intonation cross-linguistically (Dutch, En-
glish), whereas the intonation of echo questions is obligatorily rising. She
notes, in addition, that echo-questions and echo-assertions do not necessar-
ily attribute commitment to the addressee, they can attribute it to a third
person as well, and thus suggests that the commitment shift they involve
is not connected to questionhood but to their being meta-representations.
Given the contrasts listed above, Poschmann (2008) argues that echo
questions and conﬁrmative questions constitute two diﬀerent types of
speech acts: the former involve commitment shift, and the latter speaker
commitment. The speaker’s commitment “depends on the addressee’s ac-
knowledgement: the speaker’s commitment is suspended as soon as the
addressee denies the content” (op.cit., 257).
After showing that a classical implicature-based theory cannot han-
dle conﬁrmative questions properly,13 Poschmann proposes an account of
them that follows Zeevat (1996) and Nilsenová (2001) in assuming that “the
13 Such a theory would attribute the fact that Jack’s utterance in (35) should be in-
terpreted as a question to an implicature: Jack’s assertion stating his assumption
about Sophie being Tim’s mother would be completely uninformative for Sophie,
thus it would violate the Maxim of Quantity. Thus, instead of being interpreted as
an assertion, the utterance is interpreted as a question. The reason why Poschmann
rejects this approach is that although the proposition that Sophie is Tim’s mother is
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speaker’s utterance does not bring an update (of the Common Ground)
with the proposition p expressed by the utterance but rather with the
proposition BSpkr(p) – the speaker believes that p. In order for the propo-
sition to become part of the Common Ground (that means a commitment
of both speaker and hearer), the hearer has to acknowledge it, with the
update BH(p)” (Nilsenová 2001, 34).
Poschmann (2008, 258) argues that whereas the context conditions are
usually suﬃcient to trigger this acknowledgement, it is the rising intonation
that explicitly realizes the call on the addressee. She proposes that “rising
intonation in speech acts involving speaker-commitment can be used to ask
explicitly whether the addressee acknowledges the speech act performed
by the speaker”. Thus, rising intonation lends speech acts with speaker
commitment a speciﬁc tentative reading, since it triggers a supplementary
question about the acknowledgement (Ack) of the speech act performed
(F(p)). This strategy boils down to treating conﬁrmative questions not
as questions but as complex speech acts consisting of an assertion and a
question, represented formally as follows:14
(38) ASSERT (speaker, p) + QUEST (speaker, addressee, (Ack (F (p))))
(Poschmann 2008, 258, (21))
In Poschmann’s opinion, the acknowledgement of an illocutionary act in-
volves two steps: (i) the addressee acknowledges his understanding of the
speech act, and (ii) the addressee accepts or refuses the content of the
speech act. Rising intonation can be used to ask for both kinds of ac-
knowledgement, the content disambiguates as to which of them is relevant
in the situation. In the case of conﬁrmative questions like (35) above, where
the addressee, not the speaker, is the source of information concerning the
truth of the propositional content of the utterance, acknowledgement of
type (ii) plays a role. As far as “informative rising declaratives”, such as the
one illustrated in (39), are concerned, acknowledgement of type (i) plays
a role (given that the speaker is an authority as far as her place of origin
is concerned).15
uninformative for Sophie, it is not uninformative for the Common Ground, thus the
implicature does not go through after all.
14 (38) looks very similar to the interpretation Reese and Asher (2006) attribute to
nuclear tag questions. The question therefore arises what predictions the present
approach makes about the interpretational diﬀerence between rising declaratives and
tag questions, which does exist, since the two forms cannot be replaced by each other
freely in any context.
15 The example originates from Hirschberg & Ward (1995), and is also mentioned in
Gunlogson (2003), but is left without speciﬁc consideration there.
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(39) Informative rising declarative:
Radio station DJ: Good morning, Susan. Where are you calling from?
Caller: I’m from Skokie? (Poschmann 2008, 259, (23))
As far as the assertion part of the complex speech act encoded by con-
ﬁrmative questions according to (38) is concerned, Poschmann does not
seem to assume any speciﬁc licensing conditions: the speaker commitment
required for an assertion to be felicitous can either be based on contextual
evidence or on the private assumptions of the speaker. The fact that the
latter suﬃces in her opinion is demonstrated by her comments on (25),
repeated below in (40). She claims that if there is a hint in the context
that there was a source for a private assumption, e. g. , the internet, the
rising declarative in (40b) sounds much less problematic than without it.
(40) Robin is sitting in a windowless computer room with no information about current
weather conditions when another person enters. Robin says to the newcomer:
a. Is it raining?
b. #It’s raining?
c. #It’s raining.
Although I do not want to deny that in a context modiﬁed the way sug-
gested by Poschmann (40b) would be acceptable, it must be noted that
this context would not meet the description given in (40) itself: Robin
would not be without any information about current weather conditions.
In any case, the previous discussion shows that Poschmann’s views on the
acceptability of rising declaratives in a situation where only the speaker’s
private information supports the truth of the propositional content are in
opposition to those put forth by Gunlogson (2003).
The felicity of the last utterance in (32), repeated in (41) below, ac-
cords with Poschmann’s general assumptions, and is predicted in terms of
(38), without having to invoke an extra mechanism as Gunlogson does:
speaker B makes an assertion that is based on her private assumptions,
and at the same time asks for acknowledgement about the latter’s content.
(41) A: Schiphol Information
B: Hello, this is G.M. I have to go to Helsinki, from Amsterdam. Can you tell me
which ﬂights leave next Sunday?
A: Just a moment.
A: Yes, there are several ﬂights. One leaves at 9.10, one at 11.10, and one at 17.30.
B: The ﬂight takes about three hours?
Although (38) seems to account well for the examples discussed here, I am
not convinced that taking the utterance of rising declaratives to amount to
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the assertion of their propositional content (in addition to asking for the ad-
dressee’s opinion about it), as the formula suggests, is what the account by
Nilsenová (2001), which Poschmann takes as inspiration, suggests. In par-
ticular, (13) or (41) illustrate cases where the speaker’s commitment seems
to be much weaker than what is required for an appropriate assertion.
Importantly, it should be noted that the Hungarian version of (39),
containing a /n-declarative, is infelicitous:
(42) Radio station DJ: Good morning, Susan. Where are you calling from?
Caller: #Karcag mellől telefonálok?
Karcag beside.from call.1SG
‘I’m calling from the area of Karcag?’
The fact that /n-declaratives are not licensed to appear in the context
of (42) suggests that acknowledgement type (i) does not play a role in
the interpretation of /n-declaratives in Hungarian. The infelicity of the
/n-declarative is predicted, however, on the basis of clause (a) of the IBS:
in the input context the addressee is not committed to any proposition q
such that the speaker could reasonably be assumed to believe q! ‘Speaker
is calling from the area of Karcag’.
Interestingly, there is a form in the Hungarian language that can be
used to make a speech act analogous to that in (39): this is a declarative
pronounced with a ﬁnal rising tone, illustrated in (43):
(43) Caller: Karcag mellől telefonálok/.
‘I’m calling from the area of Karcag?’
The discussion of the felicity conditions of these “Hungarian rising declara-
tives” will, however, be left for a further occasion.
Rising declaratives that are said to involve an acknowledgement of the
content of the speech act in Poschmann’s framework, exempliﬁed by (13),
(15), (17), and (26b) above, and those involving an acknowledgement of
the form, as in (39), are also distinguished in Jeong (2017)’s framework.16
The author refers to the former type as inquisitive rising declaratives and
to the latter as assertive (or informative) rising declaratives. Jeong argues
that the two classes should be associated with diﬀerent felicity conditions
in English. As discussed above, assertive rising declaratives do not have
/n-declarative counterparts in Hungarian. There are, however, inquisitive
16 The journal article Jeong (2018) that developed from Jeong (2017) appeared too late
to be given a proper discussion here. This will have to wait till another occasion.
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rising declaratives, such as (41), as well, that cannot be translated into
Hungarian with the help of /n-declaratives, as shown in (33). These con-
trasts also suggest that the felicity conditions proposed to account for the
former cannot be appropriate for the analysis of the latter.17
In the next section we turn to the proposal by Gunlogson (2008),
which was put forward partly as a reaction to Poschmann’s criticism, and
incorporates some new insights.
3.3. Gunlogson (2008)
Gunlogson (2008) revises the author’s previous proposal, partly in order to
be able to account for the data that Poschmann (2008) found incompatible
with it. In order to explain the felicity of the relevant examples, Gunlogson
proposes in this more recent paper that declaratives used as questions are
acceptable in a context where they independently satisfy (i) felicity condi-
tions that are associated with the use of declaratives, and (ii) conditions
on the context that make the questioning interpretation possible, which is
facilitated by the rising tone.
In the new framework, both rising and falling declaratives are claimed
to encode the speaker’s commitment, which, however, does not have to
rely on contextual evidence, but can also be based on private information.
The felicity conditions of initiating (that is, non-echo) uses of declarative
questions rely on the concept of sourcehood:
17 (i) illustrates an inquisitive rising declarative that cannot be encoded by a /n-declar-
ative in the same context, as (ii) shows.
(i) A: The queen will arrive in ﬁve minutes.
B: O.K. The manager has of course been informed? *I wouldn’t expect that.
(Poschmann 2008, 252, (10))
(ii) A: The queen will arrive in ﬁve minutes.
B: O.K. #Az igazgatót már természetesen tájékoztatták?
‘O.K. The manager has of course been informed?’
The infelicity of (ii) comes as a surprise, since the example appears analogous to (30):
if the speaker can be attributed a belief that connects the evidence and the propo-
sitional content of the /n-declarative, the utterance of the latter should be licensed
in the context. Without looking deeper into possible ways of diﬀerentiating between
the two contexts, I want to argue that the infelicity of (ii) can be attributed to the
form of the declarative, particularly, the presence of természetesen ‘of course’, which
cannot appear in utterances used to make question acts, other than those encoding
echo questions.
K + K = 120 / p. 268 / January 25, 2020
268 Beáta Gyuris
(44) An agent  is a source for a proposition ' in a discourse d iﬀ:
a.  is committed to '; and
b. according to the discourse context, ’s commitment to ' in d does not depend
on another agent’s testimony that ' in d. (Gunlogson 2008, 113, (27))
Assuming that all commitments have sources (referred to as the Source
Principle in Gunlogson 2008, 117), the initiating uses of declarative ques-
tions satisfy the Rule of Initial Commitment, deﬁned as follows:
(45) Rule of Initial Commitment
A speaker making a discourse commitment to ' in a context neutral with respect to
' is expected to be a source for '. (Gunlogson 2008, 118, (39))
Gunlogson accounts for the infelicity of the declarative questions in (25),
repeated again in (46), in the new framework as follows:
(46) Robin is sitting in a windowless computer room with no information about current
weather conditions when another person enters. Robin says to the newcomer:
a. Is it raining?
b. #It’s raining?
c. #It’s raining.
Using a declarative involves commitment by the speaker, which makes the
speaker to be the expected source of the commitment. However, “according
to what is known about Robin’s resources in the discourse situation, she
is not a plausible source.” As a result, “Robin’s intention in uttering the
declarative is unrecognizable, resulting in infelicity” (Gunlogson 2008, 119).
The situation in (26), repeated in (47), diﬀers from the latter in that
“it gives Robin a visible basis for her commitment”, and it makes it “con-
ceivable in the context that Robin could reach the conclusion that it’s
raining without the newcomer telling her” (idem.):
(47) Robin is sitting, as before, in a windowless computer room when another person
enters. The newcomer is wearing a wet raincoat and boots. Robin says:
a. Is it raining?
b. It’s raining?
c. (I see that/So) It’s raining.
Although the evidence that the speaker bases her commitment on is present
in the dicourse context of (47), Gunlogson argues that it is not necessarily
the case, as (32) or (35), repeated in (48), illustrates. “[W]hat is generally
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required for felicity of a declarative is just that the discourse context allow
the inference that the speaker has some basis for her choice” (ibid., 120).
(48) Conﬁrmative question:
At Tim’s graduation. Tim’s standing next to Sophie, a woman in her sixties.
Jack to Sophie: You’re Tim’s mother? (*I don’t believe so.)
She argues with respect to (48) that “there is no particular evidence that
the woman standing next to Tim is his mother”, and “though the basis for
Jack’s conjecture might be partly or entirely contextual (Sophie’s proxim-
ity to Tim, say, together with the favorable odds of encountering a parent
at graduation), the declaratives seem to work without requiring us to make
that assumption” (Gunlogson 2008, 105). I believe, however, that without
these contextual bases no speaker would be considered justiﬁed to utter
the rising declarative in (48) or its Hungarian counterpart in (37), which
means that their felicitous uses are covered by the CBC and the IBC,
after all.
The proposal according to which the speaker, who commits as source,
must have adequate evidence (otherwise infelicity arises) explains only why
the declarative form is felicitous in English. To account for why the declar-
ative form can give rise to the questioning interpretation the author puts
forth the following condition:
(49) Contingent Commitment Criterion
An utterance of a declarative with content ' is questioning to the extent that the
speaker’s commitment is understood as contingent on the addressee’s ratiﬁcation
of '. (Gunlogson 2008, 129, (48))
The role of the rising intonation is then seen by the author as marking
the utterance as contingent “on some discourse condition whose identity is
determined in context” (ibid., 29).
Gunlogson looks at the infelicitous example (50b):
(50) (To coworker eating a piece of fruit.)
a. Is that a persimmon?
b. #That’s a persimmon?
c. #That’s a persimmon. (Gunlogson 2008, 102, (3))
She claims that it appears reasonable to assume that “the speaker has
some private basis for thinking the fruit might be a persimmon” (ibid.,
131), thus the condition according to which commitments made with the
help of declaratives must have sources (i.e., the Source Principle) is not
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violated. However, the Contingent Commitment Condition does seem to
be violated, since there is no indication in the context that the addressee
is acquainted with the name of the fruit he consumes. People are generally
aware of the name of the food they eat but this follows from a generalization
about people and not from properties of the context.
Note that besides echoic uses of rising declaratives, the account does
not apply to assertive rising declaratives, as in (39), either, since they vio-
late the Contingent Commitment Criterion. This means that Gunlogson’s
new theory is restricted to a smaller set of data than any of the previous
approaches.
As (51) illustrates, the Hungarian /n-declarative counterpart of (50b)
is equally infelicitous in the same situation:
(51) (To coworker eating a piece of fruit.)
#Ezt hívják datolyaszilvának?
this.ACC called persimmon.DAT
#‘This is called persimmon?’
Although it might follow from the common ground or from the properties
of the situation that people in general or the addressee in particular knows
the name of the food he is eating, it does not follow from either that the
name of the fruit is a persimmon. Thus, there is no contextual evidence
in the context that the addressee could be said to be committed to, and
which is such that a reasonable speaker could believe it to entail the propo-
sition ‘This is called persimmon’. As a result, the infelicity of (51) is easily
accounted for in terms of clause (a) of the IBC.
Consider next (52), where the appearance of a rising declarative is li-
censed, and its Hungarian counterpart containing a /n-declarative, in (53):
(52) (Laura has just entered the room, where Max sees her for the ﬁrst time that day.)
Max:
a. Did you get a haircut?
b. You got a haircut? (Gunlogson 2008, 104, (8))
(53) (Laura has just entered the room, where Max sees her for the ﬁrst time that day.)
Max:
Levágattad a hajad?
VM.have.cut.1SG the hair.your
‘You got a haircut?’
Gunlogson claims that the felicity of (52) is accounted for successfully on
the basis of the Rule of Initial Commitment and the Contingent Com-
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mitment Criterion, since the “contingency of [Max’s] commitment upon
Laura’s authority is inferable in the discourse context” (op.cit., 129). I be-
lieve that the IBC also explains (53). It is without doubt that clause (b) of
the IBC holds for (53): Max was not committed before seeing Laura to the
truth of her having had a haircut. Let us assume that, according to clause
(a) of the IBC, there is a proposition q in the context that describes the
way Laura looks, which Laura herself is committed to (given that she is
committed to public evidence). If the speaker can be attributed the belief
that q entails the proposition ‘Laura got a haircut’, the felicity of (53) fol-
lows . The next section turns to the proposal by Malamud and Stephenson
(2015).
3.4. Malamud & Stephenson (2015)
The proposal by Malamud & Stephenson (2015) regarding the interpreta-
tion of rising declaratives in English is based on two assumptions, which
seem to be inspired by the theories of Gunlogson (2008) and Poschmann
(2008), and thus the account seems to be the uniﬁcation of the latter
two. They argue, ﬁrst, that rising declaratives introduce projected (rather
than present) commitments by the speaker, which remind one of Gun-
logson’s contingent commitments, and second, that these constructions
add a context-dependent metalinguistic issue, which needs to be resolved,
and which reminds one of Poschmann’s (2008) suggestion. Malamud and
Stephenson represent the interpretation of rising declaratives in the frame-
work proposed by Farkas and Bruce (2010), whose main features are sum-
marized below.
Farkas and Bruce (2010, 85) make use of a (possibly empty) set DCX
for each participant X, consisting of the propositions that “X has pub-
licly committed to during the conversation up to the relevant time, and
which are not shared by all the other participants”, a set CG of proposi-
tions shared as joint discourse commitments by all participants, a stack of
sentential form/meaning pairs called Table, and a set PS (“projected set”)
of “projected” or “privileged” future common grounds. “The Table records
what is ‘at issue’ in the conversation. When the Table is not empty, the
immediate goal of the conversation is to empty it, that is, to settle the
issue at hand. […] A conversation is in a stable state when its Table is
empty” (ibid., 87).
The system above is enriched by Malamud and Stephenson in two re-
spects. First, they add projected commitments, “things that interlocutors
are expected to become committed to in the normal course of conversation”
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(ibid., 299), which thus “represent the expected next stage of the conver-
sation” (ibid., 288). A projected commitment of the speaker or hearer will
turn into an actual commitment after the hearer has conﬁrmed it. The
authors emphasize the speciﬁc nature of projected speaker commitments,
“given that the speaker is always in full control of her own commitment
set” (ibid., 288). Thus, “if the speaker chooses to make a projected commit-
ment, rather than a present one, the hearer(s) can infer that the speaker
has some reason to delay making a commitment that she would otherwise
be willing to make” (idem.).18
Second, they add the option of introducing a metalinguistic issue, and
propose that the rising tone signals the existence of such an issue. When
a rising declarative is uttered, both its propositional content p and then a
(possibly singleton) set of propositionsMLIp is added to the Table.MLIp is
a “contextually determined set of propositions, any of which would resolve
the contextually determined metalinguistic issue concerning p” (Malamud
& Stephenson 2015, 296). A move that simultaneously involves a commit-
ment and a metalinguistic issue indicates to the hearer that the commit-
ment is a projected one, pending the resolution of the metalinguistic issue.
“Any aspect of the utterance’s content and form can be the subject of an
MLI, as long as the speaker can give the hearer enough clues about its
nature” (idem.).19 Rises, therefore, are “predicted to be possible whenever
the speaker isn’t sure if a plain assertion is appropriate” (idem.).
In what follows, we illustrate the procedure with some examples given
by the authors, also showing the corresponding Hungarian examples en-
coded by /n-declaratives. In (54)–(57) the metalinguistic issue concerns
the correctness of an inference by the speaker based on the interlocutor’s
utterance:
(54) A and B are gossiping. A doesn’t know anything about B’s neighbor. B says, blushing,
“You’ve GOT to see this picture of my new neighbor!” Without looking, A replies:
A: He’s attractive? (Malamud & Stephenson 2015, 279, (2c))
(55) A: Jól néz ki?
well look VM
‘He looks good?’
18 Importantly, the system including projected commitments for each participant diﬀers
from Gunlogson’s contingent commitments in that Malamud and Stephenson also
include projected hearer commitment, which lacks a counterpart in Gunlogson (2008).
19 This feature of the proposal was inspired by Ginzburg (1996; 2012).
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(56) A and B are gossiping. A doesn’t know anything about B’s neighbor. B says, blushing,
“You’ve GOT to meet my new neighbor!” A replies:
A: He’s single? (Malamud & Stephenson 2015, 280, (5c))
(57) A: Nőtlen a szomszédod?
single the neighbour.your
‘Your neighbour is single?’
In (54) and (56), A infers that the neighbor is attractive or single, res-
pectively, only indirectly; the metalinguistic issue concerns the question of
whether the speaker’s inference regarding the hearer’s blushing is correct.
(55) and (57) show that the corresponding Hungarian examples are felic-
itous in the same situations. These data would be explained by the IBC
as well, if the speaker can be taken to believe that it follows from the fact
that the interlocutor made the preceding utterance that the neighbour is
good-looking or single, respectively. Note the similarity of these examples
to (2), discussed in Kálmán (2001). The fact that the intuitions described
in the latter work concerning the interpretation of the /n-declarative turn
out to be very similar to our explanation of (55) and (57) suggests to me
that the IBC is on the right track.20
Next, (58) illustrates a case where A is unsure about whether her
opinion is called for; thus, the metalinguistic issue is whether p addresses
the issue on the Table. An analogous example without a taste predicate
in (59) exempliﬁes a diﬀerent kind of tentativeness, where the speaker is
unsure about the speech act itself (i.e., whether the interlocutor is the right
person to introduce himself to, that is, whether he is at the right place for
his appointment):
(58) B hasn’t met A’s neighbor, and asks, “What do you think of your new neighbor?”
A isn’t sure if B wants to know about neighborliness or suitability for dating. A replies:
A: He’s attractive? (Malamud & Stephenson 2015, 280, (4c))
(59) (To a receptionist.) Hi, my name is Mark Liberman?21
(Malamud & Stephenson 2015, 281, (7))
Although I agree that the assertive rising declaratives in (58)–(59) intro-
duce a metalinguistic issue, I believe that the speaker’s commitment to
the propositional content of the rising declarative is in both cases actual,
20 I wish to thank László Kálmán for reminding me of the characterization of the inter-
pretation of (2) in Kálmán (2001), which made me rethink the account in the version
of the paper I presented at the birthday workshop.
21 Original source: Pierrehumbert & Hirschberg (1990, 290).
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rather than projected, and does not depend on the hearer’s conﬁrmation.
((39), an analogous example, illustrates the problem even better.)
The Hungarian /n-declarative counterparts of these rising declaratives
in (58) and (59), shown in (55) above and in (60), respectively, would not
be licensed in the same situations:
(60) (To a receptionist.)
#Engem Mark Libermannak hívnak?
I.ACC Mark Liberman.DAT call.3SG
‘My name is Mark Liberman?’
The infelicity of the Hungarian examples is expected on the basis of the
IBC: contrary to what clause (a) requires, there is no proposition that the
hearer is committed to and the speaker could believe to entail p. Addition-
ally, in the case of (60), the speaker must also previously be committed to
the relevant propositional content.
The next example with a vague scalar predicate is an assertive rising
declarative again, where “discourse commitments pertain to the appropri-
ate standards of application rather than to objective facts” (Malamud &
Stephenson 2015, 281):
(61) A and B are sorting paint cans in a store into a “red” bin and an “orange” bin. B
points to orangishred paint and says, “What color would you say this is?” A replies:
A: It’s red? (ibid., 281, (8c))
The relevant metalinguistic issue in connection with the above example is
whether the standard of redness implicit in p is acceptable, given that A is
not conﬁdent about her judgment. The corresponding Hungarian example
in (62) below is infelicitous in the same situation, as expected, on the basis
of clause (a) of the IBC:
(62)#Ez piros színű?
this red coloured
‘It’s red?’
The next one is an analogous example,but without a vague scalar predicate:
(63) A teacher (B) is quizzing a student (A) on state capitals. The teacher says: “What’s
the capital of New York?” The student isn’t sure of the answer, but thinks it might
be Albany. The student says:
It’s Albany? (Malamud & Stephenson 2015, 282, (9c))
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As expected, the /n-declarative counterpart of the example above is unac-
ceptable:
(64) A teacher (B) is quizzing a student (A) on state capitals. The teacher says: “What’s
the capital of New York?” The student isn’t sure of the answer, but thinks it might
be Albany. The student says:
#New York állam fővárosa Albany?
New York state capital.its Albany
‘The capital of New York state is Albany?’
Again, there is no previous commitment by the addressee that the speaker
could be taken to believe that it entails the proposition ‘The capital of New
York state is Albany’, thus clause (a) of the IBC is not satisﬁed. In the
next section we turn to the proposal made in Farkas & Roelofsen (2017).
3.5. Farkas & Roelofsen (2017)
Farkas & Roelofsen (2017, 255) refer to the proposition that corresponds
to the surface form of rising declaratives in English (as opposed to its nega-
tion) as the highlighted alternative, and propose that “both rising declar-
atives and tag interrogatives signal that the speaker has access to some
evidence for the highlighted alternative”. In order to account for the com-
patibility of these two form types with particular contexts, and their incom-
patibility with others, the authors suggest that the formal representation
of discourse contexts proposed by Farkas and Bruce (2010), reviewed in the
previous section, should be complemented, for every participant x, with a
list referred to as evidence(x), which contains the possibilities “for which
x has signaled to have some evidence” (idem.), and also their “credence
level”, that is, “the degree to which she believes the alternative itself to be
more likely than its complement” (ibid., 20). They suggest that “rising dec-
laratives signal that the speaker’s credence in the highlighted alternative
 is at most low” (ibid., 256), where low credence means that the speaker
considers  to be only somewhat more likely than its negation, :.
As an illustration, consider the example in (65):
(65) Student: The answer to this problem is 5 because the square root of 9 is 2 and 2+3
is 5.
Teacher: The square root of 9 is 2? (Farkas & Roelofsen 2017, 269, (55))
I agree with Farkas & Roelofsen (2017) in that (65) “cannot be accounted
for in approaches where rising declaratives are taken to signal a ‘contingent’
or a ‘conditional’ commitment”, as in Gunlogson (2008) and Malamud &
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Stephenson (2015). A contingent or conditional commitment means that
the speaker is “ready to commit to the highlighted alternative provided
that her interlocutor commits to this alternative ﬁrst” (Farkas & Roelofsen
2017, 270), but in the case of (65) it does not appear to be likely that the
teacher would commit to the claim under any circumstances.
The authors’ own explanation sounds as follows. In the case of (65),
“the available evidence for the highlighted alternative is the student’s prior com-
mitment to it. In this context, the teacher is assumed to be authoritative, that
is, she is assumed to know whether the highlighted alternative is true or not. By
her use of a rising declarative, she signals to the student that her credence in the
highlighted alternative is at most low. Since she is assumed to be authoritative,
this can only mean that her credence is zero, and that she is eﬀectively rejecting
the student’s prior commitment and urging him to reconsider.” (op.cit., 269)
Although the part of the proposal that derives how the teacher’s use of the
rising declarative can be interpreted as rejection of the highlighted alter-
native is rather resourceful, it remains a question why the teacher chooses
the rising declarative form to formulate her question at all, instead of an
ordinary positive polar interrogative form, which would unambiguously
convey zero credence, and which would also be felicitous.
Furthermore, I think that the proposal by Farkas and Roelofsen (2017)
is contradicted by example (66), from Gunlogson (2003).
(66) A: That copier is broken. B’s response:
a. Is it? Thanks, I’ll use a diﬀerent one.
b. It is? Thanks, I’ll use a diﬀerent one. (Gunlogson 2003, 21, (45))
In the example above, B is not assumed to have any doubts concerning the
truth of the proposition A has committed to. The example in (67) appears
similar in many respects to (65), since it also involves an authority asking
a question.
(67) Context: Mother sees child putting on cleats:
Mother: What? You are going to play soccer? No way! You are staying home and
doing your homework. (Farkas & Roelofsen 2017, 276, (68))
The Hungarian counterpart of (67), equally felicitous in the context, is
shown in (68):
(68) Indulsz focizni?
leave.2SG play.soccer.INF
‘You are going to play soccer?’
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(68) can easily be accounted for with the help of the IBC. There is evidence
that indicates the truth of the proposition q = ‘The child is putting on
cleats’, which both interlocutors are committed to. If the mother believes
that q, independently of any further evidence, entails the truth of p =
‘Child is going to play soccer’, the /n-declarative is licensed in the context,
independently of whether the speaker wants p to become true or not.
Let us ﬁnally consider the Hungarian version of (65), which is also
felicitous in the relevant context:
(69) A kilenc gyöke kettő?
the nine square.root.its two
‘The square root of nine is two?’
I propose that (69) would be accounted for in a manner analogous to echoic
uses of /n-declaratives, discussed in Section 3.1. Given the utterance of p =
‘The square root of nine is two’ by the hearer, the speaker can reasonably
be assumed to believe that p is entailed, based on Preparatory Condition 1
of Assertions (Searle 1969, 66), and on the fact that the speaker considers
hearer to be observing the Communicative Principle. The acceptability of
(69) indicates that its licensing conditions are not inﬂuenced by whether
the speaker believes in the truth of p or not. The eﬀect of the /n-declarative
is, however, inﬂuenced by the fact whether the speaker is expected to know
whether p or :p is the case. If she is considered an expert on the issue,
then the fact that she utters the /n-declarative indicates to the hearer
that she doubts the truth of the propositional content. If the speaker is
not supposed to know whether p is true, her question can simply be taken
as asking for conﬁrmation.
The next section summarizes the results of the paper.
4. Conclusions
This paper had two major aims. On the one hand, we investigated the for-
mal properties of the construction type in Hungarian we referred to as the
/n-declarative. On the other hand, we looked at existing formal approaches
to the felicity conditions of rising declaratives in English, a construction
type with an apparently similar distribution, in order to identify the felic-
ity conditions of /n-declaratives in Hungarian and consider possibilities for
their formal modelling. In the course of this, we pointed out some aspects
of the previous analyses that we considered problematic, but also managed
to identify some distributional diﬀerences between the two constructions.
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We argued that the necessary conditions of the use of the latter should
be captured by an account that is a modiﬁcation of the one proposed by
Gunlogson (2003) in a way that assimilates echoic uses of the construction
to conﬁrmative or inquisitive uses.
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ABSTRACT
This paper gives a short overviewof the debate on a construction inHun-
garian whose properties have classified it as nominal or verbal/clausal.
On the basis of a new set of data additional criteria from negative quan-
tifiers and negative concord are proposed to differentiate between the
relevant characteristics determining its status.
1. Introduction
This article is the latest instalment in a debate on the nature of a par-
ticular construction in Hungarian that goes back to about twenty-ﬁve
years, and even its immediate precursor is nearly ten years old. It began
when on the basis of several types of constructions I proposed in Kenesei
(2005) that -ás/és “nominalisations” or, in Szabolcsi’s (1994) terminology,
complex event nominals (CENs) behave as nonﬁnite clauses in a set of
well-deﬁned cases.
First, I will summarise my earlier arguments, and then review and
argue against the latest development in this exchange, that is, Laczkó’s
(2009) views to the contrary. Finally, I will put forward new arguments
for regarding these constructions as clauses as evidenced by the set of
examples to be presented here.
2. Arguments for the clausal analysis of CENs
According to the arguments in Kenesei (2005), the reﬂexive and recipro-
cal anaphors in the clauses containing nonﬁnite verbs, or more precisely,
participles, must ﬁnd their antecedents in their own clauses in (1a) and
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(2a), as against the pronominals in (1b) and (2b). “OP” stands for the pho-
netically empty operator, i.e., relative pronoun, associated with the noun
versek-et ‘poems-ACC’.
a.(1) A lányokj elolvasták a [[OP ﬁúki által egymáshozi/magukhozi
the girls read.3PL the boys by each.other/themselves.ALL
írt] versek-et].
written poems-ACC
‘The girlsj have read the poems written by the boysi to each otherj/themselvesi.’
b. A lányoki elolvasták a [[OP ﬁúkj által hozzájuki írt] versek-et].
the girls read.3PL the boys by they.ALL written poems-ACC
‘The girlsi have read the poems written to themi by the boysj .’
a.(2) A lányoki elolvasták az [[OP egymáshozi/magukhozi írt] versek-et].
the girls read.3PL the each.other/themselves.ALL written poems-ACC
‘The girlsi have read the poems written to each otheri/themselvesi.’
b. A lányoki elolvasták a [[OP hozzájuki írt] versek-et].
the girls read.3PL the they.ALL written poems-ACC
‘The girlsi have read the poems written to themi.’
Without any proper analysis one could say that in (2a) the anaphors are
bound by the subject a lányok ’the girls’, but then (2b) could not be
grammatical since in a position where the anaphor can be bound by its
antecedent in subject no pronominal can be bound by an antecedent in the
same subject position. And since according to the only possible construal
of (2b) the poems were written by some person(s) diﬀerent from the girls,
it follows from the Binding Principle that the nonﬁnite clauses in (2a) and
(2b) each contain a covert PRO subject, which compels us to posit the
following structures for them, respectively.
a.(3) A lányoki elolvasták az [[OP PROi egymáshozi/magukhozi írt]
the girls read.3PL the each.other/themselves.ALL written
versek-et].
poems-ACC
‘The girlsi have read the poems written to each otheri/themselvesi.’
b. A lányoki elolvasták a [[OP PROj hozzájuki írt] versek-et].
the girls read.3PL the they.ALL written poems-ACC
‘The girlsi have read the poems written to themi.’
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Note that in an ordinary possessive noun phrase both the anaphor and
the pronominal can be coreferent with an antecedent outside the NP in
question, as with the subjects in (4a–b).
a.(4) A ﬁúki látták [egymási rajz-á-t].
the boys saw each-other picture-POSS-ACC
‘The boysi saw each otheri’s pictures.’
b. A ﬁúki látták [az ői rajz-uk-at].
the boys saw the he picture-POSS.PL-ACC
‘The boysi saw theiri pictures.’
However, in the possessive constructions that contain CENs only anaphors
are acceptable. No pronominal coreferent with the subject is tolerated, just
as in the examples with nonﬁnite predicates in (2) and (3).1
a.(5) A ﬁúki abbahagyták [egymási rajzol-ás-á-t].
the boys stopped.3PL each-otheri draw-DEV-POSS-ACC
‘The boysi stopped drawing each other (lit.: each other’s drawing).’
b. *A ﬁúki abbahagyták [az ői rajzol-ás-uk-at].
the boys stopped.3PL the he draw-DEV-POSS.PL-ACC
‘*The boysi stopped drawing themi (lit.: their drawing).’
In view of the consequences of the Binding Principle this scenario is possi-
ble only if the bracketed constructions are not DPs but (nonﬁnite) clauses,
whose subjects are empty pronominals, i.e., PROs, coreferential with the
respective subjects of the matrix clauses, cf. (6).
a.(6) A ﬁúki abbahagyták [PROi egymási rajzol-ás-á-t].
‘The boysi stopped PROi drawing themselvesi.’
b. A ﬁúki abbahagyták [az PROi őj rajzol-ás-uk-at].
‘The boysi stopped PROi drawing themj .’
Kenesei (2005) lists a number of further arguments, including one that
is based on antiagreement in case of a third person plural pronominal
possessor.2 It is a well-known feature of Hungarian that whenever the
lexical possessor is plural, the possessor DP is marked for plural and its
possessum carries a possessive aﬃx unmarked for number, cf. (7a). When,
1 Obviously, in case the pronominal refers to anyone other than the subject, the con-
struction is grammatical.
2 As in many other Uralic languages, possessive aﬃxes on the possessed nominal (or
possessum) agree with the possessor in all persons if the possessor is a pronominal.
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however, a third person plural possessor is a pronominal, its possessum, but
not the pronominal, is marked for the plurality of the possessor, cf. (7b).
a.(7) [DP a ﬁú-k rajz-a/*-uk]
the boy-PL picture-POSS/POSS.3PL
‘the boys’ picture’
b. az ő rajz-uk
the s/he picture-POSS.3PL
‘their picture’
When dative possessors are moved out of their possessive DPs, the pos-
sessum has two possible possessive markings available: it could be either
unmarked or marked for plural. According to den Dikken’s (1999) pro-
posal, when the possessum is unmarked for plural, the possessor has been
moved and there is a trace left in its original position, see (8a). When,
in turn, the possessum is marked for plural, there is no movement, but
the possessor is merged in situ and there is a resumptive pronoun in the
possessor position inside the DP, see (8b).
a.(8) A ﬁúk-naki jó volt [a ei rajz-a].
the boys-DAT good was the picture-POSS
‘The boys’ picture was good.’
unmarked agreement
b. A ﬁúk-naki jó volt [a proi rajz-uk].
the boys-DAT good was the picture-POSS.3PL
‘The boys’ picture was good.’
plural agreement
I claimed in Kenesei (2005) that CENs did not allow for antiagreement,
so following den Dikken (1999), I argued that the possessors/subjects of
CENs can only occur in matrix clauses via movement, cf. (9a–b).
a.(9) A problémák-naki váratlan volt [a ei fel-merül-és-e].
the problems-DAT unexpected was the PV-emerge-DEV-POSS
‘The emergence of the problems was unexpected.’
b. *A problémák-naki váratlan volt [a proi fel-merül-és-ük].
PV-emerge-DEV-POSS.3PL
Finally, there was also an argument in Kenesei (2005) based on the fact
that negation is prohibited in possessive DPs, cf. (10a), while it is always
possible in CENs, see (10b). In other words, CENs are propositional, unlike
run-of-the-mill possessive DPs.
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a.(10) Láttam [a ﬁúk-nak (*nem) a rajz-á-t].
I-saw the boys-DAT not the picture-POSS-ACC
‘I saw the boys’ (*not) picture.’
b. Veszélyes volt [a ﬁúk-nak a le nem rajzol-ás-a].
dangerous was the boys-DAT the PV not draw-DEV-POSS
‘(The) not drawing (of) the boys was dangerous.’
3. Arguments against the clausal nature of CENs
In an article written in the framework of Lexical Functional Grammar
(LFG) Laczkó (2009) challenges the alleged nonﬁnite nature of CENs. Al-
though he acknowledges the relevance of the arguments from the Binding
Principle, he claims that simpler answers could be found even in a mini-
malist approach.3
As regards my argument from antiagreement, Laczkó is justiﬁed in
shedding doubt on my judgment of (9b) since he made a limited survey in
which some speakers found examples of this type fully acceptable. I must
then adjust my position in this regard and suppose that constructions of
this kind license resumptive pronouns as was seen in the possessive DP
in (8b).
In discussing my third argument, which was based on negation, Laczkó
raises a number of problems. One is based on the occurrence of adjectivalis-
ing aﬃxes on negated CENs formed from preﬁxed verbs, cf. (11), where he
makes use of the recent borrowing szével ‘save’ in (11a) and the nonsense
verb ki-csaskol in (11b) to show that their derivatives are not lexicalised.
a.(11) az el nem szével-és-i probléma
the PV not save-DEV-ADJ problem
‘the problem of not saving (something on a computer)’
b. a ki nem csaskolás-os jelenség-ek
the PV not csaskol-DEV-ADJ phenomenon-PL
‘the phenomena of not kicsaskol-ing’
Although I have discussed both types of adjectivalisers and shown them
to be inﬂectional aﬃxes, cf. Kenesei (1996; 2014), I did not analyse the
3 “It is unquestionable that Kenesei’s clausal proposal immediately, simultaneously and
elegantly solves both the control and the binding problems posed for either Szabolcsi
(1994) or Laczkó (1995). Nevertheless, it seems to me that Szabolcsi’s account could
be modiﬁed easily without invoking the whole complex apparatus of clausal syntactic
derivation” (Laczkó 2009, 46).
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occurrence of the negative operator in the expressions formed with them.
The fact that the negative operator is inserted between the preverb and
the head bearing the putative nominaliser aﬃx -ás/és points to its incom-
patibility with their derivation within the lexicon. It may be relevant at
this point that another construction type formerly categorised as adjectival
has also been proved to be a nonﬁnite clause in Lipták & Kenesei (2017).
While I cannot put forward a full analysis here, I suggest that they are
extensions of a vP with an implicit internal argument into a NegP, which
then undergoes suﬃxation by -ás/és, followed by syntactic aﬃxation by
the adjectivalisers -i or -Vs.
Laczkó’s claim that the preverb cannot move behind the verb in con-
structions with CENs as it does in ﬁnite clauses, cf. (12a–b) is not a cogent
counterargument since the preverb never moves behind the verb in another
type of nonﬁnite, i.e., participial, clause either, cf. (13a–b).
a.(12) A ﬁú-t nem rajzol-t-am le.
the boy-ACC not draw-PAST-1SG PV
‘I didn’t draw the boy.’
b. *a ﬁú nem rajzol-ás-a le
the boy.NOM not draw-DEV-POSS PV
‘the not drawing of the boy’
a.(13) a [le nem rajzol-t] ﬁú
the PV not draw-PPART boy
‘the boy not drawn’
b. *a [nem rajzol-t le] ﬁú
the not draw-PPART PV boy
What is demonstrated here is the well-known property of some Hungarian
nonﬁnite clause types that preserve the original verb ﬁnal or, in general,
head ﬁnal order of constituents in this Uralic language.
Laczkó has a diﬀerent objection to the nonﬁnite analysis based on
missing items from the left periphery of ﬁnite clauses. The prohibition on
is ‘also, even’ and sem ‘neither, (also/even) not’ in (14) and (15) illustrates
his point.
a.(14) A ﬁú-t le is rajzol-t-am.
the boy-ACC PV also draw-PAST-1SG
‘I even drew the boy.’
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b. *a ﬁú le is rajzol-ás-a
the boy.NOM PV also draw-DEV-POSS.3SG
‘even drawing the boy’
a.(15) A ﬁú-t le sem rajzol-t-am.
the boy-ACC PV even.not draw-PAST-1SG
‘I didn’t even draw the boy.’
b. *a ﬁú le sem rajzol-ás-a
the boy.NOM PV even.not draw-DEV-POSS.3SG
‘not even drawing the boy’
There are two options we could follow here in countering Laczkó’s point.
On the one hand, we could demonstrate that constructions with CENs are
projected up to NegP but not beyond, and items from the left periphery
such as Topics and quantiﬁers including phrases headed by is and sem
cannot occur in them – although positive or negative Focus is possible.
Focus is below NegP as is illustrated in (16b), where Anglia ‘England’ is
interpreted as constituent focus.
a.(16) Sikeres volt [csak Anglia fel-térképez-és-e].
successful was only England PV-chart-DEV-POSS.3SG
‘Making a chart only of England was successful.’
b. Tévedés volt [nem Anglia fel-térképez-és-e].
mistake was not England PV-chart-DEV-POSS.3SG
‘Making a chart not of England (but of some other country) was a mistake.’
Note that the quantiﬁer phrases headed by is or sem are impossible even
if the preverb is attached to the verb, cf. (17).
a.(17) *Sikeres volt [Anglia is fel-térképez-és-e].
successful was England also PV-chart-DEV-POSS.3SG
Intended meaning: ‘Making a chart also of England was successful.’
b. *Tévedés volt [Anglia sem fel-térképez-és-e].
mistake was England neither PV-chart-DEV-POSS.3SG
Intended meaning: ‘Making a chart neither of England was a mistake.’
On the other hand, we could claim that the alternative construction with
a dative possessor can accommodate quantiﬁer phrases headed by is and
sem, especially since it is generally impossible to insert any independent
constituent between the unmarked (or nominative) possessor and the pos-
sessed nominal. However, since dative possessors, unlike unmarked ones,
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can move out of the construction, (18a) is suspect of not being a single
constituent, and thereby the dative possessor is understood to be part of
a quantiﬁer phrase in the matrix clause, rather than in the embedded one.
This is corroborated by (18b), which is ungrammatical since (unlicensed)
negation by sem cannot follow the matrix predicate, cf. the grammatical
(18c) for contrast.
a.(18) Sikeres volt Angliá-naki is a [ei fel-térképez-és-e].
successful was England-DAT also the PV-chart-DEV-POSS
‘Making a chart of England was also successful.’
b. *Tévedés volt Angliá-naki sem a [ei fel-térképez-és-e.
mistake was England-DAT neither the PV-chart-DEV-POSS
c. *Nem volt tévedés Angliá-naki sem a [ei fel-térképez-és-e.
not was mistake England-DAT neither the PV-chart-DEV-POSS
‘It wasn’t a mistake to make a chart of England, either.’
No more of Laczkó’s arguments will be discussed here since our purpose
was not to enter into a meticulous examination of all arguments for and
against but a general overview of the points involved before a new set of
phenomena relevant to the issue is presented.
4. New data and analyses
It is well-known that in Hungarian, which is a negative concord language,
there has to be a negative operator either c-commanding the negative
quantiﬁer in its clause or licensing it by having the negative quantiﬁer in
the Spec of the NegP headed by the negative operator.4
a.(19) [NegP Nem [TP mondott erről senki senki-nek semmi-t (sem)]].
not said-3SG of.this noone noone-DAT nothing-ACC either
‘Noone said anything to anyone about this.’
b. [NegP Senkii [NegP senki-nekj [NegP semmi-tk [Neg nem] [TP mondott
noone noone-DAT nothing-ACC not said-3SG
ei ej ek erről]]]].
of.this
‘Noone said anything to anyone about this.’
4 See, e.g., Puskás (1998; 2000); Tóth (1999); Surányi (2002; 2006); Olsvay (2006);
É. Kiss (2008; 2011); Kenesei (2012).
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In case the negative quantiﬁer is in a clause diﬀerent from the one in which
the negative operator occurs, the sentence will be ungrammatical, whether
the quantiﬁer was licensed in its root position (20a) or the operator in the
matrix clause c-commands it in the embedded clause (20b). For contrast,
compare the grammatical (20c) in which the negative quantiﬁer moved
from the embedded clause is licensed in the matrix clause.
a.(20) *Anna senki-ti hisz [hogy ei nem volt beteg].
Anna noone-ACC believe.3SG that not was sick
b. *Anna nem hiszi [hogy senki volt beteg].
Anna not believe.3SG that noone was sick
c. Anna senki-ti sem hisz [hogy ei beteg volt].
Anna noone-ACC not believe.3SG that sick was
‘Anna believes noone to have been sick.’
With the exception of inﬁnitives, which behave ambiguously with respect
to the independence of their clauses, as seen, e.g., in Szécsényi (2009),
the negative operator is required to license the negative quantiﬁer in its
clause, whether or not the clause is ﬁnite. In (21a) the scope of negation
extends to the embedded clause only. In (21b) the negative operator is in
the matrix clause, therefore the inﬁnitival clause marked by brackets does
not constitute an independent domain.
a.(21) Anna képes volt [PRO semmi-t sem elolvasni].
Anna capable was nothing-ACC not read.INF
‘Anna was capable of reading nothing.’
b. Anna nem volt képes [PRO elolvasni semmi-t].
Anna not was capable read.INF nothing-ACC
‘Anna wasn’t capable of reading anything.’
In contrast to inﬁnitivals, participial clauses are acceptable only if the
negative quantiﬁer is licensed by the operator in its own clause.
a.(22) [PRO semmi-t sem észrevéve] Anna belépett a szobá-ba.
nothing-ACC not perceiving Anna entered the room-ILL
‘Having perceived nothing, Anna entered the room.’
b. *Anna nem lépett a szobá-ba [PRO semmi-t észrevéve].
Anna not entered the room-ILL nothing-ACC perceiving
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a.(23) Anna a [semelyik könyv-et nem olvasó] ﬁú-t látta.
Anna the none book-ACC not reading boy-ACC saw
‘Anna saw the boy reading none of the books.’
b. *Anna a [semelyik könyv-et olvasó] ﬁú-t nem látta.
Anna the none book-ACC reading boy-ACC not saw
Alberti and Farkas (2017, 828) present a pair of examples relevant to our
case, which they do not examine from the aspects discussed here.
a.(24) [DP Semelyik könyv el-olvas-ás-a] sem okoz gond-ot.
none book PV-read-DEV-POSS not cause problem-ACC
‘No problem is caused by reading any of the books.’
b. [NonﬁnP Semelyik könyv el nem olvas-ás-a] gond-ot okoz.
none book PV not read-NONFIN-POSS problem-ACC cause
‘Reading none of the books causes problems.’
This pair of examples corroborates the position ﬁrst put forward in Kenesei
(2005) based originally on Szabolcsi and Laczkó’s (1992) and Szabolcsi’s
(1994) analyses, namely, that constructions headed by verbs suﬃxed by
-ás/és belong to two types: they are either plain (possessive) DPs trans-
parent to negative concord as in (24a), or CENs, that is, nonﬁnite clauses
within whose boundaries the requirements of negative concord are satisﬁed,
as in (24b), where the aﬃx in question is therefore glossed as NONFINITE,
rather than DEVERBATIVE, as in (24a). Thus while there is a deverba-
tive derivational aﬃx in (24a), the subject of (24b) is a nonﬁnite clause.
The case of (24a) does not diﬀer from that of an ordinary noun phrase
containing a negative quantiﬁer, such as (25).
(25) [NegP Semelyik könyv [Neg sem] [TP okoz gond-ot]].
none book not cause problem-ACC
‘None of the books causes problems.’
Since there is a negative operator in the bracketed construction in (24b)
that can license the negative quantiﬁer in that very domain and since
negative concord works in the minimal clause in this language, this serves
as evidence that the CEN in this case is a nonﬁnite clause.
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ABSTRACT
This short paper looks at two biased question types, Polar Rhetorical
Questions (PRQs) and the so-called Negative Wh-Construction (NWHC).
Although at first glance both could seem RQs because of the Speaker’s
bias toward the negation of the proposition expressed by the sentence
radical of the interrogative, it is argued here that the NWHC is not a sub-
type of RQs. Beliefs attributed to the Addressee play a crucial role in set-
ting NWHCs and PRQs apart.
1. Introduction
The Negative Wh-Construction is a special question type: by its form it
is a wh-interrogative, but by its function, it is a denial to some previous
utterance.
(1) A: John is a vegetarian.
B: Since whén is John a vegetarian?
Since when in B’s reaction bears emphatic stress and expresses that B does
not believe the proposition that John is a vegetarian. Wh-interrogatives
expressing such a move have been observed in a wide range of unrelated
languages.
a.(2) Koei bindou jau hai toushugun sik je aa3?!
he where have be.at library eat thing Q
‘No way did he eat anything in the library.’
(Cantonese)
b. Eti John-i 60 sal i-ni?!
where John-NOM 60 year.old be-Q
‘No way is John 60 years old.’
(Korean)
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c. De dónde va a tener 60 años?!
from where goes to have 60 years
(Spanish)
‘No way is he 60 years old.’ (Cheung 2008, (1a)–(1c))
d. Can ne zaman-dan beri vejetaryan-dır?
can what time-ABL since vegetarian-COP
‘Since when is Can a vegetarian?’
(Turkish)
e. Mióta érdekel mások véleménye?
since-when interests others opinion
‘Since when do you care about others’ opinion?’
(Hungarian)
Although at a ﬁrst glance, these questions look similar to RQs, the present
paper argues that they are not rhetorical. According to Cheung (2008;
2009), the NWHC has a “negative rhetorical interpretation”, by which he
means that the at-issue meaning of a Negative Wh-Construction is a neg-
ative assertion. There are two discourse-related constraints that apply,
both of which are conventional implicatures. One of them he called the
“Conﬂicting View Condition”, which restricts the utterance of a NWHC
to contexts where the Speaker is sure that her conversational partner be-
lieves the opposite of the proposition currently in question, and the other
one being the so-called “Mis-Conclusion Condition”, which guarantees that
NWHCs be used in contexts in which the Speaker thinks that her partner
should have come to the same conclusion as the Speaker. The three mean-
ing components are shown in (3), where p is the proposition expressed by
the previous utterance to which the NWHC is a denial.
(3) At-issue meaning: :p
Conventional Implicatures:
a. Conﬂicting View Condition: The Speaker thinks that the discourse participant
believes that p.
b. Mis-Conclusion Condition: The Speaker thinks that the discourse participant
should have every reason to believe that :p. (Cheung 2009, 306)
Applying these to (1), upon uttering ‘Since when is John a vegetarian?’, the
Speaker commits herself to ‘John is not a vegetarian’, and thinks that her
Addressee (wrongly) believes that John is a vegetarian. Also, the Speaker
thinks that the Addressee should have already known that John was not
a vegetarian.
It has been noted that some NWHCs do not necessarily express propo-
sitional negation but they can target some metalinguistic issue raised by
the latest move (Kiss 2017). The present paper restricts itself to NWHCs
that express propositional negation.
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1.1. The markedness of NWHCs
NWHCs are thus biased questions, showing a marked form in several ways.
As for their syntax, they resist any kind of embedding and the wh-phrase
is restricted to a peripheral position. The examples in (4) could only be
grammatical if the embedded sentence is pronounced as a quote, but not
otherwise. Example (5) shows that a NWHC cannot serve as a sentential
subject.
a.(4) *Maria ha detto che ma dove le piaceva il concerto.
Maria has said that but where to.her pleasant the concert
(Italian)
b. *Marija skazala chto s kakix eto por chto jej
Maria said that from which it time that to.her
(Russian)
ponravilsya koncert.
was.pleasant concert
Intended: ‘Maria said that she didn’t like the concert.’
a.(5) [Bù chōuyān] yǒuyí jiànkāng.
not smoke beneﬁts health
‘Not smoking is good for your health.’
(Mandarin)
b. [*Nǎr chōuyān] yǒuyí jiànkāng.
where smoke beneﬁt health
Intended: ‘Not smoking is good for your health.’
The peripheral position of the wh-phrase in a NWHC is seen even in
wh-in-situ languages. The Cantonese example in (6) shows that unless
the wh-phrase is above the ability modal wui, the utterance cannot be
interpreted as a NWHC. (6a) and (6b) are genuine questions, (6c) is a
NWHC.
a.(6) Keoi wui hai bindou maai ce aa3?
he will at where buy car Q
‘Where will he buy a car?’
(Cantonese)
b. Keoi hai bindou wui maai ce aa3?
he at where will buy car Q
‘Where will he buy a car?’
c. Keoi bindou wui maai ce aa3?
he where will buy car Q
Lit.: ‘Where will he buy a car?’
‘No way will he buy a car’ (After Cheung 2008, 23)
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Cheung has made the following observations: Languages diﬀer in what
wh-phrases can participate in a NWHC, if any, but typically only a small
subset of wh-phrases is used, and they cannot be paraphrased. As for their
semantics, the wh-phrases do not quantify over the domains canonically
associated with them: where does not range over places, when does not
range over times, etc. (Cheung analyzes them as wh-words that stand for
possible worlds.) Also, the wh-phrase in a NWHC can easily cooccur with
a constituent that in a genuine question would serve as a congruent answer
to it.
a.(7) Since when has he been working at UCLA since 2000? (Cheung 2009, (8))
b. Tā nǎr yǒu zài túshūguǎn lǐ chī fàn (ne)?
he where have be.at library in eat meal (Q)
‘No way did he eat anything in the library.’
(Mandarin)
Another property contributing to markedness is that the wh-phrase in
NWHCs can cooccur with predicates having temporal properties that
would otherwise make them incompatible in genuine questions. Since when
is normally ungrammatical with a telic predicate like decide to vote for
Trump, and where is incompatible with stative properties like be a bus.
a.(8) Da quando ha deciso di votare per Trump?
since when has decided to vote for Trump
(Italian)
Lit.: ‘Since when did he decide to vote for Trump?’
b. E b2s kithõ ja?
this bus where COP
(Punjabi)
Lit.: ‘Where is this a bus?’
Furthermore, the wh-expressions in NWHCs tend to be marked in form
in some languages. They might not be outright idiomatic, but they are
somewhere between their ordinary meaning known from genuine questions
and the special meaning seen in NWHCs. Examples of such wh-phrases
are shown in (9):
a.(9) Italian: dove ‘where’: *(ma) dove in NWHCs
b. Cantonese: (hai) bindou ‘(at) where’: *(hai) bindou in NWHCs
c. Punjabi: kithe ‘where’: kithõ in NWHCs
English since when is close to the literal end of the continuum, but at the
other end, we ﬁnd examples such as ma dove ‘but where’ in Italian and
kithõ, derived from kithe in Punjabi.
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Lastly, NWHCs bear emphatic stress on the wh-phrase and tend to
have a falling ﬁnal tune, which diﬀerentiates them from genuine questions.
The above properties show that NWHCs have a marked form and that
the relation of the sentence radical and the wh-phrase is diﬀerent from how
it is in genuine questions. The sentence radical of a NWHC is of the same
type as the sentence radical of declaratives and polar questions, that is,
they are full propositions. While the sentence radical of wh-interrogatives
lacks information (Krifka 2011), the one of NWHCs does not. Examples
(7) and (8) prove that the wh-phrase does not come from the proposition
as it is in genuine questions. In NWHCs, the wh-phrase seems to act as
a discourse-related operator, which is supported by the fact that NWHCs
cannot embed.
1.2. What this paper is about
The present paper aims to spell out the diﬀerence between RQs and
NWHCs by representing the beliefs of the Speaker. This is shown infor-
mally in section 2.
In section 3, the system of Farkas & Roelofsen (2017) is presented,
which oﬀers a principled way to associate the semantic content and conven-
tions of use of declaratives and polar interrogatives. In this framework, only
those utterances can be accommodated that have a proposition-denoting
sentence radical and have a so-called highlighted proposition. It will be
shown that both PRQs and NWHCs contribute a highlighted proposition.
Since this framework also cares about the Speaker’s attitude towards the
truth of the proposition conveyed by some biased questions, the ques-
tion whether PRQs and NWHCs should be accommodated in Farkas and
Roelofsen’s framework becomes relevant.
2. Belief-constellations
2.1. What makes a question rhetorical?
Given Cheung’s claim that NWHCs have a ‘negative rhetorical interpre-
tation’ but are not RQs themselves, it is worth looking at where this in-
terpretation comes from. What makes a question rhetorical? There are at
two main views found in the literature on how one could analyze RQs. One
of them analyzes them as assertions (Han & Siegel 1997; Han 1998; 2002),
and the other, as questions (Rohde 2006; Caponigro & Sprouse 2007).
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The analysis that treats them as assertions is based on the fact that RQs
pattern with assertions, rather than with questions, in some tests oﬀered
by Sadock (1974), some examples of which are shown in (10). A genuine
question cannot follow after all, but an assertion can. On the other hand,
by any chance can only appear in a genuine question, not in a RQ or in
an assertion. What we see is that RQs pattern with assertions (Cheung
2009).
a.(10) After all, do phonemes have anything to do with language?
b. After all, phonemes do not have anything to do with language.
c. Does Arthur, by any chance, know anything about syntax?
The semantic derivation at some point turns RQs into assertions of the
opposite polarity, which is shown in (11). The job is done by an operator
that turns the polarity of the sentence radical to the opposite (Han 1998;
2002).
a.(11) Did I tell you that writing a dissertation was easy?
b. Op[Did I tell you that writing a dissertation was easy?]
c. :[I told you that writing a dissertation was easy] (Han 1998, (25))
Since the polarity operator is set to a pragmatically available value, the
expression is not a question any more, it becomes an assertion. One major
advantage of the analysis that treats RQs as assertions is that it also
accounts for the distribution of Negative Polarity Items in RQs: it is the
hidden operator that licenses them.
Caponigro & Sprouse (2007) and Rohde (2006) have pointed out some
problems with this analysis, both in terms of empirical facts and theoret-
ically. They noticed that RQs can be answered, while assertions cannot.
Also, RQs can have answers that are positive, that is, non-negated propo-
sitions.
(12) A: It’s understandable that Luca adores Mina. After all, who helped him when
he was in trouble?
B: Mina./#Nobody. (Caponigro & Sprouse 2007, (11))
Rohde (2006) points to Schaﬀer’s (2005) RQs-as-retorts, another example
of RQs not having an answer “of opposite polarity of what has been asked”,
as Han claims is the case.
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a.(13) A: Does Ed McMahon drink?
B: Is the Pope a Catholic? (Schaﬀer 2005, (5))
b. A: How do you like school?
B: How do you like prison? (ibid., (8))
The RQ in (13a-B) does not convey the negation of what has been asked,
on the contrary. And neither does (13b-B), strictly speaking: what it says
is ‘I like school to the extent you like prison’, and the answer also signals
that the question was a trivial one. RQs-as-retorts are special in several
ways, the reader is referred to Schaﬀer (2005) for a description of them.
As for the theoretical side of the assertion-like analysis, one cannot
overlook the costliness of Han’s assumptions. First, the interpretation of
interrogatives should branch into questions and assertions, from now on,
despite the fact that they can have the same form (at least the same
segmental material), as pointed out by Caponigro and Sprouse (2007).
Also, Han assumes two sets of wh-words: interrogative and negative ones,
yet we have hardly any reason based on morphology to do so.
The other view found in the literature, advocated by Caponigro &
Sprouse (2007) and by Rohde (2006), pictures Rhetorical Questions as
questions. On this account, it is the obviousness of the answer, and nothing
else, that makes a question rhetorical. In other words, genuine information-
seeking questions and RQs are the same semantically, although they diﬀer
pragmatically; what makes them diﬀerent is the public beliefs the discourse
participants are committed to. Once the speakers all believe the same
answer to a given question, it can be asked felicitously as a RQ.
What makes a question rhetorical in Caponigro and Sprouse’s analysis
is formulated in (14):
a.(14) Q is a Rhetorical Question iﬀ [Q]w is an element of the common ground of the
Speaker and the Addressee.
b. Q is an Ordinary Question iﬀ [Q]w is not part of the Speaker’s commitments.
The deﬁnition of Rhetorical Questions along these lines is given in (15).
(15) A RQ is an interrogative clause whose answer is known to the Speaker and the
Addressee, and they both also know that the other knows the answer as well. An
answer is not required, but possible. Either the Speaker or the Addressee can answer.
(Caponigro & Sprouse 2007, (26))
Treating RQs as questions has some advantages compared to the assertion-
like analysis: there is no need to posit two sets of wh-words and the facts
about answerability are explained. The major shortcoming of the question-
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like analysis is that it does not oﬀer an answer to why minimizers can occur
in RQs. This problem is not treated here, but the reader is referred to the
work of Guerzoni (2004) and Abels (2003) who oﬀer some answer to it.
Despite this shortcoming, in this paper, RQs are analyzed as questions to
which the answers are perceived by the Speaker as obvious.
2.2. The role of discourse participants’ beliefs
A RQ suggesting a negative answer is similar to a NWHC in an important
respect: the Speaker believes that the answer to her question is the empty
set. What RQs and NWHCs diﬀer in is the belief the Speaker attributes
to the Addressee about the truth of the proposition in question. Following
Caponigro and Sprouse, in the case of a RQ, the Speaker attributes a
positive or negative belief to herself about the proposition in question p
if the RQ in question is a polar one. If the RQ is a wh-interrogative, this
negative belief means that according to the Speaker, there is no value
that makes the sentence radical a true proposition. At the same time, the
Speaker attributes the same belief on the proposition p to her Addressee,
which is either the sentence radical of a PRQ or a proposition that serves
as a true answer to the wh-RQ. This condition holds whether it is a RQ
awaiting a positive or a negative answer.
In the case of a NWHC, recall that there are some discourse-related
constraints, namely the Conﬂicting View Condition and the Mis-Conclu-
sion Condition. These guarantee that a NWHC is pronounced felicitously
only if the Speaker and the Addressee have opposing beliefs about p. Upon
reacting to the previous utterance expressing the proposition p, a NWHC
expresses :p.
Let SS represent the Speaker’s own belief about the proposition in
question, and let SA be the belief attributed by the Speaker to the Hearer.
The polarity of the belief about the truth of p is marked by +,   and
neut for positive, negative and neutral stances on it. In this case, RQs
with negative answers, RQs with positive answers and NWHCs pertain to
three diﬀerent constellations of beliefs. Let us represent a certain belief-
constellation as an ordered pair of Speaker’s beliefs, the ﬁrst element being
S’s belief about p and the second, what S attributes to A as a belief
about p.
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a.(16) Rhetorical Question with a negative answer: hSS , SA i
b. Rhetorical Question with a positive answer: hSS+, SA+i
c. Negative Wh-Construction: hSS , SA+i
Both RQs and NWHCs are biased questions, since in both cases, the
Speaker has a bias toward the proposition she is questioning, and in ad-
dition, she also attributes a bias to the Addressee. The similarity between
RQs suggesting a negative answer and NWHCs is due to the Speaker’s
negative bias SS  in both cases. But the Addressee is attributed diﬀerent
things in the two cases: RQs with a negative answer require the Addressee’s
belief to be negative as well, while NWHCs are felicitous only if the Ad-
dressee’s belief on the subject matter p is of opposite polarity, i.e., positive.
These properties are summarized in the following table, where S
stands for Speaker, and A for the belief attributed to the Addressee by S:
Table 1: Speaker’s beliefs about the proposition in question and about Ad-
dressee’s beliefs on it
S’s belief about A
!
SA  SA:neut SA+
S’s own belief
SS  RQ  accommodate as a
RQ
NWHC
SS:neut n/a genuine question rising declarative
SS+ n/a accommodate as a
RQ
RQ+
The two dimensions of the table show the possible beliefs of the Speaker
about the truth of the proposition p. The header column shows that the
Speaker can believe that p is not true (SS ), that p is true (SS+), or
she can have a neutral stance on it (SS:neut). The header row shows three
possible beliefs the Speaker can attribute to the Addressee: she can think
A agrees with p (SA+), that A disagrees with p (SA ), or it is possible that
the Speaker has no reason to attribute any bias to A (SA:neut). Attributing
a neutral stance to A does not mean that A does not know whether p is
true, it only means that the Speaker is unable to attribute a positive or
a negative stance to A about p, which does not exclude that A does have
one. SS:neut, on the other hand, should be read oﬀ as “S cannot attribute
either a positive, or a negative attitude to S”, that is, to herself, which
means that the Speaker does not know whether p is true or not.
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(17) Belief-constellations
Any Speaker S in a conversation who pronounces an interrogative with a sentence
radical p has a belief constellation represented as an ordered pair hSS ; SAi,
where SS indicates the belief about the truth, falsity or a neutral stance of p at-
tributed by S to herself, and
where SA indicates the belief of the truth, falsity or neither, of p, attributed by S to
the Addressee A,
so that both SS and SA can have positive, negative or neutral values, depending on
the type of the question.
If we adopt Caponigro and Sprouse’s view on the “felicity conditions” of
RQs, then both members of the ordered pair should show the same (non-
neutral) value. To illustrate it, consider the following example of a RQ
awaiting a negative answer.
(18) Do chickens have lips? (Schaﬀer 2005, (1))
Here, the proposition in question p would be the sentence radical of the
RQ, ‘chickens have lips’. The answer to this question is negative and this
fact is obvious enough so that we can rely on that the Addressee also knows
this. The belief constellation of the Speaker of (18) is therefore hSS , SA i.
(19) A: It’s understandable that Luca adores Mina. After all, who helped him when he
was in trouble?
A/B: Mina./#Nobody. (Caponigro & Sprouse 2007, (11))
The proposition in question here is composed of applying the commonly
known answer to the question radical (in the terminology of Krifka 2017):
x[x helped Luca when he was in trouble](Mina). The proposition in ques-
tion in this case would be ‘Mina helped Luca when he was in trouble’. The
Speaker believes this proposition to be true and expects her Addressee to
also believe this to be the case, the belief constellation is thus hSS+, SA+i.1
As for the rest of the cases in Table 1, a Speaker can use a RQ felici-
tously even if she does not believe the Addressee to be biased towards the
answer her question suggests because as Abels (2003) noted, a cooperative
discourse participant can accommodate presuppositions arising from RQs.
This represents the notion of “one-sided mutual belief”, the importance of
which is highlighted by Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg (1990). Belief con-
stellations that have a neutral value for S’s own belief about p are genuine
1 The belief-constellation hSS+, SA+i is somewhat underspeciﬁed in this case. It only
shows that there is a true answer to the RQ, but the exact information, that is, which
element of the denotation of the wh-question is true, comes from world knowledge.
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questions in case the belief attributed to A is not biased either: hSS:neut,
SA:neuti. If A is biased towards the positive answer, however, it is a case
of a rising declarative (Gunlogson 2001). hSS:neut, SA+i represents cases
of questions that in English are syntactically declarative but have a rising
intonation. Rising declaratives fail to commit the Speaker to the truth of
the sentence radical, yet they are biased, namely their Speaker attributes
a certain proposition to the Addressee (ibid., 4).
In sum, Rhetorical Questions and the Negative Wh-Construction are
similar in an important respect, namely that the Speaker’s negative stance
on a proposition in question p (SS ) is part of the felicity conditions of
both. What sets them apart is the belief the Speaker attributes to the
Addressee.
3. Semantic content and conventions of use
Farkas and Roelofsen (2017) suggest a framework that allows that seman-
tic content and conventional discourse eﬀects divide the labor when inter-
preting declaratives and polar interrogatives. Besides information-seeking
questions, they also look at some special questions such as rising declar-
atives, claiming that their framework can host all question types, biased
and neutral. It is argued here that we have reasons to accommodate RQs
and NWHCs in their system, and if so, some extensions are needed.
The authors claim that the diﬀerence in the interpretation of asser-
tions and polar interrogatives follows from their semantic diﬀerences while
the same convention of use is assigned to both. Marked utterance types,
for example rising declaratives, are also subject to some special discourse
eﬀects, which is due to how strongly the Speaker believes that the high-
lighted proposition (the sentence radical) is true. This they call the cre-
dence level, and it becomes important whenever special eﬀects arise, and
special eﬀects arise due to markedness.
(20) Division of labor principle (Farkas & Roelofsen 2017, 250)
a. The discourse eﬀects of unmarked forms should be fully determined by their
semantic content and the basic convention of use, Fb.
b. The discourse eﬀects of marked forms should always include the discourse eﬀects
that are dictated by their semantic content and the basic convention of use Fb. In
addition, they may include special discourse eﬀects connected to the particular
sentence type involved.
The authors characterize the basic discourse context in terms of the set
of discourse participants, the table, which is a stack of propositions that
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have been raised as issues but have not yet been accepted into the common
ground (Farkas & Bruce 2010), and the set of commitments, which maps
discourse participants to the set of propositions that cover all their public
beliefs (to their commitment set, see Stalnaker (1978)).
Farkas and Roelofsen characterize the semantics of declaratives and
interrogatives in terms of clause type markers. The presence of the clause
type markers DEC or INT are signaled in English by word order, and the
clause type markers CLOSED and OPEN are signaled by falling and ris-
ing intonation, respectively. The two kinds of markers together determine
whether the sentence is inquisitive or not (Ciardelli et al. 2013). The sen-
tence radical is the argument of the DEC/INT marker, and the resulting
expression then combines with the CLOSED/OPEN marker, which can have
a further eﬀect on its inquisitiveness.
(21) Clause type markers
a.(22) JDECK = P:!P
b. JINTK = P:h?i
c. JCLOSEDK = P:P
d. JOPENK = P:?P
In the case of an assertion, the clause type marker DEC makes any sen-
tence radical non-inquisitive (marked by !), and if it is also CLOSED, the
utterance ends up non-inquisitive, that is, it is informative and does not
need further information to be completed. On the other hand, polar in-
terrogatives expressing an information-seeking question are typed INT and
OPEN, marked by ?. Marked sentence types typically have both ! and ?, as
it is exempliﬁed by the case of rising declaratives.
(23) Clause type markers in rising declaratives
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Since in this case a declarative combines with OPEN, both the highlighted
alternative P and its complement are added to the table, and the sentence
becomes inquisitive. A proposition is equivalent to a set of worlds: adding
the proposition together with its complement results in adding the whole
set of worlds W to the table, which is not an informative move.
The second interpretational component is determined by the conven-
tion of use.
(24) Basic convention of use
If a discourse participant x utters a declarative or interrogative sentence , the dis-
course context is aﬀected as follows:
a. The proposition expressed by , [], is added to the table.
b. The informative content of , S[], is added to the commitments(x).
In case of an assertion,  equals to a proposition, but in case of a polar
interrogative,  stands for both the highlighted alternative and its comple-
ment, as shown in (25). Thus, in the latter case, the entire set of worlds W
is added to commitments(x), as it becomes an inquisitive proposition,
resulting in a trivial commitment, requiring an answer.
(25) Conventional discourse eﬀects of participant x uttering a polar interrogative express-
ing the proposition {, }:
a. {, } is added to the table
b. W is added to the commitments(x). (Farkas & Roelofsen 2017, 267)
In case of a genuine question, the answer is supposed to reduce the set
of worlds in commitments(x). But in marked sentences, some special
discourse eﬀects may arise. Between any two forms that have the same
semantic content, the one that is formally more complex, and therefore
“less likely to ensure communicative success” is considered marked (ibid.,
263). Assuming that both segmental and suprasegmental material counts
as ‘form’, biased questions are all marked, as expected. Tag interrogatives
are longer than polar interrogatives without a tag, and rising declaratives,
RQs and NWHCs are marked because of their intonation. And NWHCs,
in addition, also have peculiar syntactic properties that in their genuine
counterparts would cause ungrammaticality.
Marked sentences are subject to the same basic convention as un-
marked ones, but in addition, they carry some extra information that is
signaled by their non-minimal form. The extra information, according to
Farkas and Roelofsen, concerns the level of credence the Speaker has in
the truth of the highlighted proposition. In characterizing the discourse
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context, the authors make use of a set they called evidence(x), which
stands for the set of propositions such that speaker x has access to evi-
dence to believe them (evidenced possibilities as Farkas and Roelofsen call
it). The Speaker, in addition to signalling that she has evidence to the
truth of the highlighted proposition, also signals the level of conﬁdence
she has in the truth of it. She can have high credence, as in the case of
uttering an assertion, or low credence, when uttering a rising declarative,
or in yet other cases, moderate or zero credence. The set evidence is thus
made up of ordered pairs hp; ii such that p is a proposition the Speaker
has evidence to believe and i is an interval of credence levels. In the case
of a rising declarative, the special eﬀect equals to a low level of credence
on the part of the Speaker.
(26) Special conventional discourse eﬀects of a rising declarative:
When a discourse participant x utters a rising declarative , expressing the proposi-
tion []= {, }, the discourse context is aﬀected as follows:
1. Basic eﬀects: as in (25)
2. Special eﬀect: h; [zero; low]i is added to evidence(x).
(Farkas & Roelofsen 2017, 269)
Farkas and Roelofsen’s system thus determines whether a sentence is in-
quisitive or not by using clause type markers. These sentences are then
subject to the same basic convention, namely that the inquisitive or non-
inquisitive expression is added to the table and the corresponding set of
worlds is added to the set of commitments. Thirdly, if the sentence is
marked, some special eﬀects are postulated, which share one character-
istic: they all say something about the level of the Speaker’s conﬁdence
in the truth of the highlighted proposition. However, the authors admit
that special eﬀects are assigned to each sentence form individually, but
not according to a principle.
3.1. PRQs and the NWHC in Farkas and Roelofsen’s system
Farkas and Roelofsen do not consider the case of RQs or NWHCs. They
mention that RQs are used to underline some proposition already present
in the common ground, but this property of them belongs to pragmatics.
However, both RQs and NWHCs are marked utterances based on the au-
thor’s measures, because of the mismatch between their form (an interrog-
ative) and what they convey (an assertion), which makes them “more prone
to misinterpretation”. Intonation also alters the form so that it becomes
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more marked, as RQs are more likely to have a sentence-ﬁnal falling into-
nation (Banuazizi & Creswell 1999), and NWHCs have a similar tendency.
There are some other good reasons to treat PRQs and NWHCs in the
same system, as they both have sentence radicals that are full propositions.
This is obvious for PRQs, but less so for NWHCs. In section 1.1, it was
shown that the wh-expression cannot stand for a constituent that comes
from the clause, thus NWHCs are made up of a wh-phrase independent
of the clause (a fact also observed by Cheung (2009)), and a proposition-
denoting sentence radical.
Also, these sentence radicals pass the tests of highlighted propositions
suggested by Farkas and Roelofsen, namely they can serve as antecedents
for anaphoric expressions. Such tests include expressions like yes, no, if
so and otherwise. Just as the sentence radicals of genuine polar questions,
rising declaratives, and tag questions can be referred to by such expres-
sions, as shown in (27), so can the sentence radicals of NWHCs (28b) and
PRQs (29c), too, setting them apart from wh-interrogatives, whether they
are genuine or rhetorical (28a).
a.(27) János vegetáriánus? (genuine)
John vegetarian
‘Is John a vegetarian?’
b. János/n vegetáriánus/n? (rising declarative)2
‘John’s a vegetarian?’
c. János vegetáriánus, (vagy) nem? (reverse polarity tag question)
John vegetarian or no
‘John is a vegetarian, isn’t he?’
d. Igen./Így van.
yes/so is
a.(28) A: János mióta vegetáriánus? (genuine)
John since.when vegetarian?
‘Since when is John a vegetarian?’
B: #Igen./#Így van.
yes/so is
2 Hungarian polar questions with multiple rise-fall (indicated by Kálmán 2001 as /n)
and English rising declaratives do not have the exact same distribution, although
there is an overlap, see Gyuris (2019).
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b. János mióta vegetáriánus? Ha így lenne, halat se ehetne. (NWHC)
John since.when vegetarian if so were ﬁsh either could.eat
‘Since whén is John a vegetarian? If it were the case, he couldn’t eat ﬁsh either.’
c. János talán vegetáriánus? Mert ha nem így van,
John perhaps vegetarian because if not so is
akkor ne prédikáljon állatkínzásról. (PRQ)
then not preach.SUBJ about.cruelty.to.animals
‘Is John a vegetarian? Because if not, he should not preach about cruelty to
animals.’
The same contrast is shown in English with (29): let alone genuine wh-in-
terrogatives, all other question types under discussion have highlighted
propositions that it can refer back to.
a.(29) A: Is John a vegetarian? (genuine)
B: I don’t believe it.
b. A: John’s a vegetarian? (rising declarative)
B: I don’t believe it.
c. A: John is a vegetarian, isn’t he? (reverse polarity tag question)
B: I don’t believe it.
d. A: Since when is John a vegetarian? (genuine)
B: #I don’t believe it.
e. A: Since whén is John a vegetarian? (NWHC)
B: I don’t believe it either.
f. A: Is John a vegetarian? (PRQ)
B: I don’t believe it either.
Given that the PRQs and NWHCs seem to contribute highlighted proposi-
tions to the discourse just like assertions, polar interrogatives, rising declar-
atives and tag questions, there is reason to accommodate them in the same
framework.
If INT contributes inquisitiveness and CLOSED encodes falling into-
nation, a PRQ or a NWHC should then have the following clause type
markers:
(30) Clause type markers of PRQs and NWHCs
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In the case of a PRQ, the argument of INT is a proposition, which needs INT
to become inquisitive. Since CLOSED is semantically vacuous (see (22c)),
the result is an inquisitive expression, as expected. The interpretation is
shown in (31b).
a.(31) (Come on,) Is John a vegetarian?
b. JINT John is a vegetarianK = {{John is a vegetarian}, {John is not a vegetarian}}
The conventional discourse eﬀects of a PRQ suggesting a negative answer
are the same as with a genuine polar question. But because of its marked-
ness, it is expected to have special eﬀects. If the highlighted alternative is
the sentence radical, the special eﬀect should be a strong disbelief in it,
given its typically falling ﬁnal tune. This, according to Farkas and Roelof-
sen (2017, 256), is captured by a zero credence level, which can mean that
the Speaker is unbiased or that she is against the truth of the highlighted
proposition.
(32) Special conventional discourse eﬀects of a Polar Rhetorical Question awaiting a neg-
ative answer (ﬁrst version):
Basic eﬀects:
a. {, } is added to the table
b. W is added to the commitments(x).
Special eﬀect: h; [zero]i is added to evidence(x).
The problem that arises here is that the basic and special conventional
discourse eﬀects of a PRQ awaiting a negative answer is not any diﬀer-
ent from a genuine polar question. Since in the case of a PRQ awaiting
a negative answer, the Speaker believes the opposite of the highlighted
proposition, saying that she has a zero credence level is not enough. It is
suggested that the label contrary be used in this case, and let zero be saved
for unbiased questions.
(33) Distinguishing genuine and biased polar questions by their special eﬀects
(ﬁnal version):
a. Special eﬀect of a genuine polar question:
hJohn is a vegetarian; [zero]i is added to evidence(x).
b. Special eﬀect of a PRQ with a negative answer:
hJohn is a vegetarian; [contrary]i is added to evidence(x).
Now, the case of NWHCs is peculiar and it is well possible that they cannot
be accommodated in Farkas and Roelofsen’s system at all. In what follows,
we give a ﬁrst look at the possibilities we have.
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A genuine wh-interrogative is expected to put a Hamblin-set on the
table.
a.(34) Since when is John a vegetarian? (genuine question)
b. JINT John is a vegetarian since t 2 TIMESK = {{w: John is a vegetarian since t1 2
TIMES}, {w: John is a vegetarian since t2 2 TIMES}, …, {w: John is a vegetarian
since tn 2 TIMES}}
Recall that NWHCs diﬀer from ordinary wh-interrogatives because they
have sentence radicals denoting full propositions unlike genuine wh-inter-
rogatives which have question radicals (Krifka 2017); and because they con-
tribute a highlighted proposition, unlike genuine wh-interrogatives. Also,
the wh-phrase in a NWHC does not range over entities it is canonically
associated with, e.g. since when in (1B) does not range over times (Cheung
2008; 2009), which is corroborated by the fact that the segmental material
of wh-phrases in NWHCs is slightly altered in some languages. If (34a) is
pronounced as a NWHC, we cannot use the variable t standing for time-
points to create the partition on W, because the wh-phrase is no longer
associated with its canonical domain, as it was shown in (7), and the same
applies to NWHCs containing other wh-phrases.
Otherwise, we can say that the highlighted proposition is the sentence
radical of the NWHC and put it on the table along with its complement
generated by INT, as a result of which we get the following basic conven-
tional discourse eﬀects:
(35) Basic conventional discourse eﬀects of a Negative Wh-Construction (provisional):
a. {, } is added to the table
b. W is added to the commitments(x).
But (35) is not a fortunate representation either, because we represent a
wh-interrogative (though not a canonical one) the same way we represent
a polar interrogative. Until a better way of representing the conventional
discourse eﬀects of NWHCs is found, we let (35) be the provisional repre-
sentation.
3.2. Special effects
As for the special eﬀects of NWHCs, the Speaker is expected to believe
that the highlighted proposition is false, that is, she will be assigned the
credence level contrary, as in the case of PRQs awaiting a negative answer.
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(36) Special eﬀect of a NWHC: h; [contrary]i is added to evidence(x).
If PRQs awaiting a negative answer and NWHCs have the same basic and
special conventional discourse eﬀects, cf. (32), (33), (35) and (36), then
they need to be further distinguished. It was suggested in section 2 that
RQs awaiting a negative answer and NWHCs both share the property that
their Speaker disagrees with some proposition p, possibly conveyed by the
latest move, which is also the sentence radical of the sentence. It was also
shown that NWHCs are not RQs, because the Speaker attributes diﬀerent
beliefs to her Addressee in both cases. Namely, in the case of RQs, the
Speaker believes and/or conveys that her Addressee has (or should have)
the same belief on the truth of p, while in the case of NWHCs, the Speaker
and Addressee have opposing beliefs. If so, a more adequate description
of special eﬀects would be one that includes an extra slot for the belief
attributed to the Addressee. NWHCs, PRQs and Rising Declaratives would
then be described as follows:
a.(37) Special eﬀect of a NWHC: hSh; contraryi; Ah; highii
b. Special eﬀect of a PRQ suggesting a negative answer:
hSh; contraryi; Ah; contraryii
c. Special eﬀect of a rising declarative hSh; [zero; low]i; Ah; highii
Although representing both the Speaker’s belief and the belief attributed
by the Speaker to the Addressee is more costly, as it complicates the repre-
sentation, there seems to be no other way to capture the diﬀerence between
NWHCs and PRQs with a negative answer, at least given the premises this
paper builds on.
There are various views in the literature on how it comes about that
RQs convey their speakers’ bias: it has been attributed to semantics (Han
2002) and to pragmatics (Caponigro & Sprouse 2007). As for NWHCs,
Cheung argues that the special eﬀect described here, which he called the
Conﬂicting View Condition, is a conventional implicature.3 His claim is
not inconsistent with the arguments of this paper. What we stated here
is that PRQs and NWHCs, being marked utterances, have a highlighted
proposition, based on the division of labor principle in (20), therefore they
must have special eﬀects. These special eﬀects are present by virtue of the
marked form, which means they are encoded, and being encoded is one
of the tests Potts (2015) uses to tell conventional implicatures from other
3 At least he has shown that the Conﬂicting View Condition associated with NWHCs
is not at-issue and not cancellable either.
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kinds of meaning. There are other tests though, and it is outside the scope
of this paper to determine where these special eﬀects belong, although it
is not a minor issue.
Farkas and Roelofsen (2017, 272) suggest that intonation and credence
levels show a connection in marked sentence forms. The generalization
they make is the following: the lower the credence level in the highlighted
alternative, the less likely the utterance ends with a falling tune; and the
higher the credence level, the less likely the utterance involves a ﬁnal rise.
If NWHCs have the special discourse eﬀect shown in (36), in favor of which
some supporting facts have been shown, this generalization does not hold.
In (1B), because of the falling ﬁnal tune, the Speaker should strongly
believe the truth of the sentence radical ‘John is a vegetarian’, which is
just the opposite of how it actually is. Thus, as a next step, this prediction
should be modiﬁed to possibly accommodate the belief attributed by the
Speaker to the Addressee as well.
Lastly, a remark should be made about the status of RQs. What was
considered here as special eﬀect, Farkas and Roelofsen considers prag-
matics. Undoubtedly, not all PRQs are marked the way suggested here.
Banuazizi and Creswell (1999) observed a tendency for RQs to have a
sentence-ﬁnal falling intonation, but by no means is this always the case
for (English) PRQs. What is more, as Farkas and Roelofsen claim, genuine
polar interrogatives can have a sentence-ﬁnal fall, too. If so, it raises the
question of how marked RQs are at all, and in what ways.
4. Conclusion
This short paper has presented some arguments for the importance of
belief-constellations, that is, for representing a more elaborate picture of
the Speaker’s own beliefs and those attributed to others. The advantage
of doing so is seen in a commitment-based account such as the one of
Farkas & Roelofsen (2017), that aims to host sentences having a highlighted
alternative. PRQs with a negative answer and NWHCs both have such
alternatives, so there is reason to consider their place in such a model.
Fitting them into Farkas and Roelofsen’s account raises questions; to some
of them, the paper suggested an answer.
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ABSTRACT
A purpose of this study was to test the Helsinki Finite-State Transducer
(HFST) technology tools, including its hfst-twolc compiler, the use of
weighted finite-state transducers, to use the HFST tools out of Python
scripts, and to use them together for comparing two related language
forms. A strict procedure was followed in constructing, testing and re-
vising two-level rules which relate written Modern Standard Finnish and
Old Literary Finnish as used in the 17th century Bible. In particular,
the advantages of the strict independence of the two-level rules were
utilised. No practical production system was planned, but the results
could be quite useful for indexing and concordancing similar Old Literary
Finnish texts.
1. Corpus
A corpus of readily available old Finnish texts was needed for the study,
more speciﬁcally texts whose language was suﬃciently diﬀerent from Mod-
ern Standard Finnish (MSF), but where the variation within the cor-
pus was reasonable. The Finnish language used between the years 1540
and 1820 which is called Old Literary Finnish (OLF, in Finnish vanha
kirjasuomi) is suﬃciently distinct from MSF for the purposes of this
study. Morphological analysers for MSF cannot be used as such for any
OLF texts. The diﬀerences are greater the further one goes back in time.
The Finnish translation of the Bible from 1642 (often called Biblia)
seemed suitable for the purposes of this project. Its language is homoge-
nous enough and the text of Biblia is available as a digital text from the
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Kaino1 service of The Centre for Languages in Finland (Kotus). The whole
translation consists of some 900,000 word tokens. For the present study,
the fourth part of the Old Testament (VT-4, some 20,000 word tokens)
and the ﬁrst part from the New Testament (UT-1, some 12,000 word to-
kens) were selected and used together as our corpus.2 A smaller corpus
could have been suﬃcient for the design of the rules, but one needed a fair
amount of text in order to extract a list of common word forms.
The material chosen was fairly but not fully homogeneous. Ortho-
graphic conventions used in the corpus were reasonably consistent, al-
though they represent signiﬁcantly more variation than what one ﬁnds in
MSF texts. Some older materials might have been harder to handle, and
some more recent materials might have been easier but less interesting to
process.
An extract of the 1642 translation of the Bible (B1-Jes-3:11–3:12),
along with its modern translation3 (1992), is given in Table 1 with some
notes on the structural diﬀerences between them.
Table 1: A small extract of Biblia 1642 and the same passage in modern transla-
tion
OLF MSF Note
Mutta woi jumalattomita: Voi jumalatonta! missing word
sillä he owat pahat Hänen käy huonosti, PL vs. SG, diﬀerent
verb and construction
ja heille maxetan hänelle tehdään diﬀerent verb
nijncuin he ansaidzewat. niin kuin hän itse teki. diﬀerent construction
Lapset owat minun Canssani
waiwajat
Kansani valtiaat ovat lapsia, diﬀerent
ja waimot wallidzewat heitä. ja naiset hallitsevat sitä. diﬀerent verb
Minun Canssani Kansani,
sinun lohduttajas
häiridzewät sinun
sinun opastajasi vievät sinut
harhaan,
diﬀerent verb and case
ja turmelewat tien jota si-
nun käymän pidäis.
he ovat hämmentäneet askel-
tesi suunnan.
diﬀerent verb construc-
tion
1 http://kaino.kotus.ﬁ/
2 The parts VT-4 and UT-1 refer to the ﬁles available in the Kaino service.
3 http://www.evl.ﬁ/raamattu/1992/Jes.3.html
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There are many kinds of diﬀerences between the translations. Some reﬂect
orthographic conventions which have changed meanwhile, such as using
w instead of v and sometimes a single letter a instead of a double aa
for a long vowel. OLF of those days had more features from the western
dialects than MSF. The language itself has also changed meanwhile and
continues to change. The changes are both phonological and morphological:
the OLF texts often omit word ﬁnal letters. The use of ending allomorphs
was then quite diﬀerent and has changed signiﬁcantly even during the last
ﬁfty years, as one can see by comparing Nykysuomen sanakirja (Sadeniemi
1951–1961) and Kielitoimiston sanakirja (Grönros & Kotimaisten kielten
tutkimuskeskus 2006).
One can also ﬁnd some words in the corpus that are not used in the
MSF, and some familiar words are used in another sense. The present study
did not try to solve such problems which concern the vocabulary and the
lexicon. In this study, only phonological, morphophonological and to some
extent the allomorphic diﬀerences are addressed.
2. Representative example words
It is obvious from the above examples that one cannot align the Biblia 1642
with the modern translation word by word directly, because the transla-
tions are so far apart from each other. Instead of statistical word alignment
and large sets of words, we use a fairly small set of carefully chosen good
quality examples.
We started from the list of all word forms which occurred at least six
times in the corpus. The list was browsed and some 180 example words
were picked. The words were chosen so that there were a few examples
from each type of systematic diﬀerences between OLF and MSF written
forms of the Finnish language. Figure 1 (overleaf) shows a fragment of the
word forms.
It was important that the list of example words would cover all com-
mon systematic diﬀerences between the MSF and the OLF forms, including
orthographic and morphophonological ones.
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caupungihin
caupungijn
corwes
cuckoi
cuolemaan
cuoleman
cuolluitten
cuulitta
cuulcan
kärsimän
Figure 1: Some of the selected example words from the corpus
3. Example word pairs
The next step was to associate each of these OLF word forms with its likely
MSF counterparts. The possible MSF forms corresponding to each OLF
form were addded, see Figure 2. If the OLF word form could correspond
to several MSF word forms, the OLF form was repeated, see cuoleman
and kärsimän below. The relation between the OLF forms and the MSF
forms is inherently many-to-many, i.e., one modern form may correspond
to several diﬀerent old forms, and an old form may correspond to several
distinct modern forms. Rules must permit some variation but still constrain
the possibilities to a minimum.
kaupunkiin:caupungihin
kaupunkiin:caupungijn
korvessa:corwes
kukko:cuckoi
kuolemaan:cuolemaan
kuoleman:cuoleman
kuolemaan:cuoleman
kuolleitten:cuolluitten
kuulitte:cuulitta
kuulkoon:cuulcan
kärsimän:kärsimän
kärsimään:kärsimän
Figure 2: The selected OLF example word forms with their corresponding forms
in MSF. The MSF form is to the left of the colon and the OLF form
to the right.
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4. Character by character alignment
The above example word pairs are not usable for our purposes as such,
because the OLF and the MSF word forms are sometimes of diﬀerent
length. The OLF form often omits a ﬁnal vowel, reduces long vowels into
short ones and shortens geminate consonants, but sometimes geminates a
consonant or adds a vowel etc.
Therefore, we must add some zero symbols as necessary so that the
similar letters correspond to each other, ﬁrst letter in the MSF word to
the ﬁrst letter in the OLF word etc. If the MSF word is longer than the
OLF word, one must add one or more zeros to the old word in order to
make the letters correspond to each other. Correspondingly, if the modern
word is shorter, the zeros have to be added in it. The goal is that the
letters in all corresponding positions would become similar. Zeros are added
as necessary, but sparingly, e.g., as in kärsimään:kärsimäØn ‘to suﬀer’.
It must be stressed that a real character is used as a zero instead of
an epsilon, an empty string or its representation 0 in the XFST regular
expression language. For practical reasons, the Danish Ø was chosen as the
zero symbol in rules and examples consistently in this article.4
The exact positions of the inserted zeros are as important as is the
selection of the examples. The positions of the zeros determine what kinds
of character correspondences we have. One must describe each correspon-
dence with a rule, so the grammar may change a lot by changing the po-
sitions of the zeros a bit. In particular, any poorly positioned zero would
force us to write more rules, and possibly very inadequate rules. The proper
alignment also aﬀects how well the grammar can apply to the rest of the
corpus.
Letters representing similar (or identical) sounds ought to be matched
with each other. Matching very diﬀerent ones, e.g., consonants with vowels,
must be avoided.
The initial insertion of the zeros was made manually using one’s lin-
guistic intuition as a guideline. Once the zeros were in place, we converted
the pairs of words into sequences of pairs5 of letter pairs as shown in
Figure 3 where pairs with identical letters are printed as a single letter
and pairs of corresponding non-identical letters are separated by a colon.
4 Many ﬁnite-state tools interpret the digit 0 as a null string or epsilon. Often all traces
of such a null string are lost in ﬁnite-state operations. In the two-level framework,
this is not desired, and it is safer to delete the zero symbols Ø explicitly when desired.
5 The conversion was done simply by:
hfst-strings2fst -i new-old-words.text |
hfst-fst2strings -X print-space -X print-pairs -o new-old-pairs.text
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k:c a u p u n k:g i Ø:h i n
k:c a u p u n k:g i i:j n
k:c o r v:w e s:Ø s a:Ø
k:c u k:c k o Ø:i
k:c u o l e m a a n
k:c u o l e m a:Ø a n
k:c u o l e m a n
k:c u o l l e:u i t t e n
k:c u u l k:c o:Ø o:a n
k:c u u l i t t e:a
k ä r s i m ä n
k ä r s i m ä:Ø ä n
Figure 3: Some example words with zeros added and aligned letter by letter and
shown as a sequence of letter pairs
Once we have the aligned pairs, we compute a list of diﬀerent pairs and
their frequencies as in Figure 4. The pairs end up as the declaration of the
alphabet in the two-level rule grammar. The frequencies guide the author-
ing of rules and can be directly used for weighting alternative analyses.
158 a 2 e:ö 5 j:Ø 130 n 84 s 60 u 5 ö
39 a:Ø 22 e:Ø 23 k 61 o 2 s:n 4 u:Ø 1 Ø:d
1 b 2 f:p 53 k:c 2 o:a 16 s:z 1 v 1 Ø:e
9 d 3 g 12 k:g 7 o:Ø 16 s:Ø 1 v:f 3 Ø:g
97 e 26 h 6 k:x 30 p 102 t 2 v:g 4 Ø:h
3 e:a 122 i 54 l 5 p:b 29 t:d 34 v:w 1 Ø:i
3 e:i 4 i:j 1 l:Ø 1 p:w 1 t:l 17 y 1 Ø:n
1 e:u 12 i:Ø 36 m 1 p:Ø 1 t:r 1 y:Ø 1 Ø:s
1 e:ä 6 j 3 m:Ø 30 r 1 t:Ø 44 ä 4 Ø:t
22 ä:Ø
Figure 4: Frequencies of the letter pairs found in the aligned example words
5. Automatic alignment
One may add further examples at the later stages of the research. One
may also want to remove some examples, if they turn out not to represent
any general patterns. To facilitate the maintenance of the collection of
examples, an automatic character by character alignment was constructed,
see also Koskenniemi (2017). Such an automatic procedure for character
by character alignment is expected to be useful for other purposes, as
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well, including computational historical linguistics where it can be used in
relating cognate words, cf. Koskenniemi (2013a).
The International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) presents a general taxon-
omy for vowels and another for consonants, both based on the articulatory
features of sounds. This taxonomy and the features can be utilised in com-
puting approximate distances between sounds. Alphabetic scripts of MSF
and OLF can be characterised quite well using the articulatory features of
the IPA. For our purposes, only a subset of all features permitted by the
IPA is needed.
A short Python script (see Appendix 4) was written for building a
weighted ﬁnite-state transducer (WFST) out of the IPA features for the
letters. For two-valued features, and for the tongue height of vowels and
for the place of articulation of consonants, an ad hoc numeric value was
assigned to each position.6 The distances were computed by adding the
absolute values of the diﬀerences in each feature. Insertions and deletions
of letters were all given a constant fairly long distance. In addition to
these systematically computed distances, some individual distances were
set. These were needed e.g., in order to guarantee a unique treatment of
the shortening of double vowels or consonants. Otherwise one could delete
either of the two, and there would be no diﬀerence in the overall sum of
distances. Thus, a few extra items were added in the distance calculation so
that it is always the latter letter of the two that is deleted if any (e.g., a a:Ø
rather than a:Ø a). Ambiguities caused by the orthographic conventions,
e.g., between k:x s:Ø and k:Ø s:x and gemination (adding a second
identical consonant after instead of before the existing one) were resolved
in a similar manner.
A Python script was written, see Figure 5 (overleaf), to implement the
actual alignment. The script uses the WFST for distances that was created
as discussed above. The script reads an example word pair (w1, w2) at a
time, converts the MSF word w1 into a FST and inserts zero symbols Ø
freely to it. The same is done for the OLF word w2. Then, w1 is composed
with the alignment WFST align and w2: w1/Ø .o. align .o. w2/Ø.
Out of the many possible string pairs that the resulting WFST rep-
resents, only the one with the smallest weight is taken and printed. When
testing the alignment procedure, one can assess the relative success of each
aligned pair of words. Each pair of words gets a score as the sum of all
6 The actual process of aligning appears not to be sensitive to the choice of the distances
among vowels and among consonants as long as consonants and vowels are not allowed
to correspond to each other (with the exception of semivowels). It would worth while
to ﬁnd well motivated distance measures, maybe using data from historical linguistics.
K + K = 120 / p. 322 / May 3, 2019
322 Kimmo Koskenniemi – Pirkko Kuutti
import sys, io, fileinput
import libhfst
tok = libhfst.HfstTokenizer()
algfile = libhfst.HfstInputStream("chardist.fst")
align = algfile.read()
for line in sys.stdin:
(f1,f2) = line.strip().split(sep=":")
w1 = libhfst.fst(f1).insert_freely(("Ø","Ø")).minimize()
w2 = libhfst.fst(f2).insert_freely(("Ø","Ø")).minimize()
w1.compose(align).compose(w2)
res = w1.n_best(1).minimize()
paths = res.extract_paths(output='text')
print(paths.strip())
Figure 5: Python script for aligning words letter by letter
character pair correspondence weights. Very high total weights indicate un-
typical pairs of characters which may sometimes be an error in the example
word pair.
All ﬁnite-state functions that were needed for the script were available
in the HFST-Python integration. This particular operation appears to be
clumsy to perform using the standalone programs or XFST or Foma.7
6. Writing the two-level rules
For a more detailed description of two-level rules see Beesley & Karttunen
(2003) and Karttunen et al. (1987). For the method of ﬁnding contexts
for rules, see Koskenniemi (2013b). The rules to be written in this project
have a common alphabet which consists of the letter pairs shown above
in Figure 4. We have to write a two-level rule for each non-identical pair
(unless there is just one alternative, or if we let all alternatives be allowed
anywhere). The rules may be written in any order one ﬁnds convenient.
Let us start with the pair e:a. Gnu Emacs was used for editing of test
examples, rules and all other ﬁles. The Emacs command Occurs was thus
available and used for extracting the right kind of information from the
examples in letter pair format as in Figure 6.
These OLF word forms sound like some dialectal forms found even
today. It was deduced that the correspondence e:a was restricted to two
7 One can do it using the HFST command line programs by converting ﬁrst the MSF
words into a sequence of FSTs by hfst-strings2fst, the same for OLF words, and then
composing the sequences element by element with the alignment FST.
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3 matches for "e:a" in buffer: new-old-pairs.text
71: k:c u u l i t t e:a
141: t u l e t t e:a
142: t u l i m m e:a
Figure 6: Occurrences of e:a in the examples
personal plural endings in verbs. Any other MSF word forms ending in e
do not have OLF forms with a instead. Any letters e inside the MSF words
are likewise unaﬀected by this alternation. This rule has no access to the
grammatical features, it relies on patterns consisting of letters. Thus, the
following rule in Figure 7 was written.
"e:a" e:a => [t t | m m] _ .#. ;
! k:c u u l i t t e:a
! t u l i m m e:a
Figure 7: Two-level rule which restricts the positions where MSF e may corre-
spond to a in OLF
By convention, the examples based on which the rule was designed,
were always included as comments to the rule. According to the conven-
tions of the two-level rules, see Karttunen et al. (1987), this rule says that
the pair e:a may occur only if preceded by tt or mm and is at the end of
a word. Only the context restriction (=>) is used, not the double arrow8,
because there are some words where the stem ends similarly, e.g., lumme
or amme where the ﬁnal vowel does not change. Even the best and most
obvious rules are bound to be ambiguous as long as one only has the sur-
face representations available without any morphological or grammatical
knowledge.
One can test the ﬁrst rule right away after it has been written, as
will be explained in the next section. Experienced two-level grammar writ-
ers often design a few rules before they test them. So, let us study an-
other letter pair s:Ø before we proceed to testing, see Figure 8 (overleaf).
It is easy to see two patterns here. A double ss in MSF is reduced
to a single s in OLF and ks in MSF words is represented as xØ in OLF.
Thus, we need a rule with two context parts as in Figure 9 (overleaf).
Each rule is then compiled into a FST using the two-level com-
piler hfst-twolc. All rules together form the two-level grammar which
8 A double arrow <=> rule would require that the change is obligatory in the given
context.
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16 matches for "s:Ø" in buffer: new-old-pairs.text
14: e d e s s:Ø ä
25: h a a:Ø h d e s s:Ø a:Ø
26: h a a k:x s:Ø i
31: h e n g e s s:Ø ä:Ø
37: h y v:w ä k:x s:Ø i
52: k:c a n s s:Ø a n s a:Ø
60: k:c o r v:w e s s:Ø a:Ø
80: m u r h e e:Ø l l i s e k:x s:Ø i
83: n i i:j s s:Ø ä
119: s e a s s:Ø a:Ø
126: s y d ä m e s s:Ø ä n s ä:Ø
127: s y n a g o g a s s:Ø a:Ø
129: t a p p a a:Ø k:x s:Ø e n s a:Ø
150: u n e s s:Ø a:Ø
160: v:w a p a a:Ø k:x s:Ø i
172: y k:x s:Ø i n ä n s ä:Ø
Figure 8: Occurrences of s:Ø in the examples
"s:Ø" s:Ø => s _ ;
! e d e s s:Ø ä
s e a s s:Ø a:Ø
:x _ ;
! h a a k:x s:Ø i
Figure 9: Two-level rule for restricting the deletion of s
is compiled into a sequence of such rule transducers. If one has forgot-
ten or mixed some punctuation in the rules when writing the grammar,
there will be error messages with a pointer to the probable location and
cause of the error. The grammar writer is expected to correct the error
and recompile.
7. Validating the rules against examples
There is a facility for testing two-level grammars. There is a special pro-
gram, hfst-pair-test which checks whether the grammar accepts all
examples given as sequences of letter pairs. The same Makefile which
compiles the rules, performs this check right away. The program reports
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any inconsistencies, e.g., character pairs occurring in other contexts than
those allowed by the rules or misaligned words resulting in character pairs
not allowed by the grammar.
Two familiar concepts from information retrieval are used here with
a speciﬁc interpretation. Recall means here the proportion of OLF words
that will get the correct MSF word among the results of the analysis (no
matter how many wrong alternatives were produced). Precision means here
the proportion of correct MSF results among all proposed results for a set
of OLF words, e.g., all word tokens in the corpus. Recall and precision can
equally well be used for the inverse relation, i.e., from the modern words
to the old words.
One ought to remember that the testing of pair string examples only
detects problems where the rules are too restrictive. Initially, before we
have any rules, all examples would pass the check. Using just a few rules,
one could retrieve all old forms for a modern form (as long as they par-
ticipate in those alternations that were present in the examples). But the
initial grammar has a very poor precision. A modern word corresponds
to very many (possibly inﬁnitely many) old words and vice versa. As we
write more rules in our two-level grammar, the recall can only decrease,
but every new rule improves the precision.
If one ﬁnds new types of regularities during the process, one ought
to add new word pairs to the examples. New letter pairs can then be
introduced, aligned and tested in the examples.
8. Standalone testing of the grammar
When one has rules for all letter pairs, the two-level grammar can be tested
in a new manner. One can now generate tentative OLF forms from the MSF
ones. One gets several results per each modern word. Using unweighted
rules, all results of such generation are equal. There is one trivial weighting
that can be used here to prioritise resulting words more likely: to use the
statistics we have from the example words as in Figure 4. A short Python
script is used for computing a WFST from the frequencies. Intersecting the
weighted transducer with intersected rule FST gives us a new rule WFST.
This one can be safely tested by inputting MSF words to it and selecting at
most N, say 20, best results. If the correct one is among the top results, the
rules seem to do the right thing. See the transcript in Figure 10 (overleaf)
where one can see what the grammar generates out of a few modern words.
The weighted rule transducer can be inverted and thereafter tested
in the same way. In the present project, the mapping from OLF to MSF
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$ hfst-strings2fst | hfst-compose -2 intro.fst | \
hfst-compose -2 new2old-one-w.fst |\
hfst-compose -2 delete.fst | hfst-project -p output | \
hfst-fst2strings -w -N 20
>>sija
sija 1.86035
sia 2.12402 +
>>sokeat
sokeat 3.84277
sokiat 8.85742 +
>>ruoskitte
ruoskitte 4.18848 +
ruoskitt 6.3291
ruoskitta 9.20312 +
ruoskite 10.8613
ruoskit 13.002
Figure 10: Testing how the plain rules generate tentative OLF word forms out of
MSF word forms. The MSF word form as input is marked with >> and
the correct results are marked with a plus sign (+).
words is expected to be more ambiguous than the other direction. Thus,
the weighting is useful in checking the production of candidate modern
forms. Figure 11 shows the 20 ﬁrst results generated from an old word
isäm ‘our father’ out of the total of 32 results.
For some other OLF words, there will be many more results, e.g.,
for cullainen ‘golden’, more than 300 results were produced. Even as
such, the mapping might be useful in indexing or searching a corpus. One
may easily produce a transducer oldwords which accepts exactly the word
forms in the corpus. Composing the mapping new2old used in Figure 10
with oldwords could be quite useful. One could build a search facility on
this basis which would use modern word forms as search keys and expand
it according to new2old and do the actual search using the existing OLF
words the mapping gives.
It would be impractical to use the above method in existing concor-
dance programs, as it would require the inclusion of all alternatives, even
the nonsense modern “word forms” in the index. However, nothing would
prevent us from using new2old in a front end processor to traditional con-
cordance programs such as Korp, described in e.g., Borin et al. (2012).
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$ hfst-strings2fst | hfst-compose -2 intro.fst | \
hfst-compose -2 old2new-one-w.fst | \
hfst-compose -2 delete.fst | hfst-project -p output | \
hfst-fst2strings -w -N 20
>>isäm
isäm 1.23633
isääm 2.94141
isäme 3.82129
issäm 4.31348
iisäm 4.84863
isääme 5.52637
issääm 6.01855
iisääm 6.55371
issäme 6.89844
isämme 7.40625 +
iisäme 7.43359
iissäm 7.92578
issääme 8.60352
isäämme 9.11133 +
iisääme 9.13867
iissääm 9.63086
issämme 10.4834
iissäme 10.5107
iisämme 11.0186
issäämme 12.1885
Figure 11: A test where we see the ﬁrst 20 results that the inverted rules generate
out of one OLF word isäm. The correct results are marked with a plus
(+).
9. Combining the grammar with OMORFI
As we noticed above, the rules are quite ambiguous when generating ten-
tative modern word forms from an OLF word form. We have a lot of can-
didates, among which the correct one is hidden. Most of the noise words
are non-words in MSF. Thus, it is a natural idea to ﬁlter the noisy output
of the rules using a spell-checker for MSF.
OMORFI is a ﬁnite-state morphological analyser which is open source
and freely available, cf. Pirinen (2015). It uses the same HFST tools, so
it was easy to combine it with other transducers used in this study. For
further information on the HFST morphological tools, see e.g., Lindén
et al. (2011). OMORFI is distributed both as source code and as binary
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FSTs.9 The source form consists of more than 300 ﬁles and appears fairly
complicated. More than a dozen Makeﬁles are needed for building the
FST that recognises Finnish word forms. Therefore, it was easier to use
the binary transducer which comes with the package even if there would
have been an obvious need to modify the lexicon and rules to better suit
the needs of this project.
The transducer finnish-analyze.fst takes a Finnish word form as
its input and outputs its analyses as a combination of a base form and the
morphosyntactic features characterising the grammatical form, e.g., as in
Figure 12.
$ hfst-strings2fst |\
hfst-compose -2 finnish-analysis.fst |\
hfst-fst2strings
>>kuutamoilta
kuutamoilta:kuutamo N Abl Pl
kuutamoilta:kuutamo#ilta N Nom Sg
Figure 12: Morphological analysis using plain OMORFI. Two outputs are gener-
ated from the input kuutamoilta which is either ‘from moonlights’ or
‘moonlight’ + ‘evening’. Note the word boundary in the second result.
The morphosyntactic features are not needed for the ﬁltering of the noise
words from the set of candidates that the rule transducer generates. Only
the input side of the transducer is needed for the selection of acceptable
word forms of MSF. One can simply drop the output part and keep the
input side of the analysis FST.10
The mapping all the way from OLF word forms into valid MSF word
forms is the composition of four transducers in a sequence, see Figure 13.
One may run these as a run-time pipeline using separate HFST programs
or one may compose them in advance for eﬃciency.
The combination of the steps in Figure 13 does roughly what was
expected. If we feed the OLF words in Figure 1 to it, each old word will be
expanded to several possible MSF word candidates, and the analyser will
then ﬁlter out all but those candidates that it considers acceptable MSF
word forms, as is seen in Figure 14.
9 The FSTs distributed were in a so called fast lookup form. One can convert them
back to the HFST standard form and then modify and manipulate them for the needs
of this project.
10 Projection is made using the command hfst-project -p input.
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OLF word form
#
intro.fst
#
OLF word form with zeros added in all possible ways
#
old2new.fst
#
candidates for MSF word forms with zeros
#
delete.fst
#
candidates cleaned of all zeros
#
finnish-analyze-surf.fst
#
valid MSF word form candidates
Figure 13: Producing MSF word form candidates out of OLF word forms
caupungihin [kaupunkihiin, kaupunkiin]
caupungijn [kaupunkiin, kaupunkiini]
corwes [korvessa]
cuckoi [kukko]
cuolemaan [kuolemaan, kuolemaani]
cuoleman [kuolemaan, kuolemaani, kuoleman, kuolemana,
kuolemani, kuolleemman]
cuolluitten [kuolleitten, kuolleitteni]
cuulcan [kuulkoon]
cuulitta [kuulitta, kuulitte]
kärsimän [kärsimän, kärsimäni, kärsimään, kärsimääni]
Figure 14: Analyses of some example words using the two-level grammar and
ﬁltering with OMORFI
It is to be noted that most of the modern word forms oﬀered by the se-
quence are quite acceptable. In particular, all correct interpretations that
we wanted are present. In addition to the desired results, there are some
artiﬁcial words. One of them is the very ﬁrst result kaupunkihiin ‘to
the city’ which looks odd. It turns out to be a compound of kaupunki
‘town’ and hiki ‘sweat’ which is a nonsense word. Another extra result is
K + K = 120 / p. 330 / May 3, 2019
330 Kimmo Koskenniemi – Pirkko Kuutti
kuulitta ‘you heard’, is also an odd compound of kuu ‘moon’ and litta
(a children’s play e.g., with a ball).
The number of compound boundaries in a word form would be useful
as a criterion for excluding less likely analyses. Unfortunately, when using
OMORFI, this information is only available when one reduces the word
forms all the way to their base forms. With some Python scripting and
processing, the knowledge about the number of compound boundaries can
be used at the right place. One ﬁrst produces a list of all pairs where
the ﬁrst component is the OLF word form and the second component is
the analyses OMORFI accepts from the many candidates that the rules
propose. The following pairs are in the long list:
aitais:aitaiisi
aitais:aitaisi
aitais:aitasi
aitais:aittaiisi
aitais:aittaisi
aitais:aittasi
The next step is to analyse the right parts again which were once al-
ready accepted by OMORFI, and we get a list containing entries like the
following:
aitaiisi:aita#iisi A Pos Nom Sg
aitaisi:aidata V Cond Act ConNeg
aitaisi:aidata V Cond Act Sg3
aitaisi:aita#isi N Nom Sg
aitasi:aidata V Pst Act Sg3
aitasi:aita N Gen Sg PxSg2
aitasi:aita N Nom Pl PxSg2
aitasi:aita N Nom Sg PxSg2
aittaiisi:aitta#iisi A Pos Nom Sg
aittaisi:aitta#isi N Nom Sg
aittaisi:aitta N Gen Pl PxSg2
From these pairs, we only use the number of word boundaries # in the stem
that is on the right. For each surface form we store the least number of
boundaries its base form analyses have. The ﬁrst one has only a compound
analysis, so it gets the count 1. The next, aitaisi ‘of your barn(s)’ or ‘of
your fence(s)’ has three analyses, two without boundaries and one with
one boundary, so it gets the count 0:
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aitaiisi 1
aitaisi 0
aitasi 0
aittaiisi 1
aittaisi 0
aittasi 0
Now one can return to the processing of the result pairs where the left
part is the OLF word and the right part is a word form proposed by the
rules and accepted by OMORFI. For each OLF word, we now have a list of
candidate MSF words. We can fairly safely drop some candidate MSF word
forms by using their compound boundary count as computed above. We
throw away all candidates which have more compound boundaries than the
one that has the least number of them. Thus, we start from the following
list of modern forms for the OLF word form aitais:
aitais 1 [aitaiisi, aitaisi, aitasi, aittaiisi, aittaisi, aittasi]
According to the counts we computed, the ﬁrst and the fourth have a
boundary count 1 and the rest has no boundaries. Thus, we drop the ﬁrst
and the fourth, and get the ﬁnal result which now contains only acceptable
words and no artiﬁcial constructions:
aitais 1 [aitaisi, aitasi, aittaisi, aittasi]
This processing sounds complicated,11 but it is motivated by the fact that
OMORFI produces a lot of extra analyses using its liberal compounding
mechanism. Anyway, the Python script which does the trick, is short, fast
and straightforward.
10. Reducing to the base forms
Normally, OMORFI reduces word forms to their base forms, and base
forms would be often even better for searching and indexing than the
word forms themselves. Thus, in parallel to the operations in the previous
section, the candidate MSF word forms were ﬁltered and reduced to their
base forms. This list had the same kinds of problems with the liberal
compounding of OMORFI as we saw in the previous section. The artiﬁcial
11 It would also be possible to handle the stem counts using WFSTs. One may convert
the list of MSF forms and compound part counts into a weighted transducer which
accepts the modern forms and use the weight as a criterion for exclusion.
K + K = 120 / p. 332 / May 3, 2019
332 Kimmo Koskenniemi – Pirkko Kuutti
compounds could be removed in the same way, in fact more easily as the
compound boundaries were present in the base forms directly. Before the
ﬁltering, the results for a base form alendamisest ‘from lowering’ looked
like the following:
alen#da#miss#eesti 'sale'+'da'+'miss'+'Estonian'
alen#da#miss#este'sale'+'da'+'miss'+'obstacle'
alentaa 'to lower'
alentaminen 'lowering'
alentamis#eesti 'lowering'+'Estonian'
alentamis#este 'lowering'+'obstacle'
alen#tamminen'sale'+'made of oak'
alen#tammis#eesti'sale'+'made of oak'+'Estonian'
alen#tammis#este 'sale'+'made of oak'+'obstacle'
Again, the ﬁltering program considers this set of candidate MSF base
forms. It ﬁnds two candidates with no compound boundaries and seven
with one or two boundaries. The program throws away those seven and
keeps the two. So the result for alendamisest becomes:
alentaa
alentaminen
11. Tuning the two-level rules
At this point the rules have been tested against the examples and they have
been used separately for some manually typed words in order to assess the
precision of the rules, i.e., how many unwanted analyses they produce. We
have tools for reducing OLF word forms into MSF word forms and also to
MSF base forms. Now one can see what the rules and OMORFI together
actually do to the masses of words of the Biblia 1642 corpus.
One can expect that some rules are too permissive. This will show
up as too many candidate MSF words. On the other hand, some rules
might have too narrow context conditions, which will be seen as some
OLF words left without the desired candidate words. It is also possible
that some regular phenomena were not present in the example words.
Then we have no applicable rules and many OLF words remain without
the desired candidate MSF words. In the two ﬁrst cases, we must consider
revising the two-level rules we have written. In the last case, we must select
further example word pairs and write yet another rule and test it.
In order to check what actually exists in the the Biblia 1642 corpus,
three ﬁles were used: the source text itself, an alphabetical list of distinct
OLF word forms in the corpus, and a list of reversed OLF word forms
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(sorted starting from the last character). Using the Gnu/Linux less and
egrep commands, one got quick answers to questions such as: “Are there
many other words similar to this one?” or “Is this really a form of the word
I think?”.
The tuning consumed more time than the writing of the initial two-
level grammar. It was also more demanding because one must check that
changes in rules do not have negative eﬀects, such as dropping some de-
sired candidate words which were previously correctly generated. For this
purpose, the changes in the rules were always checked by producing a sep-
arate new list and comparing it against a previous full list of analyses12. If
the diﬀerences were all for the better, then the new rules were accepted,
and the new lists taken as the new benchmark for the following changes.
Some of the new or lost analyses required checking from the corpus or the
lists of old words as mentioned above.
The tuning required partial knowledge of the language in the corpus
and was made by Kimmo Koskenniemi. An overall sense of present day
Finnish and some familiarity with Finnish dialects seemed to be suﬃcient
for ﬁnding generalisations and adequate context characterisations. Just one
OLF word form (käätyxi, ‘that has been turned’ could not be interpreted
by looking at the Biblia 1642 occurrences. One had to look it up in a more
recent Bible translation.
All changes of the rules were automatically checked against the collec-
tion of hand-selected example word pairs. Any discrepancies were immedi-
ately detected and the rule violating some word pair was identiﬁed. After
correcting the rule that failed, the rules were recompiled, retested and the
full lists were recomputed. A handful of new example words were included
in this process. The original and the new examples were used to test the
rules thereafter at every cycle.
There appears to be no clear limit how long one can tune a grammar.
After a certain level is reached the return of each cycle diminishes. Many
of the remaining shortcomings could be better solved if one could have a
diﬀerent morphological analyser for Finnish. In particular, one would like
to modify the compounding mechanism, make the derivational capacity
more productive, and use a morphophonemic representation for MSF as the
basis for rules. Then one would have access to many relevant conditions for
determining the forms of the OLF.13 Such a re-implementation of Finnish
12 The checking was done using the Gnu/Linux comm program.
13 OMORFI is open source and readily available for modiﬁcations. It was designed,
however, without morphophonemes or explicit indication for alternating phonemes.
OMORFI is very good for e.g., spell checking and even for generating inﬂected forms
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morphological analysis would be motivated also when applying two-level
methods to historical linguistics of Finno-Ugric languages, see Koskenniemi
(2013a).
A couple of cases occurred where a new letter pair and an entirely
new rule had to be established. That posed no major problem as long
as the main principles of letter alignment and correspondences remained
unchanged. With a few new example word pairs, there were no particular
problems.
A common question that arose was to decide whether the rejection
of MSF word forms was an error or a feature of OMORFI. The analyser
is committed to obey the guidelines for word inﬂection as described in
Kielitoimiston sanakirja14 (2006) which is also available as a net service.15
In most cases, a ﬁfty years earlier norm of MSF would have better suited
the needs of this project.
12. Evaluation of the mapping
The rules were developed using a set of example words. So the discussion
of the success and the shortcomings of the mappings cannot be estimated
by testing with the same words. One can assess how the mapping covers
the vocabulary of the corpus by taking a sample of the list of all distinct
word forms in the corpus, i.e., some 26,500 words. This list consist mostly
of infrequent words. Half of them are hapax legomena, i.e., occurring only
once. Less than 5,000 words occur more than ﬁve times in the corpus. Two
100 word samples were selected, one out of the full list of distinct word
forms and another from a list consisting of word forms occurring at least
six times in the corpus. Both samples were made out of the respective total
list by ﬁrst skipping some entries and then proceeding with even intervals
(the length of the list divided by 100). A third sample was made from the
running text.
12.1. Proper nouns and abbreviations
The Biblia 1642 corpus contains plenty of proper names, biblical and other.
Names of persons and places occur typically fairly few times and only
e.g., in machine translation. Modifying it for the present purposes would be as diﬃcult
as building a new analyser.
14 The dictionary of the Institute for the Languages of Finland.
15 http://www.kielitoimistonsanakirja.ﬁ/
K + K = 120 / p. 335 / May 3, 2019
Indexing old literary Finnish text 335
within a short passage of text. There are two kinds of problems concern-
ing them. Dictionaries lack most of them, so the ﬁltering could not work
properly. Most proper names are unlike normal Finnish words, and the or-
thography used in writing them diﬀered from that of normal OLF words.
Proper names are often written as in Swedish or German and not adjusted
to Finnish.
By mistake, some material, such as references to other parts of the
Bible remained in the corpus although the intention was to exclude them
all. This happened probably because such markings had more variable
forms than was expected. The abbreviations included in this way are not
valid OLF words and not a target of this study.
Thus, the proper nouns and abbreviations do occur in the samples,
but could be ignored in the results. Proper nouns, and many other words
were written with capital letters in Biblia 1642. In addition, capital letters
are found in the corpus in unusual positions, e.g., both as the ﬁrst and the
second letters. Precise normalisation of the corpus was not a goal of this
project, so nothing was done beyond forcing all text to lower case.
12.2. Words occurring more than five times
The result of testing a sample of 100 word forms from the list of word
forms occurring at least six times in the corpus is given in Appendix 1.
The following is a summary of the results with this sample:
– Eight biblical proper names or abbreviations were missed.16
– In addition, six OLF word forms were left without a proper anal-
ysis: an obsolete form käätyxi of the verb käännetyksi ‘turned’,
‘converted’; slightly archaic inﬂections löytty ‘found’, saatit ‘you
might’, ‘you escorted’, sijpein ‘of wings’, vartioidzit ‘they/you
guarded’; a word form mixette ‘why not (you)’ accidentally missing
from OMORFI. One may assume that these and similar words would
be correctly analysed, if the ﬁltering morphological analyser could be
modiﬁed so that it accepts older inﬂectional forms.
16 Four of the eight would be accepted by OMORFI if given with a capital letter: proper
names Amoksen, Saul, Jerusalemista, and the roman numeral XI. The proper name
Gedalia would not have been in OMORFI, neither the two abbreviations Cap and
Ioh accidentally included in the list.
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12.3. All word forms in the corpus
The full list of the other 100 word sample which was taken from the total
list of all word forms occurring in the corpus is given in Appendix 2. The
following is a summary of the results:
– There were 11 proper names or abbreviations which were rejected:
Ahabin, Bath, Giledassa, Ismaelille, Kanaaneri, Kyrenestä,
Magnus, Moph, Pet (=Petrus), Pilatus, Publiuksella. See the dis-
cussion above.
– In addition, 16 words did not get the proper analysis, 10 of them
occurred just once in the corpus. Two fairly frequent words (ettäs,
‘you not’, synteins, ‘of their sins’ were not accepted by OMORFI
and therefore were lost, and so was poismenit ‘you went away’ which
is nowadays written as two words.
– Out of the remaining 13 unanalysed words, one onnettomudexen ‘to
his misfortune’ was analysed to the correct base form but not to the
less frequent form actually used in the corpus.
– For three words, one could search further for a possible revision of the
rules: cauhiuttain, julgista ‘priech’, not ‘public’, tervehdimmä
‘we welcome(ed)’.
– Many missed OLF words might be better handled by revising the
lexicon of the morphological analyser rather than the rules de-
veloped for this paper. There is no guarantee that rule revisions
would really improve the recall. The OLF word onnettomudexen
=onnettomuudeksenne ‘to your misfortune’ is a case in the point. It
would be tempting to include a rule which would allow the recogni-
tion of the plural second person possessive suﬃx by deleting the two
ﬁnal letters. One ought to be careful, though: the rule would over-
generate because there are many other words ending similarly and
not so many occurrences of this suﬃx.17 One would need access to
the morphophonological level of MSF in order to describe this suﬃx
accurately.
– Altogether some 165 analyses were produced for the 100 word forms.
About 79 of them were exact matches to the actual word in the
17 It is possible to modify the endings in OMORFI although one has to make changes
in many places of the lexicon.
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corpus. Ten proposed analyses were unacceptable (six as artiﬁcial
compounds, four as guesses for proper names).
12.4. Sample of word tokens from the running text
The two above tests estimated how well the method covers the vocabulary.
Another aspect is, how well the method covers the text, i.e., how large a
portion of word tokens in the running text would get a proper base form
by which the place could be retrieved. For this purpose, a sample of 100
words was made, starting with a small oﬀset and stepping through the text
at equal intervals. A summary of results with this test:
– Four word tokens were proper names: Babelin, Efraimin , Israelin,
Maria; two were abbreviations: Reg, XXI and were left without a cor-
rect analysis.
– Three tokens were left without a proper analysis: iohtunut ‘caused
by’, murehitit ‘you worried’, sijhenasti ‘till then’. The j:i is a
very rare correspondence, and the last two ones are ungrammatical
in MSF.
– The remaining 91 words of this sample were given, among others,
the correct analysis.
One may speculate that frequent words are more common in samples
of running text than in samples from lists of distinct word forms. Therefore,
it would be expected that the rules and OMORFI perform better with such
samples.
13. Conclusion
On the whole, the authors consider the precision and recall of the com-
bination of the two-level rules and OMORFI successful, somewhat better
than was expected. Spending more time with the rules and tuning the con-
text conditions would not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the performance. By
making the conditions looser, one may improve the recall at the expense
of precision. With some manually compiled lists and by paying attention
to the capital letters, one could handle the proper names much better.
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The most promising line of development would be to build a diﬀerent
type of morphological analyser. The OLF form like jalgat ‘feet’ corre-
sponds to the MSF surface form jalØat. Adding a potential g in all pos-
sible places seems a bad idea. The morphophonemic representation of the
modern form could be something like j a l kØ a + t. Relating g to the
morphophoneme kØ describes the phenomenon more logically.
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Appendix 1: Sample of words occurring at least 6 times
This sample was made from the word forms occurring at least six times in the corpus.
The list was divided in 100 parts of equal length and then the 42nd word from each part
was selected. This sample was not used for writing or tuning the rules. The rules were not
changed after this sample was processed and this article was written.
The analysis of the sample was manually checked looking up the passages in the
corpus for judging what the original word form stood for. Decisions were inserted in the
list using the following markings: names or abbreviations are marked with a preceding (§).
They were left outside the present study because OMORFI would not cover them in any
case. OLF words which were left without any correct analyses are marked with a preceding
(@) sign. After an equal sign (=), a desired result is given, i.e., a result one would wish that
the analysis would produce. Those MSF word forms which were attested to be correct are
marked with a plus sign (+). The results which were considered to be wrong are marked
with an asterisk (*). The remaining unmarked MSF word forms in the results are formally
possible but not attested in the Biblia corpus.
ajasta 22 +ajasta, ajastaa
§ amoxen 6 =Amoksen
apostoleille 8 +apostoleille
asti 178 +asti
autuuden 21 +autuuden, autuuteen, autuuteeni, +autuuteni
cadzos 20 +katsos
callis 7 kalliisi, kalliissa, +kallis
§ cap 150 =abbreviation (not part of the text)
catumattomudens 9 kaatumattomuuteensa, kaatumattomuutensa,
katumattomuuteensa, +katumattomuutensa
§ cesareaan 11 =Kesareaan
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colmas 26 +kolmas
costaman 10 koostamaan, koostamaani, koostaman, koostamani,
+kostamaan, kostamaani, +kostaman, kostamani
cuitengin 328 +kuitenkin, kuittenkin
cunnias 9 kunniaasi, +kunniasi, +kunniassa
cuulemma 7 kuulemma, +kuulemme, kuulleemme, kuullemme
duomidzeman 20 +tuomitsemaan, tuomitsemaani, +tuomitseman,
tuomitsemani
egyptiläisten 10 +egyptiläisten, egyptiläisteni
engelille 8 +enkelille
epäjumalain 22 +epäjumalain, epäjumalaini
että 2808 +että
§ gedalia 7 =Gedalia
harwat 15 +harvat
heitän 9 +heitän, =heidät, heittäne, *heittäni, *heittään,
*heitäni, *heitään
hetke 14 +hetkeä
huones 35 +huoneesi, +huoneessa
hywä 160 +hyvä, +hyvää, =hyvät
häwitetän 14 hävitettäne, hävitettäni, hävitettään,
+hävitetään, hävitteettäni, hävitteettään
ihmisest 12 +ihmisestä
§ ioh 21 =abbreviation (not part of text)
itkemän 17 +itkemän, itkemäni, +itkemään, itkemääni
§ jerusalemist 58 =Jerusalemista
jolle 14 +jolle
judalaisista 12 +juutalaisista
jumalinen 9 +jumalinen, jumalineen, jumalineni
kedolla 53 +kedolla, ketolla
kircasta 7 kirkasta, +kirkastaa
kylään 7 +kylään, kylääni, kyyllään, kyylään, kyylääni
käsiwartens 14 käsivarteensa, +käsivartensa, käsivarttensa
@ käätyxi 21 =käätyksi (obsolete inflection pro 'käännetyksi)
laskeman 7 +laskeman, +laskemaan, laskemaani, laskemani
lewitat 11 +leviitat
luetan 14 luetan, +luetaan, luettane
lyödyxi 6 +lyödyksi
@ löytty 13 =löytty (obsolete inflection pro 'löydetty')
mailma 57 +maailma, +maailmaa
menewät 44 +menevät
miehens 11 mieheensä, +miehensä
@ mixette 6 =miksette (OK in MSF but OMORFI rejects)
muu 30 +muu
neljäkymmendä 16 +neljäkymmentä, neljääkymmentä
nimittä 12 nimittä, +nimittää
nähdä 88 +nähdä
oikein 87 +oikein, oikeine, oikeini
oma 34 +oma, +omaa
opetuslastens 40 +opetuslastensa
oxa 11 +oksa, +oksaa
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paimen 19 +paimen
palwelusta 22 palvellusta, +palvelusta
parembi 11 +parempi
perkelestä 6 +perkeleestä
pidetän 14 pidettäne, pidettäni, pidettään, +pidetään,
piteettäni, piteettään
pohjaisest 8 +pohjaisesta, pohjaisesti
prophetalle 26 +profeetalle
puolelle 19 +puolelle
päiwiä 9 +päiviä
päät 7 +päät, pääte
rangaisewa 18 +rankaiseva, rankaisevaa
ristinnaulidzit 6 ristiinnaulitsit, ristiinnaulitsitte,
+ristiinnaulitsivat
ruumis 10 +ruumis, +ruumiisi, ruumiissa, ruumissa
@ saatit 14 =saatit (old inflection pro 'saattoivat'), *saatit
sanani 45 +sanani, +sanaani
§ saul 8 =Saul
seuracunda 38 +seurakunta, +seurakuntaa
@ sijpein 10 =siipein (old inflection pro 'siipien')
sisäldä 11 +sisältä, sisältää
sucucunda 25 +sukukunta, +sukukuntaa, *suukukunta, *suukukuntaa
suus 9 +suusi, +suussa
synnyttä 13 synnyttä, +synnyttää
tahto 243 tahto, +tahtoa, +tahtoo
tapahtunut 65 +tapahtunut
tehkät 47 +tehkää
tie 15 +tie
toiseens 6 +toiseensa
tulella 35 +tulella, tulleella, tuulella, tuulleella
turmelit 6 +turmelit, turmelitte, +turmelivat
tyttäres 10 tyttäreesi, +tyttäresi, tyttäressä
täytti 11 +täytti
uscollinen 10 +uskollinen
waelsi 26 +vaelsi
waldacundain 15 +valtakuntain, valtakuntaini
wanhast 8 +vanhasta, vanhasti
@ wartioidzit 8 =vartioitsivat (old inflection pro 'vartioivat')
wertauxen 34 vertaukseen, vertaukseeni, +vertauksen, vertaukseni
wihollisen 15 viholliseen, viholliseeni, +vihollisen, +viholliseni
woi 223 +voi
wuorten 22 +vuorten, vuorteni
§ xi 13 =XI (not part of the text)
yljän 13 +yljän
ystäwä 6 +ystävä, ystävää
änellä 27 +äänellä
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Appendix 2: Sample of all OLF word forms
This sample was taken from the full list of all distinct OLF word forms of the corpus, i.e.,
each word form appeared only once in the list no matter how many times it occurred in
the corpus. The sample starts with the 86th word and proceeds with steps of equal length
in the alphabetical list. The markings for proper names or abbreviations (§), words with
no analysis (@), manually added interpretations (=), correct analyses (+) and completely
irrelevant candidates for MSF words (*) follow the same principles as in the sample in
Appendix 1.
§ ahabin 3 =Ahabin
@ alaidzen 1 =alitse
andimexi 1 +antimeksi
arpoja 1 +arpoja
asuwat 59 +asuvat
§ bath 3 =Bath
cahleis 5 +kahleissa
@ cananeri 1 =kanaaneri=Kaanaan asukas, *kanan-erie
carsi 2 kaarsi, +karsi, karsii
@ cauhiuttan 1 =kauheuttaan
@ cherubim 5 =kerubim=kerubi
colminaisuden 2 +kolminaisuuden, kolminaisuuteen,
kolminaisuuteeni, kolminaisuutena, kolminaisuuteni
cotcatkin 1 kotkaatkin, +kotkatkin
cullastans 1 +kullastansa, kultastansa
cuolettaman 1 +kuolettamaan, kuolettamaani, kuolettaman,
kuolettamana, kuolettamani
cuurnidzet 2 +kuurnitset, kuurnitsette
edestäm 8 +edestämme
eläwäin 1 +eläväin, eläväini
epäjumalista 2 +epäjumalista
@ ettäs 100 =ettäs (OMORFI)
§ gileadis 5 =Gileadissa
halkeisit 1 halkeisit, +halkeisivat, halkeisitte
hedelmälisest 2 +hedelmällisesti, hedelmällisestä
@ heräjä 1 =heräjä=herää, herääjä, herääjää
hopiaxi 1 +hopeaksi
hurscana 1 +hurskaana
häpiäs 13 +häpeäsi, +häpeässä, +häpeääsi
ihmisildä 17 +ihmisiltä
§ ismaelille 1 =Ismaelille
jalca 3 +jalka, +jalkaa
johdatan 3 +johdatan, johdattane
@ julgista 1 =julkistaa
jutteli 7 +jutteli
kelwatcon 1 +kelvatkoon
kijtoswirren 4 +kiitos-virren
kitans 1 kitaansa, +kitansa
§ kyrenist 1 =Kyrenestä
kätensä 1 +kätensä, +käteensä, kättensä
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lainaxi 1 +lainaksi
laulun 3 +laulun, lauluna, lauluni, lauluun, lauluuni
lewollisest 1 +levollisesta, levollisesti
lohdutuxellans 1 +lohdutuksellansa
luotat 5 +luotat, luotaat, luotaatte, luotatte
lähikyläins 1 +lähikyläinsä
§ magnus 3 =Magnus=Suuri, *maa-gnuusi
@ medzäficunapuulle 1 =metsä-viikuna-puulle
miehest 4 +miehestä
§ moph 1 =Moph
muucalaisilda 1 +muukalaisilta
@ nautitcat 1 =nautitkaa=nauttikaa
nimiä 1 +nimiä, nimeä, nimeää
nurisewat 1 +nurisevat, nurissevat
@ ohrapion 1 =ohrapivon=ohrakourallisen, *ohrapioni
@ onnettomudexen 1 =onnettomuudeksenne, onnettomuudekseen,
onnettomuudekseni
ota 102 +ota, oitta, otaa, +ottaa
pahenetta 1 +pahenette
paljastawat 1 +paljastavat
paransin 2 +paransin
peljännet 2 peljännet, +peljänneet, peljännette
§ pet 6 =Pet=Petrus=abbreviation, *peet
§ pilatus 58 =Pilatus, *pilattusi, *pilattuusi, *pilatussa
@ poismenit 1 =poismenit=pois menit
§ publiuxella 1 =Publiuksella
purpuraan 1 purpuraan, +purppuraan, purppuraani, purpuraani
päälimmäistä 1 +päällimmäistä
racastawanans 1 +rakastavanansa
rascautta 2 +raskautta, +raskauttaa
riemuhuudon 1 +riemuhuudon, riemuhuutona, riemuhuutoni,
riemuhuutoon, riemuhuutooni
rucouxens 3 rukoukseensa, +rukouksensa
saamme 8 +saamme
saitte 4 +saitte
@ saphir 3 =safiiri
selitetyt 1 +selitetyt
sielä 1 +siellä
@ sisälmäisin 1 =sisälmäisiin=sisimmäisiin?
sotawäke 4 +sotaväkeä
suremmaxi 1 +suuremmaksi
@ syndeins 30 =synteinsä/syntiensä (OMORFI)
syöxemän 1 +syöksemän, syöksemäni, +syöksemään,
syöksemääni
taitons 1 +taitonsa, taitoonsa, taittonsa, taittoonsa
taudist 3 +taudista, tautiista, tautiistä, tautista
@ terwehdimmä 2 =tervehdimme
todistaja 4 +todistaja, todistajaa
tottunet 3 +tottunet, tottuneet, tottunette
tunnustin 2 +tunnustin
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tyhmäin 1 +tyhmäin, tyhmäini
töilläs 1 +töilläsi, töiltäsi
uscalda 4 +uskaltaa
wacudes 1 vakuudessa, vakuuteesi, +vakuutesi
waiwan 12 +vaivaan, vaivaani, +vaivan, vaivana,
+vaivani
wallidzewat 7 +vallitsevat
warcaudella 1 +varkaudella
weidzet 1 +veitset
wialliset 2 +vialliset
wihollisillans 1 +vihollisillansa
wircaan 6 +virkaan, virkaani
wuoria 7 +vuoria
wääristä 4 +vääristä, vääristää
@ ylöllist 1 =ylöllistä=ilkeätä?
yxi 334 yksi
Appendix 3: Two-level rules
Alphabet
a a:Ø b d e e:a e:i e:u e:ä e:ö e:Ø f:p g h i i:j i:Ø
j j:i j:Ø k k:c k:g k:x l l:Ø m m:Ø n o o:a o:Ø p p:b p:w
r s s:n s:z s:Ø t t:d t:l t:n t:r t:Ø u u:Ø v v:f v:g v:w v:Ø
y y:Ø ä ä:Ø ö ö:ä ö:Ø Ø:d Ø:e Ø:g Ø:h Ø:i Ø:n Ø:s Ø:t ;
Sets
Vowel = a e i o u y ä ö ;
Cons = b c d f g h j k l m n p r s t v w x z ;
Definitions
Suf1 = [n i: | n s a: | s i: | m m: e:] ;
Suf2 = (k i n | k a :Ø n) ;
aSuff = ((a:) (n | Suf1) | i n | i Suf1 | l [l e|t a] (Suf1) |
n | n a (Suf1) | s [s:|t] a: (Suf1) | t |
[t:|:t] a (Suf1) | k:x s: e Suf1 | k:x s:Ø i) Suf2 .#. ;
oSuff = [k:x s: i | l l [a|e (e: n)] (Suf1) | n [a|e] (Suf1) |
s [s:|t] a: (Suf1) | t | [t:|:t] a (Suf1) |
t t e n | t t e Suf1] Suf2 .#. ;
Rules
"a:Ø" a:Ø => a: _ ;
! p a l a j a a:Ø
! r a a:Ø m a t t u
:Cons e _ .#. ;
! k:c a i k:c k e a:Ø
:Cons o a:Ø _ .#. ;
! h o l h o a:Ø a:Ø
:Cons o _ [(a:Ø) .#. | :i :s | j [a|i] | :m |
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:n .#. | t (t e:) .#. | :w | :Ø* :x] ;
! k i r o a:Ø i s i t
! p u t o a:Ø v:w a t
! p u t o a:Ø m i s i l l a
! v a i n o a:Ø a:Ø
! v:w a i n o a:Ø j a n i
! v:w a i n o a:Ø t t e:a
! [n | s (s:Ø) | s t] _ .#. ;
[s (s:Ø) | s t] _ .#. ;
! s e a s s:Ø a:Ø
! a i k:c a n a:Ø
! e v a n k:g e l i u m i s t a:Ø
i v:Ø _ t .#. ;
! a n t:n o i v:Ø a:Ø t
! s o t:d i:e i v:Ø a:Ø t
"e:Ø" e:Ø => e _ ;
! i h m e e:Ø t
_ .#. ;
! i s ä m m:Ø e:Ø
_ i t [t e n | a | ä] .#. ;
! a p o s t o l e:Ø i t t e n
i s _ n [a | ä] .#. ;
! t o i s e:Ø n a
a t _ r i [a | o] ;
! a t e:Ø r i o i t:d s:z i
"e:a" e:a => [t t | m m] _ .#. ;
! k:c u u l i t t e:a
! t u l i m m e:a
"e:u" e:u => l _ i t ;
! k:c u o l l e:u i t t e n
"e:ä" e:ä => n _ m ;
! e n e:ä m p:b ä Ø:t ä
"e:i" e:i => t a _ n .#. ;
! o p e t t a e:i n
_ [a | ä] ;
! r u s k e:i a t
"e:ö" e:ö => .#. y l _ n ;
! y l e:ö n k:c a t:d s:z o
"f:p" f:p => _ Ø:h ;
! p r o f:p Ø:h e e:Ø t t:Ø a i n
"i:j" i:j => i _ ;
! n i i:j s s:Ø ä
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"i:Ø" i:Ø => i _ ;
! r u u m i i:Ø n
o _ t ;
! o s o i:Ø t t i
[n | s | s t] _ .#. ;
! n i m e s i:Ø
! k:c o l m a s t i:Ø
"i:Ø .#." i:Ø <= i _ .#. ;
"j:i" j:i => .#. o r _ a ;
! o r j:i a t
"ij:iØ" j:Ø => [k: | l | s: | t:] i _ [a aSuff | o i oSuff] ;
! k:c a m a r i p a l v:w e l i j:Ø a Ø:t a
! k:c a u p i t:d s:z i j:Ø a t
! k:c u l k i j:Ø o i t a
! k:c u r k i s t e l i j:Ø a t
! h a k i j:Ø a t
! h a l t:d i j:Ø a
! h a l t:d i j:Ø o i l l e
! h a l l i t:d s:z i j:Ø a
! j u o k:x s:Ø i j:Ø a n
! p a l v:w e l i j:Ø a
! p a l v:w e l i j:Ø o i t a
! r a n k:g a i s i j:Ø a
! v:w a a t i j:Ø a n s a:Ø
! v:w a l e h t e l i j:Ø a t
! v:w a r t i j:Ø a
s i _ [a oSuff | o oSuff | o i t ] ;
! s i j:Ø a
t e k i _ ä ;
! t e k i j:Ø ä
"k:c" k:c => \:k _ [k | (:Ø) [:a | :o | :u] | Ø:h | l | r] ;
! j a l k:c a i n s a:Ø
"kk:ck" k:c <= _ k ;
"k:g" k:g => n _ ;
! e n k:g ä
.#. t y _ ö ;
! t y k:g ö s i:Ø
"k:x" k:x <=> _ s:Ø ;
! h a a k:x s:Ø i
"ll:lØ" l:Ø => l _ ;
! e h t o o:Ø l l:Ø i s e n
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"mm:mØ" m:Ø => m _ Vowel: ;
! i s ä m m:Ø e:Ø
!"nn:nØ" n:Ø => n _ e:Ø .#. ;
! k ä s i ä n n:Ø e:Ø
! t e i t ä n n:Ø e:Ø
! a j a t u k:x s:Ø i a n n:Ø e:Ø
! k y m m e n e n n:Ø e n
"o:Ø" o:Ø => o: _ ;
! e h t o o:Ø n a
"o:a" o:a => k: _ o: n .#. ;
! k:c u u l k:c o:a o:Ø n
"~ oo:oa" o:o /<= o:a _ ;
"p:b" p:b => m _ ;
! s u u r e m p:b i
! ?? s a p:b Ø:b a t h:t i
! ?? m u Ø:u l p:b e:ä r i n
! ?? t o p:b i a a:Ø n
"p:w" p:w => _ [u | y| ä] :i (s i: (v:Ø ä:Ø t)) .#. ;
! v:w i i:j p:W y i
! l u o p:w u i
! r e p:w ä i s i:Ø
! l e p:w ä Ø:i s i v:Ø ä:Ø t
"pp:pØ" p:Ø => :Vowel (:m | :l | :r) p _ ;
! k:c u m p p:Ø a n i
"s:Ø" s:Ø => s _ ;
! e d e s s:Ø ä
! s e a s s:Ø a:Ø
:x _ ;
! h a a k:x s:Ø i
"s:n" s:n => s _ [e | u | y] t .#. ;
! n o u:Ø s s:n u t
! k:c a t k:c a i s s:n e e:Ø t
"s:z" s:z => t: _ ;
! e t:d s:z i
.#. j o k: a i Ø:d _ e ;
! j o k:c a i Ø:d s:z e l l e
"t:d" t:d => [a|e|i|o|u (u:Ø)|y|ä|ö|h|l|n|t:] _ [a|e|i|o|u|y|ä|ö] ;
! p e l t:d o
_ s:z ;
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! p a i t:d s:z i
.#. _ u o m [a | i] ;
! t:d u o m i o n
"lt:ll" t:l => .#. :Cons* :Vowel (:Vowel) l _ ;
! k:c u l t:l a i n e n
"t:n" t:n => n _ [[o|u] i (v: a:Ø) (t)] .#. ;
! a n t:n o i
! i l m a a:Ø n t:n u i
! a n t:n o i v:Ø a:Ø t
n _ [[ö|y] i (v: ä:Ø) (t)] .#. ;
! s y n t:n y i v:Ø ä:Ø t
n _ [a|ä|y] i s i (v:Ø [a:Ø|ä:Ø]) t .#. ;
! a n t:n a i s i v:Ø a:Ø t
"rt:rr" t:r => r _ a i s ;
! k:c u m a r t:r a i s i:Ø
"t:Ø" t:Ø => t _ ;
! p r o f:p Ø:h e e:Ø t t:Ø a i n
"u:Ø" u:Ø => u _ ;
! h a l t:d u u:Ø n
! p a k:c a n a l l i s u u:Ø d e s t a:Ø
n o _ s s:n ;
! n o u:Ø s s:n u t
"v:f" v:f => .#. _ [a n :g | i :c u n a] ;
! v:f a n k:g i n a
! v:f i k:c u n a
"v:g" v:g => u _ u ;
! s u v:g u n
! l u v:g u n
! r i u v:g u l l a
"v:Ø" v:Ø => i _ [a:Ø|ä:Ø] t .#. ;
! s a i s v:Ø a:Ø t
"y:Ø" y:Ø => y _ ;
! v:w ä ä r y y:Ø t t ä
"ä:Ø" ä:Ø => ä _ ;
! k ä ä:Ø r m e e:Ø n
[e | n s | s s:Ø | s t] _ .#. ;
! h e t k e ä:Ø
! n ä k ö n s ä:Ø
! h e n g e s s:Ø ä:Ø
.#. t i e t _ k [ä ä:Ø Ø:t| ö] ;
! t i e t ä:Ø k ä ä:Ø Ø:t
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i v:Ø _ t .#. ;
! k ä ä n t:n i v:Ø ä:Ø t
"ö:Ø" ö:Ø => k ö: _ [n | t] .#. ;
! ä l k ö ö:Ø n
"ö:ä" ö:ä => _ ö: n .#. ;
! ä l k ö:ä ö:Ø n
"~ öö:äö" ö:ö /<= ö:ä _ ;
"Ø:d" Ø:d => _ s:z ;
! j o k:c a i Ø:d s:z e l l e
! j o u 0:d s:z e n
! ä k k:Ø i Ø:d s:z e l t ä
"Ø:e" Ø:e => .#. [e :d :z | k ä r s | k ä ä r | p y :Ø h k |
r u o :c k | s a l | s o t: | v: a a t:] _ i .#. ;
! e t:d s:z Ø:e i
! k ä r s Ø:e i
! k ä ä r Ø:e i
! p y y:Ø h k Ø:e i
! r u o k:c k Ø:e i
! s a l l Ø:e i
! s o t:d Ø:e i
! s o t Ø:e i
! v:w a a t:d Ø:e i
"Ø:g" Ø:g => .#. [a i|a l|j a|p a|t e|k:c o (r)|r u o|h u o|n ä]
_ [a|e|o|u|y|ö] ;
! a i Ø:g o i t
! a l Ø:g u s t a
! h u o Ø:g a t a
! j a Ø:g a t t e
! k:c o Ø:g o s s:Ø a:Ø
! k:c o Ø:g o l l a
! k:k o r Ø:g o t a n
! n ä Ø:g y n
! n ä Ø:g ö n
! p a Ø:g o s t a:Ø
! r u o Ø:g o n
! t e Ø:g o i l l a
! v:w a a ':g a l l a
"Ø:h" Ø:h => f:p _ ;
! f:p Ø:h a r i s e u s t e n
a _ a n .#. ;
! j u h l a Ø:h a n
e _ e n .#. ;
! h ä n e Ø:h e n
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i _ i n .#. ;
! k:c a r i Ø:h i n
o _ o n .#. ;
! a r m o Ø:h o n
u _ u n .#. ;
! l o p p u Ø:h u n
ä _ ä n .#. ;
! e l ä m ä Ø:h ä n
ö _ ö n .#. ;
! k i v:w i s t ö Ø:h ö n
.#. k:c _ r i s t ;
! k:c Ø:h r i s t u s
"asi:ais" Ø:i => [a|ä] _ s i:Ø ;
! a v:w a Ø:i s i:Ø
[a|ä] _ s i v:Ø [a:Ø|ä:Ø] t .#. ;
! l e p:w ä Ø:i s i v:Ø ä:Ø t
k:c u k:c k o _ .#. ;
! k:c u k:c k o Ø:i
o _ n u t ;
! a i k:c o Ø:i n u t
"Ø:n" Ø:n => t:d s:z e _ .#. ;
! y l i t:d s:z e Ø:n
! o h i t:d s:z e Ø:n
! l ä p i t:d s:z e Ø:n
! e d i t:d s:z e Ø:n
! a l a i t:d s:z e Ø:n
"Ø:s" Ø:s => .#. :c a n s _ [:a | :o] ;
! k:c a n s Ø:s a n
"Ø:t" Ø:t => k: [a a:Ø | ä ä:Ø] _ .#. ;
! a n t:d a k:c a a:Ø Ø:t
Vowel: Cons:+ Vowel:+ Cons:+ [a|o|i] _ a .#. ;
! a s i a Ø:t a
! p a h e m p:b i Ø:t a
Vowel: Cons:+ Vowel:+ Cons:+ [ä|i] _ ä .#. ;
! k y y n ä r ä Ø:t ä
"Ø:w" Ø:w => l _ o i [l | s] ;
! j a l Ø:w o i l l a
Appendix 4: Distances for automatic character by character alignment
The following short Python program builds a WFST which relates MSF word forms to
OLF word forms. The resulting WFST is used in the alignment script in Figure 5. The
WFST restricts the character by character matching by rejecting most consonant to vowel
and vowel to consonant correspondences. Furthermore it gives penalty weights to letter
K + K = 120 / p. 350 / May 3, 2019
350 Kimmo Koskenniemi – Pirkko Kuutti
correspondences depending on how many of their features diﬀer and how much they diﬀer.
The numerical values used in the program are more or less arbitrary and one may tune
them in order to improve the accuracy.
The program was made for written Finnish language, but one could modify it in
order to use it for some other languages. In particular, it would be interesting to extend it
so that it would cover phonetic IPA representations of any language.
"""Produces a kind of a distance matrix between
characters in an alphabet."""
import sys, io
import libhfst
algfile = libhfst.HfstOutputStream(filename="chardist.fst")
vowels = {
'i':('Close','Front','Unrounded'),
'y':('Close','Front','Rounded'),
'u':('Close','Back','Rounded'),
'e':('Mid','Front','Unrounded'),
'ö':('Mid','Front','Rounded'),
'o':('Mid','Back','Rounded'),
'ä':('Open','Front','Unrounded'),
'a':('Open','Back','Unrounded')
}
cmo = {'Close':1, 'Mid':2, 'Open':3}
fb = {'Front':1, 'Back':2}
ur = {'Unrounded':1, 'Rounded':2}
consonants = {
'm':('Bilab','Voiced','Nasal'),
'p':('Bilab','Unvoiced','Stop'),
'b':('Bilab','Voiced','Stop'),
'v':('Labdent','Voiced','Fricative'),
'w':('Labdent','Voiced','Fricative'),
'f':('Labdent','Unvoiced','Fricative'),
'n':('Alveolar','Voiced','Nasal'),
't':('Alveolar','Unvoiced','Stop'),
'd':('Alveolar','Voiced','Stop'),
's':('Alveolar','Unvoiced','Sibilant'),
'l':('Alveolar','Voiced','Lateral'),
'r':('Alveolar','Voiced','Tremulant'),
'j':('Velar','Voiced','Approximant'),
'k':('Velar','Unvoiced','Stop'),
'g':('Velar','Voiced','Stop'),
'h':('Glottal','Unvoiced','Fricative')}
pos = {'Bilab':1, 'Labdent':1, 'Alveolar':2, 'Velar':3, 'Glottal':4}
voic = {'Unvoiced':1, 'Voiced':2}
def cmodist(x1, x2):
"""Computes a distance of Close/Mid/Open and returns it"""
return abs(cmo[x2] - cmo[x1])
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def posdist(x1, x2):
"""Computes a distance of articulation position and returns it"""
return abs(pos[x2] - pos[x1])
def adist(x1, x2):
"""Computes a distance between symbols"""
return (0 if x1 == x2 else 1)
def printlset(lset):
"""Print the set of letters and their features"""
ll = sorted(lset.keys());
flist = []
for l in ll:
(x,y,z) = lset[l]
flist.append("{} : {},{},{}".format(l, x, y, z))
print('\n'.join(flist))
def featmetr(lset1, lset2, f1, f2, f3):
"""Compute all metric distances between letters in d1 and d2
according to their features."""
ll1 = sorted(lset1.keys())
ll2 = sorted(lset2.keys())
ml = []
for l1 in ll1:
(x1,y1,z1) = lset1[l1]
for l2 in ll2:
(x2,y2,z2) = lset2[l2]
dist = f1(x1,x2) + f2(y1,y2) + f3(z1,z2)
ml.append("{}:{}::{}".format(l1,l2,dist))
return (ml)
vvlist = featmetr(vowels, vowels, cmodist, adist, adist)
cclist = featmetr(consonants, consonants, posdist, adist, adist)
vowl = sorted(vowels.keys())
cons = sorted(consonants.keys())
letters = sorted(vowl + cons)
dellist = ['{}:Ø::{}'.format(l,3) for l in letters]
epelist = ['Ø:{}::{}'.format(l,3) for l in letters]
dbllist = ['{} Ø:{}::{}'.format(l,l,2) for l in letters]
sholist = ['{} {}:Ø::{}'.format(l,l,2) for l in letters]
speclist = ['k:c::0 k::0', 'k:x s:Ø::0', 't:d s:z::0', 'Ø:d s:z::3',
'i:j::1', 'j:i::1', 'i j:Ø::0', 'i i:j::0',
'f:p Ø:h::0', 'u:v::1', 'v:u::1', 'u:w::1', 'k:c::1',
'[o:Ø o:?]::5']
all = vvlist + cclist + dbllist +
sholist + dellist + epelist + speclist
re = '[{}]*'.format(' | '.join(all))
algfst = libhfst.regex(re)
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algfile.write(algfst)
algfile.flush()
algfile.close()
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ABSTRACT
A language is compositional if themeaning of an expression is a function
of the meanings of its parts, determined by the mode of composition.
A dual syntactic property is known as the autonomy of syntax: the form
of an expression is independent of themeanings of its parts. It is easy for
a language to satisfy the property on one side, as long as the other side
is completely unconstrained. Satisfying both of them simultaneously is
much harder.We call this property independence, and investigate condi-
tions underwhich a language is independently generated.Weconjecture
that there exist non-independently generated languages.
1. Compositionality versus Independence
How do humans understand the meaning of a complex sentence they have
never heard before? The answer is that there is an algorithm that al-
lows to compute the meaning of the complex expression from its parts.
While this much seems uncontroversial, semanticists have actually argued
that natural languages possess a stronger property, that of composition-
ality. A language is said to be compositional if the meaning of a complex
expression is a function of the meaning of its parts given the mode of
composition; thus, a language is compositional if the algorithm computing
the meaning can do so without knowing the expressions that carry these
meanings. It is this latter property that has been made into a litmus test
for formal semantic theories. A theory that provides a compositional ac-
count of meaning is preferred over one that does not. But how much of
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a constraint is compositionality on a language? In other words, what em-
pirical signiﬁcance does it have to say that a language is compositional?
Do noncompositional languages at all exist?
While the introduction of the subject is often credited to Montague,
it is perhaps the work that has been done in the wake of Montague that
had put compositionality ﬁrmly on the agenda of formal semantic theo-
rising, see Janssen (1997) for an account by one of the protagonists. The
survey books Barker & Jacobson (2007) and Hinzen et al. (2012) docu-
ment the persistent interest in this notion. From a mathematical point of
view, the question is how much of an empirical content this notion has.
Janssen has actually shown that any language is compositional, provided
no constraints on syntactic operations are being made (see Janssen 1997).
Though his notion of language is slightly nonstandard, the result holds also
for languages in the Saussurean sense, i.e., relations between expressions
and meanings.
However, as Kracht (2011) has pointed out, the dual property, namely
that the form of an expression is independent of the meaning of its parts,
is actually a well known hypothesis of generative grammar: It is called the
autonomy of syntax. It is curious that to our knowledge no deﬁnition of this
notion with the same explicitness has ever been given in print. In retrospect
it seems that a grammar that satisﬁes both of them simultaneously is
really what linguistics have been after, and not compositionality alone.
We call this property independence. It has a rather simple mathematical
formulation, so the investigation may also be of interest in combinatorial
theory.
Moreover, it turns out that the property of independence is actually
rather tricky. It is still unclear whether there exists a countable language
that is not independently generated. Though we believe that such a lan-
guage exists, we have not been able to ﬁnd one. The results here exhibit
some positive results (specifying languages that are independently gen-
erated) and reduces the complexity of the original problem somewhat.
We thank our reviewer for suggesting ways to improve this paper.
Also, Marcus Kracht wishes to thank András Kornai for his friendship and
the endless discussions on mathematics, language and life.
2. Autonomy and compositionality
A language is an arbitrary subset L of E M , where E and M are given
sets of expressions and meanings, respectively. An independent grammar
for L is a ﬁnite set F  L and a ﬁnite set P of pairs of functions (fi; gi),
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i < m, such that for i < m there is an ni (the arity of the functions) such
that fi : Eni ,! E and gi : Mni ,! M are both partial functions and L is
exactly the set that can be generated from F using P . The action of such
a pair is deﬁned as usual: (f; g)((e0;m0);    ; (eni 1;mni 1)) is deﬁned if
and only if both f(e0;    ; eni 1) and g(m0;    ; eni 1) are deﬁned and in
that case
(f; g)((e0;m0);    ; (eni 1;mni 1)) := (f(e0;    ; eni 1); g(m0;    ;mni 1))
There is an obvious mathematical generalisation. Let R  !d be a relation.
Say that R is independently generated if there is a ﬁnite set of partial
functions fki , k < d, of arity ni (only dependending on i) such that the
product functions (f0i ; f1i ;    ; fd 1i ) (of arity ni) generate R from a ﬁnite
subset. The limiting case of d = 1 is trivial. Any countable subset of ! can
be generated; it suﬃces to pick one constant and a single unary function.
Thus, the case d = 2 is the ﬁrst really interesting case. Notice also that
if there is a relation of arity d that is not independently generated, then
there is an example in any higher arity.
Notation. If f is a function and S a set, put f [S] := ff(x) : x 2 Sg.
Given L  !2 we write Li for the “column” fj : (i; j) 2 Lg. It follows that
L =
S
i2!fig  Li. Dually we write jL := fi 2 ! : (i; j) 2 Lg.
The notion of independence is restrictive. Let L  EM be countably
inﬁnite. Then there exists a ﬁnite subset F and a ﬁnite number of partial
functions on E  M (rather than independent functions on E and M)
generating L. Indeed, one constant plus a single unary function is enough.
Simply enumerate L = f(ei;mi) : i 2 !g, put F := f(e0;m0)g and let
f : E M ! E M be deﬁned by
f((e;m)) :=
(
(ei+1;mi+1) if (e;m) = (ei;mi)
(e;m) else
By assumption, i is unique in the ﬁrst case. Then it is easily seen that
(ek;mk) = f
k((e0;m0)), so we generate exactly L.
However, the question was whether it is possible to deﬁne the functions
in such a way that the actions on E and on M are independent of each
other. In the linguistic literature, two weaker notions have been discussed.
The most important one is compositionality. The ﬁrst result will be that
all countable languages have a compositional grammar.
Since the set of generating functions is ﬁnite, L is at most countably
inﬁnite. Thus we can restrict E and M to some countably inﬁnite subset;
without loss of generality we can assume them to be the set of natural
numbers ! = f0; 1; 2; 3;    g. (Formally, there is nothing that distinguishes
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members of E from members of M .) Thus, from now on E = M = !. Let
p1 : !
2 ! ! : (i; j) 7! i and p2 : !2 ! ! : (i; j) 7! j.
Deﬁnition 1. Let f be a partial n-ary function on !2. We say f is inde-
pendent in the ﬁrst component if for all pairs (i0; j0),    , (in 1; jn 1)
and all pairs (i0; k0),    , (in 1; kn 1): f((i0; j0);    ; (in 1; jn 1)) is de-
ﬁned if and only if f((i0; k0);    ; (in 1; kn 1)) is deﬁned, and if any of
them is deﬁned, then the ﬁrst projection of the values are identical, i.e.,
p1(f((i0; j0);    ; (in 1; jn 1))) = p1(f((i0; k0);    ; (in 1; kn 1))):
Dually the notion of independence in the second component is deﬁned.
Theorem 2. Let L  !2. Then there is a ﬁnite set of functions generating
L from a ﬁnite subset where all functions are independent in the ﬁrst
component. Likewise, the is a ﬁnite set of functions generating L from a
ﬁnite subset where all functions are independent in the second component.
Proof. Obviously, we need to prove only the ﬁrst claim. The second
follows analogously. (Or instead, apply the method to L` := f(j; i) : (i; j) 2
Lg and then “switch” the solution.) Now, consider ﬁrst the language
M := f(i; j) : Li 6= ?; j is minimal in Lig:
Clearly, M  L.
So M has the form M = f(i; ni) : i 2 Hg for some H  !. Let  be
the least member of H, i.e., the least number such that L 6= ?. Introduce
a constant for (; n). Next, let k(i; j) be deﬁned as follows. In case j = ni
and there is a q > i such that Lq 6= ?, let k(i; j) := (p; np), where p is the
smallest number > i such that Lp is nonempty. If no such number exists,
or if j 6= ni, put k(i; j) := (i; j). Now put
d((i; j)) := (p; k(i; j))
This deﬁnes our ﬁrst function. (A) d is independent in the ﬁrst component
since p can be established from i alone. (B) L is closed under d. For given
(i; j) 2 L, if d((i; j)) = (i; j) then obviously d((i; j)) 2 L. If d((i; j)) 6=
(i; j), then (i; j) = (i; ni) and d((i; j)) therefore has the form (p; np), where
by deﬁnition (p; np) 2 M . (C) M is the closure of f(; n)g under d. We
prove by induction on i that all (i; ni) 2M can be generated. For i =  this
is the case by assumption. Let i be given with (i; ni) 2M . Then let p < i
be the largest number such that (p; np) 2 M . By inductive hypothesis,
(p; np) is generated from f(; n)g. But (i; ni) = d((p; np)), so it is also
generated from f(; n)g.
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Next, deﬁne a function  as follows. Given i and j, (i; j) := j if either
j 62 Li or j is the largest member of Li. Otherwise, (i; j) yields the least
j0 such that j0 2 Li and j0 > j. Now put
u((i; j)) := (i; (i; j))
(A) u is evidently independent in the ﬁrst component. (B) L is closed under
u. For if (i; j) 2 L and u((i; j)) = (i; j) then u((i; j)) 2 L. Otherwise,
u((i; j)) = (i; (i; j)) = (i; j0), where among other j0 2 Li. So, u((i; j)) 2
Li  L. (C) L is generated from M using u. This is proved by induction
on j. Choose (i; j) 2 L. If j is minimal in Li then j = ni and the claim
trivially follows. Otherwise, choose j0 to be maximal such that (i; j0) 2 L
and j0 < j. By inductive hypothesis, (i; j0) is generated from M using u.
But u((i; j0)) = (i; j), and so (i; j) is likewise generated from M using u.

Notice that we have been able to deﬁne total functions. Consider a
system F of generating (partial) functions on EM . This system is called
compositional if each member f 2 F is independent in the second com-
ponent; it is called autonomous if each member f 2 F is independent in
its ﬁrst component. We can rephrase the previous theorem as follows. A
language is compositional (autonomous) if it has a ﬁnite compositional
(autonomous) set of generating functions.
Corollary 3. Let L be a countable language.
• L is autonomous.
• L is compositional.
Here is a surprising consequence.
Corollary 4. Suppose that L is either many-to-one (=unambiguous) or
L is one-to-many. Then L is independently generated.
Proof. Consider the second case, i.e., assume that L is one-to-many
(the other case being dual). Let f : M ! E be such that f(j) is the unique
i such that (i; j) 2 L. Deﬁne the grammar as in the proof of Theorem 2.
Now put
d((i; j)) := (p; k(f(j); j))
as well as
u((i; j)) := (i; (f(j); j))
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where k and  are deﬁned as before. By assumption, i = f(j), so that this
deﬁnes the same function. The so-deﬁned functions do not depend on the
ﬁrst component any more, and so are independent. 
Corollary 5. Let L  E M a language such that for some A  E,
B  M , L \ A  B is a many-to-one or one-to-many relation on A  B
containing an inﬁnite partial bijection. Then L is independently generated.
Proof. We generate L\AB by means of independent partial func-
tions deﬁned on AB, as shown in Corollary 4. L contains a partial inﬁnite
bijection f(ai; bi) : i < !g. Let L AB = f(ei;mi) : i < !g. Now add a
new unary partial function f : AB ! (E  A) (M  B) with
f((x; y)) =
(
(ei;mi) if (x; y) = (ai; bi)
undeﬁned else
By assumption, i is uniquely determined by x alone and by y alone, so f
is actually independent. 
The notion of independence for languages is not the conjunction of
autonomy and compositionality (if it were, all languages would be inde-
pendent, by Corollary 3); indeed, it is much stronger than that. For it says
that the language has an independent grammar, that is, a grammar where
every function is independent in both components. This is what we are
going to study now.
3. Basic results
In using partial functions, here is a trick that will be used on several
occasions. Denote by [F ]P the closure of F under P . Let A be the disjoint
union of B and C. Let P be a set of partial functions on B, and Q a
set of partial function on C. Take B0  B and C0  C. Then [B0 [
C0]P[Q = [B0]P [ [C0]Q. To see that notice that functions from P are
undeﬁned on every tuple containing elements from C, and functions from
Q are undeﬁned on every tuple containing an element from B. Therefore,
functions from P cannot act on outputs of functions from Q, and vice
versa.
Lemma 6. Let L  !2, and ! = E0 [ E00, with E0 and E00 disjoint, and
let M  !. Now put L0 := L \ E0 M , L00 := L \ E00 M . Then if both
L0 and L00 are independently generated, so is L \ ! M .
Indeed, simply take the (disjoint) union of the constants and functions.
The following two claims are obvious.
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Lemma 7. If L is independently generated, so is L` := f(j; i) : (i; j) 2 Lg.
Lemma 8. Let ;  : ! ! ! be injections. Let (; )[L] := f((e); (m)) :
(e;m) 2 Lg. Then (; )[L] is independently generated iﬀ L is indepen-
dently generated.
There is a special corollary of this theorem that is worth stating
separately. Consider the case where Li = ? for certain i. Denote by
U := fi : Li 6= ?g. If U is inﬁnite there is a bijection  : U ! !. Consider
the language L := (; idM )[L]. We have (L)i = L(i) 6= ? for all i 2 !.
Corollary 9. L is independently generated iﬀ L is.
If U is ﬁnite, L is independently generated anyway, by the next the-
orem.
Lemma 10. Let n be a ﬁnite number.
1. Every ﬁnite language is independently generated.
2. n n is independently generated.
3. !  ! is independently generated.
4. !  n, n ! are independently generated.
5. Every coﬁnite subset of !  ! is independently generated.
Proof. The ﬁrst claim is easy. Just introduce a constant for every
element of L. The second claim follows immediately. To show the third
claim introduce a constant for (0; 0), and two unary functions: one sending
(i; j) to (i + 1; j), and one sending (i; j) to (i; j + 1). The fourth claim
is proved thus. For each j < n take a constant for (0; j). Finally, add a
single unary function sending (i; j) to (i + 1; j). For the last claim, let
L = !  !   f(ik; jk) : k < ng. Put E0 := fik : k < ng, E1 := !   E0;
M0 := fjk : j < ng,M1 := ! M0. Now L\E0M0 is ﬁnite; L\E0M1 =
E0M1, L\E1M0 = E1M0, and L\E1M1 = E1M1. The ﬁrst
is independently generated since it is ﬁnite. The others are independently
generated because they are a simple product of at most countable sets.
Now use Lemma 6. 
Say that L is essentially bounded if L  n ! or L  !  n.
Lemma 11. Every essentially bounded language is independently gener-
ated.
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Proof. >From Lemma 10 by repeated application of Lemma 6. 
Next we are going to reduce the problem even further. Let H  !
such that for every i 2 H there is a j 62 H and Lj = Li. Then put
L H := f(i; j) : (i; j) 2 L; i 62 Hg
Lemma 12. If L H is independently generated then L is independently
generated.
Proof. Suppose that L H is independently generated. For j 62 H put
Bj := fk : k 2 H;Lk = Ljg
Now let h : ! ! ! be deﬁned as follows. If j 62 H and Bj = ? then
h(j) := j. If j 62 H and Bj 6= ?, then let h(j) := minBj . Else, if j 2 H
then j 2 Bi for some i. If j = maxBi, put h(j) := j, otherwise let h(j) be
the least j0 2 Bi such that j0 > j. Finally, let f be deﬁned by
f((i; j)) := (h(i); j)
(A) f is independent. (B) L is closed under f . Consider (i; j) 2 L. If
f((i; j)) = (i; j) then f((i; j)) 2 L. Otherwise, f((i; j)) = (h(i); j), where
by deﬁnition Lh(i) = Li. Thus, (h(i); j) 2 Lh(i) and so (h(i); j) 2 L. (C) L
is generated from L H using f . If not, let i be minimal such that for some
j, (i; j) 2 L but it is not generated from L H using f . Then i 2 H. Let i0
the largest number such that i0 < i and i0 2 H if it exists, else let i0 62 H
such that i = minBi0 . By deﬁnition, i = h(i0). It is easily seen that (i0; j)
is generated from L H using f ; the same is now true for (i; j). 
Thus we can restrict our search for nonindependent languages to those
subsets of !2 where all columns are diﬀerent and all rows are diﬀerent.
4. Main theorems
We are going to investigate three conditions under which languages are
independently generated. The second and third conditions both generalise
the ﬁrst, in slightly diﬀerent directions. Examples will show that the gen-
eralisations are proper.
Deﬁnition 13. Let L  !  !. Say that L is n-discriminable if there
is a family fAi : i 2 !g of sets such that:
1. for each i: 0 < jAij  n;
2. for each i; j: if i 6= j then Ai 6= Aj;
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3. for every i: Ai  Li; and
4. for every i; j Aj  Li if and only if j = i.
In that case, we call the family fAi : i 2 !g an n-discriminating family
for L. (Notice that 4. implies 3.)
Notice that by deﬁnition, Ai * Aj for i 6= j. For if Ai  Aj we have
Ai  Aj  Lj , from which by deﬁnition i = j.
Theorem 14. Let L be n-discriminable. Then L is independently gener-
ated.
Proof. Let fAi : i 2 !g be a discriminating family for L. Let Ai be
a sequence of length n that enumerates Ai, possibly repeating an element
to reach length n. (Eg if n = 4 and A2 = f3; 6; 7g then A2 = h3; 6; 7; 7i
is a possible choice.) For each member of f(0; i) : i 2 A0g we introduce a
constant. Now we deﬁne the following n-ary functions fk, k < n. Let h be
the kth member of Ai+1.
fk((i; j0); (i; j1);    ; (i; jn 1)) :=
(
(i+ 1; h) if hj0; j1;    ; jn 1i = Ai
undeﬁned else (1)
Clearly this function is independent: on the ﬁrst component it gives i+1 if
all arguments are identical to i and is undeﬁned otherwise. On the second
component it gives h if the arguments are exactly given as in Ai, and is
undeﬁned else. The partiality seems to be essential here.
Now deﬁne a single n + 1-ary function g with the following action.
For each i we assume Li   Ai to be enumerated as fkij : j < ig where
i < ! + 1 (so i can be ﬁnite or = !).
g((i; j0); (i; j1);    ; (i; jn)) :=
8>>><>>>:
(i; ki0) if hj0; j1;    ; jn 1i = Ai
and jn = jn 1, i 6= 0
(i; kip+1) if hj0; j1;    ; jn 1i = Ai
and jn = kip, p+ 1 < i
undeﬁned else
(2)
So deﬁned g is independent. On the ﬁrst coordinate the output is i if all
inputs equal i; and is undeﬁned elsewhere. On the second coordinate it
yields the next element in the enumeration if there is one (and repeats the
element if it is the last in the enumeration), provided the ﬁrst n arguments
equal Ai; and is undeﬁned elsewhere.
It now remains to be shown that this set of functions generates exactly
L. There are two parts: (i) the functions generate all of L; (ii) L is closed
under the functions.
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To prove (i), we shall ﬁrst show that all fig Ai are generated using
the fk and the constants. Recall that all members of f0gA0 are values of
some constant. Now by induction assume that figAi is generated. Thus
all pairs (i; jp) exist, p < n, where jp 2 Ai. Then, using the functions fk,
we can generate (i + 1; h), where h is the kth member of Ai+1. Since all
elements of Ai+1 appear at least once in Ai+1, all of fi+1gAi+1 is thus
generated. Next we show that for every i, figLi is generated from figAi
using the function g. To that end, recall that Li Ai is enumerated as ki0, ki1
and so on for indices in i. If i = 0, nothing needs to be done. If i > 0,
we get (i; ki0) as the value of g((i; j0); (i; j1);    ; (i; jn 1); (i; jn 1)), and
(i; kip+1) as the value of g((i; j0); (i; j1);    ; (i; jn 1); (i; kip)). By induction,
all values are generated.
Finally, we need to show that L is closed under the functions. Consider
fk((i0; j0); (i1; j1);    ; (in 1; jn 1))
This is deﬁned only if i := i0 = i1 =    = in 1 and hj0; j1;    ; jn 1i =
Aq for some q. We have q = i, since fig  Ap  L only if p = i
by deﬁnition of n-discrimination. So, the function is deﬁned only on
fk((i; j0); (i; j1);    ; (i; jn 1)), where hj0;    ; jn 1i = Ai, and yields the
value (i + 1; j0k), where j0k is the kth member of Ai+1. By deﬁnition, this
is in L. Next, consider
g((i0; j0);    ; (in; jn))
This is deﬁned only if i := i0 = i1 =    = in. Additionally, like in the
case of fk, the sequence hj0; j1;    ; jn 1i must equal Ai. Hence we have
to look at
g((i; j0); (i; j1);    ; (i; jn))
Several cases arise. (a) jn = jn 1. In that case we get (i; ki0), provided that
i > 0. In that case, Li   Ai is nonempty, and contains ki0 by deﬁnition.
(b) jn = kip, where kip is a member of Li Ai. In fact, it is the pth member
of the enumeration. If p + 1 = i, then Li   Ai is exhausted, and g is
undeﬁned. If not, we get (i; kip+1), which is in Li   Ai by deﬁnition. (c)
The function is undeﬁned on all other inputs. In all cases, we get values in
L. The proof is complete. 
Corollary 15. Suppose that there exists an n such that for all i 2 !
jLij  n. Then L is independently generated.
Proof. By Lemma 12 we can reduce this to the case where for i 6= j
Li 6= Lj . Deﬁne I(j) := fi : jLij = jg and Lj := [i2I(j)Li. By Lemma 6,
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we need to show only that each of the Lj is independently generated. To
this end, it is enough to show that fLji : i 2 I(j)g is a j-discriminating
family. This is easy to verify. 
As an application, consider the language L = f(i; i); (i; i2) : i 2 !g.
Here we can simply take Ai := Li. Indeed, this is a 2-discriminating family.
For jAij  2, the sets are nonempty, pairwise distinct (fi; i2g = fj; j2g iﬀ
i = j), and, ﬁnally, if fi; i2g  Lj then j = i; for if fi; i2g = fj; j2g
then either the sets contain both two members, and then since i < i2,
j < j2 we have i = j; or they contain one member and then have the form
fig = fjg, from which again i = j. So, by the previous result the language
is independently generated.
A more complex example, to which this result cannot be applied,
though, is f(i; ik) : i; k 2 !g. It is a consequence of the next theorem that
this language is independently generated.
Deﬁnition 16. Call a language weakly n-discriminable if there is a
family fAi : i 2 !g of sets such that
1. for every i, 0 < jAij  n;
2. for every i; j: if i 6= j then Ai 6= Aj; and
3. for every i, Ai  Li; and
4. for every i; j: if Aj  Li then Li  Lj. (This is trivially true if
i = j.)
In particular, if Ai  Aj then we must have Lj  Li. Clearly, all n-
discriminable languages are also weakly n-discriminable, but the converse
does not hold, as the example just given shows. For if L is n-discriminable,
we must have Li * Lj for all i 6= j. (For if i 6= j and Li  Lj , then
since Ai  Li we also have Ai  Lj , which is excluded.) But the language
f(i; ik) : i; k 2 !g fails this: we have L2  L4. On the other hand, the family
deﬁned by Ai := fi; i2g is a weakly discriminating family. For if Ai  Lj
then i = jp for some p, whence Li = fik : k 2 !g  fjp : p 2 !g. The next
theorem establishes that this language is independently generated.
Theorem 17. Let L be weakly n-discriminable. Then L is independently
generated.
Proof. Let M := fi : for no j < i: Aj = Aig. Furthermore, let
B(i) = fj : Ai = Ajg. Thus, M consists of all minimal members of the
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sets B(i). Now let m and n be unary partial functions with the follow-
ing action. m(j) is undeﬁned if j is maximal in M , and otherwise it is
m(j) := minfk : k 2M; j < kg. n(j) is undeﬁned if j is maximal in B(j),
and n(j) := minfk : k 2 B(j); k > jg otherwise.
We need three sets of functions in addition to constants for the mem-
bers of f0g  A0. The ﬁrst contains the functions fk, k < n. Deﬁne the
sequences Ai as above, with the exception that we require Ai = Aj if
B(i) = B(j) (that is, if Ai = Aj).
fk((i; j0); (i; j1);    ; (i; jn 1)) :=
(
(m(i); h) if i 2 M , hj0; j1;    ; jn 1i = Ai
undeﬁned else (3)
The second set consists of the hk, k < n.
hk((i; j0); (i; j1);    ; (i; jn 1)) :=
(
(n(i); ik) hj0; j1;    ; jn 1i = Ai
undeﬁned else (4)
Finally, we deﬁne the function g as above:
g((i; j0); (i; j1);    ; (i; jn)) :=
8>>><>>>:
(i; ki0) if hj0; j1;    ; jn 1i = Ai
and jn = jn 1, i 6= 0
(i; kip+1) if hj0; j1;    ; jn 1i = Ai
and jn = kip, p+ 1 < i
undeﬁned else
(5)
These functions are independent.
Again, we need to show that (i) L is generated from the functions,
and (ii) L is closed under these functions. As for (i), we note that by
deﬁnition, we can generate all Ai where i 2 M from f0g  A0. Next, we
can generate the fjg  Aj for all j 2 B(j) just by applying the hk, since
we have generated its minimal members. Third, by using g we generate
the columns Li.
Now we show that L is also closed under the functions. Consider
fk((i0; j0); (i1; j1);    ; (in 1; jn 1))
This is deﬁned only if i := i0 = i1 =    = in 1 2M and hj0; j1;    ; jn 1i=
Aq for some q. By deﬁnition of M , for two numbers p; q 2 M , Ap 6= Aq,
and so q = i. The value (m(i); h) is in Am(i) by deﬁnition of fk. Next
consider
hk((i0; j0); (i1; j1);    ; (in 1; jn 1))
This is deﬁned only if i := i0 = i1 =    = in 1, and hj0; j1;    ; jn 1i = Aq
for some q. The value is (n(i); jk); while jk is again in Aq, the new index
is n(i). However, by choice of the function n, An(i) = Ai, so we get a value
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from An(q). Thus, these functions are only deﬁned on
S
qfqgAq and yield
values in that set.
Finally, we need to show that L is closed under g. Consider
g((i0; j0);    ; (in; jn))
This is deﬁned only if i := i0 = i1 =    = in and hj0;    ; jn 1i = Aq for
some q. Now, suppose that Aq = fj0;    ; jn 1g  Li. Then by assumption
on weak discriminability, Lq  Li. Hence, two cases arise. (i) q = i. Then
by deﬁnition of g, the value is in Li. (ii) p 6= i. Then, since the value is in
Lq, and Lq  Li, it is also in Li. 
Deﬁnition 18. Call L boundedly discriminable if there are numbers
n and n0, an inﬁnite set M  ! and a family fAi : i 2 Mg of sets such
that the following holds:
1. for each i 2M , jAij  n;
2. for each i 2M : Ai  Li;
3. for each i 2 M , the set B(i) := fj : Ai  Ljg has at most n0
elements; and
4. for each i; j 2M , i 6= j, B(i) \B(j) = ?.
Every n-discriminable language is boundedly discriminable; just takeM :=
!. The sets B(i) each have only one member in this case, so n0 := 1.
Actually, it follows that for each i; j 2 M , i 6= j, Ai 6= Aj . For if
i; j 2 M and i 6= j, the last clause implies j 62 B(i), that is, Aj * Lj , so
that Aj 6= Ai, since Ai  Li.
Notice that allowing M to be ﬁnite would not gain anything, as then
the set of indices would be ﬁnite, bounded by some multiple of jM j. So the
only remaining interesting case is where M is inﬁnite. Moreover, we could
assume n = n0 to simplify the deﬁnition.
Theorem 19. Suppose that L is boundedly discriminable. Then L is in-
dependently generated.
Proof. Without loss of generality we may assume that all the i 2M
are minimal in B(i); in particular, the least element of B(0) is 0 2 M . If
i 62 M let j < i be the least element of B(i). Then j 2 M and we put
Aj := Ai.
First we introduce constants for f0gA0. Next we introduce functions
fk and hk, k < n, as in the previous proof. Finally, for k < n0, let zk be an
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n+1-ary function, deﬁned similar to g above. Let P (i; k) be the statement:
i is the kth number in B(i). As before, order the elements of Li   Ai for
each i 2 !, and align the elements of Ai in a sequence kij of length n.
zk((i; j0); (i; j1);    ; (i; jn)) :=
8>>><>>>:
(i; ki0) if hj0; j1;    ; jn 1i = Ai
P (i; k) and jn = jn 1, i 6= 0
(i; kip+1) if hj0; j1;    ; jn 1i = Ai
P (i; k) and jn = kip, p+ 1 < i
undeﬁned else
(6)
It remains that to show that (i) the functions generate L, (ii) L is closed
under these functions. (i) is reasonably clear. We generate Ai, i 2 M ,
using the functions fk, and then all the Ai using the gk as in the previous
proof. Finally, the zk allow to generate all of Li for P (i; k). Since for each
number i there is a k < n0 such that P (i; k), we generate Li from Ai using
zk essentially as we used g. Now on to (ii). Closure under fk. Consider
fk((i0; j0); (i1; j1);    ; (in 1; jn 1))
This is deﬁned only if i := i0 = i1 =    = in 1 2 M and hj0;    ; jn 1i 2
Ai; and in that case it yields the kth member of Aj , j the next member of
M . Closure under hk. Pretty much as in the previous proof. Closure under
zk. Consider
zk((i0; j0); (i1; j1);    ; (in; jn))
If this is deﬁned, i := i0 = i1 =    = in, i is the kth member of B(i), and
Aq = hj0;    ; jn 1i for some q. If zk is deﬁned, we know from q alone the
identity of i. Thus, Li is known in the second component. Now if Aq  Li,
then q 2 B(i) and so Aq = Ai. Now by assumption either jn = jn 1,
and we get the least member of Li   Ai according to the enumeration (if
i > 0). Or else we get the next member according to the enumeration. 
5. Progressive functions
The method has so far been to enumerate L by going through the Li in
increasing order. The interest in this method stems from using grammars
to generate languages. We think of a grammar as producing complex ex-
pressions from less complex expressions. In that sense, a formation step
produces a strictly more complex expression. Consider now an ordering
of the E of expressions in increasing complexity. Extend this to a linear
order, and number the expressions with natural numbers. We expect now
that the meaning of expression j is produced from some of the expressions
0; 1    ; j   1. This way of generating expressions is called progressive.
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Deﬁnition 20. Let f be a partial n-ary function on !. A point of pro-
gressivity is a vector ~x such that f(~x) > max1in xi (henceforth simply
written max ~x). A point of stagnation is a vector ~x such that f(~x) =
max ~x. A point of regression is a vector ~x such that f(~x) < max ~x. f is
called strictly progressive if it has no points of stagnation or regression.
f is weakly progressive if it has no points of regression. Finally, a set
of functions is strictly or weakly progressive if all its members are.
We extend this now to functions on !2 as follows. If f is an indepen-
dent function on !2 then it has the form (f1(~x); f2(~y)). We say that f is
(strictly, weakly) progressive if f1 is.
The functions in the previous proofs have generally been weakly pro-
gressive. The following theorem shows why we cannot strengthen this to
strongly progressive functions.
Theorem 21. There is a L  !2 which cannot be generated by a ﬁnite
strictly progressive set of independent partial functions.
Proof. Suppose that F is a ﬁnite set of strictly progressive indepen-
dent partial functions. Let  be the cardinality of F , and  the maximal
arity of these functions. We may wlog assume that  = . Then by pro-
gressivity, a member from Li is obtained by applying a function to the
members of Sj<i Lj . If their number is bounded by ki, then there are at
most ki elements. Thus, choose the following sequence of numbers.
0 :=1
i+1:=(i+ 1)
i+1
i
This sequence is strictly increasing. Moreover, for each choice of  and 
there is i such that
i+1 > 
0@X
ji
i
1A
To see this, note that Pji i  ii  2i , since i > i (except for i =
0; 1; 2). Then
2+1 = (2 + 1)
2+1
2 > (2 + 1)
0@X
ji
2
1A
Now deﬁne
L := f(i; j) : j < ig
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Then jLij = i for all i. It follows that for i = 2 +1 there are not enough
functions to generate the elements of L2+1 for the elements with lower
index. 
6. Conclusion
We have shown that all countable languages are compositional and au-
tonomous. Moreover, some results have been obtained concerning lan-
guages that are independently generated. However, it is open whether
all countable languages are independently generated. It is also unclear
whether or not allowing partial functions rather than total functions makes
a diﬀerence.
The conjecture is that there exist nonindependent countable lan-
guages. However, no example has been found.
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ABSTRACT
Vowel quantity is phonologically distinctive in Hungarian. Over years, the
quantity opposition has become rather unstable in high vowels, espe-
cially in unstressed positions. This paper investigates the role of analogy
by frequency and that of functional load. Due to the overall higher fre-
quency of short vowels in all vowel classes including low vowels, results
provide no evidence for the impact of frequency-based neutralisation.
Differences show high functional load for low vowels, but low functional
load for high and mid vowels. The potential communicative loss con-
nected to the opposition in low vowels could explain the stability of their
opposition.
1. The Hungarian vowel system
Hungarian has traditionally been described as a language with a phono-
logical quantity distinction for both vowels and consonants. While the
relevance of this feature for consonants has been questioned by Siptár
(1995) based on the small number of minimal pairs and their restricted
distribution, the quantity distinction for vowels is unquestionably a rele-
vant feature according to both phonetic and phonological descriptions. The
vowels i–í, ü–ű, u–ú, o–ó, ö–ő, where the accent sign marks long quantity,
not stress, correspond to the vowel qualities /i–i:/, /y–y:/, /u–u:/, /o–o:/,
/ø–ø:/ and are accounted for as ﬁve pairs distinguished primarily by length.
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The remaining vowels, a–á and e–é, are classiﬁed in a diﬀerent manner in
form-oriented (phonetic) and function-oriented (phonological) frameworks.
Phonetic descriptions take into account that these vowels do not only diﬀer
by quantity, but also by quality, the latter being the primary cue. Accord-
ing to traditional descriptions, short a is a back, mid-low, rounded vowel
/O/, while long á corresponds to a central, low, and unrounded /a:/. In
Mády (2008) it was argued that vowel height is not necessarily distinctive
between a and á, since the somewhat smaller jaw opening of a can be
explained by the fact that the vowel is rounded: Hungarian /y/ was also
produced with a smaller jaw opening than its unrounded equivalent /i/
in this articulography study. Nevertheless, the a vowels /ɒ/ and /a:/ are
obviously distinguished by at least one quality feature next to quantity.
The same is true for e and é, of which the short vowel corresponds to
a somewhat lowered open-mid front unrounded /E/, and the long one to
close-mid front unrounded /e:/. The vowel system of Standard Hungarian
does not contain any other vowels such as reduced ones or diphthongs.
Phonologists, on the other hand, encounter phonological processes in
which /ɒ/ alternates with /a:/ and /E/ with /e:/ in exactly the same
way as short and long mid and high vowels do. One such rule is Final
Stem Vowel Shortening: in certain stems, a long vowel is replaced by its
short counterpart if a given suﬃx is added to the stem, e.g., kút /ku:t/
‘well’–kutak /kutɒk/ ‘wells’, kéz /ke:z/ ‘hand’–kezel /kEzEl/ ‘handle’, sár
/Sa:r/ ‘mud’–sarat /sɒrɒt/ ‘mud-ACC’. Another example is Internal Stem
Vowel Shortening that is triggered by certain suﬃxes such as -ál, -ikus etc.,
e.g., aktív /ɒkti:v/ ‘active’–aktivál /ɒktiva:l/ ‘activate’, kultúra /kultu:r6/
‘culture’–kulturális /kultura:liS/ ‘cultural’. (See Siptár & Törkenczy 2000,
58–62 for a detailed description.) In this paper we will accept the assump-
tion that the vowels /ɒ/–/a:/ and /E/–/e:/ are vowel pairs with quantity
as a distinctive feature, regardless of their diﬀerent qualities, for reasons
to be explained below.
Vowel length in Hungarian is encoded by orthography: long vowels are
marked by an accent aigu sign, short vowels by the absence of it (e.g., ó-o,
ő-ö for /o/ and /ø/, the umlaut marking front rounded vowels). This has
two consequences: ﬁrst, native Hungarian speakers are consciously aware
of vowel quantity, second, the pronunciation norm is conserved by orthog-
raphy to some extent.
Given this, it might appear surprising that quantity is not consistently
realised in the way orthography would suggest. For example, the compound
word kórház ‘hospital’ is often produced as /korha:z/, i.e., with a short
/o/, in Educated Colloquial Hungarian (a variety widely accepted all over
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the country), although the lexemes kór ‘disease’ and ház ‘house’ are both
pronounced with long vowels. This discrepancy between orthography and
the usual pronunciation of a word does not involve mid vowels very often,
but it is frequent for the high vowels u, y, and i. While there are some
examples where an orthographically short vowel is produced as a long one
in colloquial speech (such as dicsér ‘praise’ that is pronounced as /di:Ùe:r/
by many speakers), the vast majority of the discrepancies involves cases in
which long graphemes are produced as short vowels (e.g., címke /ʦimkE/
‘label’). The shortening tendency is even more advanced in unstressed
syllables. Siptár and Törkenczy (2000) claim that the quantity distinction
for high vowels is missing completely in word-ﬁnal position, at least in
Educated Colloquial Hungarian.
In this paper, the relevance of the distribution of short and long vowels
is investigated, with a special focus on syllables carrying higher or lower
prominence. Hungarian has ﬁxed word-level stress that is always word-
initial. Syllables with lexical stress are potential carriers of sentence-level
pitch accents. Thus, the distribution of short and long vowels in these
syllables might have a diﬀerent impact on the preservation of the vowel
quantity distinction.
The structure of this paper is as follows: in section 2, a short di-
achronic overview of quantity variation in dialects is given. In section 3,
the frequency of short and long vowels in a type and a token word list is
analysed. In section 4, the potential interplay between the functional load
of a quantity opposition and its preservation is investigated.
2. Dialectal variation
There is considerable variation in the distribution of high short and long
vowels across the regional varieties of Hungarian. In large parts of West-
ern Hungary, the vowel system does not contain long high vowels at all
(Kálmán 1989). On the other hand, a prevalence of long high vowels can
be observed in the Eastern Hungarian dialects, in which many short vowels
of the standard variety are lengthened, especially in stressed (i.e., word-
initial) syllables. According to Benkő (1957), short vowel lengthening in
the Eastern dialects took place from the 16th century on, and the oppo-
site tendency to shorten long vowels in the Western regions is at least this
old. Benkő explains the instability of these vowels by the process of the
Final Stem Vowel Shortening (see above): while in the Eastern dialects
the shortening rule often failed to apply to suﬃxed stems and resulted in
a higher number of long vowels, the Western region shortened vowels in
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unsuﬃxed stems analogously to their suﬃxed forms as opposed to Central
Hungarian dialects on which today’s standard is based. (E.g., Eastern út
‘road’, útazik ‘travel’, as opposed to Central út, utazik, and Western viz
‘water’, vizes ‘wet’ as opposed to Central víz, vizes.)
Another change in vowel quantity was the shortening of word-ﬁnal
long /u:/ and /y:/ that included large regions both in West and East (in
the West it also applied to /i:/). Since word-ﬁnal vowels in polysyllabic
words are always unstressed in Hungarian, Benkő (1957) suggests that the
shortening process is due to the missing prominence in these syllables.
Although the same process did not take place in Central Hungary, it is
remarkable that vowel shortening in unstressed syllables has become part
of today’s Colloquial Educated Hungarian that is also spoken in the capital
Budapest in Central Hungary.
According to Benkő, the quantity change in stressed syllables was
triggered by the coexistence of stems with long and short word-ﬁnal vowels
in their unsuﬃxed and suﬃxed forms. However, as described above, this
rule is not restricted to high vowels, on the contrary, it mostly applies
to stems with low vowels (for an exhaustive list, see Siptár 2003, 311).
The few stems that include word-ﬁnal mid vowels are special: in course
of the shortening process, a /v/ is inserted after the vowel, e.g., ló ‘horse’
vs. lovak ‘horses’. Thus, the systematic shortening of stem vowels alone
cannot account for the variable quantity of high vowels.
3. Distribution of short and long vowels
3.1. Frequency in types
Another potential reason for the shortening of long high vowels is their
lower frequency in the language. According to Gósy (2004), long vowels
are far less frequent in Hungarian than short ones. The proportion of long
vowels is given with 21% among all vowels, long /y:/ being the most un-
frequent one (ibid., 85ﬀ).
A further question is whether the distribution of long and short vowels
is identical across word-initial (= stressed and potentially accented) and
non-initial (always non-prominent) syllables. A lower occurrence of long
vowels in non-initial syllables could explain the shortening tendency in an
analogy-based framework.
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Type analysis was performed on a word list consisting of 29,245 lem-
mas based on the lexical entries in Magyar értelmező kéziszótár (Pusztai
2003). The list contained word stems (such as asztal ‘table’) and derived
forms (such as asztalos ‘carpenter’), but not words with inﬂectional suf-
ﬁxes such as plural forms, since the latter are not separate lexicon entries.
Frequency counts for vowels are given in Table 1. Since there is no
general agreement on the corresponding IPA symbols in the literature,
orthographic symbols are used.
Table 1: Frequency of vowels in lexicon entries in Magyar értelmező Kéziszótár
Vowel Word-initial syllable Non-initial syllable Sum
a 5804 10130 15934
á 2121 6387 8508
e 6016 9990 16006
é 1823 3554 5377
i 3926 8420 12346
í 532 1188 1720
o 3673 6766 10439
ó 686 2938 3624
ö 1295 1143 2438
ő 339 1382 1721
u 1749 2742 4491
ú 417 484 901
ü 610 512 1122
ű 221 350 571
Figures 1 and 2 (overleaf) show the frequency of short and long vowels in
the dataset, consisting of 85 198 vowels altogether, 29 212 of which occurred
in the ﬁrst syllable of the word (34%). The amount of short vowels was
62 776 (74%).
Given that the proportion of non-initial syllable positions was sub-
stantially higher, the ratios reported in the ﬁgures were calculated based
on the overall count of vowels in word-initial vs. non-initial syllables, e.g.,
the absolute frequency of short /o/ in the word-initial syllable was divided
by the number of all vowels in the same position.
K + K = 120 / p. 374 / May 3, 2019
374 Katalin Mády – Uwe D. Reichel
a e i o ø u y
o
cc
u
rr
e
n
ce
 r
a
tio
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
Frequency of short vowels
types based on dictionary entries
initial
non−initial
Figure 1: Frequency of short vowels in lemmata. Dark grey: vowels in word-initial
syllables, light grey: vowels in non-initial syllables.
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Figure 2: Frequency of long vowels in lemmata. Dark grey: vowels in word-initial
syllables, light grey: vowels in non-initial syllables.
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The amount of short vowels in word-initial syllable position was higher
than in non-initial syllables, except for /i/. At the same time, long vowels
occurred more often in non-initial syllables in most vowel pairs. A pos-
sible reason for this could be that certain derivational suﬃxes with high
frequency contain long vowels, such as -ás/-és, -ság/-ség.
Interestingly, vowel frequency did pattern with the three categories
high, mid and low. Short /E/ was the most frequent vowel closely followed
by short /ɒ/, and also their long equivalents were more frequent than the
other ﬁve vowels. The low frequency of the other high vowels /u/, /y/ is
in line with the analogy hypothesis. On the other hand, the frequency of
long /i:/ was almost identical with that of long /ø:/, while /i/ alone is
involved in the shortening process described in the literature. Thus, the
tendency observed in the type-based word list does not support the analogy
by frequency hypothesis.
3.2. Frequency in tokens
Type frequency by itself is not necessarily informative about the actual
occurrence of long vowels in spoken language for various reasons. First,
token frequency is not taken into account. Second, inﬂexional suﬃxes that
do not occur in the list of lexical entries discussed above contain more often
short than long vowels in Hungarian. Third, the frequency of certain types
in colloquial speech can substantially diﬀer from the word list discussed in
the previous section.
For this reason, spoken language data from a maptask corpus was
used to analyse the distribution of short and long vowels in spontaneous
speech. The corpus contains data from 27 speakers between 18 and 63
years, including 13 female and 14 male speakers. Dialectal background
and social status of speakers diﬀered (see Mády 2010a for more detail).
The database was created for the acoustic analysis of short and long
vowels in identical consonantal environments. On one of the maps, a path
along various objects was marked. The speaker with this map was supposed
to guide the second speaker along this path by verbally explaining the
route. As can bee seen in Figure 3, the two maps were not completely
identical, resulting in vivid discussions during the recording session. The
maps used for the task are shown in Figure 3 (overleaf).
The overall length of the speech material was 115 minutes. Record-
ings were transcribed into their orthographic form, i.e., according to the
grapheme system of Hungarian using the canonical form of words. The ma-
terial was segmented into word forms. Unﬁnished forms due to interruption
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Figure 3: Maps used for the task. Left: ﬁrst speaker’s map, right: second speaker’s
map.
were removed from the list. Since target words were partly invented geo-
graphical names such as Szákos-patak referring to a stream that are not
part of everyday language usage, proper names were not taken into account
for further analysis.
One of our research questions is whether the frequency of short and
long vowels located in potentially prominent (i.e., pitch-accented) syllables
is identical. However, not every word can carry a pitch accent. Therefore,
deﬁnite and indeﬁnite articles such as a ‘the’, non-accentable conjunctions
such as és ‘and’, ha ‘if’ and modal particles such as hát ‘well’ were excluded
from the analysis. Admittedly, this procedure is blind for the presence of
pitch accents on these words. For example, the indeﬁnite article egy ‘a’ is
homophonous with the numeral egy ‘one’, and the latter usually carries a
pitch accent. Since manual checking of the accent patterns was not possible
in this case, all tokens of this type were disregarded. Other words that can
function both as a content or a function word, e.g., fog ‘grab’ or a future
auxiliary, were regarded as potential prominence carrier units and were
included in the analysis.
K + K = 120 / p. 377 / May 3, 2019
Analogy by frequency and functional load 377
The ﬁnal dataset contained 17,916 vowels, 9024 of which were located
in word-initial syllables (50%), and 13,475 were short ones (75%). The high
proportion of vowels in word-initial syllables was due to the overall high
occurrence of monosyllabic words such as verbal preﬁxes.
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Figure 4: Frequency of short vowels in spontaneous speech. Dark grey: vowels in
word-initial syllables, light grey: vowels in non-initial syllables.
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Figure 5: Frequency of long vowels in spontaneous speech. Dark grey: vowels in
word-initial syllables, light grey: vowels in non-initial syllables.
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The distribution of short vowels was partly diﬀerent from the frequency
counts in the word list. Here, /E/ was by large the most frequent vowel.
This is in line with the wide-spread assumption that this sound is the
most frequent one in Hungarian, but it diﬀers from frequency data based
on the lexicon entries where /ɒ/ was only slightly less frequent than /E/.
It is interesting that /i/ was extremely unfrequent in unstressed syllables.
The relative frequencies of long vowels show a similar pattern to type
frequencies, with the exception of /u:/.
The distributional data do not favour the hypothesis that the small
number of long high vowels could be responsible for the preference for short
high vowels. First, /i:/ is not less frequent than /ø:/. Second, not only
high, but all long vowels are less frequent both in stressed and unstressed
positions than short ones.
4. Functional load of quantity oppositions
Next to the vowel frequency analyses we investigated whether the func-
tional load of a quantity opposition could account for its preservation.
We hypothesise that oppositions with a high functional load are more sta-
ble than oppositions for which the functional load is low. The importance
of the opposition is quantiﬁed by two measures described in the following.
4.1. Functional load
The functional load (FL) of a phonological opposition of the phonemes a
and b is related to the number of contrasts this opposition is responsible
for in a language L. The information-theoretic deﬁnition adopted here was
ﬁrst introduced in Hockett (1967):
FL(a; b) = H(L) H(La=b)
H(L)
H(L) is the entropy of a language L. La=b denotes a language lacking
an opposition of a and b. FL(a; b) thus stands for the relative amount of
information loss resulting from such a merging, reﬂecting the increase of
homophones.
L and La=b are the sets of word types w ofMagyar értelmező kéziszótár
before and after vowel merging, respectively. Merging or neutralisation
means that in the second lexicon, long vowels were replaced by their short
counterpart in all stems. From the word type frequencies contained in this
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dictionary, maximum likelihood probabilities were calculated in order to
derive the entropies for L and La=b as follows:
H(L) =  
X
w2L
p(w) log2 p(w)
H(La=b) =
X
w2La=b
p(w) log2 p(w)
The frequencies for merged types in La=b were simply obtained by summing
up the frequencies of all types of L undergoing this merging after the
neutralisation of the opposition of a and b.
4.2. Type number ratio
Since the FL is calculated over the entire lexicon, it does not normalise for
vowel-related frequencies, that in turn determine the number of resulting
homophones after quantity merging. FL is positively correlated with vowel
frequency, since the merging of frequent vowels results in more homophones
so that their quantity opposition receives a high functional load.
In order to reduce this frequency bias, we additionally calculated the
ratio of those types only, that are aﬀected by a vowel quantity merging. As
an example, for the merging of /u:/ we considered only those words that
contain the letter u and/or ú. For these types we derived the ratio Na/Nb,
where Nb denotes the number of types before merging and Na denotes the
number of types after merging.
4.3. Word stress
In order to test the impact of word stress on quantity merging, we applied
the two measures for three diﬀerent vowel merging scenarios: (1) in all
syllables, (2) in the word-stressed (initial) syllable only, and (3) in all non-
stressed (non-initial) syllables only.
4.4. Results
The functional loads and type number ratios for each vowel pairing are
shown in Figures 6 and 7, respectively. Important oppositions are indicated
by a high functional load and a low type number ratio.
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Figure 6: Functional loads of vowel quantity oppositions over the entire word
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Figure 7: Type number ratios of vowel quantity oppositions over the entire word
(top-left), in word-initial stressed position (top-right), and in non-initial
unstressed position (bottom)
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Based on Figure 6 for the impact of functional load on quantity preserva-
tion, the following conclusions can be drawn:
– The quantity oppositions for /e, a/ have the highest functional loads,
which – in line with our hypothesis – prevents them to undergo quan-
tity merging. This merging would result in a signiﬁcant decrease in
lexical contrasts and therefore an increase in ambiguity.
– Over the entire word, /i, u, y/ quantity oppositions have the lowest
functional loads. Thus it is not crucial to maintain these oppositions,
and indeed, these vowels are least stable in preserving them.
– Also word-initially the functional loads of /i, u, y/ quantity opposi-
tions are the lowest, so that the absence of these oppositions e.g., in
Western Hungarian does not lead to a communicative loss.
– However, in non-initial syllables also the quantity opposition for /ø/
has a low functional load, but against the expectation for this vowel
the quantity opposition is maintained.
For the type number ratios shown in Figure 7 we obtained the same ten-
dencies.
– For /a, e/ the lowest ratios were measured, again well explaining the
stability of their quantity contrasts in order not to drastically increase
the number of homophones.
– /i, u, y/ show high ratios, especially in non-initial syllables, indicating
only a negligible increase of ambiguity in case of quantity merging.
– However, high ratios are given also for /o, ø/.
5. Discussion and conclusions
Vowel statistics, i.e., analogy by frequency did not turn out to play a crucial
role in explaining varying degrees of the stability of quantity oppositions.
The functional load of an opposition, however, was found to have an impact
on maintaining quantity contrasts. A high functional load is a suﬃcient
motivation to maintain such contrasts. The reverse case, i.e., when a low
functional load leads to quantity merging, holds for high vowels.
The quantity opposition in mid vowels might be subject to an ongoing
sound change process. Perception experiments in Mády (2010b) and Mády
(2012) show that the perceptual boundary between long and short /o/ in
word-ﬁnal position is shifted towards the short vowel in young speakers,
but not in the older group. Young participants categorised both shorter and
more centralised /o/ segments as long vowels, whereas a segment had to
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be longer and more centralised to be identiﬁed as a long /o:/ by listeners
above 50 years. Thus, the quantity distinction might become less stable
also for mid vowels within a certain time range. This development would
again be well explainable by the low functional load of mid-vowel quantity
oppositions.
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ABSTRACT
We analyze whether different sense vectors of the same word form in
multi-sense word embeddings correspond to different concepts. On the
more technical side of embedding-based dictionary induction, we also
test whether the orthogonality constraint and related vector prepro-
cessing techniques help in reverse nearest neighbor search. Both ques-
tions receive a negative answer.
Word sense induction (WSI) is the task of discovering senses of words
without supervision (Schütze 1998). Recent approaches include multi-sense
word embeddings (MSEs), i.e., vector space models of word distribution
with more vectors for ambiguous words. In MSEs, each vector is sup-
posed to correspond to a diﬀerent word sense, but in practice models fre-
quently have diﬀerent sense vectors for the same word form without an
interpretable diﬀerence in meaning.
In Borbély et al. (2016), we proposed a cross-lingual method for the
evaluation of sense resolution in MSEs. The method is based on the princi-
ple that words may be ambiguous to the extent to which their postulated
senses translate to diﬀerent words in some other language. For the transla-
tion of words, we applied the method by Mikolov et al. (2013b) who train a
translation mapping from the source language embedding to the target as
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a least-squares regression supervised by a seed dictionary of the few thou-
sand most frequent words. The translation of a source word vector is the
nearest neighbor of its image by the mapping in the target space. In the
multi-sense setting, we have translated from MSEs. (The target embedding
remained single-sense.)
Section 1 discusses our linguistic motivation and section 2 introduces
MSEs. In section 3, we elaborate on the cross-lingual evaluation. Part
of the evaluation task is to decide on empirical grounds whether diﬀer-
ent good translations of a word are synonyms or translations in diﬀerent
senses. Reverse nearest neighbor search, the orthogonality constraint on
the translation mapping, and related techniques are also discussed. Section
4 oﬀers experimental results with quantitative and qualitative analysis. It
should be noted that our evaluation is not very strict, but rather a process
of looking for something conceptually meaningful in present-day unsuper-
vised MSE models. We make our Hungarian multi-sense embeddings1 and
the code for these experiments2 available on the web.
1. Towards a less delicious inventory
We emphasize that our evaluation proposal probes an aspect of MSEs,
semantic resolution, which is not well measured by the well-known word
sense disambiguation (WSD) task that aims at classifying occurrences of
a word form to diﬀerent elements of a sense inventory pre-deﬁned by some
experts. Our goal in WSI is to probe the granularity of the inventory
itself. The diﬀerentiation of word senses, as already noted in Borbély et al.
(2016), is fraught with diﬃculties, especially when we wish to distinguish
homophony, i.e., using the same written or spoken form to express diﬀerent
concepts, such as Russian mir ‘world’ and mir ‘peace’ from polysemy,
where speakers feel that the two senses are very strongly connected, such
as in Hungarian nap ‘day’ and nap ‘sun’.
The goal of WSI can be set at two levels. We may more modestly
aim to distinguish homophony from polysemy. Ideally, we could even dif-
ferentiate between metonymy and metaphor, two subtypes of polysemy,
discussed in more detail in the next section.
1 https://hlt.bme.hu/en/publ/makrai17
2 https://github.com/makrai/wsi-fest
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ﬁnom
durva
ﬁnom
ízletes
ﬁne
coarse
delicious
tasty
Figure 1: Linear translation of word senses. The Hungarian word ﬁnom is am-
biguous between ‘ﬁne’ and ‘delicious’.
1.1. Lexicographic background
Lexical ambiguity is linguistically subdivided into two main categories:
homonymy and polysemy (Cruse 2004). Homonymous words have seman-
tically unrelated and mutually incompatible meanings, such as punch1,
which means ‘a blow with a ﬁst’, and punch2, which means ‘a drink’. Some
have described such homonymous word meanings as essentially distinct
words that accidentally have the same phonology (Murphy 2002). Polyse-
mous words, on the other hand, have semantically related or overlapping
senses (Cruse 2004; Jackendoﬀ 2002; Pustejovsky 1995), such as mouth
meaning both ‘organ of body’ and ‘entrance of cave’.
Two criteria have been proposed for the distinction between homonymy
and polysemy. The ﬁrst criterion has to do with the etymological derivation
of words. Words that are historically derived from distinct lexical items
are taken to be homonymous. However, the etymological criterion is not
always decisive. One reason is that there are many words whose historical
derivation is uncertain. Another reason is that it is not always very clear
how far back we should go in tracing the history of words (Lyons 1977).
The second criterion for the distinction between homonymy and poly-
semy has to do with the relatedness/unrelatedness of meaning. The distinc-
tion between homonymy and polysemy seems to correlate with the native
speaker’s feeling that certain meanings are connected and that others are
not. Generally, unrelatedness in meaning points to homonymy, whereas
relatedness in meaning points to polysemy. However, in a large number of
cases, there does not seem to be an agreement among native speakers as
to whether the meanings of the words are related. So, it seems that there
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is not a clear dichotomy between homonymy and polysemy, but rather
a continuum from ‘‘pure’’ homonymy to ‘‘pure’’ polysemy (Lyons 1977).
Most discussions about lexical ambiguity, within theoretical and com-
putational linguistics, concentrate on polysemy, which can be further di-
vided into two types (Apresjan 1974; Pustejovsky 1995). The ﬁrst type of
polysemy is motivated by metaphor (irregular polysemy). In metaphorical
polysemy, a relation of analogy is assumed to hold between the senses of
the word. The basic sense of metaphorical polysemy is literal, whereas its
secondary sense is ﬁgurative. For example, the ambiguous word eye has the
literal basic sense ‘organ of the body’ and the ﬁgurative secondary sense
‘hole in a needle.’ The other type of polysemy is motivated by metonymy
(regular polysemy). In metonymy, the relation that is assumed to hold
between the senses of the word is that of contiguity or connectedness.
In metonymic polysemy, both the basic and the secondary senses are lit-
eral. For example, the ambiguous word chicken has the literal basic sense
referring to the animal and the literal secondary sense of the meat of
that animal.
2. Multi-sense word embeddings
Vector-space language models with more vectors for each meaning of a
word originate from Reisinger & Mooney (2010). Huang et al. (2012)
trained the ﬁrst neural-network-based MSE. Both works use a uniform
number of clusters for all words that they select before training as poten-
tially ambiguous. The ﬁrst system with adaptive sense numbers and an ef-
fective open-source implementation is a modiﬁcation of skip-gram (Mikolov
et al. 2013c), multi-sense skip-gram by Neelakantan et al. (2014), where
new senses are introduced during training by thresholding the similarity
of the present context to earlier contexts.
Bartunov et al. (2016) and Li & Jurafsky (2015) improve upon the
heuristic thresholding by formulating text generation as a Dirichlet pro-
cess. In AdaGram (Bartunov et al. 2016), senses may be merged as well
as allocated during training. mutli-sense skip-gram3 (Li & Jurafsky 2015)
applies the Chinese restaurant process formalization of the Dirichlet pro-
cess. neela, AdaGram, and mutli have a parameter for semantics resolution
(more or less senses): , , and , respectively.
3 Note the l $ t metathesis in the name of the repo which is the only way of distin-
guishing it from the other two multi-sense skip-gram models.
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MSEs are still in the research phase: Li & Jurafsky (2015) demonstrate
that, when meta-parameters are carefully controlled for, MSEs introduce a
slight performance boost in semantics-related tasks (semantic similarity for
words and sentences, semantic relation identiﬁcation, part-of-speech tag-
ging), but similar improvements can also be achieved by simply increasing
the dimension of a single-sense embedding.
3. Linear translation from MSEs
Mikolov et al. (2013b) discovered that embeddings of diﬀerent languages
are so similar that a linear transformation can map vectors of the source
language words to the vectors of their translations.
The method uses a seed dictionary of a few thousand words to learn
translation as a linear mapping W : Rd1 ! Rd2 from the source (monolin-
gual) embedding to the target: the translation zi 2 Rd2 of a source word
xi 2 Rd1 is approximately its image Wxi by the mapping. The translation
model is trained with linear regression on the seed dictionary
min
W
X
i
jjWxi   zijj2
and can be used to collect translations for the whole vocabulary by choos-
ing zi to be the nearest neighbor (NN) of Wxi. We follow Mikolov et al.
(2013b) in (i) using diﬀerent metrics, Euclidean distance in training and
cosine similarity in collection of translations, and in (ii) training the source
model with approximately three times greater dimension than that of the
target embedding.
In a multi-sense embedding scenario, Borbély et al. (2016) take an
MSE as the source model, and a single-sense embedding as target. The
quality of the translation has been measured by training on the most fre-
quent 5k word pairs and evaluating on another 1k seed pairs.
3.1. Reverse nearest neighbor search
A common problem when looking for nearest neighbors in high-dimensional
spaces (Radovanović et al. 2010; Suzuki et al. 2013; Tomašev & Mladenic
2013), and especially in embedding-based dictionary induction (Dinu et al.
2015; Lazaridou et al. 2015) is when there are hubs, data points (target
words) returned as the NN (translation) of many points (Wxs), resulting in
incorrect hits (translations) in most of the cases. Dinu et al. (2015) attack
the problem with a method they call global correction. Here, instead of
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the original NN, which we will call forward NN search to contrast with the
more sophisticated method, they ﬁrst rank source words by their similarity
to target words. In reverse nearest neighbor (rNN) search, source words
are translated to the target words to which they have the lowest (forward)
NN rank.4
In reverse NN search, we restricted the vocabulary to the some tens
of thousands of the most frequent words. We introduced this restriction
for memory saving, because the jVsrj  jVtgj similarity matrix has to be
sorted column-wise for forward and row-wise for reverse ranking, so at
some point of the computation we keep the whole integer matrix of forward
NN ranks in memory. It turned out that the restriction makes the results
better: a vocabulary cutoﬀ of 215 = 32768 both on the source and the
target size yields slightly better results (74.3%) than the more ambitious
216 = 65536 (73.9%). This is not the case for forward NN search, where
accuracy increases with vocabulary limit (but remains far below that of
reverse NN).
3.2. Orthogonal restriction and other tricks
Xing et al. (2015) note that the original linear translation method is the-
oretically inconsistent due to its being based on three diﬀerent similarity
measures: word2vec itself uses the dot-product of unnormalized vectors,
the translation is trained based on Euclidean distance, and neighbors are
queried based on cosine similarity. They make the framework more coher-
ent by length-normalizing the embeddings, and restricting W to preserve
vector length: their matrixW is orthogonal, i.e., the mapping is a rotation.
Faruqui & Dyer (2014) achieve even better results by mapping the two em-
beddings to a lower-dimensional bilingual space with canonical correlation
analysis. Artetxe et al. (2016) analyze elements of these two works both
theoretically and empirically, and ﬁnd a combination that improves upon
dictionary generation and also preserves analogies Mikolov (2013d) like
woman+ king man  queen
among the mapped points Wxi. They ﬁnd that the orthogonality con-
straint is key to preserve performance in analogies, and it also improves
bilingual performance. In their experiments, length normalization, when
followed by centering the embeddings to 0 mean, obtains further improve-
ments in bilingual performance without hurting monolingual performance.
4 If more target words have the same forward rank, Dinu et al. (2015) make the decision
based on cosine similarity. This tie breaking has not proven useful in our experiments.
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4. Experiments
4.1. Data
We trained neela, AdaGram and mutli models on (original and stemmed5
forms of) two semi-gigaword (.7–.8 B words) Hungarian corpora, the Hun-
garian Webcorpus (Webkorpusz, Halácsy et al. 2004) and (the non-social-
media part of) the Hungarian National Corpus (HNC, Oravecz et al. 2014).
We used Wiktionary as our seed dictionary, extracted with wikt2dict6
(Ács et al. 2013). We tried several English embeddings as target, including
the 300 dimensional skip-gram with negative sampling model GoogleNews
released with word2vec (Mikolov et al. 2013a),7 and those released with
GloVe (Pennington et al. 2014).8 We report the best results, which were
obtained with the release GloVe embeddings trained on 840 B words in
300 dimensions.
4.2. Orthogonal constraint
We implemented the orthogonal restriction by computing the singular
value decomposition
UV = S>t Tt
where St and Tt are the matrices consisting of the embedding vectors of
the training word pairs in the source and the target space respectively, and
taking
W = U1V
where 1 is the rectangular identity matrix of appropriate shape.
Table 1 (overleaf) shows the eﬀect of these factors. Precision in forward
NN search follows a similar trend to that in Xing et al. (2015) and Artetxe
(2016): the best combination is an orthogonal mapping between length-
normalized vectors; however, centering did not help in our experiments.
Reverse NNs yield much better results than the simpler method, but none
of the orthogonality-related techniques give further improvement here. The
cause of reverse NN’s apparent insensitivity to length may be the topic of
further research.
5 Follow-up work reported in section 4.5 applied a third option in preprocessing.
6 https://github.com/juditacs/wikt2dict
7 https://code.google.com/archive/p/word2vec/
8 https://nlp.stanford.edu/projects/glove/
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8192 16384 32768
general linear orthogonal general linear orthogonal general linear orthogonal
any disamb any disamb any disamb any disamb any disamb any disamb
fw
d
vanilla 28.7% 2.40% 32.1% 2.40% 36.2% 3.40% 42.0% 4.70% 36.7% 4.20% 44.5% 6.00%
normalize 28.2% 2.20% 33.7% 3.40% 35.1% 2.80% 44.4% 5.80% 36.6% 3.80% 48.2% 6.00%
+ center 26.6% 2.10% 32.8% 2.90% 32.9% 2.70% 42.0% 4.50% 34.6% 3.50% 43.9% 5.50%
re
v
vanilla 53.8% 11.85% 51.7% 11.37% 58.3% 11.99% 56.6% 12.59% 74.3% 23.60% 73.6% 22.30%
normalize 53.3% 11.61% 50.0% 10.90% 58.0% 12.35% 56.5% 12.59% 73.7% 24.20% 72.8% 22.10%
+ center 51.7% 11.37% 53.3% 11.14% 57.1% 11.99% 57.7% 12.35% 69.7% 22.20% 73.5% 23.00%
Table 1: Precision@10 of forward and reverse NN translations with and without
the orthogonality constraint and related techniques at vocabulary cut-
oﬀs 8192 to 32768. any and disamb are explained in section 4.3. The
source has been an AdaGram model in 800 dimensions,  = :1, trained
on Webkorpusz with the vocabulary cut oﬀ at 8192 sense vectors.
4.3. Results
We evaluate MSE models in two ways, referred to as any and disamb. The
method any has been used for tuning the (meta)parameters of the source
embedding and to choose the target: a traditional, single-sense translation
has been trained between the ﬁrst sense vector of each word form and
its translations. (If the training word is ambiguous in the seed dictionary,
all translations have been included in the training data.) Exploiting the
multiple sense vectors, one word can have more than one translation. Dur-
ing the test, a source word was accepted if any of its sense vectors had at
least one good translation among its k reverse nearest neighbors (rNN@k).
In disamb, we used the same translation matrix as in any, and in-
spected the translations of the diﬀerent sense vectors to see whether the
vectors really model diﬀerent senses rather than synonyms. The lowest re-
quirement for the non-synonymy of sense vectors s1; s2 is that the sets of
corresponding good rNN@k translations are diﬀerent. The ratio of words
satisfying this requirement among all words with more than one sense vec-
tor is shown as disamb in Table 2.
The values in Table 2 are low. This can in part be due to that the
neela and the mutli models were trained with lower dimension than the
best-performing model, so results here are not comparable among these
diﬀerent architectures. Follow-up experiments (conducted after the paper
review) are reported in section 4.5.
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dim / p m any disamb
HNC 800 .02 100 48.5% 7.6%
neela Wk 300 – 2 big 54.0% 12.4%
HNC stem 800 .05 big 55.1% 10.4%
HNC 160 .05 3 200 62.2% 15.0%
mutli Wk 300 .25 71 62.9% 17.4%
Webkorpusz 800 .05 100 65.9% 17.4%
HNC 600 .05 5 100 68.6% 16.6%
HNC 600 .1 3 50 69.1% 18.8%
Webkorpusz 800 .1 100 73.9% 23.9%
Table 2: Our measures, any and disamb, for diﬀerent MSEs. The source embed-
ding has been trained with AdaGram, except for when indicated other-
wise (neela, mutli). The meta-parameters are dimension, the resolu-
tion parameter ( in AdaGram and  in mutli), the maximum number
of prototypes (sense vectors), and the vocabulary cutoﬀ (min-freq, the
two models with big have practically no cut-oﬀ).
Table 3 (overleaf) shows the successfully disambiguated words sorted
by the cosine similarity s of good rNN@1 translations of diﬀerent sense
vectors. (We found that most of the few cases when there are more than
two sense vectors with a good rNN@1 translation are due to the fact that
the seed dictionary contains some non-basic translation, e.g., kapcsolat
‘relationship, conjunction’ has ‘aﬀair’ among its seed translations. In these
cases, we chose two sense vectors arbitrarily.) Relying on s is similar to
the monolingual setting of clustering the sense vectors for each word, but
here we restrict our analysis to sense vectors that prove to be sensible in
linear translation.
We see that most words with s < :25 are really ambiguous from a
standard lexicographic point of view, but the translations with s > :35
tend to be synonyms instead.
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s covg
E  0.04849 függő addict, aerial 0.4
S 0.01821 alkotó constituent, creator 0.5
S 0.05096 előzetes preliminary, trailer 1.0
S 0.0974 kapcsolat aﬀair, conjunction, linkage 0.33
I 0.1361 kocsi coach, carriage 1.0
S 0.136 futó runner, bishop 1.0
S 0.1518 keresés quest, scan 0.67
S 0.1574 látvány outlook, scenery, prospect 0.6
S 0.1626 fogad bet, greet 1.0
S 0.1873 induló march, candidate 1.0
I 0.187 nemes noble, peer 0.67
E 0.1934 eltérés variance, departure 0.4
E 0.1943 alkalmazás employ, adaptation 0.33
S 0.2016 szünet interval, cease, recess 0.43
E 0.2032 kezdeményezés initiation, initiative 1.0
S 0.2052 zavar disturbance, annoy, disturb, turmoil 0.57
S 0.2054 megelőző preceding, preventive 0.29
IE 0.2169 csomó knotI , lumpI , matE 1.0
E* 0.21 remény outlook, promise, expectancy 0.6
S 0.2206 bemutató exhibition, presenter 0.67
E 0.2208 egyeztetés reconciliation, correlation 0.5
S 0.237 előadó auditorium, lecturer 0.67
E 0.2447 nyilatkozat profession, declaration 0.4
I 0.2494 gazda farmer, boss 0.67
I 0.2506 kapu gate, portal 1.0
I 0.2515 előbbi anterior, preceding 0.67
I 0.2558 kötelezettség engagement, obligation 0.67
E 0.265 hangulat morale, humour 0.5
E 0.2733 követ succeed, haunt 0.67
SE 0.276 minta normS , formulaE , specimenS 0.75
S 0.2807 sorozat suite, serial, succession 1.0
S 0.2935 durva coarse, gross 0.18
I 0.3038 köt bind, tie 0.67
E 0.3045 egyezmény treaty, protocol 0.67
I 0.3097 megkülönböztetés discrimination, diﬀerentiation 0.5
I 0.309 ered stem, originate 0.5
I 0.319 hirdet advertise, proclaim 1.0
E 0.3212 tartós substantial, durable 1.0
I 0.3218 ajánlattevő bidder, supplier, contractor 0.6
I 0.3299 aláírás signing, signature 0.67
I 0.333 bír bear, possess 1.0
I 0.3432 áldozat sacriﬁce, victim, casualty 1.0
IE 0.3486 kerület wardI , boroughI , perimeterE 0.3
I 0.3486 utas fare, passenger 1.0
I 0.3564 szigorú stern, strict 0.5
I 0.3589 bűnös sinful, guilty 0.5
I 0.3708 rendes orderly, ordinary 0.5
I 0.3824 eladó salesman, vendor 0.5
I 0.3861 enyhe tender, mild, slight 0.6
I 0.3897 maradék residue, remainder 0.33
I 0.3986 darab chunk, fragment 0.4
E 0.4012 hiány poverty, shortage 0.5
I 0.4093 kutatás exploration, quest 0.5
...
...
I 0.4138 tanítás tuition, lesson 0.67
I 0.4196 őszinte frank, sincere 0.67
I 0.4229 környék neighborhood, surroundings, vicinity 0.38
I 0.4446 ítélet judgement, sentence 0.67
I 0.4501 gyerek childish, kid 0.67
I 0.4521 csatorna ditch, sewer 0.4
I 0.4547 felügyelet surveillance, inspection, supervision 0.43
E 0.4551 ritka rare, odd 0.5
S 0.4563 szerető fond, lover, aﬀectionate, mistress 0.67
I 0.4608 szeretet aﬀection, liking 0.67
I 0.4723 vizsgálat inquiry, examination 0.67
I 0.4853 tömeg mob, crowd 0.5
I 0.4903 puszta pure, plain 0.22
I 0.4904 srác kid, lad 1.0
I 0.4911 büntetés penalty, sentence 0.29
I 0.4971 képviselő delegate, representative 0.67
I 0.4975 határ boundary, border 0.67
I 0.5001 drága precious, dear, expensive 1.0
S 0.5093 uralkodó prince, ruler, sovereign 0.5
I 0.5097 válás separation, divorce 0.67
I 0.5103 ügyvéd lawyer, advocate 0.67
I 0.5167 előnyös advantageous, proﬁtable, favourable 1.0
I 0.5169 merev rigid, strict 1.0
I 0.5204 nyíltan openly, outright 1.0
I 0.5217 noha notwithstanding, albeit 1.0
I 0.5311 hulladék litter, garbage, rubbish 0.43
I 0.5311 szemét litter, garbage, rubbish 0.43
I 0.5612 kielégítő satisfying, satisfactory 1.0
E 0.5617 vicc joke, humour 1.0
I 0.5737 szállító supplier, vendor 1.0
I 0.5747 óvoda nursery, daycare, kindergarten 1.0
I 0.5754 hétköznapi mundane, everyday, ordinary 0.75
I 0.5797 anya mum, mummy 1.0
I 0.5824 szomszédos neighbouring, neighbour 0.4
E 0.5931 szabadság liberty, independence 1.0
I 0.6086 lelkész pastor, priest 0.4
I 0.6304 fogalom notion, conception 1.0
I 0.6474 ﬁzetés salary, wage 0.67
I 0.6551 táj landscape, scenery 1.0
I 0.6583 okos clever, smart 0.67
I 0.6707 autópálya highway, motorway 0.5
I 0.6722 tilos prohibited, forbidden 1.0
I 0.6811 bevezető introduction, introductory 1.0
I 0.7025 szövetség coalition, alliance, union 0.75
I 0.7065 fáradt exhausted, tired, weary 1.0
I 0.7066 kiállítás exhibit, exhibition 0.67
I 0.7135 hirdetés advert, advertisement 1.0
I 0.7147 ésszerű rational, logical 1.0
I 0.7664 logikai logic, logical 1.0
I 0.7757 szervez organise, organize, arrange 1.0
I 0.8122 furcsa strange, odd 0.4
I 0.8277 azután afterwards, afterward 0.67
I 0.8689 megbízható dependable, reliable 0.67
Table 3: Hungarian words with the rNN@1 translations of their sense vectors.
The ﬁrst column is a post-hoc annotation by András Kornai (E error in
translation, I identical, S separate meanings), s is the cosine similarity
of the translations, covg denotes the coverage of the @1 translations over
all gold (good) translations. *= the basic translation hope is missing.
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4.4. Part of speech
The clearest case of homonymy is when unrelated senses belong to diﬀerent
parts of speech (POSs), and the translations reﬂect these POSs, e.g., nő
‘woman; increase’ or vár ‘wait; castle’.9 In purely semantic approaches,
like 4lang (Kornai 2018; Kornai et al. 2015), POS-diﬀerence alone is not
enough for analyzing a word as ambiguous, e.g., we see the only diﬀerence
between the noun and participle senses of alkalmazott, ‘employee; applied’
as employment being the application of people for work; in the case of belső
‘internal; interior’, the noun refers to the part of a building described by
the adjective.
More interesting are word forms with related senses in the same POS,
e.g., cikk, ‘item; article’ (an article is an item in a newspaper); eredmény,
‘score; result’ (a score is a result measured by a number); magas, ‘tall;
high’ (tall is used for people rather than high); or idegen, ‘strange, alien;
foreign’, where the English translations are special cases of ‘unfamiliar’
(person versus language).
4.5. Follow-up experiments
After the compilation of the Festschrift, we trained models that enable a
more fair comparison of AdaGram and mutli in terms of semantic reso-
lution: we trained 600-dimensional models for Hungarian to have the 2:1
ratio between the source and the target dimension that has been reported
to be optimal for this task (Mikolov et al. 2013b; Makrai in preparation).
This time we used the de-glutinized version (Borbély et al. 2016; Nemeskey
2017) of the Hungarian National corpus for better morphological general-
ization.
We can see in Table 4 (overleaf) that there is a trade-oﬀ between the
two measures, which may be interpreted to indicate that the more speciﬁc
a vector is, the easier it is to translate, but if the vectors are too speciﬁc,
then the translations may coincide.10
As a direction for future research, the analysis of the observed and
inferred number of word senses as a function of word frequency may shed
more light on how good a model of word ambiguity the Dirichlet Process is.
9 We note that some POSs in Hungarian have blurred borders, e.g., it is debatable
whether the nominal önkéntes ‘voluntary; volunteer’ is ambiguous for its POS.
10 There are two mutli models because Skip-gram and the related MSE models repre-
sent each word with two vectors, u and v in the formula p(wi j wj) / exp(u>i vj),
that mutli calls sense versus context vectors respectively.
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any disamb
AdaGram 73.3% 18.53%
mutli sense vectors 71.0% 19.46%
mutli context vectors 69.9% 20.76%
Table 4: The resolution trade-oﬀ between translation precision and sense dis-
tinctiveness. The source models are 600-dimensional Hungarian models
trained on the de-glutinized version of the Hungarian National Corpus.
Other meta-parameters have been set to default.
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ABSTRACT
The paper deals with the formal and functional properties of the Hun-
garian particle ugye and its use in sentences encoding question acts.
The investigation is based on a corpus study of the “Budapest Sociolin-
guistic Interviews”. As ugye is referred to as a tag, a comparison is made
between ugye-sentences encoding question acts and English tag ques-
tions. This reveals that these constructions share most formal (e.g., ba-
sic structure, complex sentence type, resistance to embedding, intoler-
ance to NPIs) and functional properties (e.g., bias for one of the answers,
encoding of a complex speech act), although a few differences are also
found (e.g., preference of particles, occurrence in declaratives).
I am grateful to László Kálmán for many things. First, and
most importantly, I would like to thank him for teaching me
to be suspicious of rash theoretical generalizations and respect
the diversity and variability of linguistic data.
1. Introduction
The Hungarian discourse particle ugye has been investigated by several
linguists during the past decades. The process of its development is well
known: the elliptical interrogative matrix clause úgy van-e ‘so be-E’ (liter-
ally: ‘is that so?’) was reduced to the shorter form ugye, and at the same
time, its distribution became less constrained. In contemporary Hungarian
it appears to be compatible both with polar interrogatives and declaratives.
(These assumptions, however, will have to be qualiﬁed later.) As discussed
below, there is little agreement in the literature as to how the interpretation
of this constituent should be described. The following examples illustrate
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the variety of its uses in utterances realizing question acts. I am referring
to this construction as ugye-Q:1
(1) (B7313)
I: És számolni, hát számolni azt meg tudni kell.
and count.INF so count.INF that.ACC and know.INF must
‘One should deﬁnitely know how to count.’
F: Ugye, hogy tudni kell?
UGYE that know.INF must
‘One should know, shouldn’t one?’
I: Nagyon kell, …
really must
‘Of course one should, …’
(2) (B7402)
F: Ott magyarul beszéltek, ugye?
there Hungarian.in spoke.3PL UGYE
‘You spoke Hungarian there, right?’
I: Hát ott magyarul beszéltünk,
well there Hungarian.in spoke.1PL
de az első-második osztályban németül tanultunk, …
but the ﬁrst-second class.in German.in learned.1PL
‘Yes, there we spoke Hungarian, but in the ﬁrst and the second classes we
learned German …’
(3) (B7307)
LF: Akkor ugye nem, nem érezte magát ilyen veszélyben, ugye? …
then UGYE not not felt.3SG self.ACC such danger.in UGYE
‘So, you didn’t feel you were in such danger then, did you?’
I (laughing): Nem, nem. Ilyenre nem.
no no such.onto not
‘No, no, I didn’t.’
1 Most of my examples are from the corpus of the Budapest Sociolinguistic Interviews
(BuSI). In the examples cited here, I did not retain the transcription used in the
corpus, I rather follow Hungarian orthography. “I” stands for “informant”, and “F”
stands for “ﬁeld worker”. Each of the examples is cited together with the number of
the interview in which it appears.
K + K = 120 / p. 401 / February 1, 2020
Hungarian ugye is a tag, isn’t it? 401
(4) (B7404)
LF: Ugye akkor hol dogozott az édesapja?
UGYE then where worked.3SG the father.your
‘Remind me, where did your father work at that time?’
I: Malomszerelő Vállalatnál dolgozott.
mill-construction company.at worked.3SG
‘At the mill construction company.’
This paper investigates the form and the uses of the particle ugye in
ugye-Qs. I use the BuSI corpus as an empirical basis for this investiga-
tion, where 239 discourse segments can be found in which ugye has the
relevant function. The main goal of the paper is to investigate the sim-
ilarities and the diﬀerences between Hungarian ugye-Qs and English tag
question constructions (TQ). If ugye-Qs turn out to be similar to TQs in
most respects, their discourse-semantic description should also follow that
of TQs. This may be the theoretical impact of my work.2 The paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews earlier descriptive and the-
oretical work about the contributions of the particle ugye in questions.
Section 3 presents a possible distinction between tag questions, following
Reese’s (2007) dissertation. Section 4 contrasts the theoretical generaliza-
tions about TQs with Hungarian ugye-Q data. Finally, section 5 summa-
rizes the conclusions.
2. Hungarian ugye as a question tag
In this section I brieﬂy summarize the main claims of the previous liter-
ature on the syntactic distribution and the diﬀerent uses of the particle
ugye. In the ﬁrst part, I go through the descriptive works, and then, in the
second part, I discuss semantic-pragmatic analyses that treat ugye as a dis-
course particle. My aim here is to enumerate the main claims on ugye, the
evaluation or critique of earlier approaches is not in the focus of my work.
2 Despite the fact that there are many results for particle ugye in declarative, and a
few in imperative sentences in the BuSI corpus, this article cannot deal with all these
uses. Further research should investigate whether these diﬀerent uses are connected
to each other, and if so, how this connection can be described in a coherent way on
the level of sentence types, conventional meaning, and discourse function.
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2.1. Etymology and descriptive grammars
According to the Hungarian Historical-Etymological Dictionary (Benkő
1967–1984), the ﬁrst occurrence of the ugye particle dates back to 1585.
The matrix interrogative clause úgy van-e became a compound consist-
ing of the adverb3 úgy ‘so’, and the polar interrogative marker -e. This
compound was used in utterances where the speaker intended to conﬁrm,
acknowledge, or reinforce the truth of a statement. Thus, the particle was
ﬁrst only used in utterances realizing question acts, where, according to
Benkő’s assumptions, it had a typical interrogative prosody (a rise-fall con-
tour on the penultimate syllable).4 Benkő, incorrectly, claims that later the
rise-fall contour disappeared, and ugye became an “intensifying modiﬁer”,
more recently a “meaningless expletive element” (ibid., 1027).5 From the
above assumption it would follow that the conditions under which ugye
can be used currently are less constrained than they were earlier. How-
ever, the corpus study below does not prove that the particle can be used
freely, without any syntactic constraints as “a meaningless expletive ele-
ment”. I will show that the distribution of ugye is constrained by syntactic,
semantic, and pragmatic factors.
Kenesei et al.’s (1998) descriptive grammar argues that sentences con-
taining ugye encode “leading questions”. By using this type of question, the
speaker expects agreement or conﬁrmation from the partner. The particle
can appear in any syntactic position within the sentence, there is no limi-
tation on its use either in aﬃrmative or in negated sentences. They treat
ugye as the only marker of biased (or leading) questions.6 The comple-
mentary distribution of the -e interrogative particle and ugye, which they
point out, can be seen as a consequence of this functional diﬀerentiation,
i.e., -e is the marker of neutral questions (cf. Gyuris 2017), while ugye is
the marker of biased questions. (See also H. Molnár 1959 and Kugler 1998
3 In Hungarian, Benkő (1967–1984) uses the term módosítószó ‘modiﬁer word’.
4 In fact, Benkő (1967–1984) uses the term “interrogative sentence” here, which I think
is problematic.
5 In the course of sketching the historical development of ugye, Benkő ignores the fact
that in contemporary Hungarian it depends on the intended speech act (question or
assertion) whether ugye bears the rise-fall intonation contour.
6 In Hungarian, polar interrogatives are either marked by intonation (rise-fall contour)
or by the -e particle. Although the use of the latter in root clauses is limited in some
dialects, it is acceptable in formal style (e.g., marriage ceremony, legal contexts) for
speakers of every dialect. Embedded polar interrogatives are obligatorily marked by
the -e particle.
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who treat ugye as the marker of the interrogative sentence type). They
do not mention that the particle can also appear in declaratives encoding
assertions.
The descriptive grammar of Keszler (2000) claims that the function of
ugye is similar to that of other “mood markers” (like -e, or the interrogative
rise-fall intonation), adding that ugye usually appears in tag questions, but
it does not specify other syntactic environments where the particle can ap-
pear. It is also claimed that with ugye, the speaker post factum modiﬁes
the mood of a declarative sentence (which has declarative intonation and
expresses a proposition). Note that the fact that the distribution of ugye
and that of vajon (to be discussed below), on the one hand, and the dis-
tribution of ugye and that of -e, on the other hand, are complementary,
does not necessary mean that their functions are identical. This can easily
be proven by the fact that in a given discourse an ugye-Q usually can-
not be replaced either by an interrogative sentence containing -e or by an
interrogative sentence containing vajon.
The descriptive syntax of Kálmán (2001) does not mention sentences
containing ugye in the chapter on questions (ibid., 98–135).7 This may be
due to the fact that ugye-Qs fail the syntactic tests of polar interrogatives.
According to these, ﬁrst, a Hungarian sentence is an interrogative if and
only if the particle vajon can be inserted into it. Second, an interrogative
is a polar one in case it can be answered by a simple nem ‘no’ (ibid.,
100). The latter criterion aims to diﬀerentiate polar interrogatives from
wh-interrogatives, which cannot be answered by a simple nem ‘no’ in any
circumstances.8 As mentioned above, the distribution of ugye and vajon
is complementary, thus, according to this test, ugye-Qs cannot be treated
as interrogatives, as (5a) illustrates. However, as (5b), an example from
the BuSi corpus shows, ugye-Qs (at least with negation) can be answered
felicitously by a simple nem ‘no’. As (5c) illustrates, though, there are
cases when a simple nem ‘no’ does not sound like a suﬃcient answer to
ugye-Qs, especially in cases where the question has a positive (aﬃrmative)
root (or achor) (see also 3.2.).
7 The title of the chapter is “Questions” (not “interrogatives”) despite the fact that it
deals mostly with the formal properties of the relevant sentences.
8 Kiefer (1980) lists several types of polar interrogatives in the case of which a simple
nem ‘no’, or igen ‘yes’ answer, although formally adequate, does not sound suﬃcient
or natural.
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a.(5) *Vajon ott magyarul beszéltek, ugye?
VAJON there Hungarian.in spoke.3PL UGYE
‘You spoke Hungarian there, didn’t you?’
b. (B7514)
F: És ugye nem volt azért az olyan borzasztó?
And UGYE not was still that so awful
‘It was not so awful, was it?’
I: Nem.
‘No.’
c. A: Ott magyarul beszéltek, ugye?
there Hungarian.in spoke.3PL UGYE
‘There, you spoke Hungarian, right?’
B: #Nem.
‘No.’
B0: Nem, ott már nem magyarul beszéltünk, hanem németül.
no there already not Hungarian.in spoke.1PL but German.in
‘No, we didn’t speak Hungarian there any more, we spoke German.’
Following Kálmán (2001), we can conclude that ugye-Qs are ambivalent
in nature: they fail the vajon-test, so they are not “real” interrogatives,
but, at the same time, they pass the nem-as-answer-test.9 We will see in
sections 2.2. and 4.2.2. that other tests also point to the conclusion that
ugye-Qs do not belong to the interrogative sentence type. Along with this,
their semantics/pragmatics is more complicated. We will see that in most
cases an ugye-Q deﬁnitely requires an answer from the partner. The answer
can be either igen ‘yes’ or nem ‘no’, and the ugye-Q is biased for one of
these answers (see 4.2.). In 4.2.3. I argue that in spite of the fact that
the particle seems to attach to declaratives, ugye-Qs realize question acts.
2.2. Hungarian ugye as a discourse particle
There are several recent theoretical and empirical approaches to discourse
particles10 in Hungarian, which also address ugye. Gyuris (2008; 2009;
2018) and Alberti and Kleiber (2014) intend to give uniﬁed accounts of
9 Note that a simple nem ‘no’ is a felicitous reaction not only to polar interrrogatives
but also to declaratives, thus, the relevant test does not discriminate between the
latter two sentence types.
10 Alternative terms in the literature include that of “discourse marker” or “pragmatic
marker”.
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the distribution and/or interpretation of diﬀerent uses of ugye based on
theories of biased questions, or the theory of “context markers”. The as-
sumption that there should be a limited number of general rules govern-
ing the distribution and interpretation of ugye can also be supported by
arguments from language acquisition. Gyuris (2009) makes a distinction
between two forms: ugye-declaratives and ugye-sentences encoding a ques-
tion. She describes the meaning of ugye in declaratives by saying that it
indicates that the propositional content p of the declarative sentence in
which ugye appears follows from the Common Ground (CG) by default
reasoning (following Zeevat 2003). Gyuris (2009) considers ugye-questions
to be similar to tag questions in English both in their distribution and
interpretation, which she judges to be feasible for the following reasons.
First, the distributions of particle -e and ugye are complementary, cf. (6).
Second, the distribution of ugye-questions and polar interrogatives is not
identical: ugye-questions cannot be embedded; an embedded ugye-sentence
can only be interpreted as a declarative, cf. (7a–b).11 Third, whereas polar
interrogatives are compatible with weak NPIs (e.g., valaha is ‘ever’) ugye-
questions are not, cf. (8). Fourth, the historical development of ugye (see
2.1.) and the fact that it ﬁrst appeared on the peripheries of the clause
also points to the conclusion that ugye is a tag-like element.
(6) (*Ugye) Mari (*ugye) volt-e (*ugye) Párizsban (*ugye)?
UGYE Mari UGYE was-E UGYE Paris.in UGYE
‘Has Mary been to Paris?’
(Gyuris 2009, (16))
a.(7) Józsi tudja, hogy Mari ugye volt Párizsban.
Józsi knows that Mari UGYE was Paris.in
‘Joe knows that, as you know, Mary has been to Paris.’
(ibid., (18))
b. *Józsi tudja, hogy Mari ugye volt-e Párizsban.
(8) *Mari ugye volt valaha is Párizsban?
Mari UGYE was ever too Paris.in
(ibid., (20))
Gyuris (2018) derives the interpretation of ugye in declaratives from its
original interpretation in questions, and provides a uniﬁed meaning for the
two, according to which ugye introduces a condition on input contexts:
the interlocutor of the default perspective center of the speech act under
consideration (that is, the hearer in assertions and the speaker in questions)
is committed to the propositional content.
11 I will return to this observation in sections 3.1. and 4.2.
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Alberti and Kleiber (2014) treat ugye as a particle whose “pragmatico-
semantic” contribution is to encode the speaker’s bias towards the positive
answer in “polar interrogatives”.12 Thus, they treat ugye as if it had only
one function, they ignore its uses in declaratives and other sentence types.
Schirm (2009) presents an empirical study of a corpus of parliamentary
discourses. In this corpus ugye turned out to be the second most frequent
particle after hát ‘so’. She claims that in declaratives, ugye serves to conﬁrm
or emphasize, as a default, that a statement is correct/acceptable/right,
while in interrogatives it expresses that the speaker expects the positive
answer (ibid., 172). The corpus data shows that in parliamentary speech
ugye has various additional functions. Its use is frequent in emotional,
emphatic questions: it indicates that the speaker is happy about some
negative developments involving the hearer, or that she blames the latter
for some developments.
In parliamentary dialogues ugye-Q is often used as a means of ar-
gumentation: it encodes a “rhetorical question”, by which Schirm means
those that cannot be answered, or for which the answer is so obvious that
there is no need to formulate it explicitly. The repetitive use of ugye en-
hances the rhetoricity of the text. In addition, it can be seen as a device
of self-protection in the case of face-threatening acts: asking a question
in general, even an ugye-Q, is much less face-threatening than asserting
the corresponding proposition (ibid., 173). Summarizing all these features,
Schirm claims that ugye, generally speaking, expresses the speaker’s at-
titude. But it does not seem easy to identify the contribution of ugye,
because the sentences cited from the corpus remain rhetorical, and “emo-
tionally loaded” even if we leave out the particle. The question of how these
diﬀerent uses are interconnected also remains open in this work.
Abuczki (2015) works with the most recent Hungarian multi-modal
corpus, HuComTech. Based on the corpus data, she identiﬁes three dif-
ferent uses of ugye: (i) a tag in tag questions, (ii) an evidence marker or
context marker (usually with rhetorical function), (iii) a tool of emphasis,
marking new information, truth, explanation, or narrative structure. The
possible connections between these interpretations remain unclear.
Despite the number of open questions concerning the diﬀerent uses
of ugye, the literature conﬁrms the idea of treating ugye-Qs (or at least a
subset of them) as tag questions. In the next chapter, I turn to syntactic
and semantic properties of English TQs in order to compare them with
ugye-Qs.
12 The authors thus disregard the above mentioned diﬃculties with treating ugye-Qs as
interrogatives.
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3. Tag question constructions in English
Examples (9)–(10) below show that English tag questions (TQs) are com-
plex forms: they consist of a full declarative sentence, the anchor, and a
reduced interrogative clause, the tag. Two diﬀerent types of TQs can be
distinguished: (9a,b) are examples of reversed polarity tags, while (10a,b)
are examples of constant polarity tags. (The examples are simpliﬁed ver-
sions of Reese’s (2007) examples.)13
a.(9) Jane is coming, isn’t she?
b. Jane isn’t coming, is she?
a.(10) Jane is coming, is she?
b. Jane isn’t coming, isn’t she?
Compared to positive polar interrogatives, TQs are marked forms. In most
uses a TQ is assumed to encode a non-neutral, biased question. In what
follows, I am going to summarize Reese’s main theses about TQs.
3.1. The form of tag questions
Reese (2007) claims that English TQs are a syntactically mixed sentence
type, being composed of a declarative and an interrogative clause. Their
structure can be represented schematically as in (11).
(11) [NP Aux (XP)], [Aux Pro] (Reese 2007, 40)
It is easy to see that the form of the tag depends on the form of the anchor.
Furthermore, Reese (2007) claims that the form of the tag is constrained by
the anchor not only syntactically, but semantically and pragmatically too.
The pronoun in the tag must be co-referential with the matrix subject of
the anchor. The auxiliary verbs (Aux) used in the anchor and the tag need
to be compatible with each other. And the proposition expressed by the
anchor need to be a possible answer to the question expressed by the tag.
If we take prosody into account, the above picture about TQs gets
more complex. TQs can be pronounced with a falling (12a) or a rising (12b)
contour. In addition, following Ladd’s fundamental work (Ladd 1981), TQs
13 According to Reese (2007), the latter type only exists in American dialects, and its
use is not widespread. Other authors (e.g., Quirk et al. 1985) do not treat it as a
special or rare form.
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can be classiﬁed as nuclear (13a) or post-nuclear (13b). The latter type is
always pronounced with a rising contour, while the former can get both
a falling or a rising contour. According to Ladd (1981, 167), nuclear TQs
“have a separate nucleus or nuclear pitch accent, generally preceded in the
rhythm of the sentence by a noticeable pause or intonational boundary”
(indicated by “/”), while post-nuclear TQs “have no separate nucleus, the
pitch contour on the tag merely continuing the nuclear contour begun at
the preceding nucleus in the main sentence” and “there is noticeably less of
a pause or boundary before the tag” (indicated by “=”). The possible uses
of these forms are also diﬀerent (see section 3.2.).
a.(12) Jane is coming, isn’t she? #14
b. Jane is coming, isn’t she? "
a.(13) Jane isn’t coming / is she?15 # / "
b. Jane isn’t coming = is she? "
In the course of investigating the semantics and pragmatics of biased ques-
tions, embedding is a useful test for TQs and other marked forms (see
Farkas & Roelofsen 2017, 8, examples (15)–(16)).
a.(14) *John told Bill that [Jane is coming, isn’t she].
b. *I know that [Jane is coming, isn’t she].
The examples in (14) show that English TQs cannot be embedded. For
Hungarian ugye-Qs the same was shown by Gyuris (2009), see examples
(7a–b) of section 2.2. I also applied the “embedding test” for all ugye-Q
data of the BuSI corpus, the results are presented below, in section 4.2.
3.2. The use of tag questions
Reese (2007) claims that TQs encode complex speech acts: they realize
an assertion and a question at the same time.16 He proves this by apply-
ing Sadock’s distributional tests (Sadock 1974) to TQs. These tests show
that TQs have the distributional properties of both assertions and ques-
tions. Sadock assumes that certain discourse markers select utterances with
14 “#” marks the falling and “"” the rising intonation contour.
15 I use Ladd’s notation for distinguishing nuclear and post-nuclear TQs.
16 According to other authors (e.g., Farkas & Roelofsen 2017; Malamud & Stephenson
2015; Krifka 2017), the assertion expressed by a TQ is “tentative”.
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speciﬁc illocutionary forces. For example, the expression after all can be
inserted into sentences that convey an assertion, but not into those that
convey a neutral question. Sentences encoding questions (but not asser-
tions), however, remain grammatical after the insertion of the expressions
by any chance and tell me. The latter two expressions can discriminate
between neutral and biased questions. By any chance can only be inserted
into interrogatives encoding neutral questions, while tell me is compatible
with all types of questions (see Sadock 1974). Applying these tests to TQs,
we can see that TQs17 tend to convey an assertion and a biased question
at the same time, but no neutral questions, cf. (15).
a.(15) After all, Jane is coming, isn’t she? # (Reese 2007, 51, (13), simpliﬁed)
b. #Jane is coming, by any chance, isn’t she? # (ibid., 51, (14), simpliﬁed)
c. Tell me, Jane is coming, isn’t she? # (ibid., 52, (15), simpliﬁed)
To sum up, we have seen so far that as a rule, English TQs encode biased
questions. Moreover, biased questions conveyed by TQ-forms are diﬀer in
interpretation depending on their intonation. On the one hand, if the tag
has a falling contour, the speaker is really committed, strongly biased to-
wards the truth of the proposition expressed by the anchor. In this case the
function of the TQ is to seek the partner’s acknowledgement (acknowledge-
ment TQ). On the other hand, if the tag has a rising contour, the speaker
has some doubts or uncertainty (or only weak bias) towards the truth of
the proposition expressed by the anchor. In this case the function of the
TQ is to seek conﬁrmation from the partner (conﬁrmation TQ). Thus,
both uses are biased, but on a diﬀerent level.
According to Reese (2007), the strong commitment of the speaker to
the anchor of an acknowledgement TQ is of the same type as in an assertion
realized by a declarative sentence. As opposed to this, the anchor of a con-
ﬁrmation TQ conveys “weak assertion”. As a consequence, a conﬁrmation
TQ can be felicitously answered by a plain “no”, while an acknowledgement
TQ cannot, as (16) shows:
(16) A: Well, that’s interesting, isn’t it? # (Reese 2007, 58, (24), modiﬁed)
B: #No. / #No, it isn’t.
Summing up Reese’s suggestions about TQs: he says that the seman-
tic/pragmatic complexity of English TQs is due to their complex form,
17 Reese (2007) presents a special type of TQ that can convey a neutral question: the
negative anchor post-nuclear TQ pronounced with rising contour, as in Jane isn’t
coming too, by any chance = is she? " (op.cit., 53, (20b), simpliﬁed).
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that is, they are of a mixed sentence type. In the next chapter, I turn to
Hungarian ugye-Qs to compare their properties with those of English TQs.
4. Are Hungarian ugye-constructions tag question constructions?
In this section I compare Hungarian ugye-Qs with English TQs. I describe
the properties of ugye-Qs based on my database consisting of BuSI-2 corpus
data. In this database I collected all utterances containing the particle
ugye together with their contexts (together with preceding and following
utterances). In what follows, I ﬁrst brieﬂy present the BuSI-2 corpus and
the ugye-data in it, and some arguments for using this corpus for this study.
Then I turn to the similarities and the diﬀerences between Hungarian
ugye-Qs and English TQs.
4.1. Introductory remarks on the BUSZI-2 corpus
The interviews constituting the BuSI-2 corpus were recorded in 1987 (un-
der the direction of Miklós Kontra). The corpus contains 50 personal in-
terviews conducted by four ﬁeld workers. Members of ﬁve diﬀerent social
groups were involved in the interviews (ten persons in each group): univer-
sity students, high school teachers, shop assistants, factory workers, and
apprentices. For this study, I used the annotated and analyzed transcripts
of these anonymous interviews.18
The BuSI-2 interviews are not recent, they do not record contempo-
rary spoken language, but it still seemed to be worth using them in the
investigation of Hungarian polar interrogative forms (including the prob-
lem of ugye-Qs). The main argument for using this corpus was that the
social statuses of the informants are quite diﬀerent and they speak in a
relaxed, natural manner. Another advantage is that the spoken data is
accurately transcribed, and the database can be accessed and searched
on-line.19 One disadvantage is that the 30-year-old recordings are not of a
good quality, so for intonational analyses they are inappropriate. Finally,
I should admit, that for my purposes it is not ideal that most questions
are asked by the ﬁeld workers.20
18 Despite the fact that I got permission to access some of the sound ﬁles of the inter-
views, I could not properly investigate the intonation pattern of the ugye-utterances,
because of the bad quality of the recordings.
19 The BuSI-2 corpus is accessible after a short registration process here:
http://buszi.nytud.hu.
20 Most declarative ugye-sentences, however, are produced by the informants.
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In BuSI-2 there are 562 dialogues in which ugye appears; the number of
ugye-tokens is higher, because there are dialogues in which it has multiple
occurrences. Out of these, 239 utterances realize question acts (ugye-Qs).
Since BuSI-2 is a spoken language corpus, these utterances are not always
realized by complete, grammatical sentences, but there are many (multi-
ply) interrupted, fragmented clauses in it. In most cases (in 217 utterances)
the ﬁeldworker asks the ugye-Q.
Non-question
57.5%
Question
42.5%
Distribution of "ugye" according to whether the sentences 
encode a question or not
Figure 1: Distribution of ugye according to whether the sentences encode a ques-
tion or not
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fieldworker informant
The role of speakers producing "ugye"-sentences
Figure 2: The role of the speakers producing ugye-sentences
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To distinguish between ugye-declaratives realizing only assertions and
ugye-Qs that can realize questions, I applied the tests proposed for the
identiﬁcation of speech acts by Sadock (1974), discussed above. I cate-
gorized an ugye-sentence as an ugye-Q if it can realize a question act
according to the Hungarian counterpart of Sadock’s speech act test for
questions, i.e., when it remains grammatical after the phrase mondd csak
‘tell me’ is inserted into it (see 4.2. for further discussion).21 In fact, most
of the relevant examples are marked with a question mark (?) in the tran-
scription, and the reaction to the utterance could either be igen ‘yes’ or
nem ‘no’.
After having summarized the basic properties of the corpus I used,
I turn to the comparison of English TQs and Hungarian ugye-Qs.
4.2. Similarities and differences between Hungarian ugye-Qs and English TQs
I start the comparison of English TQs and Hungarian ugye-Qs with the
formal properties of these constructions, and then I turn to their possible
functions.
4.2.1. Anchor and tag
According to Keszler (2000) and Gyuris (2009), the forms encoding ugye-Qs
can be divided into a declarative and an interrogative part, so we can an-
alyze these sentences as consisting of a declarative anchor (the sentence
without the particle) and an interrogative tag (the particle itself) – see
section 2.
a.(17) (B7301)
F: Szóval maga mindig pesti volt, ugye?
so you always Pest.from was UGYE
‘So, you have always been living in Budapest, right?’
I: [Igen]
[‘Yes’]
21 Note that these utterances also satisfy the Hungarian counterpart of the test proposed
by Sadock for the identiﬁcation of assertions (insertability of the phrase végül is ‘after
all’), see 4.2.3. below for discussion. Thus, if we follow Sadock’s and Reese’s approach,
ugye-questions should be assumed to encode both a question and an assertion at the
same time.
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b. (B7301)
F: Nem tudja, ugye?
not knows UGYE
‘You do not know it, do you?’
I: Nem tudom.
not know.1SG
‘No, I do not know it.’
In (17a) the anchor is the Maga mindig pesti volt ‘You have always been
living in Budapest’ part, to the truth of which the speaker commits herself
by uttering the sentence. She adds the tag ugye to indicate that she is
seeking conﬁrmation from her partner for the truth of the latter. In (17b)
the anchor is negated, but the form of the tag remains the same. Thus,
while the structure of ugye-sentences, and the functions of the “tag” are
similar to those of TQs, the form of the Hungarian tag does not depend on
the form of the anchor. In many cases ugye is interchangeable with other
tag-like elements (nemde? ‘not?’, igaz? ‘right?’).
Word order shows another important diﬀerence: while in English the
tag seems to have a ﬁxed, sentence-ﬁnal position in most cases, ugye can
occur in most positions of the Hungarian sentence (see Kenesei et al. 1998).
In BuSI-2 there are many examples for sentence-initial as well as non-
peripheral occurrences of “questioning” ugye.22
a.(18) (B7106)
F: Ugye, magának most lukasórája van?
UGYE you.DAT now empty.hour.your be.3SG
‘You have free time now, haven’t you?’
I: Igen, lukasórám van.
Yes empty.hour.my be.3SG
‘Yes, I have free time.’
b. (B7416)
LF: Ott önnel találkoztunk, ugye benn a cégnél?
there you.with met.1PL UGYE inside the company.at
‘We once met each other at your company building, right?’
22 Kenesei et al. (1998) and descriptive grammars (e.g., Keszler 2000) treat ugye as
completely free element: it is claimed that it can be situated anywhere in the sentence,
no word-order constraints delimit its occurrence. Looking more closely at the data, it
becomes obvious that its word order is not completely free: it cannot be placed into
the immediately pre-verbal position (the so called focus position), for example. Here
I cannot go into details about the exact syntactic distribution of the particle.
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But if we take the frequency of the word order patterns into account, we
can see that examples with sentence-ﬁnal ugye are by far the most frequent
(153 occurrences) in BuSI-2, and the second most frequent case is when
the particle stands alone (isolated) after a separate declarative sentence
(52 occurrences) – see Figure 3.23 In sum, comparing the ratio of sentences
with ugye in peripheral positions and those with ugye in internal positions
we can see that the former case is ten times more frequent than the latter
– see Figure 4.24
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Figure 3: Syntactic distribution of ugye in ugye-Qs 1
Corpus studies on British and American English presented in Tottie &
Hoﬀmann (2006) show that reversed polarity TQs are signiﬁcantly more
frequent than same polarity TQs in both dialects. Additionally, the pos-
itive anchor is much more frequent than the negative one (see ibid., 290,
Figure 3). Analysis of the BuSI-2 data revealed the same pattern: negative
23 I am aware of the problem of using the abstract term “sentence” in case of spoken
data, given possible diﬃculties of segmentation. In my analysis, I consequently relied
on the intuition (and the consistency) of the transcriptors. Sentence-ﬁnal position
means that in the transcription there is no full stop after the declarative sentence
(the anchor), but there is a full stop after the particle ugye (the tag). Ugye is treated
as “isolated” when there is a full stop after the declarative sentence, and the ﬁrst
letter of ugye is capitalized, and there is a question mark after it. (It is transcribed
as a separate sentence.)
24 Although I do not deal with ugye-sentences encoding (only) assertions here, I have to
mention that in those cases the syntactic distribution of ugye is diﬀerent from that
in ugye-Qs.
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Figure 4: Syntactic distribution of ugye in ugye-Qs 2
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Figure 5: The polarity of the anchors in ugye-Qs
anchors are rare in Hungarian as well – Figure 5. (However, I could not ﬁnd
an explanaton for this diﬀerence in frequency in the relevant literature.)
As far as syntactic distribution is concerned, we can conclude that
although the position of the particle ugye within the sentence seems to be
relatively unrestricted, it prefers the peripheries of the sentence, especially
the right periphery (that is, the sentence-ﬁnal position). So does the tag
in English TQs.
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4.2.2. Embedding and negative polarity items
As was already mentioned, Gyuris (2009) presents two tests with which
she demonstrates that the distribution of Hungarian polar interrogatives
and what she refers to as ugye-“interrogatives” (thus avoiding commit-
ment to the interrogative status of structures with ugye encoding ques-
tions) is not the same (see section 2.2. for further details). One of the tests
shows that while canonical polar interrogatives (expressing neutral ques-
tions) are grammatical with weak negative polarity items (NPIs), ugye-
“interrogatives” are not (see example (8) in section 2.2.). Farkas and Roelof-
sen (2017) made the same observation about English TQs. I applied the
test for the utterances of the BuSI-2 corpus I consider ugye-Qs, and I found
that all of them are ungrammatical with valaha is ‘ever’. In (20) I show
that the insertion of the weak NPI above makes (1)–(2) ungrammatical.
a.(19) *Ugye, hogy valaha is tudni kell?
b. *Ott magyarul beszéltek valaha is, ugye?
The other test by Gyuris (2009) shows that ugye-“interrogatives” cannot be
embedded under the matrix declarative X tudja, hogy… ‘X knows that…’.
As mentioned in section 3.1 above, Farkas and Roelofsen (2017) demon-
strate the same property for English TQs. Having applied the same test for
the ugye-data from BuSI-2, I found that the ones I consider to be ugye-Qs
cannot be embedded either.
a.(20) *Józsi tudja, hogy ugye, hogy tudni kell.
b. *Józsi tudja, hogy ott magyarul beszéltek, ugye.
c. *Józsi tudja, hogy akkor nem érezte magát ilyen veszélyben, ugye.
‘Józsi knows where your father worked at that time.’
Thus, with respect to the weak NPI-insertion and embedding tests, Hun-
garian ugye-Qs and English TQs show the same syntactic behavior, which
is diﬀerent from that of canonical interrogatives encoding neutral questions.
4.2.3. Complex speech act
It was already mentioned in section 3, based on Reese’s (2007) assump-
tions, that the formal complexity of TQs leads to semantic/pragmatic com-
plexity. Applying Sadock’s speech act tests (Sadock 1974), Reese shows
that English TQs convey complex speech acts: they are assertions and
questions at the same time. I applied the speech act tests of Sadock for all
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ugye-data from the BuSi-2 corpus. This means that I tested the grammat-
icality of each ugye-Q with three expressions: (i) elvégre/végül is ‘after all’,
(ii) mondd csak ‘tell me’, and (iii) véletlenül ‘by any chance’. Following
Sadock, I assumed that elvégre ‘after all’ can be inserted into sentences
encoding assertions, while mondd csak ‘tell me’ can be inserted into sen-
tences encoding questions, and véletlenül ‘by any chance’ can be inserted
into sentences encoding unbiased (neutral) questions. The tests showed
that almost 80 per cent of the ugye-Qs can be said to realize a question
and an assertion at the same time (see Figure 6), and (almost) all ugye-Qs
are unnatural with véletlenül ‘by any chance’. Thus, according to Sadock’s
tests, ugye-Qs are not neutral but biased (see example (21)).
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Figure 6: Results of the Sadock-tests for ugye-Qs
a.(21) (B7402)
F: Az két év vót, ugye?
that two year was UGYE
‘It was two years, wasn’t it?’
I: Igen.
‘Yes, it was.’
b. Elvégre/végül is az két év volt, ugye?
after.all that two year was UGYE
‘After all, it was two years, wasn’t it?’
c. Mondd csak, az két év volt, ugye?
tell.IMP.2SG only that two year was UGYE
‘Tell me, it was two years, wasn’t it?’
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d. *Véletlenül az két év volt, ugye?
by.any.chance that two year was UGYE
‘By any chance, it was two years, wasn’t it?’
Given Figure 6, one can ask what speech act the remaining 20 per cent of
the examples realize. As I have already mentioned, analyzing spoken lan-
guage data is not easy because of the elliptical, interrupted, fragmented
structures. Ugye is often used in elliptical sentences like (22) and in isola-
tion, like in (23). In these cases the Sadock-tests cannot be applied at all,
or can only be applied in a restricted way. This is the reason why only the
80 per cent of the relevant data has turned out to indicate the presence of
a complex speech act.
(22) (B7303)
L: Na, utolsó követ(kezik).
so last follow.3SG
‘So, this is the last one.’
I: Igen.
‘Yes.’
F: Már ideje is, ugye? [laughing] Na, parancsoljon.
already time.its also UGYE so order.IMP.3SG
‘It’s time for it, right? [laughing] So, here you are…’
(23) (B7105)
F: Hát én is kapocsnak hívom.
well I also brace.DAT call.1SG
‘I call it a brace.’
I: Ugye.
‘Do you?’
F: Én is kapocsnak hívom.
I also brace.DAT call.1SG
‘I would also call it a brace.’
As mentioned in section 3, the discourse function of English TQs depends
on their intonation. In case of a falling intonation, the speaker expects
acknowledgement form the addressee, and in case of a rising intonation,
he/she expects conﬁrmation from the partner. Since I could only use the
transcription for the present analysis of the BuSI-2 data, I cannot say any-
thing about these properties of Hungarian ugye-Qs. It is worth mentioning,
though, that ugye-Qs in the corpus hardly ever get negative responses (see
Figure 7). Two possible explanations present themselves: (i) ugye-Qs only
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have an acknowledgement reading, and this is why they cannot felicitously
be answered by a plain nem ‘no’ without any further explanation, as men-
tioned above; or (ii) this is a speciﬁc characteristic of the BuSI corpus
and not of ugye-Qs in general, because the participants recorded here were
exceptionally polite.
0
50
100
150
positive response negative response No reaction Other reaction (e.g. ask again)
The polarity of the responses for ugye-Qs
Figure 7: The polarity of the responses for ugye-Qs
Examining the polarity of the responses is not enough to make any con-
clusions about the possibilities of rejecting the propositions expressed by
the anchors of ugye-Qs. Figure 5 above shows the polarity of ugye-Q an-
chors. Out of 239 situations where ugye appears only 18 include an answer
rejecting/denying the proposition in the anchor, as in (24).
(24) (B7308)
F: Namost ugye nekem közelebb van itt a villamosmegálló, mint
so UGYE I.DAT closer is here the tram.stop than
a busz.
the bus
‘So the tram station is nearer here than the bus stop, right?’
I: Nem mert itt van lent a buszmegálló.
not because here is down the bus.stop
‘No, because the bust stop is just down here.’
F: Ja, igen. Aha.
‘Oh, yes, OK.’
So far, we have seen that ugye-Qs, like English TQs, are biased. The anchor
presents the preferred answer. However, based on the transcription of the
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BuSI-2 data alone, we cannot give a conclusive answer about the exact
discourse function (seeking conﬁrmation or acknowledgement) of this form.
4.3. Non tag-like properties
I have shown above that in several respects, Hungarian ugye-Qs are similar
to English TQs. We have also seen that their semantic/pragmatic prop-
erties are partly the same. In what follows, I mention some properties of
ugye-data from BuSI-2 which are not typical tag-like properties. These
properties point to the conclusion that we should not categorize ugye-Qs
as pure TQs.
Unlike English tag elements, ugye is not always used as a tag, its use
is widespread in declaratives and it appears even in imperative sentences
(intended as requests), cf. Figure 1 above.25 More than half of the ugye-
tokens appear in declarative sentences in BuSI-2.
As was mentioned above, ugye can be used in elliptical sentences and in
isolation. This is not typical for English tags (with the probable exception
of the invariable tag innit, cf. Tottie & Hoﬀmann 2006).
Another diﬀerence between English tag elements and ugye is that the
latter can appear in constituent questions too, as (4) illustrates. In the
BuSI-2 corpus there are 15 results for ugye in wh-interrogatives. Since
ugye cannot be considered a tag in constituent questions, the latter use
has been assimilated to the use of the particle in declaratives (for further
discussion see Molnár 2016).
Finally, Hungarian ugye very often co-occurs together with other dis-
course particles. This seems to be a common main characteristic of all
types of ugye-sentences. But this is not a property of English tags. Figure
8 shows the particles that co-occur with ugye most frequently.
Maybe this property is due to the fact that BuSI-2 interviews come
from spontaneous speech, and thus it is not special to ugye-sentences.
25 Ugye in sentences with a verb in imperative mood is only illustrated with a few
examples in the BuSi corpus, cf. (i) below. (Mood is marked morphologically in
Hungarian.)
(i) Na, előszöris ugye át, azért csak gondosan fusd át,
so ﬁrst UGYE through though just carefully run.IMP.2SG through
meg nézted végig mind.
VM saw.2SG till.end all
‘So ﬁrst just run through it, just carefully run through it, have you seen it all till
the end?’
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Figure 8: Particles co-occurring with ugye in ugye-Qs
Figure 9 compares ugye-Qs and ugye-declaratives with respect to the co-
occurrence of ugye with other particles.
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5. Conclusion
This paper has investigated the properties of utterances containing the
particle ugye that encode question acts, and compared them to those of
English TQs. Table 1 summarizes my ﬁndings.
Table 1: Properties of English TQs and Hungarian ugye-Qs
English TQs Ugye-Qs
Structure: anchor + tag + +
The syntactic position of the tag is ﬁxed +  
Tag occurs in elliptical sentences and in isolation   +
The proposition expressed by the anchor is a possible answer to
the question encoded by the tag
+ +
Co-occurrence with particles is typical   +
Multiple occurrences of the tag within one sentence   +
Can be embedded under the matrix clause ‘X knows that…’    
Co-occurrence with NPIs    
Realizes a complex speech act (assertion + question) + +
Encodes a biased question + +
The occurrence of the tag is not restricted to utterances realizing
question acts
  +
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ABSTRACT
The epsilon calculus seems to be an appropriate environment for mod-
elling the meaning of definite and indefinite descriptions in a natural
language. A philosopher of language may ask whether Russell’s mean-
ing theory on descriptions is applicable in this language or not. Or more
precisely, in what circumstances a sentence (containing an epsilon-
expression) has a contextual meaning, and what its logically equivalent
quantified reformulation is. The question was answered for first order
languages earlier, but the conditionswere full of technical complications
and the construction applied difficult semantics. In this paper, the ques-
tion is answered for a typed lambda calculus, in an easier way and by a
simpler semantics.
1. Introduction
1.1. Hilbert’s epsilon, descriptions and FOL
The ﬁrst-order language (FOL) extended by the Hilbertian variable bind-
ing operator " is possibly a good choice as an environment modelling a cou-
ple of formal linguistic and language philosophical phenomena concerning
descriptions.1 The term
(1) ("x)'
where ' is a FOL formula and x is a variable, has the following intuitive
meaning:
(2) “an F , if there is any F at all”
1 See Slater (2007); Kneebone (1963, 100).
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where predicate F is the intended meaning or the natural language trans-
lation of the formula '. (Here, the notion of translation is due to Tarski.
In the present case, the object-language is FOL and the meta-language is
the natural language.2) The intuition above follows straightforward from
the ﬁrst epsilon (or transﬁnite) axiom introduced by David Hilbert, which
is the following formula scheme
(9x)'(x)! '(("x)'(x))
The intended meaning of the epsilon term shows that ("x)' can be called
a conditional indeﬁnite description, since “an F ” alone is an indeﬁnite
description, with the addition of the conditional clause “there is any F
at all” it becomes a diﬀerent linguistic entity with, perhaps, a diﬀerent
meaning. Obviously, I do not have to mention that the meaning of the
phrase “an F ” is itself a problematic one. Therefore, the problem of the
semantic diﬀerence between “an F ” and “an F , if there is any F at all”
is also a tricky one. In the paper I am committed to the standpoint that
these phrases have the same meaning.
In order to show an application of Hilbert’s symbol let me provide a
formal reconstruction and analysis of the sentence
(3) The man drinking a martini is interesting-looking.
in FOL extended by " (this extended language is denoted by FOL+").3
Since, FOL+" does not contain deﬁnite descriptions, the phrase the man
drinking a martini can be seen as a special case of the use of ". A pos-
sible solution is to add a uniqueness clause to the following formula:
“man drinking a martini(x)” (the formula in FOL+" expressing the natural
language predicate …is a man and drinks a martini; see Slater 2009, 417):
("x)(man drinking amartini(x) & (8y)(man drinking amartini(y)  (x = y))
Let us denote the term above by
(4) ("Dx)man drinking amartini(x)
Then sentence (3) is formulated as follows:
(5) interesting-looking(("Dx)(man drinking amartini(x)))
2 Cf. the notion of translation as applied in Convention T in (Tarski 1956, 188).
3 The original sentence can be found in Donnellan (1966).
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Let me remark again, that the claim that the phrase the man drinking a
martini can be expressed by ("Dx)man drinking amartini(x) is not an obvi-
ous one, however a possibly good enough working hypothesis. Without a
man holding martini in his hand, the meaning of the man drinking a mar-
tini is as vague as the meaning of the phrase the man drinking a martini,
if anybody at all.
Accepting the hypothesis above, by sentence (3) one can refer to the
interesting-looking person in question, even if he holds a glass of water in
his hand. In this case, the semantic value of the term (4) is a person – not
drinking a martini – who seems to be interesting.
The problem of sentence (5) reminds one of Russell’s Theory of De-
scriptions (RTD). In Russell’s On Denoting or in Whitehead & Russell
(1910/1967) it is proposed that descriptions must not be treated as proper
names, but as incomplete parts of quatiﬁed sentences.
“Thus we must either provide a denotation in cases in which it is at ﬁrst sight
absent, or we must abandon the view that the denotation is what is concerned
in propositions which contain denoting phrases.” (Russell 1905, 484)
“According to the view I advocate, a denoting phrase is essentially part of a
sentence, and does not, as like most single words, have any signiﬁcance on its
own account.” (ibid., 488)
According to RTD, a description D, as a denoting phrase, is not inter-
changeable by an other individual name N which is identical to D, since
D is meaningless in separation, and has only contextual meaning. Russell
in On Denoting (Russell 1905) gives a FOL reformulation for sentences of
the form (3), but in the general case, when the natural language sentence
contains more than one descriptions or a lot of logical operators the FOL
reformulation can be carried out along diﬀerent lines. One must mind the
scope of logical operators and descriptions. Hence, in the general case RTD
is appears to be a FOL reformulation program, in the spirit of the treat-
ment of the simple case described in Russell (1905). At this point, a bit
naive question arises.
(6) Is the closed formula (5) equivalent to a plain, quantiﬁed one?
If it is in general, then RTD, or rather its quantiﬁcational program, is ap-
plicable to FOL+", in the sense that an epsilon-term, containing a closed
formula, can be considered as incomplete part of a quantiﬁed reformu-
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lation.4 If it is not equivalent in general, then for FOL+" Donnellan’s
proposal holds (i.e., sometimes descriptions have separate meaning, too;
see Donnellan 1966). The answer to the question seems to be the latter.
The term ("x)' is a referring one (its semantic value is always deﬁned)
and its semantics is unproblematic, even if there is no ', at least if the
reference of ("x)' is not a '. Nevertheless, note that RTD is a strategy
proposed to solved the problem ‘how to deal with descriptions’ and not a
(mathematical) thesis. In FOL+", ("x)' is a proper name (in the sense of
Russell), hence the question must be rewritten in a weaker form. But what
will be this weakened question?
It is well-known that if the truth value of the sentence  (("x)') in
any model does not depend on the semantic value of ("x)', then there is a
FOL reformulation of  (("x)').5 Hence, if  (("x)') is an epsilon-invariant
formula (its semantic value is independent of the value of the containing
epsilon-term) then the term ("x)' can be eliminated from  (("x)') by a
logically equivalent reformulation. The problem is that this plain FOL re-
formulation is not an explicit or transparent one. The proof of the theorem
applies Craig’s Interpolation Theorem, which is a pure existence theorem
not giving the needed explicit formula. Hence, in the light of the above
considerations, the relevant question is the following.
“Is there an explicit, transparent, well-explainable FOL reformulation of  (("x)'),
provided that  (("x)') is epsilon-invariant (in some model)?”
For FOL+", the question has been positively answered in Molnár (2013),
however with the application of a lot of technical conditions. When one
changes FOL to lambda calculus the picture becomes much more clear. The
point is that, in FOL the substitution  [x/("x)'] is only a meta-language
operation, but in the lambda-calculus it is encoded into the object-language
via the applicationMN , whereM is an expression of the lambda-language
and N is an epsilon-term of the form ("x)P .
4 The crucial point in the tradition of RTD is not that what the FOL reformulation
is, but wheter there is any such reformulation. For instance, as Zvolenszky puts
the question: “Initially, at issue was the meaning of a speciﬁc, rather narrow class
of expressions, incomplete deﬁnite descriptions: are they devices of reference or of
quantiﬁcation?” (Zvolenszky 2007, 1).
5 One can call it Caicedo’s Theorem or the Blass–Gurevich Theorem. Its proof ﬁrst
presented in Caicedo (1995), but Blass and Gurevich (2000) claim before the theorem
(Prop. 3.2.) that the proposition is a folklore and “it is mentioned in Caicedo (1995)
without a reference”.
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1.2. Hilbert’s epsilon and the lambda operator
In section 2, a syntax and semantics will be given for the epsilon symbol in
the context of typed lambda calculus (TL). The syntactic notions will be
the well-known ones, but in the deﬁnitions diﬀerent way will be followed,
based on labeled, ordered trees.6 Since, by the Curry–Howard Correspon-
dence, TL is closely related to the proof theory of the natural deduction
system of propositional logic, we make use of the possibility to deﬁne the
TL notions of TL syntax the same style as proofs. The form of the def-
initions will ﬁt this doctrine and a tree-based method will be applied.
In section 3, it will be seen that in TL the result can be reached much
more faster than in FOL. There is no need to refer to the so-called in-
tensional and substitutional epsilon semantics.7 The strategy will be the
following. The typed lambda language extended by Hilbert’s epsilon (L8" )
will be considered as a formal model of the fragment of the natural language
containing descriptions. Then, if it is possible, the epsilon expressions will
be eliminated and the sentences containing them will be mapped, in an
explicit way, to the epsilon-free quantiﬁed reduct L8 of L8" . The plain
lambda language reformulation will keep the logical truth in the model.
Giving Montague-semantics to the extended language and to the plain
epsilon-free language as models (the (M; f)-s and the M-s below, respec-
tively) the construction will be unproblematic.
Figure 1: Chain of fragments. The natural language, the -8-" expressible frag-
ment and the -8 expressible fragment.
6 It is not easy to refer to a single book or paper, but the book Simmons (2000) (with
the programmatic subtitle “Taking the Curry–Howard Correspondence Seriously”)
surely uses the tree technique that I follow.
7 Note that, Ahrendt and Giese introduced several types of epsilon semantics. See
(Ahrendt & Giese 1999, Def. 4,5). In Molnár (2013) the substitutional semantics
was applied. Now, in TL the extensional semantics (see Molnár 2013, 821 or Monk
1976, Def. 29.23) will be enough.
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In section 4, it will be pointed out that the result is not less eﬀective
than the RTD proposed by Russell.
2. Syntax and semantics of typed lambda system with epsilon
2.1. Syntax
For building the syntax a tree-based method is chosen (parsing or con-
struction trees), which is much more transparent than the old-fashioned
character sequence technique. One thing to note is that here the trees grop
upward, as those used by by linguists in Combinatory Categorial Gram-
mar, or, what the main motivation is, in proof theory of the style used in
natural deduction.
The deﬁnitions below are basically combinations of the well-known
ones from Troelstra & Schwichtenberg (2000, Sec. 1) and from Sørensen &
Urzyczyn (1998).
The so called typeability relation (`) is a pure syntactic relation that
joins the expressions of the lambda calculus to types with respect to a
ﬁxed set of typed variables called context. Of course, the relation ` plays
a fundamental role in the Curry–Howard Isomorphism, which links the
lambda expressions to proof trees of the natural deduction system of the
implicational logic.
Deﬁnition 1. The language of types is the tuple LTyp = h; o; (; ); [; ]i. The
set of its strings Str(LTyp) contains the ﬁnite sequences of the characters
from f; o; (; ); [; ]g. A construction tree  of the string  2 Str(LTyp) is a
ﬁnite, labeled, ordered tree such that the labels of  are from Str(LTyp)
and
1. the labels of the leaves of  come from the set f; og,
2. the branch nodes of  (these are not leaves) and their labels are of
the form
[()]

3. the root of  is .
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If there is a tree  such that  is a construction tree of  2 Str(LTyp),
then  is said to be a type (expression) in LTyp. The set of all types in
LTyp is denoted by Exp(LTyp). (Cf. Troelstra & Schwichtenberg 2000, Def.
1.2.1 (p. 9); Def. 1.1.7. (p. 7).)
Note that the construction tree of a type is unique. The construction tree
of the type  is denoted by Tree(). The reference to brackets [; ] is avoided
when a type  is well-known and its construction tree can be completely
reconstructed without them.
Intuitively,  is the type of individuals and o is the type of sentences.
The compound type o() is, for example, the grammatical type of the
single-variable predicates.
Deﬁnition 2. A lambda language is a tuple L = hV;C; (; ); ; [; ]i, where
V is an inﬁnite and C is non-empty set and V is disjoint to C. Str(L)
contains the ﬁnite sequences from V [C [f; (; ); [; ]g. A construction tree
 of the M 2 Str(L) is a ﬁnite, labeled, ordered tree such that the labels
of  are from Str(L) and
1. the labels of the leaves of  come from the set V [ C,
2. the branch nodes of  and their labels are of the form
[P (Q)]
QP
[(x)P ]
P
3. the root of  is M .
If there is a tree  such that  is a construction tree of M 2 Str(L),
then M is said to be an expression in L. The set of all expression in L
is denoted by Exp(L).
The elements of V are called the variables of L and V is denoted by
Var(L). The elements of C are the constants of L and C is denoted by
Const(L). (Cf. Troelstra & Schwichtenberg 2000, Def. 1.2.2 (p. 9); Def.
1.1.7. (p. 7).)
Note that the construction tree of an expression is unique. The construction
tree of the expression M is denoted by Tree(M). The height of Tree(M)
is deﬁned by the well-known manner and is denoted by jTree(M)j.
Referring to brackets [; ] is avoided when an expression M is known
and its construction tree can be completely reconstructed without them.
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Deﬁnition 3. Let hV;C; (; ); ; [; ]i be a lambda language. The tuple L =
hV;C; (; ); ; [; ]; Zi is a typed lambda language, if Z : C ! Exp(LTyp). The
function Z is denoted by CnstTp(L).
Deﬁnition 4. Let L be a lambda language and let   Var(L) be a
non-empty ﬁnite set. A function f :  ! Exp(LTyp) is called a context, and
the set of all contexts is denoted by Cont(L). ( :  ) 2 Cont(L) denotes
a function f with domain  and range  . If f = ( :  ) is a context, and
x 2  then (x : ) denotes f(x) = .
For a typed lambda language L the sets of variables, expressions, contexts
etc. deﬁned and denoted by the same manner as for a lambda languages.
Deﬁnition 5. Let L be a typed lambda language. By induction on the
height of the construction tree of the expressions, relation
( :  ) `M : '
will be deﬁned as follows for every context ( :  ) 2 Cont(L), expression
M 2 Exp(L) and type '. ` is called the typeability relation.
1. Let jTree(M)j = 1.
a. If c 2 Const(L) and ( :  ) is a context, then ( :  ) ` c : ',
if ' = CnstTp(L)(c).
b. If x 2 Var(L) and ( :  ) is a context, then ( :  ) ` x : ', if
(x : ') 2 ( :  ).
2. Let us suppose that n > 1 and for every ( : ) context, type  
and expression N with jTree(N)j < n, the relation ( : ) ` N :  
is deﬁned. Let ( :  ) be a context, ' a type and M an expression
such that jTree(M)j = n.
a. Let M = P (Q). Then ( :  ) ` M : ', if ( :  ) ` Q :  and
( :  ) ` P : () and ' = .
b. Let M = (x)P . Then ( :  ) ` M : ', if ( : ) ` P : ,
' = () and ( :  ) = ( : ) n f(x : )g.8,
For some examples, see Troelstra & Schwichtenberg (2000, 10).
8 Cf. Sørensen & Urzyczyn (1998, 41, def. 3.1.1.).
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2.2. Montague-semantics
Deﬁnition 6. Let M 6= ;. By induction on jTree(')j, the domain set
DM (') of type ' 2 LTyp is deﬁned as follows.
1. DM (o) = fT;Fg, DM () =M
2. If DM () and DM () is deﬁned earlier, then
DM (()) =
DM ()DM ()
where DM ()DM () is the set ff : DM () ! DM ()g.
If M is ﬁxed, then D(') is written instead.
Deﬁnition 7. IfM 6= ;, L is a lambda-language and ( :  ) is a context,
then a function a : Var(L) ! ['2LTypDM (') is an assignation of the
variables. The assignation a is an assignation of the type ( :  ), if for
every x 2 , a(x) 2 DM () whenever (x : ) 2 ( :  ).
Deﬁnition 8. Let L be a typed lambda-language, M 6= ;. The tuple
M = hM; IpMi is a model over the language L, if IpM : C ! ['2LTypD(')
such that IpM(c) 2 D(CnstTp(L)(c)).
Deﬁnition 9. Let L be a typed lambda-language, M = hM; IpMi a
model over the language L, ( :  ) a context and a an assignation of the
type ( :  ). Suppose that for N 2 Exp(L) there is a type ' such that
( :  ) ` N : '. By induction on jTree(N)j the semantic value [[N ]]Ma in
context ( :  ) is deﬁned as follows.
1. If N = c 2 Const(L), then
[[c]]Ma = IpM(c):
2. If N = x 2 Var(L), then
[[x]]Ma = a(x):
3. Let N = P (Q), then
[[P (Q)]]Ma = [[P ]]
M
a ([[Q]]
M
a ):
4. Let N = (x)P and let the assignment a[x! ] be the following:
a[x! ](y) = a(y) for every variable y 6= x, and a(x) = .
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Then
[[(x)P ]]Ma : D() ! D() ;  7! [[P ]]Ma[x!]
where ( :  ) ` x :  and ( :  ) ` P : .
Note that if N is not typeable in a context ( :  ), i.e., there is no type '
such that
( :  ) ` N : '
then N has no semantic value in an assignment of the type of the context.
For example, let the type of the constant c be o() and the context ( :
 ) = f(x : o)g. Then the expression c(x) is not typeable from the context
f(x : o)g, since the argument of c must be an expression of the type .
However, c(x) is a well-deﬁned expression, it has no semantic value in the
context f(x : o)g.
2.3. Logical and epsilon extensions
The logical operators will be deﬁned as constants of certain types. If L
is a typed lambda language, then it could be extended by the following
constants.
1. : : o(o) IpM(:) : T 7! F;F 7! T in a model M,
2. _ : o(o(o)) IpM(_) : (F;F) 7! F; and T otherwise in a model M,
3. 8 : o(o()) IpM(8) : fT;FgM ! fT;Fg; (M ! fT;Fg;  7! T) 7!
T; and F otherwise in a model M,
4. " : (o()) IpM(") : fT;FgM !M : f 7! g(f 2M j f() = Tg),
where g is a ﬁxed choice function P(M)!M such that g(S) 2 S, if
S 6= ; and g(S) 2M , if S = ;, in a model M.
In what follows, two speciﬁc extensions will be made use of, the plain
extension
L8 with Const(L8) = Const(L) [ f:;_; 8g
and the epsilon extension
L8" with Const(L8" ) = Const(L) [ f:;_; 8; "g:
If M is a model of L8, then (M; g) will denote the (expanded) model of
the L8" extension with a choice function g described above.9
9 Actually, epsilon-terms are a special kind of Skolem functions; it is pointed out in
Monk (1976, 481) and in Mints (1996, sec. 2).
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Some further (classical) notations will also be used:
P ! Q = _([:(P )](Q)); P&Q = :(_([:(P )](:(Q)))); (8x)P = 8((x)P )
("x)P = "((x)P ):
For further purposes the language L8"= using identity of individuals is also
introduced and the meaning of = is deﬁned as
5. =: (o())() IpM(=) : M2 ! fT;Fg; (x; y) 7! T; if x = y and F
otherwise in a model M.
2.4. Examples
Proposition 1. Let x be a variable and (M; g) be a model over the lan-
guage L8"= . Then
1. ` (8x)(x = x) : o
2. ` ("x)(x 6= x) = ("x)(x 6= x) : o
3. [[(8x)(x = x)]](M;g) = [[("x)(x 6= x) = ("x)(x 6= x)]](M;g) = T
Proof. (1)
8((x)(x = x)) : o
(x)(x = x) : o() /
x = x : o
x :  .=(x) : o()
x :  .= : [o()]()
8 : o(o())
Here (= (x))(x) is denoted by x = x. The proof tree above shows that the
expression 8((x)(x = x)), which is the same as (8x)(x = x), is typeabe
by the type o. The labels . on the left sides of the leaves mark the places
which are called the “dischargeable premises” in proof theory. / marks the
node where they are abandoned. According to part (2b) of Deﬁnition 5,
both the x : -s are discharged by the node (x)([= (x)](x)) : o(), i.e.,
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(x : ) can be canceled from the context, which is now an empty set. Note
that, the use of the labels / and . is completely unnecessary, since the
role of the variable x is exactly that of the triangles. The variable x in the
leaves marks the “dischargeable premises” and the symbol (x) marks the
node discharging the premises labeled by the free variable x, after which
x becomes a bound variable.
(2)
Here, according to the deﬁnitions of " and= as constants above, "((x)(x 6=
x)) is denoted by ("x)(x 6= x) and :(x = x) is denoted by x 6= x. The
above proof tree proves that ("x)(x 6= x) = ("x)(x 6= x) is typeable by o.
(3)
[[(8x)(x = x)]](M;g)a = [[8((x)(x = x)]](M;g)a
= [[8]](M;g)a ([[(x)(x = x)]](M;g))a
= [[8]](M;g)a ( 7! [[= (x)(x)]](M;g)a[x!])
= [[8]](M;g)a ( 7! [[= (x)]](M;g)a[x!]())
= [[8]](M;g)a ( 7! [[=]](M;g)a[x!]()())
= [[8]](M;g)a ( 7! T)
= T
The second expression’s semantic value is trivial:
[[("x)(x 6= x) = ("x)(x 6= x)]](M;g)a = [[=]](M;g)a ([[("x)(x 6= x)]](M;g)a )([[("x)(x 6= x)]](M;g)a )
= T
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below, we determine it:
[[("x)(x 6= x)]](M;g)a = [["((x)(x 6= x))]](M;g)a
= [["]](M;g)a ([[(x)(x 6= x)]](M;g)a )
= [["]](M;g)a ( 7! [[x 6= x]](M;g)a[x!])
= g(f 2M j [[x 6= x]](M;g)a[x!] = Tg) = g(;)
= g(f 2M j [[:]](M;g)a[x!]([[=]]
(M;g)
a[x!]()()) = Tg) = g(;)
2.5. Epsilon-invariant expressions
Deﬁnition 10. Let N 2 Exp(L8" ) be such that for a context ( :  ) the
relation ( :  ) ` N : ' holds for a type ' and let M be a L8 model. N
is said to be epsilon-invariant over the model M, if for every assignment
a of type ( :  ) and choice functions g1; g2 : P(M)!M it holds that
[[N ]](M;g1)a = [[N ]]
(M;g2)
a :
The notion above is a symbolic formulation of the intuitive term “epsilon-
independent”. In FOL this concept was applied to show that “epsilon-
independent” sentences can be reformulated into an epsilon-free one, pro-
vided the sentence is independent over every model (see Blass & Gurevich
2000).
3. Epsilon and application
Theorem 1. Let P;Q 2 Exp(L8" ),M be a model of L8, ( :  ) a context,
( :  ) ` P : o, ( :  ) ` Q : o and x 2 Var(L8" ), furthermore, let
[(x)P ](("x)Q), P and Q be epsilon-invariant over the modelM. Then for
every assignment a of type ( :  ) and choice function g : P(M) !M :
[[[(x)P ](("x)Q)]](M;g)a = [[((8x)(:Q)&(8x)P ) _ (((9x)Q)&(8x)(Q! P ))]](M;g)a :
Proof. (1) Let the right hand side be T.
First case: [[((8x)(:Q)&(8x)P )]](M;g)a = T. Then [[(8x)P )]](M;g)a = T holds
and let m = [[("x)Q]](M;g)a 2M . Hence, by deﬁnition
T = [[(8x)P )]](M;g)a = [[8((x)P )]](M;g)a
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that is
[[(x)P ]](M;g)a =

 7! [[P ]](M;g)a[x!]

 T:
Hence
[[[(x)P ](("x)Q)]](M;g)a = [[[(x)P ]]]
(M;g)
a (m) = [[P ]]
(M;g)
a[x!m] = T:
Second case: [[(((9x)Q)&(8x)(Q! P ))]](M;g)a = T. Then
[[(x):Q]](M;g)a =

 7! [[:Q]](M;g)a[x!]

6 T
hence for a  2 M [[Q]](M;g)a[x!] = T. Therefore, if [["((x)Q)]]
(M;g)
a = m
then [[(x)Q]](M;g)a (m) = T. But from [[(8x)(Q ! P ))]](M;g)a = T it follows
that [[P ]](M;g)a[x!m] = T, since [[Q]]
(M;g)
a[x!m] = T. Hence, [[(x)P ]]
(M;g)
a (m) =
[[[(x)P ](("x)Q)]]
(M;g)
a = T:
(2) Suppose the left hand side is T. First case: let [[((8x)(:Q)]](M;g)a = T,
m 2M arbitrary and g0 is the choice function such that g0(;) = m. Hence,
by the epsilon-invariance of P and [(x)P ](("x)Q) it follows that
T = [[[(x)P ](("x)Q)]](M;g)a = [[[(x)P ](("x)Q)]](M;g
0)
a = [[P ]]
(M;g0)
a[x!m] = [[P ]]
(M;g)
a[x!m]
therefore [[(8x)P ]](M;g)a = T. Second case: let [[((9x)Q]](M;g)a = T, m 2 M
arbitrary such that [[Q]](M;g)a[x!m] = T and g0 is the choice function such that
g0(f 2M j [[Q]](M;g)a[x!] = Tg) = m. Then by the epsilon-invariance of P , Q
and [(x)P ](("x)Q) it follows that
T = [[[(x)P ](("x)Q)]](M;g)a = [[[(x)P ](("x)Q)]](M;g
0)
a = [[P ]]
(M;g0)
a[x!m] = [[P ]]
(M;g)
a[x!m]
for every m such that [[Q]](M;g)a[x!m] = T. Hence, [[(8x)(Q! P )]]
(M;g)
a = T
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4. Morning Star and King of France tests
The concluding facts can be stated in two claims:
1. In the formal language L8" (which is supposed to model the be-
haviour of descriptions) the (closed) term ("x)Q has referential
meaning in the sense that a ﬁxed model (M; g) singles out an in-
dividual [[("x)Q]](M;g) 2M for ("x)Q as semantic value.
2. In some cases, when ("x)Q is part of a compound sentence
[(x)P ](("x)Q), with all its components being epsilon-invariant, the
("x)Q has a contextual meaning, such that the sentence [(x)P ](("x)Q)
has an equivalent epsilon-free reformulation using quantiﬁed expres-
sions from the plain language L8.
We do not intend to set up a weaker theory than Russell’s Theory of
Descriptions. A new theory must serve at least as many solutions as far as
Russell’s proposal was able to solve. An appropriate indicator is to look
at the two problems that the Theory of Descriptions solved and examine
what the new model porposes. The ﬁrst one is the problem of Hesperus
and Phosphorus (below it will be called Morning Star Test), the second
one is the problem of the empty names (the King of France Test).
4.1. Morning Star Test
In 1905, Russell gave a FOL-based solution of the so-called Frege Puzzle in
terms of RTD, understandably, without mentioning the intensional tools
of possible world semantics, which is a much later development. Here, I
would like to show brieﬂy that even the exposition of the puzzle is so
widely criticized, that the RTD result of the test is rather irrelevant to us.
“Gottlob thinks that the Morning Star is illuminated by the Sun.”
“The Evening Star is the Morning Star.”
—
“Gottlob thinks that the Evening Star is illuminated by the Sun”.
(Cf. Frege 1892/1990.)
First of all, I would like to point out that several scholars are commit-
ted to the assumption that the names such as the Morning Star or the
Evening Star are understood tacitly as deﬁnite descriptions. For Russell,
these names abbreviate descriptions, hence they are denoting phrases too
(Dummett 1973, 97). The problem is that, according to Leiniz’s Rule, since
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the Evening Star is the Morning Star, the two phrases are interchangeable.
However, the above inference does not seem to be valid, since it is possi-
ble that Gottlob thinks that the Morning Star is illuminated by the Sun,
but he does not necessarily know this fact about the Evening Star, even
if in reality the two planets are the same, which is the case. Russell’s so-
lution was that the phrases the Morning Star and the Evening Star are
not proper names, they only have contextual meanings, hence they are not
interchangeable due to formal reasons.10
In the epsilon language L8" , the deﬁnite descriptions are proper names,
they are manifested as epsilon terms on the object language level, hence
the modelling in terms of the epsilon-language fails the Morning Star Test,
and it does not explain the puzzle. Fortunately, hitherto, the Frege Puzzle
and the semantic status of the expressions like the Morning star are not
completely solved. If the phrase the Morning star is a rigid designator, as it
is done in Kripke’s proposal, then the Puzzle is solved. Here, temporarily,
not having modal context, rigid means that the model designates a single
individual in one step, and does not select ﬁrst a set, then a member of
it, by a choice function.11 Then the puzzle only says that, if planet Venus
is illuminated by the Sun, then planet Venus is illuminated by the Sun.
According to Kripke’s approach, the problematic case is the sentence The
Evening Star is the Morning Star. It is a necessary truth, but it may
be problematic from an epistemological point of view.12 For the epsilon
model, the solution is the same. According to Monk, the closed epsilon
terms are constants, therefore they are rigid designators in accordance with
the Kripke doctrine. However, as Fitting pointed out, an epsilon term,
being description-like, can neither be a constant, nor a variable. It is a
complex ﬂexible designator (see Fitting 1972). Here, if the Morning star
is a complex demonstrative (selected by a descriptive term in the actual
world), then it is a rigid designator (see Kaplan 1989). Clearly, now, I do
not have to deal with the modal context of epsilon terms, knowing that the
highly applicable tool of demonstratives might make the modal approach
much more complex, and might not add essentially more to the above
consideration.
10 See Russell (1905) and Whitehead & Russell (1910/1967).
11 Of course, it is a rough simpliﬁcation. Picking an individual means direct reference,
rigid means the term has the same semantic value along the possible worlds. What
is more, the notion of “rigid” above is understandable, but mathematically vague.
12 See Kripke (1972, 102). The whole story can be found in Zvolenszky (2007).
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4.2. The King of France Test
Consider the following two sentences
“The present King of France is bald.”
“The present King of France is not bald.”
In order to determine the truth value of the ﬁrst one, let us imagine the set
of all bald people. Since the present King of France is not in this set, the
ﬁrst sentence is false. But, the same reasoning leads to the fact that the
second sentence is false too. Which is a contradiction. Hence, the phrase
the present King of France is not a proper name, it cannot have a meaning
in isolation, rather it only has a contextual meaning and the sentences
containing such phrases are quantiﬁed formulas. This is Russell’s solution.
In the epsilon calculus the semantic values of the epsilon terms are deﬁned
in all cases. The two sentences above are unproblematic, they assign to the
phrase the present King of France an existing individual as reference. And
it is either bald or not bald. According to Theorem 1 of the present paper,
sentences may possess contextual meaning too, where the truth value is
also well-deﬁned. Of course, the reference of the present King of France
in the epsilon calculus is not the present King of France. Approaching the
situation on a more formal level, let us consider the symbolic sentence
("x)(x 6= x) = ("x)(x 6= x)
This is a sentence containing terms which are ill-deﬁned as descriptions:
x 6= x is an empty predicate. However, the semantic value of ("x)(x 6= x), in
a given model, is well-deﬁned. Moreover, ("x)(x 6= x) = ("x)(x 6= x) is an
epsilon invariant sentence, since, it is true in any given epsilon semantics.
And indeed, there are epsilon semantics (for example the Bourbaki group’s
formal systems), where ("x)(x 6= x) = ("x)(x 6= x) is syntactically identical
to the sentence (8x)(x = x). ("x)(x 6= x) = ("x)(x 6= x) is an epsilon-
invariant sentence, which has contextual meaning too: it is equivalent to
the fact that every individual is identical to itself.
The situation is very similar to the problem of the interesting-looking
man holding a martini. In this case, the the present King of France is
rather a person who is, in fact, bald, but not the present King of France,
and ("x)(x 6= x) is an existing individual, which is identical to itself, but
of course, it does not hold that it is not the same as itself.
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ABSTRACT
Could a grammatical English sentence contain three consecutive strictly
transitive prepositions? One might easily think not: strictly transitive
prepositions require NP complements. However, prepositions can be
stranded, clausal constituents can begin with prepositions, and so on.
Ideally one would like such questions to be algorithmically decidable.
I examine the theoretical issue, note a parallel in number theory, reveal
the solution to the empirical puzzle (but not the number-theoretic one),
and conclude by noting that there is indeed an algorithm for deciding
whether somesequence can appear as a proper subsequenceof a gram-
matical string, provided English is context-free.
1. A puzzle in English grammar
Some English prepositions can be used either with a noun-phrase comple-
ment or without it if the context permits:
a.(1) Open the gate and walk through it.
b. Open the gate and walk through.
a.(2) After a while we went back inside the house.
b. After a while we went back inside.
Others, like of and into, strictly require a noun-phrase complement and
cannot be used grammatically without one:
a.(3) She asked for dihydrocodeine, but I had never heard of it.
b. *She asked for dihydrocodeine, but I had never heard of.
a.(4) We went back to the car and got into it.
b. *We went back to the car and got into.
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I’ll refer to the latter kind of prepositions as strictly transitive. Consider
now the question stated in (5).
(5) Is there a grammatical English sentence containing a sequence of three consecutive
occurrences of a single strictly transitive preposition?
You might think that this question can be immediately answered in the
negative on the grounds that the next word after a strictly transitive prepo-
sition would have to be the beginning of a noun phrase and noun phrases
do not begin with prepositions. But not so fast: English syntax is much
trickier than that. For one thing, the complement of a preposition does not
have to immediately follow it, but can be displaced in at least three ways.
First, there are prepositional passives like (6b), where what is under-
stood as the complement of a preposition (as in (6a)) is in grammatical
terms the subject of the clause, and thus separated from the preposition:
a.(6) People seldom speak of this.
b. This is seldom spoken of.
Grammarians speak of such prepositions as stranded. Because of what are
often called “subject raising” constructions, the subject can appear arbi-
trarily far away from the stranded preposition:
(7) This seems to have turned out under the circumstances to have been only very seldom
spoken of.
Second, items like interrogative or relative words or phrases can be dis-
placed an arbitrary distance to the beginning of a clause. This is the most
common way in which a preposition can be stranded. Notice that these
two sentences are both grammatical, and are synonymous (though while
the ﬁrst is normal in style, the second is rather formal and pompous):
a.(8) Which regulation do you think the committee imagines the provost’s action might
have been in violation of?
b. Of which regulation do you think the committee imagines the provost’s action
might have been in violation?
In both of these the preposition of is understood to have which regulation
as its complement. Notice that in (8b) the construction involved allows the
strictly transitive preposition of to be the ﬁrst word in its clause.
Third, phrases can also be displaced toward the end of the clause,
yielding a diﬀerent way in which a strictly transitive preposition may fail
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to be immediately followed by its complement, as when a parenthetical is
inserted after a preposition:
(9) It was a painting of, or perhaps I should say a painting apparently intended to vaguely
suggest, a cornﬁeld in summer.
Thus in order to settle the question in (5) it will be necessary to ensure that
no facts of this sort can interact to create a way in which three transitive
prepositions could become adjacent. It is not just a matter of which words
are allowed to be adjacent to which other words: the interactions of the
many diﬀerent syntactic constructions in English are not necessarily going
to be easy to foresee.
2. Generative grammars and decidability
What (5) asks is whether some combination of grammatical conﬁgurations
can permit a sentence to contain a sequence like of of of or into into into.
It seems intuitively unlikely. But can we prove that it is impossible?
There are systematic computational ways of answering some kinds of
questions about sentences in languages. The great majority of the relevant
work has been based on systems of rules that Post (1943) originally called
production systems, and computer scientists often call rewriting systems,
and linguists call generative grammars. Basically they are sets of rules
for nondeterministic random construction of abstract structures such as
strings or trees.
Post’s systems were developed for the purpose of formalizing rules of
inference in logic, and were very elaborate, allowing for conclusions to be
derived from arbitrary-sized ﬁnite sets of premises of arbitrary complexity.
As soon as the concept of recursively enumerable (r.e.) sets was clearly
formulated in the 1930s, it was clear to Post that any r.e. set of strings
could be generated by one of his “canonical production systems”. In 1943 he
proved that this remained true for dramatically restricted systems that he
called “normal” systems, in which every rule had the form “yX ) Xz” for
speciﬁed strings y and z, where X is a free string-valued variable, and in
1947 he proved the same for another special case, where the rules all have
the form “X1yX2 ) X1zX2”, for speciﬁed strings y and z and variables X1
and X2. This, of course, is exactly the form of the grammars that Chomsky
(1959) later called “type 0”.
For any form of grammar that has this kind of expressive power (i.e.,
that can generate any arbitrary r.e. set), questions of the form “Does
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grammar G generate any string containing the substring w?” are always
going to be undecidable. This follows from Rice’s theorem (Hopcroft & Ull-
man 1979, 185–192) as applied to generative grammars rather than Turing
machines. All non-trivial properties of r.e. sets (that is, properties that
hold of some r.e. sets but not all) are undecidable.
I suspect it will also hold for the restricted class called context-sensitive
languages (equivalent to the class of type 0 grammars in which the z is
always at least as long as the y), though the conjecture needs a proof. The
rationale for my conjecture is that nearly all decision problems asking for a
property of an arbitrary context-sensitive stringset L are undecidable, the
two exceptions being membership (“Is w in L?”), which is decidable, and
complement type (“Is L context-sensitive?”), which was proved in 1987,
surprisingly, to be trivial in the sense of having a positive answer for every
context-sensitive L (this follows from the Immerman–Szelpcsényi theorem;
see Immerman 1999, 149–151). Despite the decidability of membership,
context-sensitive languages are extremely similar to arbitrary c.e. sets,
and have essentially all of their complexity. Any type 0 grammar G over
a symbol inventory  can be converted into a context-sensitive grammar
G0 over  [ b where b is a new dummy symbol used for padding the ends
of rules in which the right hand side is shorter than the left hand side.
L(G) is then obtainable from L(G0) simply by ignoring b (where “ignoring
b” means applying a homomorphism that erases b).
The most interesting family of stringsets for purposes of studying the
properties of human languages is the much smaller subset known as the
context-free stringsets (standardly called CFLs). This deserves closer at-
tention. CFLs are generated by context-free grammars (CFGs). It is by
no means implausible that the set of grammatical sentences of English
could be exactly generated by a CFG: see Pullum & Gazdar (1982), Pul-
lum (1985), and Pullum & Rawlins (2007) for discussion of some failed
counterarguments.
CFGs are far more tractable than context-sensitive grammars in most
respects. But even for a CFG, it is not always immediately obvious what it
can do. As a very simple example, consider the CFG with terminals fa; bg,
nonterminals fS;A;Bg, start symbol S, and the rules shown in (10).
(10) S ! aB A! bAA
S ! bA B ! b
A! a B ! bS
A! aS B ! aBB
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The strings that this grammar generates are jumbles of a’s and b’s in
arbitrary orders, but they all meet a special condition: the number of a’s
is exactly the same as the number of b’s. The grammar in (10) generates
all and only the strings meeting that condition. This could hardly be said
to be immediately evident from looking at the rules, but it can be proved
inductively (see Hopcroft & Ullman 1979, 81–82).
It follows that the grammar deﬁnitely allows for the construction of a
sentence with aaa in it, and that any such string will also contain at least
three instances of b, and so on. Indeed, we know for any arbitrary string of
a’s and b’s that the answer to whether (10) can generate it is yes. However,
that is speciﬁc to (10), and depends on the proof concerning what stringset
it generates. Can we decide such questions more generally?
After all, although membership (“Can the string w be generated by
the CFG G?”) is decidable, and so is emptiness (“Are any strings at all
generated by the CFG G?”), many other semantic questions about CFGs
(i.e., questions not about their form but about their meaning, in the sense
of what strings they can generate under their usual interpretation) are for-
mally undecidable. These include intersection emptiness (“Does CFL L1
have a non-empty intersection with CFL L2?”), stringset inclusion (“Are all
the sentences of CFL L1 included among the sentences of CFL L2?”), reg-
ularity (“Is CFL L accepted by a ﬁnite-state automaton?”), (see Hopcroft
& Ullman 1979, 281), and many others.
The set of all strings of English words (whether grammatical or not)
in which the substring of of of appears is clearly regular (ﬁnite-state), as-
suming only that English has a ﬁnite vocabulary V of words.1 The ﬁnite
automaton accepting the set remains always in its start state q0, checking
only that each word is in V , and always rejects, except that if it encoun-
ters an of it switches to q1, and if another one immediately follows that it
goes into q2, and if another immediately follows that it goes into q3. Once
in q3 it always accepts provided only that all subsequent words are in V .
We seek a general algorithm for ﬁnding out whether some speciﬁc CFL
has a non-null intersection with that regular set. But the general ques-
tion of whether two stringsets have a non-null intersection is undecidable.
That is not in contradiction with what was said above about the rules
in (10) and the set of strings containing aaa. There we had a speciﬁc CFG
1 Kornai (2002) gives an interesting argument against this assumption, based on em-
pirical facts about statistical properties of text: English text exhibits properties that
are best modelled in terms of an inﬁnite word stock. But for the sake of the present
argument we continue under the usual formal language theory assumption of a ﬁnite
terminal vocabulary.
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for which it happened to be possible to construct a proof that all the
generated strings had equinumerous as and bs, and that some generated
strings contained aaa. This shows that in certain special cases we may ﬁnd
out the answer. That does not give us a general algorithm for all cases.
I will return later to the question of whether, given a complete gen-
erative grammar for English, there would be a systematic general way of
using it to guarantee answers to questions like (5). But ﬁrst I want to note
an interesting similarity to a question in mathematics.
3. A parallel in number theory
Question (5) has a particular logical property in common with the question
in (11), which derives from a famous conjecture in number theory.
(11) Is there an even number that is not equal to the sum of two primes?
This can be easily stated using ﬁrst-order logic interpreted in the usual
number-theory model where the domain is the non-negative integers with
the operations “+” (addition) and “” (multiplication). The predicate “even”
can be deﬁned as in (12a); “prime” can be deﬁned as in (12b); and then
(11) is the question of whether (12c) is true in the speciﬁed model.
a.(12) even(x) =df (9y[y  1 ^ y  2 = x])
b. prime(x) =df (:(9y9z[y  2 ^ z  2 ^ y  z = x]))
c. 9x[even(x) ^ :(9y9z[prime(y) ^ prime(z) ^ y + z = x])]
What (11) is in eﬀect asking for is a counterexample to the strong Goldbach
conjecture, henceforth GC, which claims that every even number greater
than 2 is the sum of a pair of primes. Most number theorists are inclined
to think this conjecture is true. One reason is that as we consider larger
and larger even integers n, the number of diﬀerent pairs of primes that
sum to n increases, so that for any large n it is overwhelmingly likely that
there is at least one pair that sums to n. But GC is a non-probabilistic
claim, and as is well known, no proof of it has been found, so currently it
cannot be guaranteed that the answer to (11) is negative.
The logically interesting property that (5) and (11) share is that for
each of them, showing that the question is algorithmically undecidable
would ipso facto (though indirectly) tell us the answer. This sounds para-
doxical, but it is not. It is a fairly simple point, fairly well known among
number theorists and mathematical logicians.
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Consider (11) ﬁrst. To say that the answer to (11) cannot be discovered
by an algorithm would mean that GC is unprovable within our system for
proving things in arithmetic. And we know from Gödel (1931), of course,
that some truths of arithmetic are unprovable in any system capable of
expressing all arithmetical truths.
For concreteness, assume the standard system deﬁned by the Peano
axioms, known as PA, and a monadic second-order logic interpreted on
hN;+; i (the natural numbers with addition and multiplication). To say
that GC is incapable of proof within PA is in eﬀect to say that GC is
independent of PA, in the sense that we could add GC to the set of PA’s
consequences, or add its negation, without losing consistency either way.
You could believe all the truths of PA plus GC, or believe all the truths of
PA plus the negation of GC, and no one would be able to use PA to prove
you wrong either way.
Yet if GC were shown to be independent of PA, we would immediately
know whether it was true or not: it would have to be true, so the answer
to (11) would be negative. Here is the reasoning.
If GC were false, there would be a counterexample, an even number
that cannot be expressed as the sum of any two primes. Let g be that num-
ber. We could demonstrate GC’s falsity in an elementary way by simply
exhibiting the list of all triples hp1; p2; ki such that p1 and p2 are primes
and k  g and p1+p2 = k. The list might be very long, if g were very large,
but it would be ﬁnite, and could be constructed by a very straightforward
computer program. The absence from the list of any case where k = g
would falsify GC, and thus answer (11) in the aﬃrmative.
If (11) cannot be answered in the aﬃrmative by a proof, the answer
to it must be negative, i.e., GC must be true. The answer to (11) cannot
be positive yet unprovably so.
An analogous result holds for (5). If we found some way, using facts
about a generative grammar for English, to show that (5) cannot be an-
swered within some system of mathematical reasoning, then we would im-
mediately (but indirectly) know that the answer to (5) is negative, because
otherwise there would exist a sentence containing three consecutive occur-
rences of a single transitive preposition, and simply exhibiting the deriva-
tion of that sentence would settle the question, oﬀering a proof of the
positive answer. The answer to (5) cannot be positive yet unprovably so.
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4. The answer to the grammatical puzzle
A key diﬀerence between question (5) and question (11) is that (5) is in a
sense empirical. It is an empirical fact that those who describe themselves
as speakers of English invariably regard All cows eat grass as grammatical
but *Grass eat cows all as ungrammatical; they regard Never have I heard
such nonsense as grammatical but *Never I have heard such nonsense
as ungrammatical; and so on. If there is a sentence containing three in-
stances of some transitive preposition in a row that English speakers treat
as grammatical when it is presented to them, then that is an empirical
fact (subject to all the usual epistemological caveats, to be discussed very
shortly).
My guess, on the basis of 40 years’ experience of working on English
syntax and techniques for formalizing syntactic theories, and six years
working with Rodney Huddleston on the largest and most complete refer-
ence grammar currently available for English (Huddleston & Pullum 2002),
would have been that the answer to (5) was negative: I would have thought
that the rules of English grammar could not allow three consecutive oc-
currences of a strictly transitive preposition, on the grounds that there
wouldn’t appear to be any context in which all three of them could have
the obligatory noun-phrase complements they require.
But it is a very important fact about argument and evidence in syntax
that the intuition of a grammarian regarding generalizations of this sort
cannot be trusted.
It is true that the intuition of a native speaker (whether a gram-
marian or not) can generally be trusted on individual sentences. This is
why determining grammatical well-formedness for a sentence of reasonable
length normally involves little more than having a native speaker look at
it or listen to it, provided some minimal conditions of attentiveness are re-
spected. But caveats are necessary even to that claim, because aspects of
meaning, style, phonology, or processing may interfere with intuitive judg-
ments about sentencehood. For example, (13a) will generally be judged
grammatical, but the synonymous (13b) will not.
a.(13) Everybody whom everybody left departed.
b. Everybody everybody left left.
This apparently because center-embedding a phrase or clause inside an-
other, even once increases the processing load substantially. (Notice that
the relative clause everybody left is embedded with parts of the main
clause either side of it, which means processing of the main clause must be
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interrupted by the processing of another clause and then resumed where
it left oﬀ; this is discussed in Miller & Chomsky (1963) and much subse-
quent psycholinguistic literature.) The combination of that with two pairs
of adjacent duplicate words is confusing enough to completely wreck the
chances of recognizing the grammatical structure.
Likewise, it is well known that there are sentences that confuse us into
thinking they are ungrammatical by (as it were) tempting us to process
them incorrectly. They are known as garden-path sentences (Bever 1970).
One celebrated example, well known from the psycholinguistic literature,
is (14):
(14) The horse raced past the barn fell.
Our tendency to process this with raced as the preterite-tense verb of
the main clause, and an unneeded extra verb fell on the end, is almost
irresistible, and blinds us to the fact that raced can also be a past participle,
so raced past the barn could be a nonﬁnite passive clause modifying horse.
In other words, the sentence can be read with the same structure as (15):
(15) The car driven past the barn crashed.
Many other similar examples could be given of the ways in which poor ac-
ceptability may wrongly make a properly-formed sentence seem ungram-
matical.
However, even if native speakers can in typical cases intuitively per-
ceive the well-formed structure of an individual sentence, even skilled syn-
tacticians cannot reliably intuit the truth of generalizations about wide
ranges of sentences or phrases.
The young Noam Chomsky ventured in a conference discussion the
assertion that “The verb perform cannot be used with mass-word objects:
one can perform a task, but one cannot perform labor” (Hill 1962, 29).
Challenged by another participant (Anna Granville Hatcher) to say how
he knew this, he answered: “Because I am a native speaker of the English
Language”. Later in the discussion Hatcher asked him what he would say
if the non-count noun were magic, and Chomsky was immediately forced
to confess: “I think I would have to say that my generalization was wrong”
(ibid., 31).
On the speciﬁc point of whether a short sentence like They can per-
form magic is grammatical, or whether a short string of words like *They
can perform justice is ungrammatical, he could supply reliable intuition
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reports, like most native speakers; but conﬁrming a broader generalization
about English sentence structure is a very diﬀerent matter.
And to return to the case at hand, judging whether three consecu-
tive transitive prepositions is possible in English is a judgment concerning
an indeﬁnitely large range of sentences. I would have hazarded the guess
that the answer was negative, but I would have been wrong. The answer
to question (5) is now known, thanks to Wells Hansen (personal com-
munication), and it is positive. Hansen showed this by constructing and
exhibiting, rather surprisingly, a grammatical sentence with an at at at
sequence. A similar one is given in (16).
(16) Donald Trump was laughed at at at least three dinner parties in Manhattan this
year.
It is fully grammatical (as well as probably also true), and surprisingly
simple to understand. Of course, it might be impugned for style: a writer
who notices that some word has been used three times within a short space,
or that a jingle eﬀect has been created by two or three words with a similar
sound will generally reword. But that is about stylistic acceptability, not
grammaticality.
Retrospectively, we can see why and how the Hansen sentence has
to be regarded as grammatical. At occurs as a grammaticized preposition
syntactically required in the construction laugh at:
a.(17) They laughed at him.
b. *They laughed to him.
c. *They laughed by him
d. *They laughed on him.
And the choice of preposition is determined by the choice of verb; other
verbs require diﬀerent prepositions:
a.(18) *We spoke at him. (speak does not take at)
b. We spoke to him. (speak does take to)
c. *We spoke on him. (speak does not take on)
a.(19) *They rely at him. (rely does not take at)
b. *They rely to him. (rely does not take to)
c. They rely on him. (rely does take on)
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Verb-preposition combinations of this sort readily yield prepositional pas-
sives (was laughed at, was spoken to, was relied on, etc.). Hansen’s sen-
tence has the form of a prepositional passive clause, with the ﬁrst at of
the sequence as its stranded preposition. The subject of the clause (Donald
Trump) is understood as the complement of the ﬁrst at.
But at is somewhat more syntactically versatile than of in one respect:
it can also serve as the head of a locative modiﬁer like at three parties,
which can occur following a prepositional passive; and it occurs in the
idiomatic Preposition + Adjective combination at least, which can serve
as an adjunct modifying a determinative like three, hence, crucially, can
stand at the beginning of a noun phrase, as in at least three parties, and thus
can begin a noun phrase serving as the complement of the preposition at.
Thus when the ﬁrst at is stranded in a prepositional passive construc-
tion it is possible for a second at-phrase heading a locative adjunct to
follow, and for a third at-phrase to begin the noun phrase within that
locative adjunct. All those facts are relevant to why it is that at at at can
be a possible subsequence in a grammatical sentence.
5. Proper substring possibility for CFLs
We should never forget that English syntax constitutes a vast domain of
exploration, within which are many known unknowns, and an unknown
number of unknown unknowns. This domain cannot be explored via the
simplistic appeals to “logic” that purists and usage advisers so often advo-
cate. Which sentences are grammatical is not determined by any kind of
common-sense or formal logic. The grammatical sentences are simply the
ones that happen to be permissible under the set of rules or constraints
that deﬁnes the language – the large set of exception-ridden and often
rather quirky rules that deﬁne English as it happens to be today. Dis-
covering how we are to precisely formulate the content of those rules is
a major scientiﬁc enterprise. Even an informal survey of the ground that
must be covered takes up more than 1,700 pages of text (Huddleston &
Pullum 2002, henceforth CGEL).
And we cannot blithely assume, even when we have produced such a
grammar, that there will exist an algorithm for ﬁnding out whether it is
possible for a grammatical sentence to meet some given condition, such
as having three consecutive transitive prepositions, or containing the se-
quence and the of, or any other syntactically deﬁnable property of symbol
strings. Indeﬁnitely many precisely framed questions about human lan-
guages (considered as stringsets over a word vocabulary) are undecidable,
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even given a full, exact, and correct grammar for the language (which even
for English, of course, we do not have as yet).
While in general native speakers (whether grammarians or not) have
intuitive reactions concerning the grammaticality of speciﬁc strings of
words presented to them, they do not have intuitional access to the truth
values of generalizations about the entire range of sentences that are gram-
matical in their language, any more than mathematicians have intuitional
access to the truth values of generalizations about the integers. The key dif-
ference is that we take the truths of number theory to be a priori and neces-
sary, substantiable through rigorous proof as in the other formal sciences,
while the true statements about English grammar are at root empirical.
We have qualiﬁed intuitional access to the status of speciﬁc sentences
because we subconsciously respond to them as if we were encountering
them in actual use, and to some extent we can report on our responses
(see Devitt 2006, chapter 7, for a discussion of this topic that I ﬁnd very
perceptive). But we have no veridical intuitional access to broader gener-
alizations about the grammar of our language, and can be surprised by
discovering them.
Questions about whether some word sequence like at at at or of of of
can form a subsequence of a grammatical sentence in some human lan-
guage, if we assume for concreteness that human languages can be gener-
ated by CFGs, have the general form seen in (20):
(20) Proper substring possibility
Given a CFG G with terminal vocabulary V and an arbitrary string w in V , does
G generate any string that has w as a proper substring?
One might ask whether there could ever be practical reasons for needing
answers to such questions. Practical importance is of course something
that in general we discover only retrospectively, but it is not impossible
to imagine a context in which information about occurrence of substrings
might be of practical use to an engineer. A robot equipped to parse and
understand spoken English might be designed with a special simple word
sequence that would immobilize it to permit servicing (or to block a West-
world-style disaster in which robots become malign). To make sure the
robot could not be immobilized unintentionally through ordinary conver-
sation, one might want the word sequence to be one that deﬁnitely could
not form part of any sentence of the language. We know, thanks to Wells
Hansen’s discovery, that at at at could not serve that purpose. Maybe
of of of could.
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So is (20) formally decidable? The answer turns out to be yes. A prob-
lem closely related to it was studied by Lang (1988) in the context of de-
vising a context-free parsing algorithm that will yield useful output even
when faced with sentences containing unknown parts of unknown length,
by producing a ﬁnite representation of the set of all possible parses (per-
haps inﬁnitely many) that could allow for the missing parts. Subsequently
Osorio and Navarro (2001) tackled more directly the problem of solving
proper substring possibility as stated in (20), using the CKY algorithm as
the basis for their proof and showing that the problem can be decided in
cubic time.
Osorio and Navarro point out that the problem actually has many
more areas of potential application than you might think, since CFG pars-
ing is so closely related to other computational tasks like matrix multipli-
cation and is so widely applicable: it could be relevant to DNA analysis
in bioinformatics, syntax-driven development of language tools, and shape
analysis in pattern recognition.
Given a CFG for English, therefore, we could use a fully general al-
gorithm to ﬁnd out (in cubic time) whether, for example, there is a gram-
matical string with of of of as a substring. (I think there probably is,
but I leave the exercise of constructing one for the reader to pursue in
idle moments.) Of course, the algorithm presupposes the completion of a
CFG that fully and accurately generates all and only the sentences of En-
glish. The informal account in CGEL, mentioned above, is not expressed
in anything like the form of a CFG.
For what it is worth, Pullum and Rogers (2008) provide, in a rather
unexpected way, good reason to believe that there is nothing in CGEL
that is beyond the power of CFGs. They note that although the objects
that CGEL uses as structural representations are not trees, they are very
close to being trees, and the very limited departure from treehood that is
employed (downward convergence of branches in certain particular kinds of
noun phrase) can be described by a transduction to covering trees express-
ible in weak monadic second-order logic (wMSO), and wMSO-describable
sets of trees always have CFLs as their frontier sets (by the theorem of
Doner 1970). Hence CGEL appears to covertly entail that English (con-
sidered as a stringset over a vocabulary of dictionary words) is a CFL.
In principle, then, there almost certainly exists a CFG for English
on which we could run an algorithm of the sort sketched by Osorio and
Navarro to ﬁnd out whether of of of (or any other word sequence) can be
a substring of a sentence.
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ABSTRACT
Online media, online news and online communication have an unprece-
dented and increasing level of social, political and also economic rele-
vance. This article proposes an infrastructure to address phenomena of
modern onlinemedia production, circulation and reception by establish-
ing a distributed architecture that relies on automatic processing and
human feedback.
1. Introduction
Usually lumped together under the “fake news” label, a bundle of novel top-
ics around online media production, circulation, reception and their impact
has emerged in recent years and, thus, is receiving a lot of attention from
multiple stakeholders including politicians, journalists, researchers, indus-
try, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society. In addition
to the challenge of addressing and dealing with “fake news”, “alternative
facts” as well as “post-truth politics”, there is an ever increasing amount
of hate speech, abusive language and cyber bullying taking place online.1
Among the interested stakeholders are politicians who have begun to
realise that, increasingly, major parts of public debates and social discourse
are carried out online, on a small number of social networks. We have wit-
nessed that not only online discussions but also the perception of trends,
ideas, theories, political parties, individual politicians, elections and so-
cietal challenges can be subtly inﬂuenced and signiﬁcantly rigged using
targeted social media campaigns, devised at manipulating opinions to cre-
ate long-term sustainable mindsets on the side of the recipients. We live in
1 A revised version of this paper was published in Rehm & Declerck (2017).
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a time in which online media, online news and online communication have
an unprecedented level of social, political and also economic relevance.
Due to the sheer importance and visibility of the topic one cannot
help but think about designing and deploying technologies to improve the
situation, maybe even to solve the problem altogether – thanks to the
recent breakthroughs in artiﬁcial intelligence (AI) (Metz 2016; Gershgorn
2016; Martinez-Alvarez 2017; Chan 2017) –, while at the same time not
putting in place a centralised infrastructure that could be misused for the
purpose of censorship, media manipulation or mass surveillance.2
This paper addresses key challenges of the digital age (section 2) by
introducing and proposing a technological framework concept (section 3),
which has been devised under the umbrella of a two-year research and
technology transfer project, in which a research centre collaborates with
four small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) partners that face the chal-
lenge of having to process, analyse and make sense of large amounts of
digital content. The companies cover four diﬀerent use cases and sectors
(Rehm & Sasaki 2015) including journalism. For these partners we develop
a platform that provides access to language and knowledge technologies
Bourgonje et al. (2016a;b). The services are integrated by the SME part-
ners into their own in-house systems or those of clients (Rehm et al. 2017).
Among others, we currently develop services aimed at the detection and
classiﬁcation of abusive language and clickbait content.
2. Online media in 2017: status quo
The debate around online media is currently dominated by several topics
and challenges. They share certain characteristics that make it possible to
address them with the same technological approach.
A key prerequisite for the current situation is the existence of the
World Wide Web itself: everybody is able to create content, to write an
article on a certain topic. Until a few years ago the key challenge was to
optimise the HTML code, linking and metadata to get into the top of the
relevant search engine results pages for important keywords. Nowadays,
however, content is no longer predominantly discovered through search
engines but through social media platforms: users see interesting content,
which is then shared to their own connections. Many users only read a
2 An indicator for the relevance of the topic is the increasing number of “how to iden-
tify fake news” articles published online (Mantzarlis 2015; Bazzaz 2016; Rogers &
Bromwich 2016; Wardle 2017; Walbrühl 2017).
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headline, identify a certain relevance to their own life and then spread the
content. When in doubt, users estimate the trustworthiness of the source:
potentially dubious stories about which they are skeptical are shared any-
way if the source or friend through whom the story was discovered is con-
sidered reliable or if the number of views is rather high, which, to many
users, indicates legitimacy.
There is a tendency for very provocative, aggressive, one-sided, al-
legedly “authentic” (Marchi 2012) content. The idea is to make it as easy
as possible to identify the stance of the article so that the reader’s own
world view is validated, implicitly urging the user to share the content. The
hope of the content’s originator is that a story will go viral, that it will be
shared very quickly by many users and spread through multiple networks
in order to establish a reach of millions of people. One sub-category of this
type of content is “clickbait”, articles with dubious factual content that are
presented with misleading headlines, designed for the purpose of generat-
ing many clicks. The more extreme the virality, the higher the reach, the
higher the click numbers, the higher the advertisement revenue. The term
“clickbait” is usually associated with commercial intentions, but it can also
refer to articles spreading political mis- or disinformation.
Content is, ﬁrst and foremost, discovered through a small number of
big social networks. While only a handful of search engines and online
news outlets used to be the central points of information until a few years
ago, the role of the centralised hub is now played by social networks that
help content to be discovered and go viral (Barthel et al. 2016). All social
networks have the same key feature, a feed or timeline, i.e., posts, news,
tweets, photos that are presented to the user, starting at the most recent
one. As there is simply too much content, all social networks introduced
machine learning-based algorithms to determine which content to present
to a certain user. They are continuously trained through interactions with
the network, i.e., “liking” a post boosts the respective topic, checking the
feed of a certain friend on the network boosts the connection to this friend.
Some networks have even introduced more ﬁne-grained sentiments that
can be used in addition to the simple “like” (see, e.g., Facebook’s reactions
“love”, “haha”, “wow”, “sad”, “angry”). Through “likes” of topics, connec-
tions to friends and interactions with the site, the social network creates,
and continuously updates, for every single user, an internal model of likes
and interests. This model is used to select content to be presented on the
timeline by only selecting content that is assessed as being relevant to
the user’s interests. Plus, algorithms typically favour content that is being
“liked” or shared by those friends and connections that the user interacts
K + K = 120 / p. 464 / May 3, 2019
464 Georg Rehm
with the most. This is the origin of the ﬁlter bubble phenomenon: users
are only exposed to content that can also be described as “safe” – content
shared by friends they know and like is considered content that matches
a user’s interests. Controversial content that contradicts a user’s world
view or that presents opposing information, that challenges their beliefs is
not presented – according to the underlying user model it is not relevant.
In the digital age, we can no longer assume that everything that has
been published is necessarily correct. While this has been true in some
parts of the world for decades, this challenge has now also entered the
Western part of the world. Since November 2016 it has been socially ac-
cepted, in some parts of the political spectrum, to categorise fact-checked
articles, written by experienced journalists and published by respected
news outlets, as “fake news” – not because the news are false but because
the corresponding articles do not endorse and support the opinion and
agenda of the reader. The age of post-factual politics creates an unprece-
dented tension and stimulates fundamental debates about the relationship
between politics and the fourth estate in civil society and beyond.
Additionally, we are faced with the challenge that more and more
content is produced and spread with the sole purpose of manipulating the
readers’ beliefs and opinions by appealing to their emotions instead of
informing them objectively. Rather, this type of opinionated, emotional,
biased, often aggressive and far-right content is prepared and spread to
reach speciﬁc goals, for example, to create support for controversial ideas
or to destroy the reputation of a politician. These coordinated online mar-
keting campaigns are often carried out by experts with in-depth knowledge
of the underlying technologies and processes. They involve large numbers
of bots and fake accounts as ampliﬁers Weedon et al. (2017) as well as large
budgets for online advertisements in social media, clearly targeted at very
speciﬁc demographic groups the originators want to inﬂuence and then to
ﬂip to reach a speciﬁc statistical threshold. The way news are nowadays
spread, circulated, read and shared – with less and less critical thinking
or fact checking – enables this type of content to gather a large number
of readers (and sharers) quickly. The ﬁlter bubble acts like an echo cham-
ber that can amplify any type of content, from genuine, factual news to
emotionally charged, politically biased news, to false news to orchestrated
disinformation campaigns, created with the speciﬁc purpose of large-scale
manipulation. Content of the last two categories can be hard or very hard
to identify even for human experts.
A key challenge is to separate objective, balanced content, be it jour-
nalistic or user-generated, from hateful, abusive or biased content, maybe
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produced with a hidden agenda. Even if fundamentally diﬀerent in nature,
nowadays both types of content share the same level of visibility, reach and
exposure through the equalisation mechanisms of the social web, which
can be easily manipulated. In the past the tasks of fact checking, critical
thinking and unveiling hidden agendas have mostly been in the realm of
journalism, but in the digital age they are more and more transferred to the
actual reader and recipient of online content. The analysis, curation and
assessment of content is no longer carried out by professional journalists or
news editors – the burden of fact checking and content veriﬁcation is left
to the reader. This aspect is getting even more crucial because the num-
ber of people who state that social networks are their only source of news
and information is growing steadily (Marchi 2012). The most prominent
example from recent history is that social media manipulation can appar-
ently even make or break a national election (Barthel et al. 2016; Rogers
& Bromwich 2016; Marwick & Lewis 2017). It must be noted, though,
that a large number of fact checking initiatives is active all over the world
(Mantzarlis 2017), but they mostly rely on human expertise and, thus, do
not scale (Martinez-Alvarez 2017; Dale 2017). The small number of au-
tomated fact checking initiatives are fragmented (Babakar & Moy 2016).
Several types of online content are often grouped together under the
label “fake news”. For example, Holan (2016) deﬁnes fake news as “made-up
stuﬀ, masterfully manipulated to look like credible journalistic reports that
are easily spread online to large audiences willing to believe the ﬁctions
and spread the word.” In reality, the situation is much more complex.
Initially based on the classiﬁcation suggested by Wardle (2017), Table 1
(overleaf) shows a ﬁrst attempt at bringing together the diﬀerent types of
false news including selected characteristics and associated intentions. The
table shows the complexity of the situation and that a more ﬁne-grained
terminology is needed to discuss the topic properly, especially when it
comes to designing technological solutions that are meant to address one
or more of these types of content.
An additional challenge is the proliferation of hateful comments and
abusive language, often used in the comments and feedback sections on so-
cial media posts. The eﬀects can be devastating for the aﬀected individual.
Many hateful comments on repeated postings by the same person, say, a
pupil, are akin to cyberbullying and cybermobbing. There is also a clear
tendency to aggressive comments on, for example, the social media pages
of traditional news outlets, who have to ask the users more and more to
behave in a civilised way.
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Table 1: Characteristics and intentions associated with diﬀerent types of false
news (adapted from Wardle 2017; Walbrühl 2017; Rubin et al. 2015;
Holan 2016; Weedon et al. 2017)
Satire or
parody
False con-
nection
Misleading
content
False
context
Imposter
content
Manipu-
lated
content
Fabricated
content
Clickbait X X ? ? ?
Disinformation X X X X
Politically
biased
? X ? ? X
Poor
journalism
X X X
To parody X ? X
To provoke X X X
To proﬁt ? X X X
To deceive X X X X X X
To inﬂuence
politics
X X X X
To inﬂuence
opinions
X X X X X
3. Technology framework: approach
Technically, online content is predominantly consumed through two pos-
sible channels, both of which rely substantially on World Wide Web tech-
nology and established web standards. Users either read and interact with
content directly on the web (mobile or desktop versions of websites) or
through dedicated mobile apps; this can be considered using the web im-
plicitly as many apps make heavy use of HTML5 and other web technolo-
gies. The World Wide Web itself still is and, for the foreseeable future, will
continue to be the main transport medium for online content. The sug-
gested technology architecture is, hence, designed as an additional layer
on top of the web. Nevertheless, we also have to be clear about the scope
and ambition of the challenge: the infrastructure needs to be able to cope
with millions of users, arbitrary content types, hundreds of languages and
massive amounts of data. The goal is to empower and to enable users to
balance out the network, echo chamber and ﬁlter bubble eﬀects and to
provide mechanisms to ﬁlter for abusive content.
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3.1. Services of the infrastructure
In many cases the burden of analysing and fact checking online content
has been shifted to the reader (section 2), which is why corresponding
analysis and curation services need to be made available in an eﬃcient
and ubiquitous way. The same tools to be used by content consumers can
and should also be applied by content creators, e.g., journalists and blog-
gers. Those readers who are interested to know more about what they
are currently reading should be able to get the additional information as
easily as possible, and the same applies to those journalists who are inter-
ested in fact-checking the content they are researching for the production
of new content.
Readers of online content are users of the World Wide Web. They
need, ﬁrst and foremost, web-based tools and services with which they
can process any type of content to get additional information on a speciﬁc
piece, be it one small comment on a page, the main content component
of a page (for example, an article) or even a set of interconnected pages
(one article spread over multiple pages), for which an assessment is sought.
The provided services need to be designed to operate in and with
the web stack of technologies, i.e., within the web ecosystem, they need
to support users in their task of reading and curating content within the
browser in a smarter and, eventually, more balanced way. This can be
accomplished by providing additional, also alternative opinions and view
points, by presenting other, indepedent assessments, or by indicating if
content is dangerous, abusive, factual or problematic in any way. Fully au-
tomatic technologies (Rubin et al. 2015; Schmidt & Wiegand 2017; Horne
& Adal 2017; Martinez-Alvarez 2017) can take over a subset of these re-
sponsibilities but, given the current state of the art, not all, which is why
the approach needs to be based both on simple or complex automatic ﬁlters
and watchdogs as well as human intelligence and feedback.3
The tools and services should be available to every web user without
the need to install any additional third-party software. This is why these
services, ideally, should be integrated into the browser on the same level
as bookmarks, the URL ﬁeld or the navigation bar, i.e., without relying on
the installation of a plugin. The curation tools should be thought of as an
inherent technology component of the World Wide Web, for which intuitive
and globally acknowledged user-interface conventions can be established,
3 A fully automatic solution would work only for a very limited set of cases. A purely
human-based solution would work but required large amounts of experts and, hence,
would not scale. This is why we favour, for now, a hybrid solution.
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such as, for example, traﬃc light indicators for false news content (green:
no issues found; yellow: medium issues found and referenced; red: very
likely false news). Table 2 shows a ﬁrst list of tools and services that could
be embedded into such a system.4 Some of these can be conceptualised
and implemented as automatic tools (Horne & Adal 2017), while others
need a hybrid approach that involves crowd-sourced data and opinions. In
addition to displaying the output of these services, the browser interface
needs to be able to gather, from the user, comments, feedback, opinions
and sentiments on the current piece of content, further to feed the crowd-
sourced data set. The user-generated data includes both user-generated an-
notations (UGA) and also user-generated metadata (UGM). Automatically
generated metadata are considered machine-generated metadata (MGM).
Table 2: Suggested tools and services to be provided through the infrastructure
(selection)
Tool or Service Description Approach
Political
bias
indicator
Indicates the political bias (Martinez-Alvarez 2017) of a
piece of content, e.g., from far left to far right
automatic
Hate
speech
indicator
Indicates the level of hate speech a certain piece of content
contains
automatic
Reputation
indicator
Indicates the reputation, credibility (Martinez-Alvarez
2017), trustworthiness, quality (Filloux 2017) of a certain
news outlet or individual author of content
crowd,
automatic
Fact
checker
Checks if claims are backed up by references, evidence, es-
tablished scientiﬁc results and links claims to the respective
evidence (Babakar & Moy 2016)
automatic
Fake
news
indicator
Indicates if a piece of content contains non-factual state-
ments or dubious claims (Horne & Adal 2017; Martinez-
Alvarez 2017)
crowd,
automatic
Opinion
inspector
Inspect opinions and sentiments that other users have with
regard to this content (or topic) – not just the users com-
menting on one speciﬁc site, but all of them
crowd,
automatic
4 This list is meant to be indicative rather than complete. For example, services for
getting background information on images are not included (Gupta et al. 2013). Such
tools could help pointing out image manipulations or that an old image was used,
out of context, to illustrate a new piece of news.
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3.2. Characteristics of the infrastructure
In order for these tools and services to work eﬀectively, eﬃciently and reli-
ably, they need to possess several key characteristics, which are quintessen-
tial for the overall success of the approach.
Like the Internet and the World Wide Web, the infrastructure must be
operated in a federated, i.e., de-centralised setup – a centralised approach
would be too vulnerable for attacks or misuse. Multiple organisations, com-
panies, research centres or NGOs should be able to set up, operate and
oﬀer services (section 3.1) and additional pieces of the infrastructure. The
internal design of the respective algorithms and tools may diﬀer substan-
tially, but their output (MGM) should comply to a standardised metadata
format. It is rather likely that political biases in diﬀerent models meant
to serve the same purpose cannot be avoided, which is especially likely for
models based on large amounts of data, which, in turn, may inherently
include a political bias. This is why users must be enabled to activate
or deactivate as many of these tools as they want to get an aggregated
value, for example, with regard to the level of hate speech in content or
its political bias. Services and tools must be combinable, i.e., they need to
comply to standardised input and output formats (Babakar & Moy 2016).
They also need to be transparent (Martinez-Alvarez 2017). Only transpar-
ent, i.e., fully documented, checked, ideally also audited approaches can
be trustworthy.
Access to the infrastructure should be universal and available every-
where, i.e., in any browser, which essentially means that, ideally, the infras-
tructure should be embedded into the technical architecture of the World
Wide Web. As a consequence, access mechanisms should be available in
every browser, on every platform, as native elements of the graphical user
interface (GUI). These functions should be designed in such a way that
they support users without distracting them from the content. Only if these
tools are available virtually anywhere, can the required scale be reached.
The user should be able to conﬁgure and to combine multiple services,
operated in a de-centralised way, for a clearly deﬁned purpose in order to
get an aggregated value. There is a danger that this approach could result
in a replication and shift of the ﬁlter bubble eﬀect (section 2) onto a
diﬀerent level but users would at least be empowered actively to conﬁgure
their own personal set of ﬁlters to escape from any resulting bubble. The
same transparency criterion also applies to the algorithm that aggregates
multiple values, of course.
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3.3. Building blocks of the infrastructure
Research in Language Technology and Natural Language Processing (NLP)
currently concentrates on smaller components, especially watchdogs, ﬁlters
and classiﬁers (see section 4) that could be applied under the umbrella of a
larger architecture to tackle current online media phenomena (section 2).
While this research is both important and crucial, even if fragmented and
somewhat constrained by the respective training data sets (Rubin et al.
2015; Conroy et al. 2015; Schmidt & Wiegand 2017) and limited use cases,
we also need to come to a shared understanding how these components can
be deployed and made available. The suggestion consists of the following
building blocks (see Figure 1).
3.3.1. Building block: natively embedded into the World Wide Web
An approach that is able to address modern online media and communica-
tion phenomena adequately needs to operate on a web-scale level. It should
natively support cross-lingual processing and be technically and concep-
tually embedded into the architecture of the World Wide Web itself. It
should be standardised, endorsed and supported not only by all browser
vendors but also by all content and media providers, especially the big
social networks and content hubs. Only if all users have immediate access
to the tools and services suggested in this proposal can they reach its full
potential. The services must be unobtrusive and cooperative, possess intu-
itive usability, their recommendations and warnings must be immediately
understandable, and it must be simple to provide general feedback (UGM)
and assessments on speciﬁc pieces of content (UGA).
3.3.2. Building block: web annotations
Several pieces of the proposed infrastructure are already in place. One
key component are Web Annotations, standardised by the World Wide
Web Consortium (W3C) in early 2017 (Sanderson 2017; Sanderson et al.
2017a;b). They enable users to annotate arbitrary pieces of web content,
essentially creating an additional and independent layer on top of the reg-
ular web. Already now Web Annotations are used for multiple individual
projects in research, education, scholarly publishing, administration and
investigative journalism.5 Web Annotations are the natural mechanism to
5 See, for example, the projects presented at I Annotate 2015 (http://iannotate.org/
2015/), 2016 (http://iannotate.org/2016/) and 2017 (http://iannotate.org/2017/).
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enable users and readers interactively to work with content, to include
feedback and assessments, to ask the author or their peers for references
or to provide criticism. The natural language content of Web Annota-
tions (UGA) can be automatically mined using methods such as sentiment
analysis or opinion mining – in order to accomplish this across multiple
languages, this needs to be done cross-lingually (Rehm et al. 2016). How-
ever, there are still limitations. Content providers need to enable Web
Annotations by referencing a corresponding JavaScript library. Federated
sets of annotation stores or repositories are not yet foreseen, neither are
native controls in the browser that provide aggregated feedback, based
on automatic (MGM) or manual content assessments (UGM, UGA). An-
other barrier for the widespread use and adoption of Web Annotations
are proprietary commenting systems, as used by all major social networks.
Nevertheless, services such as Hypothes.is enable Web Annotations on any
web page, but native browser support, ideally across all platforms, is still
lacking. A corresponding browser feature needs to enable both free-text
annotations of arbitrary content pieces (UGA), but also very simple ﬂag-
ging of problematic content, for example, “content pretends to be factual
but is of dubious quality” (UGM). Multiple UGA, UGM or MGM annota-
tions could be aggregated and presented to new readers of the content to
provide guidance and indicate any issues.
3.3.3. Building block: metadata standards
Another needed piece of the architecture is an agreed upon metadata
schema Babakar & Moy (2016) to be used both in manual annotation sce-
narios (UGM) and also by automatic tools (MGM). Its complexity should
be as little as possible so that key characteristics of a piece of content can
be adequately captured and described either by humans or machines. With
regard to this requirement, W3C published several standards to represent
the provenance of digital objects (Groth & Moreau 2013; Belhajjame et al.
2013a). These can be thought of as descriptions of the entities or activi-
ties involved in producing or delivering a piece of content to understand
how data was collected, to determine ownership and rights or to make
judgements about information to determine whether to trust content (Bel-
hajjame et al. 2013b). An alternative approach is for content publishers
to use Schema.org’s ClaimReview6 markup in their websites after speciﬁc
facts have been checked. The needed metadata schema can be based on
the W3C provenance ontology and/or Schema.org. Additional metadata
ﬁelds are likely to be needed.
6 https://schema.org/ClaimReview
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3.3.4. Building block: tools and services
Web Annotations can be used by readers of online content to provide
comments or to include the results of researched facts (UGA, UGM). Au-
tomatic tools and services that act as ﬁlters and watchdogs can make use of
the same mechanisms (MGM, see section 3.1). These could be functionally
limited classiﬁers, for example, regarding abusive language, or sophisti-
cated natural language understanding (NLU) components that attempt to
check certain statements against one or more knowledge bases. Regard-
less of the complexity and approach, the results can be made available as
globally accessible Web Annotations (that can even, in turn, be annotated
themselves). Services and tools need to operate in a decentralised way,
i.e., users must be able to choose from a wide variety of automatic helpers.
These could, for example, support users to position content on the politi-
cal spectrum, either based on crowd-sourced annotations, automatic tools,
or both.
3.3.5. Building block: decentralised repositories and tools
The setup of the infrastructure must be federated and decentralised to pre-
vent abuse by political or industrial forces. Data, especially annotations,
must be stored in decentral repositories, from which browsers retrieve,
through secure connections, data to be aggregated and displayed (UGM,
UGA, MGM, i. e., annotations, opinions, automatic processing results etc.).
In the medium to long term, in addition to annotations, repositories will
also include more complex data, information and knowledge that tools
and services will make use of, for example, for fact checking. In parallel to
the initiative introduced in this article, crowd-sourced knowledge graphs
such as Wikidata or DBpedia will continue to grow. The same is true for
semantic databases such as BabelNet and many other data sets, usually
available and linkable as Linked Open Data. Already now we can fore-
see more sophisticated methods of validating and fact-checking arbitrary
pieces of content using systems that make heavy use of knowledge graphs,
for example, through automatic entity recognition and linking, relation ex-
traction, event extraction and mapping etc. One of the key knowledge bases
missing, in that regard, is a Web Annotation-friendly event-centric knowl-
edge graph, against which fact-checking algorithms can operate.7 Basing
algorithms that are supposed to determine the truth of a statement on
automatically extracted and formally represented knowledge creates both
7 GDELT (Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone) comes close but is lacking
with regard to its integratability, see http://www.gdeltproject.org.
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practical and philosophical questions, among others, who checks these au-
tomatically extracted knowledge structures for correctness? How do we
represent conﬂicting view points and how do algorithms handle conﬂict-
ing view points when determining the validity of a statement? How do we
keep the balance between multiple subjective opinions and an objective
and scientiﬁc ground-truth?
3.3.6. Building block: aggregation of manual and automatic annotations
The ﬁnal key building block of the proposed system relates to the aggre-
gation of manual and automatic annotations, created in a de-centralised
and highly distributed way by human users and automatic services (UGA,
UGM, MGM). Already now we can foresee very large numbers of annota-
tions so that the aggregation and consolidation will be a non-trivial chal-
lenge. This is also true for those human annotations that are not based
on shared metadata vocabularies but that are free text – for these free
and ﬂexible annotations, robust and also multilingual annotation mining
methods need to be developed.
4. Related work
Research on Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC) has a long tradi-
tion. Scholars initially concentrated on diﬀerent types of novel communica-
tion media such as e-mail, IRC, Usenet newsgroups, and diﬀerent hypertext
systems and document types, especially personal home pages, guestbooks
and, later, discussion fora. Early on, researchers focused upon the (obvi-
ous) diﬀerences between these new forms of digital communication and
the traditional forms, especially when it comes to linguistic phenomena
that can be observed on the text surface (smileys, emoticons, acronyms
etc.). Several authors pointed out that the diﬀerent forms of CMC have a
certain oral and spoken style, quality and conceptualisation to them, as if
produced spontaneously in a casual conversation, while being realised in a
written medium (Haase et al. 1997).
If we now fast forward to 2017, a vastly diﬀerent picture emerges.
About half of the global population has access to the internet, most of
whom also use the World Wide Web and big social networks. The internet
is no longer considered fringe technology that is only used by scientists,
early adopters and computer nerds, but it is mainstream. Nowadays the
internet acts like an ampliﬁer and enabler of social trends. It continues
to penetrate and to disrupt our lives and social structures, especially our
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established traditions of social and political debates. The relevance of on-
line media, online news and online communication could not be any more
crucial. While early analyses of CMC, e.g., Reid (1991), observed that the
participants were involved in the “deconstruction of boundaries” and the
“construction of social communities”, today the exact opposite seems to
be case: not only online but also oﬄine can we observe the (disturbing)
trend of increased, intricately orchestrated, social and political manipula-
tion, nationalism and the exclusion of foreigners, immigrants and seemingly
arbitrary minorities – boundaries are constructed, social communities de-
constructed, people are manipulated, individuals excluded.
There is a vast body of research on the processing of online content
including text analytics (sentiment analysis, opinion and argument min-
ing), information access (summarisation, machine translation) and docu-
ment ﬁltering (spam classiﬁcation). Attempting to classify, among others,
the diﬀerent types of false news shown in Table 1 requires, as several re-
searchers also emphasise, a multi-faceted approach that includes multiple
diﬀerent processing steps. We have to be aware of the ambition, though, as
some of the “fake news detection” use case scenarios are better described
as “propaganda detection”, “disinformation detection”, maybe also “satire
detection”. These are diﬃcult tasks at which even humans often fail. Cur-
rent research in this area is fragmented and concentrates on very speciﬁc
sub-problems, see, for example, the Fake News Challenge, the Abusive Lan-
guage Workshop, or the Clickbait Challenge.8 What is missing, however,
is a practical umbrella that pulls the diﬀerent pieces together and that
provides an approach that can be realistically implemented and deployed
including automatic tools as well as human annotations.
5. Summary and conclusions
Humanity is transitioning into becoming a digital society, or at least a “dig-
ital ﬁrst” society, i.e., news, media, facts, rumours (Zubiaga et al. 2016;
Srivastava et al. 2017), information are created, circulated and dissemi-
nated online. Already now the right social media strategy can make or
break an election or is able to inﬂuence if a smaller or larger societal or
demographic group (city, region, country, continent) is in favour or against
constructively solving a certain societal challenge. Social media and online
communication can be extremely powerful tools to bridge barriers, to in-
8 See http://www.fakenewschallenge.org, http://www.clickbait-challenge.org, https://
sites.google.com/site/abusivelanguageworkshop2017/.
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form people and to enable global communication. When abused, misused
or inﬁltrated, they are a dangerous weapon.
The ﬁelds of Computational Linguistics, Language Technology and
Artiﬁcial Intelligence should actively contribute solutions to this key chal-
lenge of the digital age. If we don’t, there is a concrete danger that stake-
holders with bad intentions are able to inﬂuence parts of the society to
their liking, only constrained by their political, commercial, egotistical in-
terests. Technologies need to be developed to enable every user of online
media to break out of their ﬁlter bubbles and to inform themselves in a
balanced way, taking all view points into account.
After dumb digital content, smart content and semantic content en-
richment we now need to concentrate on content curation tools that en-
able contextualised content, i.e., content that can be, ideally, automatically
cross-referenced and fact-checked, and for which additional background in-
formation can be retrieved in a robust way. This can involve assessing the
validity of claims and statements made in the content as well as retrieving
related texts, facts and statements, both in favour and against a certain
piece of content.
Next steps include presenting this proposal in various diﬀerent fora
and communities, among others, researchers and technologists, standards-
developing organisations (Babakar & Moy 2016) and national as well as
international political bodies. At the same time, research needs to be con-
tinued and prototypes of the architecture as well as individual services
developed, enabling organisations to build and to deploy decentralised
tools early. While a universal, globally accessible, balanced and well main-
tained knowledge graph containing up-to-date information about entities
and events would be handy to have, it is out of scope with regard to the ini-
tiative reported here; it is safe to assume that such a knowledge repository
will be developed in parallel in the next couple of years. The proposed ar-
chitecture can be used to link online content against this knowledge graph
and to measure the directions of online debates.
The proposal introduced in this article is ambitious in its scope and
implications, prevention of misuse will play a hugely important role. How
can we make sure that a certain piece of technology is only used with good
intentions? Recently it has been shown that a user’s social media data can
reliably predict if the user is suﬀering from alcohol or drug abuse (Ding
et al. 2017). Will this technology be used to help people or to stigmatise
them? Will an infrastructure, as brieﬂy sketched in this paper, be used
to empower users to make up their own minds by providing additional
information about online content or will it be used to spy on them and to
manipulate them with commercial or political intentions?
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ABSTRACT
Named Entity Recognition (NER) is one of the most intensively studied
tasks of computational linguistics. It has two substeps: first, locating
the Named Entities (NEs) in unstructured texts, and second, classifying
them into pre-defined categories. A key issue is how to define NEs. This
issue interconnects with the issue of selection of classes and the anno-
tation schemes applied in the field of NER. The major standard guide-
lines do not give an exact definition of NEs, but rather list examples and
counterexamples. For getting a usable definition of NEs, we investigate
the approach taken in the philosophy of language and linguistics, andwe
map our findings to the NER task. We do not wish to give a complete de-
scription of the theory and typology of proper names but to find a plau-
sible way to define linguistic units relevant to the NER task.
1. Introduction
Named Entity Recognition (NER), the task of automatic identiﬁcation of
selected types of Named Entities (NEs), is one of the most intensively
studied tasks of Information Extraction (IE). Presentations of language
analysis typically begin by looking words up in a dictionary and identifying
them as nouns, verbs, adjectives, etc. But most texts include lots of names,
and if a system cannot ﬁnd them in the dictionary, it cannot identify them,
making it hard to produce a linguistic analysis of the text. Thus, NER is of
key importance in many Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks, such
as Information Retrieval (IR) or Machine Translation (MT).
The NER task, which is often called Named Entity Recognition and
Classiﬁcation in the literature, has two substeps: ﬁrst, locating the NEs
in unstructured texts, and second, classifying them into pre-deﬁned cate-
gories. A key issue is how to deﬁne NEs. This issue interconnects with the
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issue of selection of classes and the annotation schemes applied in the ﬁeld
of NER.
The major standard guidelines applied in the ﬁeld of NER do not give
an exact deﬁnition of NEs, but rather list examples and counterexamples.
The only common statement they make is that NEs have unique references.
For getting a usable deﬁnition of NEs, we investigate the approach taken
in the philosophy of language and linguistics, and we map our ﬁndings
onto the NER task. We do not wish to give a complete description of the
theory and typology of proper names, but to ﬁnd a plausible way to deﬁne
linguistic units relevant for the NER task.
The article is structured as follows.1 In section 2, we give an overview
of the annotation schemes applied in the ﬁeld of NER. Section 3 describes
the philosophical approach, and section 4 gives the linguistic background
of the theory of proper names. The article concludes in section 5 with the
most important ﬁndings about mapping the theory of proper names to the
NER task.
2. Annotation schemes
2.1. MUCs
The ﬁrst major event dedicated to the NER task was the 6th Message Un-
derstanding Conference (MUC-6) in 1995. As the organizers write in their
survey about the history of MUCs (Grishman & Sundheim 1996), these
conferences were rather similar to shared tasks, because the submission of
participants’ results was a prerequisite for participation at the conference.
Prior MUCs focused on other IE tasks; MUC-6 was the ﬁrst including the
NER task, which consisted of three subtasks (Sundheim 1995):
– entity names (ENAMEX): organizations, persons, locations;
– temporal expressions (TIMEX): dates, times;
– number expressions (NUMEX): monetary values, percentages.
The annotation guidelines deﬁne NEs as “unique identiﬁers” of entities, and
give an enormous list of what to annotate as NEs. However, the best sup-
port for annotators is the restriction about what not to annotate: “names
that do not identify a single, unique entity”.
1 This article is a slightly modiﬁed version of a chapter of the author’s PhD dissertation
(Simon 2013).
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As for the temporal expressions, the guidelines distinguish between
absolute and relative time expressions. To be considered absolute, the ex-
pression must indicate a speciﬁc segment of time, e.g.,
(1) twelve o’clock noon
(2) January 1979
A relative time expression indicates a date relative to the date of the
document, or a portion of a temporal unit relative to the given temporal
unit, e.g.,
(3) last night
(4) yesterday evening
In MUC-6, only absolute time expressions were to be annotated.
The numeric expressions subsume monetary and percentage values.
Modiﬁers that indicate the approximate value of a number are to be ex-
cluded from annotation, e.g.,
(5) about 5%
(6) over $90,000
The modiﬁed version of the MUC-6 guidelines was used for the MUC-7
NER task in 1998 (Chinchor 1998). The most notable change was that
relative time expressions became taggable. The MUC-7 guidelines became
one of the most widely used standards in the ﬁeld of NER. They were used
with slight modiﬁcations for the Multilingual Entity Tasks (MET-1 and
2) (Merchant et al. 1996) and for the Hub-4 Broadcast News Evaluation
(Miller et al. 1999) in 1999.
According to the MUC guidelines, embedded NEs can also be anno-
tated, e.g.,
(7) The [morning after the [July 17]DATE disaster]TIME
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2.2. CoNLL
The Computational Natural Language Learning (CoNLL) conference is the
yearly meeting of the Special Interest Group on Natural Language Learn-
ing (SIGNLL) of the Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL).
Shared tasks organized in 2002 and 2003 were concerned with language-
independent NER (Tjong Kim Sang 2002; Tjong Kim Sang & De Meulder
2003). Annotation guidelines were based on the NER task deﬁnition of
the MITRE Corporation (http://www.mitre.org/) and the Science Appli-
cations International Corporation (SAIC) (Chinchor et al. 1999), which are
slightly modiﬁed versions of the MUC guidelines. A new type, Measure,
was introduced for NUMEX elements, e.g.,
(8) 23 degrees Celsius
In contrast to the MUC guidelines, instructions are given regarding certain
kinds of metonymic proper names, decomposable and non-decomposable
names, and miscellaneous non-taggables. The latter constitute a new cat-
egory, Miscellaneous, which includes names falling outside the classic
ENAMEX, e.g., compounds that are made up of locations, organizations,
etc., adjectives and other words derived from a NE, religions, political
ideologies, nationalities, or languages.
2.3. ACE
As part of the Automatic Content Extraction (ACE) program (a series of
IE technology evaluations from 1999 organized by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST)), new NE types were introduced in
addition to the classic ENAMEX categories: Facility, Geo-Political
Entity, Vehicle and Weapon. The category Facility subsumes arti-
facts falling under the domains of architecture and civil engineering.
Geo-Political Entities are composite entities comprised of a popu-
lation, a government, a physical location, and a nation (or province, state,
county, city, etc.). The seven main types are divided into dozens of sub-
types and hundreds of classes (ACE 2008) . The ACE program is concerned
with automatic extraction of content, including not only NEs but also their
relationships to each other and events concerning them. For the purposes
of this more complex task, all references to entities are annotated: names,
common nouns, noun phrases, and pronouns. In this regard, ACE is excep-
tional in the race of NER standards, where common nouns and pronouns
are not to be annotated.
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2.4. LDC
The Linguistic Data Consortium (LDC) has developed annotation guide-
lines for NEs and time expressions within the Less Commonly Taught Lan-
guages (LCTL) project. In contrast to the ones mentioned above, these
guidelines give an exact deﬁnition of NEs (LDC 2006) : “An entity is some
object in the world – for instance, a place or a person. A named entity is
a phrase that uniquely refers to that object by its proper name, acronym,
nickname or abbreviation.” Besides the classical name categories (PER,
ORG, LOC), they also annotate Titles, which are separated from the per-
son’s name, e.g.,
(9) said [GlobalCorp]ORG [Vice President]TTL [John Smith]PER
The LCTL annotation guidelines are the ﬁrst concerned with meaning and
compositionality of NEs: “The meaning of the parts of names are not typ-
ically part of the meaning of the name (i.e., names are not compositional)
and, therefore, names cannot be broken down into smaller parts for anno-
tation.” Thus, a NE is treated as an indivisible syntactic unit that cannot
be interrupted by an outside element.
In addition to the classical ENAMEX, TIMEX and NUMEX cate-
gories, there are a wide range of other, marginal types of NEs, which are
relevant for particular tasks, e.g., extracting chemical and drug names from
chemistry articles (Krallinger et al. 2015); names of proteins, species, and
genes from biology articles (Ding et al. 2015); or project names, email
addresses and phone numbers from websites (Zhu et al. 2005).
2.5. Summary
Early works deﬁne the NER problem as the recognition of proper names in
general. Names of persons, locations and organizations have been studied
the most. Besides these classical categories, there is a general agreement in
the NER community about the inclusion of temporal expressions and some
numerical expressions, such as amounts of money and other types of units.
The main categories can be divided into ﬁne-grained subtypes and classes,
and marginal types are sometimes included for speciﬁc tasks. Annotation
guidelines usually do not go further in deﬁning NEs than saying that they
are “unique identiﬁers” or that they “uniquely refer” to an entity. Only
one of the guidelines mentions the meaning and compositionality of NEs:
it postulates NEs as indivisible units, although earlier guidelines allow
embedded NEs.
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3. Language philosophical views: from Mill to Kripke
3.1. John Stuart Mill
“A proper name is a word that answers the purpose of showing what thing
it is that we are talking about, but not of telling anything about it”, writes
John Stuart Mill in his 1843 A system of logic (Mill 2002). According
to him, the semantic contribution of a name is its referent and only its
referent. One of his examples illustrating this statement is the name of
the town Dartmouth. The town was probably named after its localization,
because it lies at the mouth of the river Dart. But if the river had changed
its course, so that the town no longer lay at the mouth of the Dart, one
could still use the name Dartmouth to refer to the same place as before.
Thus, it is not part of the meaning of the name Dartmouth that the town
with this name lies at the mouth of the Dart.
3.2. Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell
Gottlob Frege’s puzzle of the Morning Star and the Evening Star chal-
lenges the Millian conception of names. In his famous work Über Sinn und
Bedeutung (Frege 2000), he distinguishes between sense (Sinn) and refer-
ence (Bedeutung). Without the distinction between sense and reference,
the following sentences would be equal:
(10) The Morning Star is the Evening Star.
(11) The Morning Star is the Morning Star.
Both names have the same reference (Venus), so they should be inter-
changeable. However, since the thought expressed by (10) is distinct from
the thought expressed by (11), the senses of the two names are diﬀerent.
While (11) seems to be an empty tautology, (10) can be an informative
statement, even a scientiﬁc discovery. If somebody did not know that the
Evening Star is the Morning Star, he/she could think that (11) was true,
while (10) was false.
To solve the puzzle, without resorting to a two-tiered semantic the-
ory, Bertrand Russell used the description theory. The description theory
of names states that each name has the semantic value of some deﬁnite
description (Cumming 2012). For example, Aristotle might have the se-
mantic value of ‘the teacher of Alexander the Great’. The Morning Star
and the Evening Star might correspond to diﬀerent deﬁnite descriptions
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in their semantic value, and would make diﬀerent semantic contributions
to the sentences in which the occur.
Frege and Russell both argue that Mill was wrong: a proper name
is a deﬁnite description abbreviated or disguised, and such a description
gives the sense of the name. According to Frege, a description may be used
synonymously with a name, or it may be used to ﬁx its reference.
3.3. Saul Kripke
Saul Kripke concurred only partially with Frege’s theory. Description ﬁxes
reference, but the name denoting that object is then used to refer to that
object, even if referring to counterfactual situations where the object does
not have the properties in question, writes Kripke in Naming and necessity
(Kripke 1981). One of Kripke’s examples is Gödel and the proof of incom-
pleteness of arithmetic. If it turned out that Gödel was not the man who
proved the incompleteness of arithmetic, Gödel would not be called ‘the
man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic’, but he would still be
called ‘Gödel’. Thus, names are not equal to deﬁnite descriptions.
Kripke postulates proper names as rigid designators. Something is a
rigid designator if it designates the same object in every possible world.
The concept of a possible world (or counterfactual situation) is used in
modal semantics, where the sentence Frank might have been a revolutionist
is interpreted as a quantiﬁcation over possible worlds. Kripke suggests an
intuitive test to ﬁnd out what is a rigid designator. An updated example:
the President of the US in 2017 designates a certain man, Trump; but
someone else (e.g., Clinton) may have been the President in 2017, and
Trump might not have; so this designator is not rigid. When talking about
what would happen to Trump in a certain counterfactual situation, we are
talking about what would happen to him. So ‘Trump’ is a rigid designator.
With respect to proper names, reference can be ﬁxed in various ways.
In the case of initial baptism it is typically ﬁxed by ostension or description.
Otherwise, the reference is usually determined by a chain, passing the name
from link to link. In general, the reference depends not just on what we
think, but on other people in the community, the history of how knowledge
of the name has spread. It is by following a history that one gets to the
reference.
Kripke argues that proper names are not the only kinds of rigid des-
ignators: species names, such as tiger, or mass terms, such as gold, certain
terms for natural phenomena, such as heat, and measurement units, such as
one meter are further examples. There is a diﬀerence between the phrase
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one meter and the phrase the length of the metre bar at t0. The ﬁrst
phrase is meant to designate rigidly a certain length in all possible worlds,
which in the actual world happens to be the length of the metre bar at t0.
On the other hand, the length of the metre bar at t0 does not designate
anything rigidly.
3.4. Summary
Kripke goes back to the Millian theory of names, and at the same time
breaks with Frege’s theory, when he writes that proper names do not have
sense, only reference. He declares that a proper name is a rigid designator,
which designates the same object in every possible world. Through exam-
ples he proves that deﬁnite descriptions are not synonymous with names,
but they can still ﬁx a referent. In the case of proper names, the refer-
ence can be ﬁxed in an initial baptism, after which the name spreads in
the community by a chain, from link to link. In Kripke’s theory, species
names, mass terms, natural phenomena and measurement units are also
rigid designators.
4. The linguistic approach
Besides the theory of rigid designators, another concept used in the lit-
erature to deﬁne NEs is that of unique reference. In subsection 4.1, we
clarify the meaning of the phrase “unique reference”, which seems to be
used non-systematically in NER guidelines. Unique reference can act as
the separator line between proper names and common nouns. There are
however certain linguistic properties by which we can make a stronger dis-
tinction, as described in subsection 4.2. The main feature distinguishing
between them is the issue of compositionality, which is discussed in subsec-
tion 4.3. Finally, we sum up our ﬁndings about the linguistic background
of proper names in subsection 4.4.
4.1. Unique reference
In the MUC guidelines (Chinchor 1998), the deﬁnition of what to annotate
as NEs is as follows: “proper names, acronyms, and perhaps miscellaneous
other unique identiﬁers”, and what not to annotate as NEs: “artifacts, other
products, and plural names that do not identify a single, unique entity”.
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In the LCTL guidelines we ﬁnd the following deﬁnition: “a NE is a phrase
that uniquely refers to an object by its proper name, acronym, nickname
or abbreviation” (LDC 2006).
Let us take these deﬁnitions one by one. In the ﬁrst case, the phrase
“unique identiﬁers” is coordinated with “proper names” and “acronyms”, and
“unique” is an attributive adjective modifying the noun “identiﬁers”. Thus,
“unique” means here that the identiﬁer is unique, similarly to proper names
and acronyms. In the second case, however, it is the entity a linguistic unit
refers to that must be unique in order for the unit to qualify as a NE. In
the LCTL guidelines, the phrase “uniquely refers” means something similar
as in the ﬁrst case, it is therefore the referring linguistic unit that must be
unique, not the entity in the world to which it refers.
Here and in several other places in the literature, the diﬀerence be-
tween the concepts of referring act and reference seems to be blurred.
When trying to determine what is unique, we ﬁnd that in most grammar
books the names and the entities they refer to are not clearly distinguished.
However, it does matter whether we are talking about Charlie or about
the name Charlie. To prevent such an ambiguity, we always indicate the
meta-linguistic usage by single quotation marks.
By investigating various deﬁnitions of proper names, we can conclude
that names refer to a unique entity (e.g., London), so names have unique
reference (Quirk & Greenbaum 1980), in contrast to common nouns, which
refer to a class of entities (e.g., cities), or non-unique instances of a certain
class (e.g., city). However, we can refer to and even identify an entity
by means of common nouns. The diﬀerence is that proper names, even
standing by themselves, always identify entities, while a common noun
can do so only in such cases when it constitutes a noun phrase with other
linguistic units. Common nouns may stand with a possessive determiner
(e.g., my car), or with a demonstrative (e.g., this car), or can be a part of
a description (e.g., the car that I saw yesterday).
Many proper names share the feature of having only one possible
reference, but a wide range of them refer to more than one object in the
world. For example, Washington can refer to thousands of people who
have Washington as their surname or given name, a US state, the capital
of the US, cities and other places throughout America and the UK, roads,
lakes, mountains, educational organizations, and so forth. These kinds of
proper names are referentially multivalent (Anderson 2007), but each of
the references is still unique.
Some proper names occur in plural form, optionally or exclusively. In
the latter case, the plural suﬃx is an inherent part of the name. These are
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the so called pluralia tantum (e.g., Carpathians, Pleiades). According to
their surface form, it might seem that they can be broken down into smaller
pieces, but the Carpathians do not consist of carpathian1, carpathian2, …,
carpathiann, just as the Pleiades do not consist of pleiades. These names
refer to groups of entities considered unique.
Names of brands, artifacts, and other products can be optionally used
in plural form. For example, Volvo is a proper name referring to a unique
company. But if we put it in a sentence, like He likes Volvos, it will refer to
particular vehicles. This is a kind of metonymy, with the company name
used to refer to a product of this company. Proper names in plural form can
also be used in other kinds of ﬁgures of speech, for example in metaphors.
In the phrase a few would-be Napoleons, some characteristics of the emperor
are associated with men to which the word Napoleons refers. In these cases,
proper names act like common nouns, i.e., they have no unique reference.
Additionally, there is a quite large number of linguistic units which
are on the border between proper names and common nouns, because it
is diﬃcult to determine whether their reference is unique. Typically, they
are used as proper names in some languages, but as common nouns in
other ones. The diﬃculty of classiﬁcation is usually mirrorred even in the
spelling rules. For example, in the case of events (World War II, Olympic
Games in English; 2. világháború, olimpiai játékok in Hungarian; Segunda
Guerra Mundial, Juegos Olímpicos in Spanish; Seconde Guerre mondiale,
Jeux olympiques in French), expressions for days of the week and months of
the year (Monday, August in English; hétfő, augusztus in Hungarian; lunes,
agosto in Spanish; lundi, août in French), expressions for languages, na-
tionalities, religions and political ideologies (Hungarian, Catholic, Marxist
in English; magyar, katolikus, marxista in Hungarian; húngaro, católica,
marxista in Spanish; hongrois, catholique, marxiste in French), etc. Cate-
gories vary across languages, so there seems to be no language-independent,
general rule for classifying proper names.
4.2. Distinction between proper names and common noun phrases
As mentioned above, proper nouns are distinguished from common nouns
on the basis of the uniqueness of their reference. However, we can make a
stronger distinction based on other linguistic properties.
First, we have to clarify the disctinction between proper nouns and
proper names made by current works in linguistics (e.g., Anderson 2007;
Huddleston & Pullum 2002). Since the term “noun” is used for a class of
single words, only single-word proper names are proper nouns: Ivan is both
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a proper noun and a proper name, but Ivan the Terrible is a proper name
that is not a proper noun. From this distinction follows that proper names
cannot be compared to a single common noun, but to a noun phrase headed
by a common noun. A proper noun by itself constitutes a noun phrase,
while common nouns need other elements. In subsection 4.1, we gave a few
examples. In the subsequent analysis, proper names and common noun
phrases are juxtaposed.
Distinction between proper nouns and common nouns is commonly
made with reference to semantic properties. One of them is the classic
approach: entities described by a common noun, e.g., horse, are bound
together by some resemblances, which can be summed up in the abstract
notion of ‘horsiness’ or ‘horsehood’ (Gardiner 1957). A proper name, on
the contrary, is a distinctive badge: there is no corresponding resemblance
among the Charlies that could be summed up as ‘Charlieness’ or ‘Char-
liehood’. Thus, we can say that common nouns realize abstraction, while
proper names make distinction. However, Katz (1972) argues that the
meaninglessness of names means that one cannot establish a semantic
distinction between proper names and common noun phrases. The latter
are compositional, because their meaning is determined by their struc-
ture and the meanings of their constituents (Szabó 2008), while proper
names “allow no analysis and consequently no interpretation of their ele-
ments”, quoting Saussure (1959). Thus, proper names are arbitrary linguis-
tic units, and are therefore not compositional (see 4.3 for more details).
Moving on to syntax, common noun phrases are compositional, i.e.,
they can be divided into smaller units, while proper names are indivisible
syntactic units. This is conﬁrmed by the fact that proper names – as op-
posed to common nouns – cannot be modiﬁed internally, as can be seen
in these examples:
(12) my son’s college
(13) my son’s beautiful college
(14) beautiful King’s College
(15)*King’s beautiful College
Further evidence is that in Hungarian and other highly agglutinative lan-
guages, the inﬂection always goes to the end of the proper name consti-
tuting a noun phrase. (16) presents the inﬂection of a proper name (here:
a title), while (17) shows its common noun phrase counterpart (consider
the second determiner in the latter):
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(16) Láttam az Egerek és embereket.
‘I saw (Of Mice and Men).ACC’
(17) Láttam az egereket és az embereket.
‘I saw the mice.ACC and the men.ACC’
From the perspective of morphology, proper names must always be sa-
cred, which means that the original form of a proper name must be re-
constructible from the inﬂected form (Deme 1956). This requirement is
mirrorred even in the current spelling rules in Hungarian: e.g., Papp-pal
‘with Papp’, Hermann-nak ‘to Hermann’. Some proper names in Hungar-
ian have common noun counterparts, as well, e.g., Fodor  fodor ‘frill’,
Arany  arany ‘gold’. Since the word fodor is exceptional, when inﬂecting
it as a common noun, the rule of vowel drop is applied: fodrot ‘frill.ACC’.
However, when inﬂecting it as a proper name, it is inﬂected regularly, with-
out dropping the vowel: Fodort ‘Fodor.ACC’. The common noun arany also
has exceptional marking, it is lowering, which means that it has a as a link
vowel in certain inﬂectional forms, e.g., in the accusative, instead of the
regular bare accusative marker: arany-at ‘gold-ACC’. But as a proper name,
it is inﬂected regularly: Arany-t ‘Arany-ACC’ (for more details, see Kornai
1994 and Kenesei et al. 1998). Psycholinguistic experiments on Hungarian
morphology also conﬁrm that proper names are inﬂected regularly (Lukács
2001), while common nouns may have exceptional markings.
4.3. The non-compositionality of proper names
In order to examine whether proper names are compositional or arbitrary
linguistic units, here we give an analysis of how knowledge about the named
entity can be deduced from the name. Proper names are not simply arbi-
trary linguistic units, but they show the arbitrariness most clearly of all,
since one can give any name to his/her dog, ship, etc. It follows from the
arbitrariness of the initial baptism that proper names say nothing about
the properties of the named entity, in fact they do not even indicate what
kind of entity we are talking about (a dog, a ship, etc.).
Although monomorphemic proper names are classic examples of non-
compositionality, they are not semantically empty. For instance, Charlie
is a boy by default, but this name is often given to girls in the US, and
of course it can be given to pets or products. Semantic implications of
proper names (if any) are therefore defeasible. This is in contrast with
common nouns, since we cannot call a table ‘chair’ without violating the
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Gricean maxims (Grice 1975). Monomorphemic proper names have only
one non-defeasible semantic implication, namely if one is called X, then
the predicate ‘it is called X’ will be true (cf. the Millian theory of proper
names in section 3).
In the context of the current analysis, two types of polymorphemic
proper names can be distinguished. First, there are phrases which are
headed by a common noun and modiﬁed by a proper name, e.g., Roosevelt
square, Columbo pub. The second type consists of two (or more) proper
nouns, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt, Volvo S70.
In the case of the former, more frequent type, every non-defeasible
semantic implication (except the fact of the naming) comes from the head,
the modiﬁer does not make any contribution. This can be shown by re-
moving the head: from the sentence You are called from the Roosevelt,
one cannot determine the source of the call, which might come from the
Roosevelt Hotel, from the Roosevelt College, or from a bar in Roosevelt
square. All we have is the trivial implication, that Roosevelt is the name
of the place. The fact that the modiﬁer contributes nothing to the seman-
tics of the entire construction can be illustrated better by replacing the
proper names with empty elements, e.g., A square, B pub. The acceptabil-
ity of the construction is not compromised even in this case. One further
argument against compositionality is that if we try to apply it to polymor-
phemic proper names, we get unacceptable result: Roosevelt has not lived
at Roosevelt square, and Columbo has never been to the Columbo pub.
In the second construction, both head and modiﬁer are proper nouns.
The only contribution made by the head to the semantics of the phrase is
that we know that the thing referred to by the modiﬁer is a member of the
group of things referred to by the head, e.g., Volvo S70 is a kind of Volvo,
but not a kind of S70.
Regarding polymorphemic proper names in general, we can say that
the head H bears the semantics of the entire construction, while the only
contribution of the modiﬁer M is that it shows that M is called ‘M’ and
that it is a kind of H. This is in contrast with the classic compositional
semantics of common nouns, where the red hat means a hat which is red,
the former president used to be a president, etc., and these implications
are non-defeasible.
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4.4. Summary
This section gives an overview how we can distinguish between proper
names and common nouns using an approach based in linguistics. The ﬁrst
distinguishing property is the unique reference: common nouns, standing
by themselves, never have unique reference. They have to be surrounded
by other constituents within a phrase to refer some unique entity in the
world, while proper nouns have unique reference on their own. There are,
however, proper names which seemingly refer to several entities; it is shown
through examples that these do have unique reference. Additional linguis-
tic properties of proper names are presented, based on which a stronger
distinction between proper names and common nouns can be made. The
distinction based on semantic properties is the clearest: common noun
phrases are compositional while proper names are not.
5. Conclusion
As can be seen from this overview, the deﬁnition of proper names is still
an open question in both philosophy and linguistics. If we try to apply the
ﬁndings presented above to the NER task, we will face various challenges.
However, there are a few statements which can be used as pillars of deﬁning
what to annotate as NEs.
Early works formulated the NER task as recognizing proper names in
general. This generality posed a wide range of problems, so the domain
of units to be annotated as NEs had to be restricted. In this restricted
domain, we only ﬁnd person and place names, which have been postulated
as proper names from the very beginnings of linguistics (e.g., in Plato’s
dialogue, Cratylus, and in Dionysius Thrax’ grammar). The third classical
name type, the type of organization names has been mentioned in grammar
books from the 19th century. Although the range of linguistic units to
annotate was cut, the challenges have remained, since these kinds of names
already exhibit properties which make the NER task diﬃcult.
In the expression “named entity”, the word “named” aims to restrict the
task to only those entities where rigid designators stand for the reference
(Nadeau & Sekine 2007). Something is a rigid designator if it designates the
same object in every possible world and thus has unique reference – unique
in every possible world. Rigid designators include proper names as well as
species names, mass terms, natural phenomena and measurement units.
These natural kind terms are only partially included in the NER task.
The MUC guidelines allow for annotating measures (e.g., 16 tons) and
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monetary values (e.g., 100 dollars), which are rigid designators according
to Kripke’s theory. Some temporal expressions, typically absolute time
expressions, are also rigid designators (e.g., the year 2017 is the 2017th
year of the Gregorian calendar), but there are also many non-rigid ones,
typically the relative time expressions (e.g., June is a month of an undeﬁned
year). Thus, the rigid designator theory must be restricted to keep out
species names, mass terms and certain natural phenomena, but must also
be loosened to allow tagging relative time expressions as NEs.
If we say that every linguistic unit which has unique reference must
be annotated as a NE, we should annotate common noun phrases as well.
However, dealing with common nouns is not part of the NER task, so
other linguistic properties of proper names and common nouns must be
considered to make the distinction between them stronger. The greatest
diﬀerence is the issue of compositionality. Applying Mill’s, Saussure’s, and
Kripke’s theory about the meaninglessness of names, we must conclude
that proper names are arbitrary linguistic units, whose only semantic im-
plication is the fact of the naming. Thus, the semantics of proper names
is in total contrast with the classic compositional semantics of common
nouns, as they are indivisible and non-compositional units. To map it to
the NER task: embedded NEs are not allowed, and the longest sequences
must be annotated as NEs (e.g., in the place name Roosevelt square there
is no person name ‘Roosevelt’ annotated).
There still remain a quite large number of linguistic units which are
diﬃcult to categorize. Typically, they are on the border between proper
names and common nouns, which is conﬁrmed by the fact that their sta-
tus varies across languages. We should not forget that the central aim of
the NER task is extracting important information from raw text, most
of which is contained by NEs. Guidelines should be ﬂexible enough to al-
low the annotation of such important pieces of information. For getting
a usable deﬁnition of NEs, the classic Aristotelian view on classiﬁcation,
which states that there must be a diﬀerentia speciﬁca which allows some-
thing to be the member of a group, and excludes others, is not applicable.
For our purposes, the prototype theory (Rosch 1973) seems more plausible,
where proper names form a continuum ranging from prototypical (person
and place names) to non-prototypical categories (product and language
names; Langendonck 2007 – consider the parallelism with the order in
which names are mentioned in grammar books). Finally, the goal of the
NER application will further restrict the range of linguistic units to be
taken into account.
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ABSTRACT
Philosophical orthodoxy holds that ‘true’ is a monadic predicate. I think
this view is only halfway correct: there is indeed a monadic truth-
predicate in English and other natural languages but this is not the
fundamental truth-predicate we use. What can be true simpliciter are
particular mental states (beliefs, hopes, wishes, etc.) a thinker might
be in or particular speech acts (assertions, denials, suppositions, etc.)
a speaker might perform. These mental states and speech-acts are
truth-apt because they have propositional contents. But propositions
are not true simpliciter – they are true of situations. Thus, the funda-
mental notion of truth is relational.
1. Simplicity
G.E. Moore held a simple view about the adjective ‘good.’ He took it to
be a monadic predicate expressing a property:1
“For ‘good conduct’ is a complex notion: all conduct is not good; for some is
certainly bad and some may be indiﬀerent. And on the other hand, other things,
beside conduct, may be good; and if they are so, then ‘good’ denotes some
property, that is common to them and conduct […].”
Compelling though Moore’s observation may sound, the simple view is
too simple: there are good violinists who are pianists without being good
pianists, and if goodness were a property shared by all and only what
is correctly said to be good, these people would have to both have and
lack goodness.2 This cannot be right, so – appearances notwithstanding –
‘good’ is not a monadic predicate.
1 Moore (1903, 2).
2 The point goes back to Geach (1956).
K + K = 120 / p. 500 / February 1, 2020
500 Zoltán Gendler Szabó
Moore held the same simple view about ‘true’: he considered it a
monadic predicate expressing a property. This is no surprise, for if we re-
place ‘good’ with ‘true’, ‘bad’ with ‘false’, ‘indiﬀerent’ with ‘meaningless’
and ‘conduct’ with ‘report’ in the quote above we ﬁnd the point equally
compelling. Alas, it also faces the same objection. A double agent sends a
report about a person of interest who happens to be an American to both
Moscow and Washington, describing him as ‘a foreigner’. Here we have a
true report sent to Moscow, which is also a false report sent to Washing-
ton. Does this show that ‘true’ is not a monadic predicate expressing the
property of truth?
Yes and no. The example indeed shows that applied to reports ‘true’
is relational: the double agent’s report addresses diﬀerent audiences, and
is true relative to the Moscow context but false relative to the Washing-
ton context. However, the standard explanation of this fact brings back
monadic truth: the report expresses a true proposition in the former con-
text, a diﬀerent false proposition in the latter. The usual view in philosophy
of language today is that there is a monadic truth predicate in English and
other natural languages applicable to all and only propositions, and that
everything else we correctly call true (sentences, beliefs, theories, reports,
etc.) is true because it has propositional content, relative to a context, that
is true absolutely. Thus, truth is fundamentally monadic.
I think this view is incorrect. There is indeed a monadic truth-
predicate in English and other natural languages, but it does not ap-
ply to propositions. What can be true simpliciter are particular mental
states (beliefs, hopes, wishes, etc.) that a thinker might be in or particular
speech acts (assertions, denials, suppositions, etc.) that a speaker might
perform. These mental states and speech-acts are truth-apt because they
have propositional contents. But the propositions themselves are not true
or false simpliciter – they are true or false of situations. The fundamental
notion of truth is thus relational – or, at least, so I will argue in this paper.3
My view opposes the ﬁrst plank of the doctrine Herman Cappelen
and John Hawthorne have dubbed Simplicity. I won’t quarrel here with
the other four planks: that the semantic values of declarative sentences
relative to contexts of utterance are propositions; that propositions are
the objects of certain mental attitudes; that propositions are the objects
of illocutionary acts; and that propositions are the objects of agreement
3 I hold a similar view about ‘good’ – in its core sense it is a predicate expressing a re-
lational property of being good in a way; cf. Szabó (2000a). The Geachean alternative
is that ‘good’ is not a predicate at all, but a predicate-modiﬁer.
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and disagreement.4 I even agree with part of the ﬁrst plank – I too believe
that propositions instantiate fundamental truth and falsity. What I reject
is that truth and falsity are properties; I believe they are relations to
situations.
Cappelen and Hawthorne spend most of their book warding oﬀ chal-
lenges against Simplicity coming from those who maintain that a lim-
ited number of linguistic devices (epistemic modals, predicates of personal
taste, terms of aesthetic or moral approval) are used to build sentences
that express propositions whose truth is relative to something (a body of
knowledge, a standard of taste, or prevailing opinion). They call such pro-
posals relativist, and this is certainly one of the standard ways to use this
loaded term. The other standard use is narrower: it requires that propo-
sitional truth be sensitive to contexts of assessment.5 The view I defend
diﬀers from the usual relativist views in two important respects. I do not
think that the need for relativization is tied to special vocabulary, and I
do not propose that truth is relative to something mental or subjective.6
Rather, I claim that all propositions expressed by our declarative sentences
are true or false relative to situations. At the same time, I maintain that
the proposed view provides a common framework in which these special
forms of relativism can be fruitfully debated.
My positive argument has a Quinean ﬂavor despite its distinctly non-
Quinean conclusion. It goes as follows. Monadic truth-predicates are ill-
suited for the purposes of semantics. If we take semantics seriously, we
should either accept that truth is the relation the truth-predicate employed
in our overall best semantic theory picks out, or provide some adequate
paraphrase of that theory which employs only a monadic truth-predicate.
For most standard relative truth-predicates employed in semantics these
days such paraphrases can be found. But when it comes to ‘sentence S
is true at context c and situation s’ we can only provide a paraphrase in
terms of dyadic propositional truth. I will make a case that an adequate
semantic theory does need this truth-predicate, and also that we should
accept the paraphrase. If I am right we have good reason to think that
propositional truth is dyadic.
4 Cappelen & Hawthorne (2009, 1). I do, however, reject the claim that mental states
or speech-acts are individuated in terms of their objects.
5 The broader notion is employed by Kölbel (2002), the narrower by MacFarlane (2005).
6 What opponents of relativism ﬁnd objectionable tends to be not relativism per se –
it is the more speciﬁc doctrine that truth is relative to what people happen to think
or want.
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This sort of argument has obvious limitations. Even if our physical
theories make reference to numbers and functions it would not follow that
there are such things – our theories might be false. Literal falsehood need
not be a fatal ﬂaw: the right sort of falsehood can make a theory more
perspicuous and more explanatory than any of its available true competi-
tors. Obviously, this could be true for semantics as well: it may well be
that semantic theories are committed to propositions being true or false
relative to situations and that in virtue of this very commitment they are
false, despite providing insightful accounts of the semantic facts. Moreover,
unlike physics, semantics is not an established science – it is not beyond
the pale to suggest that it is simply on the wrong track. I take both the
general ﬁctionalist challenge and the particular concerns about the rela-
tively undeveloped state of semantic theorizing seriously, so I will put my
conclusion carefully: to the extent that we think our currently best seman-
tic theories are literally true we have reason to think that propositional
truth is dyadic. I hope the thesis is of interest despite the qualiﬁcation.
2. Context and index
Why can’t we use a monadic truth-predicate in semantics? Such a pred-
icate works well as long as we are concerned with the language of the
sentential calculus: in saying that :p is true just in case p is not, or that
p ^ q is true just in case both p and q are, we are entirely successful in
specifying the truth-conditions of certain complex sentences in terms of
the truth-conditions of their syntactic constituents. Indeed, I think we can
regard semantic theory here as providing an explanation why p^ q has the
truth-value it has. If p^ q is true, it is true because both p and q are true,
and if p ^ q is false, it is false because it is not the case that both p and
q are true.7 This is just what semanticists seek to do: they explain why
certain complex expressions have the semantic values they do in terms of
the semantic values of their constituents and their structure.8 The prob-
7 For a defense of this view about the explanatory power of semantic theories, see
Szabó (2019).
8 I would like to stay clear of the debate whether this is all semantics should do. There
are familiar arguments to the eﬀect that the meaning of a sentence is not exhausted
by its truth-conditions, including considerations relating to attitude reports, presup-
position, discourse dynamics, and conventional implicature. What matters here is
the relatively uncontroversial claim that for declarative sentences diﬀerence in truth-
conditions is suﬃcient for diﬀerence in meaning.
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lem is that to provide this sort of explanation in the case of more complex
languages semanticists need relative truth-predicates.
L8, the language of the predicate calculus, contains variables – un-
interpreted expressions substitutable for interpreted ones. Unlike the in-
dividual constant Viktor, the variable x is not assigned anything by the
interpretation function but it can still replace Viktor anywhere salva bene-
formatione. The string corrupt (x) is well-formed yet neither true nor false
simpliciter – it is true relative to an assignment g if and only if g maps x
to a member of the set the interpretation function assigns to corrupt. This
relative truth-predicate is the only one used to articulate truth-conditions
in L8. For example, corrupt (Viktor) is true relative to an assignment g
if and only if whatever the interpretation function assigns to Viktor is a
member of whatever it assigns to corrupt.
Terminology can mitigate discomfort: we can introduce the term ‘for-
mula’ to refer to a category of expressions that include both corrupt
(Viktor) and corrupt (x) and reserve the term ‘sentence’ for formulae with-
out free variables. Then we do not have to say that sentential truth in L8 is
relative to assignment. Absolute truth can be introduced through a mean-
ing postulate: if ' is a sentence then ' is true iﬀ ' is true relative to
all assignments. But verbal magic does not change the facts: insofar as
our concern is to account for the truth-conditions of sentences of L8, this
new monadic truth-predicate is completely idle. The explanation of why
a sentence has the truth-value it does proceeds as follows: ﬁrst we give a
complete explanation of why the sentence has the truth-value it does rel-
ative to all assignments, and then we tuck the deﬁnition of monadic truth
to the end.
L, the language of the modal sentential calculus, has intensional op-
erators – expressions whose syntactic proﬁle is to yield sentences when
combined with sentences, and whose semantic proﬁle is undeﬁnable via
truth-tables. Ascription of truth-conditions to  (corrupt (Viktor)) relies
on the truth or falsity of corrupt (Viktor) relative to possible worlds: the
sentence is true relative to a possible world w just in case it is true rela-
tive to all possible worlds accessible from w. This relative truth-predicate
is employed in ascribing truth-conditions to corrupt (Viktor) as well: the
sentence is true relative to a possible world w if and only if what the inter-
pretation function assigns to Viktor at w is a member of what it assigns
to corrupt at w.
Once again, there is a terminological move that can make the de-
parture from our usual talk of absolute truth seem less drastic. We can
distinguish a world among all the possible ones, and call it actual. With
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this extra machinery in hand we can deﬁne absolute truth as truth rel-
ative to the actual world. But again, as far as the semantics of L is
concerned, the absolute truth-predicate is a ﬁfth wheel. The explanation
of why a sentence has the truth-value it does proceeds as follows: ﬁrst
we give a complete explanation of why the sentence has the truth-value it
does relative to an arbitrary possible world, and then we apply this general
explanation to the actual world.
If we have both individual variables and intensional operators – as in
the language of quantiﬁed modal logic, L8 – we need a truth-predicate
that is relativized both to assignment functions and possible worlds. The
reason the two relativizations cannot be collapsed into one is simple: vari-
ables do not shift their semantic values when they occur within the scope
of intensional operators. Whether  (corrupt (x)) is true at an assignment
and a world depends on the truth or falsity of corrupt (x) at the same
assignment at all the diﬀerent worlds; whether 8x (corrupt (x)) is true at
an assignment and a world depends on the truth or falsity of corrupt (x)
at the same world at all the diﬀerent assignments.9 We have independent
sources of variation in the truth-value of corrupt (x).10
Natural languages contain expressions that may be considered as vari-
ables or intensional operators. Third person singular pronouns are fairly
uncontroversial examples of the former, modal auxiliaries of the latter.11
‘He is corrupt’ is not true simpliciter – it is true only relative to assign-
ments that map the pronoun ‘he’ to a male person who is corrupt. The
truth-conditions of ‘Viktor must be corrupt’ are not ﬁxed by the truth or
falsity of ‘Viktor is corrupt’ – they are determined by the truth or falsity
of ‘Viktor is corrupt’ relative to possible worlds accessible from actuality.
There are also expressions in natural languages that are pretty clearly
not variables or intensional operators, but share enough with them to
warrant analogous semantic treatment. First and second person singular
pronouns are not variables, for normally they cannot be bound by a quan-
9 Cf. Lewis (1980).
10 Truth-predicates are also relativized to models. Models are necessary to deﬁne logical
consequence, but not for the semantics – they provide alternative interpretations for
the same expressions. Thus, I will ignore relativization to models it in what follows.
11 This is not to say that treating pronouns as variables or modal auxiliaries as inten-
sional operators is obligatory. There are successful semantic theories on the market
that interpret pronouns as identity-functions (cf. Szabolcsi 1987 and Jacobson 1999)
and modal auxiliaries as quantiﬁers (cf. Percus 2000 and Keshet 2008).
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tiﬁer.12 Yet they are variable-like insofar as linguistic conventions alone fail
to determine their referent. It is customary to think that all variable-like
expressions receive their semantic value somehow or other from the context
of utterance.13 The expression ‘necessary’ is not an operator, for it cannot
directly combine with a sentence. But if we choose to interpret ‘must’ as
an operator, we should probably seek an operator-like interpretation for
‘necessary’ as well, so as to account for their tight semantic connection. It
is customary to lump all the information needed to interpret operator-like
expressions into an index of evaluation. Semantic theories of suﬃciently
large fragments of natural languages use a truth-predicate relativized to
both context and index. They do not employ unrelativized truth-predicates
at all.
If truth is fundamentally monadic, the relational truth-predicates of
semantics must somehow be analyzed in terms of a monadic one. If that
cannot be done we would have good reason to believe that truth is the
very relation picked out by the irreducible truth-predicate employed in
explaining the truth-conditions of sentences of our languages in our best
semantic theories.
3. Defining the relativized truth-predicate
How can we analyze ‘sentence S is true at context c and index i’ using a
monadic truth-predicate? First, we need something monadic truth-predi-
cates might plausibly apply to. Sentences won’t do – ‘He is corrupt’ is not
true or false simpliciter only relative to some value context provides for the
pronoun. However, we might conjecture that by assigning an individual to
the pronoun (e.g., Viktor) context associates a proposition with the entire
sentence (e.g., the proposition that Viktor is corrupt) and that the truth
of the sentence relative to the context can be deﬁned as the truth of the
12 There are bound readings much discussed in the linguistic literature, such in ‘You
are the only one who eats what you cook’. For an extended discussion of the state of
the art on these “fake indexicals”, see Kratzer (2009).
13 It is not customary to say that the assignment function is a feature of the context of
utterance. Kaplan (1989) treats indexicals (including demonstratives) as constants
and regards the assignment function as a parameter distinct from both context and
index. This has the disadvantage of ﬂouting the ideal of uniform interpretation for
pronouns. Contemporary semantic approaches typically view all pronouns as variables
and regard the assignment function as a parameter of the index; cf. Heim & Kratzer
(1998). It is the context of utterance that initiates the assignment function of the
index, which can then be shifted when quantiﬁer expressions are evaluated.
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associated proposition. Propositional truth is still index-sensitive but that
can be captured using a subjunctive conditional and an appropriate index-
ical. ‘Proposition p is true relative to possible world w’ can be deﬁned as ‘if
possible world w were actual proposition p would be true.’14 The doubly
relativized truth-predicate of semantics can then be deﬁned as follows:
(1) Sentence S is true at context c and index w if and only if S expresses a proposition
in c that would be true if w were actual.
The main line of opposition to (1) in contemporary philosophy of language
comes from those who maintain that propositions are never, or hardly ever,
expressed in language.15 In their view, what most declarative sentences ex-
press are incomplete entities, things that become propositions only when
properly supplemented. A variety of terms have been ﬂoated for these enti-
ties: ‘propositional fragments’, ‘propositional skeletons’, ‘propositional rad-
icals’, ‘propositional frames’, etc. So, for example, one might hold that the
sentence ‘Andy is rich’ expresses a propositional function f from amounts
of money to propositions, such that for any amount a, f (a) is the proposi-
tion that Andy has wealth in excess of a. There are many other examples
cited in the literature – ‘Árpád is subservient’ might express a proposi-
tional function that assigns to a class of individuals c the proposition that
Árpád is subservient to members of c, ‘Lőrinc’s contract is illegal’ might
express a propositional function that assigns to a relation r the proposition
that the contract that bears r to Lőrinc is illegal, and so on.
I think this view rests on an overly restrictive conception of context.
I will illustrate my point using the sentence ‘László’s mustache is huge’ but
the considerations apply generally.16 Imagine someone uttering ‘László’s
mustache is huge’ in the course of a conversation about László’s latest
clash with nosy reporters shown on television. Let’s suppose by uttering
this sentence this speaker manages to assert the proposition that László’s
mustache is signiﬁcantly larger than size s. If so, she asserted this without
any obvious indirectness, and accordingly, it seems theoretically parsimo-
nious to say that on this occasion in this speaker’s mouth this sentence
14 The wording in Soames (2010) is diﬀerent: he deﬁnes ‘proposition p is true relative
to possible world w’ as ‘p would be true if w were instantiated’. But since Soames
thinks possible worlds are properties and since he would cash out ‘w is actual’ as ‘w
is instantiated,’ this is an equivalent deﬁnition.
15 For classic examples of this view, see Bach (2001) and Carston (2002).
16 The considerations in the next three paragraph are spelled out in more detail in
Szabó (2010).
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expressed the very proposition the speaker asserted. Why say instead that
the speaker expressed something less, to wit, the propositional function
that maps arbitrary sizes to the proposition that László’s mustache is
larger than that size? The idea must be that the relevant size is not ﬁxed
by the context, only by the relevant intentions of the speaker. But why
think that those intentions cannot be part of the context? If the speaker
managed to assert that László’s mustache is signiﬁcantly larger than size s
then she must have made her intentions to talk about s manifest somehow,
and if she did, the fact that she has a particular size in mind became part of
the common ground relative to which the sentence must be interpreted.17
As long as we think of context as common ground it is reasonable to main-
tain that context determines the comparison class left unarticulated in the
sentence ‘László’s mustache is huge’.18
One might doubt that the description of the scenario I gave is plau-
sible. Maybe by uttering ‘László’s mustache is huge’ a speaker can never
really assert anything as speciﬁc as the proposition that László’s mustache
is signiﬁcantly larger than size s. This is a fair concern, but it does not
save the objection against the idea that ‘László’s mustache is huge’ is true
in a context just in case it expresses a true proposition in that context. If
we think it is hard, or even impossible to assert a determinate proposition
uttering ‘László’s mustache is huge’ because the sentence lacks suﬃcient
speciﬁcity then, we should also think it is hard or impossible for the sen-
tence to be determinately true.19
17 See Stalnaker (1998) for a discussion of the fact that indexical expressions must be
interpreted not against the context as it was prior to the utterance but as it is after
the context is already updated with the information that the utterance has already
been made.
18 I assume that the fact that many philosophers represent context, à la Kaplan, with
an ordered n-tuple has also contributed to the idea that context cannot provide all
the information necessary for identifying the proposition people normally express by
uttering various context-sensitive sentences. As Lewis (1980) has observed a long ago,
context-sensitivity in natural languages goes way beyond ‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’ and so
its sources cannot be captured by a simple list of parameters.
19 One might concede that if we use a suﬃciently generous conception of context, declar-
ative sentences do express propositions relative to context, but insist that they do not
express them semantically. Thus, the relational truth-predicate ‘sentence S is true at
context c and index i’ would belong not to semantics, but to a broader enterprise –
truth-conditional pragmatics; cf. Recanati (2010). While I will continue to call this
theory ‘semantics’ those who prefer to think of it under a diﬀerent label are welcome
to rephrase my argument accordingly.
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I think the standard view in semantics that assumes that sentences ex-
press proportions relative to contexts is perfectly reasonable. The problem
with (1) is not that it is false, but rather that it is not suﬃciently general.
It deﬁnes ‘sentence S is true at context c and index i’ only if we assume
that indices of evaluation comprise nothing beyond a possible world. What
if we have intensional operators in natural languages that are not modal?
‘Soon’ and ‘nearby’ are possible candidates – if they are operators, this is
what their semantic clauses might look like:
(2) If  is a sentence, then Soon  is true at context c and index hw, t, li if and only if
there is a time t0 in the near future of t such that  is true at c and hw, t0, li.
(3) If  is a sentence, then Nearby  is true at context c and index hw, t, li if and only
if there is a location l0 in the vicinity of l such that  is true at c and hw, t, l0i.
To deﬁne truth relative to a context and an index comprising a world,
a time, and a location, defenders of Simplicity can extend the blueprint
provided by (1). At ﬁrst, this seems easy:
(10) Sentence S is true at context c and index hw, t, li if and only if S expresses a
proposition in c that would be true if w were actual, t were present, and l were local.
But there is a problem with this suggestion. We have a clear grip on what
would be the case if October 25, 1963 were present. The US and the Soviet
Union would be entangled in the Cuban Missile Crisis and people in the
know would be wondering whether they live another day. By contrast, it
is not clear what would be the case if Melbourne were local. Would it be
fall, as it is in Melbourne or would it be spring, as it is locally? (Yes, I
am writing this in May in the Northern hemisphere.) There seems to be
an indeterminacy here, yet it is determinate that ‘It is fall’ is true at hw,
t, Melbournei, as long as w is the actual world and t the present time.
Thus, (10) is by no means a satisfying paraphrase for ‘sentence S is true
at context c and index hw, t, li’.
The problem gets worse if we leave English behind and consider its
extensions. Let’s say that ‘somemoney’ as a one-place sentential operator
whose semantic clause goes as follows:20
(4) If  is a sentence, then Somemoney  is true at context c and index hw, t, l, ¤i if
and only if there is a currency ¤0 legally convertible from ¤ such that  is true at c
and hw, t, l, ¤0i.
20 As I learned writing this paper, ‘¤’ is the currency symbol used when the speciﬁc
symbol of a particular currency is unavailable.
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It seems plausible that such a stipulation can bestow meaning upon
‘somemoney’. If you know that one dollar is legally convertible to .89
euros and you know that the latte you just bought in a Starbucks in Man-
hattan cost you $3.65 you can also tell (perhaps using a calculator) that
‘Somemoney, a latte in New York costs €3.25’ is true. You also know
(without knowing anything about exchange rates) that ‘Somemoney, a
latte in New York costs $3.65’ and ‘Somemoney, snow is white’ are also
true and that ‘Somemoney, a latte in New York costs £0’ and ‘Somem-
oney, snow is black’ are false. All this knowledge suggests that you have
acquired competence with this new word. Yet, it seems clear that deﬁning
propositional truth relative to currency cannot follow the blueprint. The
obvious suggestion – proposition p is true at currency ¤ just in case p
would be true if ¤ were a local currency – fails spectacularly. Plausibly,
if the Euro were a local currency in New York then the US would be a
member of the EU, yet there is nothing in clause (4) that would suggest
that ‘Somemoney, the US is a member of the EU’ is true just because the
latte you just bought in a Starbucks in Manhattan cost you $3.65. There
seems to be no hope to paraphrase the relative truth-predicate ‘sentence
S is true at context c and index hw, t, l, ¤i’ in terms of absolute truth.
To fend oﬀ these objections, defenders of monadic truth have to deny
the need for indices beyond worlds and times. They would have to ar-
gue that despite the explicit stipulation, we understand ‘somemoney’ as a
quantiﬁer over currencies. Thus, instead of trying to use (4) to interpret
‘Somemoney, a latte in New York costs €3.25’, we paraphrase this sentence
as ‘There is some currency ¤ such that the price of a latte in New York in
¤ is legally convertible to €3.25’ which we can understand perfectly well.
Our ability to provide such a paraphrase comes from understanding (4) by
analogy and from our general capacity to articulate sentences in English
which manifest this understanding. No need then to assume that indices
could include currencies. Of course, these are hefty claims about the way
we in fact purse strings containing ‘somemoney’ – that is, bold hypotheses
about human psychology.
Making psychological assumptions is enough when it comes to made-
up words, like ‘somemoney’ but to defend the simplicity of indices in light
of our proposed semantics for ‘nearby’ defenders of monadic truth will have
to descend into the trenches of linguistic semantics. They would argue that
(3) is not a correct semantic clause because ‘nearby’ is a quantiﬁer that
binds location variables. This claim raises a host of questions about loca-
tion variables. Are they base-generated or traces left behind after move-
ment? What happens to them when there is no expression like ‘nearby’ to
K + K = 120 / p. 510 / February 1, 2020
510 Zoltán Gendler Szabó
bind them? What is their semantic type? Why is there no expression that is
used to articulate them phonologically in English? Is there such an expres-
sion in other natural languages?21 These are substantive empirical ques-
tions about which there is considerable disagreement among the experts.22
Here is where we stand. I argued that semantics needs the relational
truth-predicate ‘sentence S is true at context c and index i’. If truth is fun-
damentally monadic, we should be able to analyze this predicate in terms
of monadic truth. I claimed that relativity to contexts is indeed analyzable
in this way: if we set aside controversial cases, the claim that a declarative
sentence is true at a context just in case it expresses a true proposition at
that context is quite plausible. Relativity to indices is more problematic.
If indices contain nothing more than a possible world and perhaps a time,
truth at an index can be analyzed by means of an appropriate counterfac-
tual, but such an analysis is not available for richer indices. Thus, defenders
of the idea of that truth is fundamentally monadic are forced to say that
natural languages contain no operators, except perhaps modal and tem-
poral ones. It is a mark against the traditional view that it is forced to
take a strong stand on unresolved empirical questions but I concede that
this is not a decisive argument against it. In the next section, I consider a
diﬀerent line of attack.
4. Topic sensitivity
There is an old idea, going back at least to J. L. Austin’s 1950 paper on
truth, according to which the statement one makes in uttering a sentence
is true just in case the situation the statement is about is of the type
identiﬁed by the meaning of the sentence.23 The beneﬁts of thinking along
21 For a thorough discussion of the question whether we should postulate location vari-
ables in natural languages, see chapter 3 of Recanati (2010).
22 It is sometimes suggested that we should try to avoid postulating variables in syntax,
whenever possible. This would not fully resolve the operator vs. quantiﬁer debates
but it would give the upper hand to proponents of operators. But those who are
willing to follow this methodological principle should eschew variables altogether –
after all, we do have variable-free semantic theories that fare rather well in accounting
for the truth-conditions of English sentences.
23 “A statement is said to be true when the historic state of aﬀairs to which it is corre-
lated by the demonstrative conventions (the one to which it ‘refers’) is of a type with
which the sentence used in making it is correlated by the descriptive conventions”
Austin (1950/1961, 122).
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these lines are illustrated by an example due to Jon Barwise and John
Etchemendy (with names changed slightly for ease of cognitive load):24
“We might imagine, for example, that there are two card games going on, one
across town from the other: Xavier is playing cards with Anna and Beth, and
Claire is playing cards with Dana. Suppose someone watching the former game
mistakes Anna for Claire, and claims that Claire has the three of clubs. She
would be wrong on the Austinian account, even if Claire had the three of clubs
across town.”
Let us call the bystander Yolanda and let us assume that she makes her
statement by uttering the sentence (5):
(5) Claire has the three of clubs.
Yolanda’s statement appears to be untrue. (I leave the question open
whether it is false or simply lacks a truth-value.) Now imagine that across
town Zoe is watching Claire’s game and at the same time also utters (5).
That statement is undoubtedly true. This pair of observations is the data
to account for. The Austin-inspired line is as follows: in uttering the same
sentence, Yolanda and Zoe stated the same thing (i.e., expressed and as-
sented to the very same proposition) but made diﬀerent statements (i.e.,
performed diﬀerent assertions). What they both stated was the proposi-
tion that Claire has the three of clubs. They made diﬀerent statements
because they were concerned with diﬀerent situations (call these the topic
situations) when they stated that Claire has the three of clubs. If this is the
right way to think about the case, the proposition that Claire has the three
of clubs is topic-sensitive – its truth-value depends on which situation is
the topic the speaker asserting the proposition is talking about.
The Austinian view gives up the simple assumption that we can in-
dividuate speech-acts and mental states by their contents. Yolanda and
Zoe assert and believe the same thing – the proposition that Claire has
the three of clubs. Yet Zoe’s assertion and belief is true, while Yolanda’s is
not. To say what their assertions and beliefs are besides their contents, one
must rely on their topics as well. Yolanda asserts and believes that Claire
has the three of clubs regarding the game Anna and Beth are playing, Zoe
asserts and believes that Claire has the three of clubs regarding the game
Claire and Dana are playing.
There are more conventional alternatives to the Austinian line and I
am fully aware of the fact that they are prima facie more attractive to
24 Barwise & Etchemendy (1987, 122–123).
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many. I will try to argue that these alternatives face diﬃculties that make
them in the end less appealing. But before I try to do that I’d like to make
the case that if the Austinian account of the example is correct then we
are stuck with an irreducibly dyadic propositional truth-predicate.
Recall that we can deﬁne ‘proposition p is true at possible world w’
as ‘p would be true if w were actual’. To deﬁne ‘proposition p is true at
situation s’ analogously we would need to replace ‘actual’ by an appropriate
indexical for situations. In fact, we have no such indexical in English but
we could perhaps introduce one by ﬁat. Let’s stipulate that ‘topical*’ refers
in any context to the topic situation of the context. (The star is there to
distinguish this freshly minted word from the English ‘topical’.) Then we
could try the following deﬁnition:
(6) The proposition p is true at the situation s iﬀ p would be true if s were topical*.
Does this work? It might if ‘topical*’ behaves just like ‘actual’ does within
the antecedents of subjunctive conditionals. But not all indexicals do –
‘local’ seems like a counterexample, given the fact that ‘It would be winter
here if Melbourne were local’ does not seem to be determinately true or
false. This suggests that antecedents of subjunctive conditionals cannot
shift the location against which the consequent is evaluated in the way in
which they can shift the world.
Is there a deﬁnition in English? I can think of one plausible candidate
which exploits the intuition that situations are parts of the world. The
idea is that truth at a situation is nothing more than truth at a situation-
sized world:
(7) The proposition p is true at the situation s iﬀ p would be true if s were the actual
world.
According to (7) the proposition that Claire has the three of clubs is true
at the card game between Claire and Dana because if that card game were
all there is to actuality Claire would indeed have the three of clubs. But the
proposition is not true at the card game between Anna and Beth because
if the actual world were just that card game, Claire would not have the
three of clubs (indeed she would not even exist).
While this might be acceptable in the case at hand, it fails in general.
Consider the sentence ‘I do not exist’ and imagine that Yolanda utters it
while she is talking about a card game in which she is not a participant. (7)
predicts that she is clearly speaking the truth: after all, if that card game
had been all there is to actuality Yolanda would indeed fail to exist. But
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that is counterintuitive – maybe she speaks falsely, maybe her statement is
neither true nor false, but it is surely not straightforwardly true. Could we
say that topic situations must always be big enough to contain everything
the speaker is referring to? That might explain why ‘I do not exist’ cannot
be used to make a true statement. But the explanation is not particularly
plausible – if Yolanda uttered ‘Only four people exist’ or ‘An hour ago
there was nothing’ or ‘Any two things are at most a few yards apart’ she
would not be speaking truly despite the fact that she would not be referring
to anything outside the card game.
Is there some way other than (6) or (7) to deﬁne truth at a situation
in terms of monadic truth? I cannot prove that there is not but I certainly
do not know of any. If we need to use ‘sentence S is true at context c and
situation s’ in the semantics of natural languages then I think we should
concede that we are employing a truth-predicate that we cannot deﬁne in
terms of a monadic propositional truth-predicate.
5. Against invariantism and contextualism about topic-sensitivity
The question remains whether we really need the truth-predicate ‘sentence
S is true at context c and situation s’ in the semantics of English and
other natural languages. Is the Austinian account of the statements made
by Yolanda and Zoe correct?
The example of Claire and the three of clubs has been around for a
while and it has failed to convince most semanticists that propositional
truth is relative to topic situations. There are two main lines of resistance:
the invariantist and the contextualist one. The invariantist denies the ex-
istence of topic-sensitivity, claiming that (5) has the same truth-value as
uttered by Yolanda and Zoe. The contextualist accepts topic-sensitivity
and accounts for it by claiming that Yolanda and Zoe express diﬀerent
propositions. I think there are strong reasons to reject both of these views.
The invariantist will point to the fact that while Yolanda’s claim is
infelicitous it does not seem outright false. Perhaps we ﬁnd it infelicitous
because we are told about her mistaking Anna for Claire and hypothesize
that she did not really mean what she said. (When she recognizes her
mistake, she may indeed say ‘Oh, I did not mean that – Ann has the
three of clubs.’) If this is the reason we ﬁnd Yolanda’s utterance odd, its
infelicity is independent of its truth-value. So, maybe (5) is actually true
when uttered by Yolanda.
This response can be disarmed by changing the example. Suppose that
Claire is simultaneously playing two on-line card games and she has the
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three of clubs in one but not the other. Yolanda follows the second game
on a screen and knows nothing about the ﬁrst. She does not know what
cards Claire holds but makes a bet uttering (5). It seems perfectly clear
that Yolanda loses this bet. Her bet concerns the game in which Claire
does not have the three of clubs, it is not based on any misidentiﬁcation,
and there is no plausibility to the claim that she somehow failed to say
what she meant.
Still, invariantists could insist that we should distinguish between the
proposition expressed by Yolanda’s utterance and the proposition asserted
by her. The idea would be that the job of semantics is nothing more than
to associate, based on linguistic conventions in a context-independent way,
a proposition with sentences. So, (5) expresses the proposition that Claire
has the three of clubs, even though what Yolanda meant and said was a
diﬀerent proposition, to wit, that Claire has the three of clubs in the game
she is following. This latter proposition is obtained from the proposition
expressed through a pragmatic process called enrichment.25
The trouble is that there is an element of ineliminable arbitrariness in
the semantic project thus construed, as long as we take propositional truth
to be monadic. Is the proposition that Claire has the three of clubs true or
false when Claire has the three of clubs in one on-line card game but not
the other? Many would say it’s true, on the account that she does have
the three of clubs in some ongoing game. But why not say instead that it’s
false because she does not have the three of clubs in every ongoing game?
If our semantic project is supposed to abstract away from the vagaries of
context there seems to be no good reason to prefer the ﬁrst option to the
second. The pure linguistic meaning of ‘Claire has the three of clubs’ seems
neutral on how many games she is supposed to have the three of clubs in
– the sentence does not encode existential, universal, or any other kind of
quantiﬁcation over card games. The sensible way to avoid the arbitrary
choice is to concede that the proposition that Claire has the three of clubs
is true at one game but false at the other.26 But once we come this far,
25 The debate on modulation is voluminous. For a classic attack on the idea, see Stanley
(2000; 2002); for a classic defense, see Recanati (2002; 2004).
26 One might avoid arbitrariness by pleading ignorance: the proposition that Claire has
the three of clubs is determinately true or false when she has that card in one game
but not in another, we just don’t know which. This is the sort of view advocated by
Cappelen & Lepore (2005). But if we really understand this proposition why can’t
we tell whether it is true in the simple case described? Is there some information we
are missing? The proposal has much in common with the view that vague sentences
express propositions whose truth-value we cannot know. Except that in the vagueness
case there is a story about the source of the ignorance and here there is none.
K + K = 120 / p. 515 / February 1, 2020
Dyadic truth 515
the motivation for denying that the proposition expressed by the sentence
Yolanda uttered is exactly what she said and meant evaporates.
Contextualists accept that (5) is topic-sensitive but argue that this is
so simply because it expresses diﬀerent propositions on diﬀerent occasions.
In their view, in uttering (5) Yolanda and Zoe both asserted the proposition
the sentence expresses in their respective contexts. In the context Yolanda
was in this was the proposition that Claire has the three of clubs in s,
where s is the situation Yolanda was talking about; in the context Zoe
was in, it was the proposition that Claire has the three of clubs in s’,
where s’ is the situation Zoe was talking about. Thus, the proposition Zoe
asserted is true simpliciter while the one Yolanda asserted is not. One
reason this line may appear promising is that (5) contains the deﬁnite
description ‘the three of clubs’. On the Russellian view, this is a quantiﬁer
phrase which, in a plausible semantic theory, is associated with a domain.
If you think what situation a speaker talking about ﬁxes the domain of
the description, you immediately predict that Yolanda and Zoe expressed
diﬀerent propositions.27
The semantics of deﬁnite descriptions and the pragmatics of domain
choice are complicated and philosophers of language have strong feelings
about them. I do too and I’d rather not go into this here.28 Fortunately,
we can change the example and bypass the issue. Suppose that instead of
(5) Yolanda and Zoe had uttered (8), and suppose that in the game Zoe
is observing Claire indeed has a strong hand:
(8) Claire has a strong hand.
Since the predicate is an idiom, there is no overt element in this sentence
that could be construed as a quantiﬁer in need of a domain. Of course,
there might be covert elements; contextualists have every right to hypoth-
esize that (8) expresses the proposition that Claire has strong hand in
s, where s is a contextually supplied situation. But there is no indepen-
dent motivation for this, beyond the desire to keep propositional truth
27 One should not think that topic situations always ﬁx quantiﬁcational domains. Nor-
mally when one utters a sentence like ‘The researchers monitored everyone’s sleep’
one is talking about a situation that includes some sleeping experimental subjects and
some wide-awake researchers. Yet, the statement can be true. The obvious sugges-
tion is to let context assign to ‘everyone’ a restricted domain, thus guaranteeing that
the sentence in context expresses the proposition that the researchers monitored the
sleep of every experimental subject. This proposition will then be true at a situation
s where the researchers in s monitor the sleep of every experimental subject in s.
28 See Stanley & Szabó (2000) and Szabó (2000b; 2005).
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monadic. I will discuss contextualism using (5) but if the presence of the
deﬁnite description distracts you, feel free to replace it with (8).
I was a contextualist about topic sensitivity for a long time. But then I
noticed that the view has a really bad consequence. In the original example,
the topic situation is the one Yolanda is observing – a situation involving
Anna and the particular cards she holds in her hands. Since Anna could not
be Claire, it appears that this particular situation could not be one in which
Claire has the three of clubs. In the modiﬁed example, the topic situation
is the one represented on the computer screen Yolanda is observing – a
situation involving Claire and the particular cards she has in a game.
Since none of those cards is the three of clubs, it seems that this particular
situation also could not be one in which Claire has the three of clubs. So,
in both cases, what Yolanda said cannot be true.29 But this is intuitively
wrong: in both examples, what Yolanda said was false but could have been
true. The problem with contextualism is that it construes the proposition
that Claire has the three of clubs as the position that s – the particular
situation the speaker is talking about – is such that Claire has the three
of clubs in it, and this proposition is not a contingent one.
This argument relies on a metaphysical assumption, to wit, that a
situation involving someone and some cards could not be identical to a
situation involving someone else or some other cards. This can be chal-
lenged. One might say that the situation Yolanda is talking about in the
original example is a particular card game where Anna plays but that very
card game could have been one where Claire plays instead, and that the
situation Yolanda is talking about in the modiﬁed example is a particular
card game where Claire does not have the three of clubs but that very card
game could have been one where she does. Maybe so. But no matter who
the players are and what cards they hold, these situations would still be
card games. Thus, if Yolanda utters ‘A card game is going on’ concerning
either of the situations, she speaks the truth. And if the proposition she
asserts in uttering this sentence is that a card game is going on in s, where
s is the topic situation in the context of utterance, then what she asserted
would be necessarily true. And this is still deeply counterintuitive.
Contextualists could avoid the troubling modal commitments by go-
ing descriptivist about the topic situation. Thus, they could say that the
29 It is no good to insist that in some epistemic sense Ann could be Claire, and a
card that isn’t in fact the three of clubs could be the three of clubs. This is true,
and consequently it is also true that what Yolanda asserted could be true is some
epistemic sense. It is still predicted to be metaphysically necessary, which is bad
enough.
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proposition Yolanda expresses is not the proposition that Claire has the
three of clubs in s, where s is just a variable whose value is the particular
game she is observing but rather the proposition that Claire has the three
of clubs in d, where d is a deﬁnite description picking out the situation she
is observing. Then, assuming the description is well chosen, there will be
possible worlds where d picks out a diﬀerent situation or no situation at
all, and the contingency of the proposition expressed is secure.
But I do not think this approach can capture the relevant intuitions.
Consider some suggestions about what the missing description might be.
It could be something like ‘the game I am observing’ or ‘the game going
on at that table’. Is the proposition Yolanda expressed contingent because
she could have been observing a diﬀerent game, or because the game she
is talking about could have been going on at a diﬀerent table? Hardly. The
intuition is that her statement is de re – its topic is a particular situation,
the one she is attending to, not some situation or other that ﬁts the way
in which she might describe this situation. The puzzle is how it can be
still contingently false, given that it characterizes that situation as being a
way it could not be. The Austinian view solves the problem by separating
topic from content: Yolanda’s statement is de re but the content of this
statement is contingent (true at some situations but not of others).
I accept the Austinian account of our key example. And while this is
just a single example, I also believe it is fairly clear that topic-relativity is
a general phenomenon. Usually when someone makes an assertion we can
ask them to identify the situation they are talking about.30 When such
a request sounds most unreasonable (e.g., when someone utters ‘Snow is
white’ or ‘Unicorns do not exist’ or ‘There is no largest prime’) it can
still be answered by saying that the topic of one’s assertion is the whole
world. In claiming that propositional truth is dyadic, we avoid the prob-
lems invariantists and contextualists are stuck with. Unlike invariantists
we are not forced to make an arbitrary choice about the truth-value of cer-
tain propositions, and unlike contextualists we do not have to deny their
contingency.
Accepting topic-sensitivity for propositions is not a semantic theory;
it’s just a constraint of how semantic theories should be constructed. The
particular way topic-sensitivity is usually built into semantic theories by
those who believe in it is contrary to my own view. Situation semantics,
motivated in part by the very example I cited, distinguishes two levels
30 Of course, uttering ‘What situation are you talking about?’ may not be the best way
to ask this question. We can think of follow-up questions involving ‘where’ or ‘when’
or ‘which’ as aiming at specifying the topic situation.
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of content for a sentence in context: the infon (roughly, what I called
the proposition the sentence expresses in the context) and the Austinian
proposition (something that comprises both the infon and the topic situ-
ation of the context).31 The Austinian proposition is supposed to be true
simpliciter just in case its infon is true relative to its topic situation. How-
ever, it does not seem like semantics is in need of two diﬀerent entities
playing the role of content for each declarative sentence. Once you have
the infon, you have everything you need for explaining truth-conditions.
Austinian propositions have nothing to do except to ensure that there is
some content that can be true or false simpliciter.
But do not we have content that is true or false simpliciter anyway?
Let p be the proposition that Claire has the three of clubs and let s be the
situation across town including Claire holding the three of clubs. Then p
is true at s. There is also the proposition p’ that p is true at s. Isn’t p’ a
proposition that is true simpliciter? I don’t think so. Unlike p, which is
true at some situations and false at others, p’ is true at all situations (or
at least, it is not false at any). The diﬀerence between p and p’ is that the
former is contingent and the latter is not, but this does not aﬀect the fact
that their truth is equally relative to situations. There is, of course, Zoe’s
assertion and the belief she expresses when she utters ‘Claire has the three
of clubs’ talking about s, and these are indeed both true simpliciter. But
these are representations, not contents of any sort. Representations can
be true simpliciter, provided their contents are true at the situation they
are about.
A common objection against the sort of view I recommend is that it
fails to respect the intuition propositions must be complete. The charge
is that whenever we ﬁnd ourselves lured into thinking that a proposition
is true relative to something or other, that’s a clear sign that we are not
really thinking of a proposition, only a propositional function.32 But what
is the relevant notion of completeness? We do have intuitions about certain
sentences being syntactically incomplete: ‘Claire does too’ is a well-formed
sentence, but without knowing the antecedent of ‘too’ we perhaps cannot
know which sentence it is. We also have intuitions about certain sentences
being semantically incomplete: ‘Claire is ready’ is a meaningful sentence,
but without knowing what Claire is ready for we perhaps cannot know what
31 See Barwise & Etchemendy (1987) and Barwise (1989).
32 Recanati (2008) advocates a version of standard situation semantics against the view
I defend (which he labels “radical relativism”) on the basis of this objection.
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it means. These intuitions can be criticized but I think we are better oﬀ
respecting them.33 However, ‘Claire has the three of clubs’ and ‘Claire has a
strong hand’ appear to be complete in both of these senses. The complaint
that this sentence fails to express a complete proposition bottoms out in
the observation that without knowing which of the simultaneous games we
are talking about we cannot know whether it is true simpliciter.34 Since I
do not think they are true simpliciter, this does not move me.
Let me summarize the main argument of the paper. In this section,
I have argued that declarative sentences are topic-sensitive and semantic
theory should employ a relativized truth-predicate ‘sentence S is true at
context c and index i’, where i includes a topic situation. In the two sections
before this one, I argued that while this predicate can be analyzed as
‘sentence S expresses at context c a proposition that is true at index i’,
if index i includes a situation this cannot be further analyzed in terms of
monadic propositional truth. The conclusion is that unless our semantics
is on the wrong path, we have reason to think that truth is not a property
of propositions but a relation they bear to situations and to whatever
else is included in the indices. In the next section, I will argue that indices
needn’t contain anything other than situations. This rounds up the case for
my central claim: that truth is a relation between positions and situations.
6. Worlds, times, events, and propositions
I favor a conservative way of building topic sensitivity into the semantics:
simply replace possible worlds with possible situations in giving truth-con-
ditions for logically simple declarative sentences. This is a minimal change
as far as the basic structure of the theory is concerned. There are dif-
33 Chapter 5 of Cappelen & Lepore (2005) contain skeptical arguments against appeals
to incompleteness.
34 The classic place for voicing such concerns is Evans (1985). Evans argues against
temporally neutral propositions and points out that assertions made in uttering a
tensed sentence “would not admit of stable evaluation as correct or incorrect” (349).
To my mind, this conﬂates two senses of ‘assertion’. What one asserts in uttering
‘Socrates is sitting’ can be true at one situation yesterday and false at another today,
so they can indeed not be evaluated tout court. But the act of assertion (or the
particular belief expressed when that act is performed) which is about a particular
situation is true or false simpliciter depending on whether that situation is one where
Socrates is sitting or one where this isn’t the case.
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ferent ways to expand such a semantics to logically complex declarative
sentences.35
What are situations? I will not be able to give a particularly informa-
tive answer, for I think situation is a basic ontological category. What I
can do is argue that our understanding of ‘situation’ is no worse than our
understanding of ‘object’.
The technical term ‘object’ designates all the paradigm objects (tables,
chairs, coﬀee cups), things people would occasionally call objects (moun-
tains, animals, people), and then also some things people would never call
objects (clusters of galaxies, centuries of time, theorems of mathematics). It
is doubtful that these things share some language-independent character-
istic. We can say, following Frege, that objects are the things we designate
with singular deﬁnite descriptions. And since singular deﬁnite descriptions
are built from count nouns (possibly modiﬁed by adjectives and relative
clauses) we can say that objects are the things to which count nouns apply.
Situations can be topics, that is, they are the sorts of things that
comprise what we are talking about. Claire’s playing a game of poker is a
paradigm situation, Claire’s betting $5 in a poker game is something people
would occasionally call a situation, and Claire’s cheating in her Thursday
evening poker games over the course of a decade would probably never be
called a situation. Yet, I want to use the word ‘situation’ in such a broad
way as to cover all these and much else. The possessive constructions I
listed are usually treated in semantics as singular deﬁnite descriptions built
around a gerund, so if they designate anything, they designate objects (in
the broad Fregean sense). I suggest that situations are the things to which
gerunds apply.
It’s tempting to think of situations as parts of the world. We can do
that, as long as we do not think of parthood in a spatial way. Suppose
you and I are playing two simultaneous games of chess in our heads (just
assume we are that good). It would be very hard to maintain that the two
games occupy separate regions of space. Yet, they are distinct situations:
it could easily be that with regard to one it is true that white can win in
three moves but with regard to the other it isn’t. If we are willing to count
both of these chess games as parts of the actual world, we are appealing
to a notion of parthood according to which the mereological sum of all
situations is nothing more or less than the world as it is right now.
35 Fine (2017) distinguishes three diﬀerent approaches, which he calls loose, inexact,
and exact. These approaches agree on the basic semantic apparatus but disagree on
the interpretation of Boolean connectives and quantiﬁers.
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If you are a presentist, you think the world as it is right now is the
world. If you believe in the past and the future as well, you could say that
the world as it is right now is simply the present time. The world as it was
ﬁve minutes ago is a past time, the world as it will be a year from now
is a future time. The world itself is then the sum of all past, present, and
future times, which are all sums of past, present, and future situations.
If you believe that besides the actual world there are also merely possible
worlds, you can think of those too as sums of possible situations. Obviously,
if we have merely past, merely future, and merely possible situations and
appropriate ways of restricting mereological summation, we have all the
worlds and times we need for interpreting modal and temporal operators.
Believing in possible worlds is not the same thing as having a particu-
lar take on their nature. Some (actually, very few) think they are concrete
particulars on a par with the universe, some think they are properties
the universe is apt to instantiate, some think they are states the universe
might be in, some think they are pictorial or linguistic representations of
the universe, and I am sure there are other options as well. All of these
views can be extended with an appropriate mereology and thus accom-
modate situations. I argued that to adequately account for what we think
and say, semantics should countenance situations; I did not say semantics
needs to take a ﬁrm stance on their nature.
Situation is a broad enough ontological category to model all the other
parameters relativists have proposed. Suppose you are convinced that the
proposition that roller coasters are fun is true relative to some standards
of taste but not others – you can then say that this proposition is true
at situations where certain standards of states are at play and false where
others are. (What it is for a standard of taste to be at play is a meta-
semantic question, not a question for semantics.) Suppose you think that
the proposition that the butler might have killed the duchess is true relative
to some information but not relative to other – you can say that this
proposition is true at situations where that information is available and
false where it is not. (What it is for information to be available is, again, a
meta-semantic question.) And if you think genuine relativism requires not
only the relativity of propositional truth, but relativity of propositional
truth to contexts of assessment, all you need to do is to employ in your
semantics two contexts – one for utterance and the other for assessment
– and let target situations be determined by the latter, not the former.
Whether any of this is needed to account for our thought and talk is a
substantive question much debated in the literature. Here I take no stand
on these. What I claim is that debates about various forms of relativism
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could be seen as debates about what sorts of topic situations there are and
how they are to be determined in a conversation.
Situations are also what semanticists following Davidson have been
calling events. Originally, Davidson suggested that action verbs have an
extra event-argument, that adjuncts are predicates of events, and that
action sentences contain an existential quantiﬁer to bind event variables.
Ignoring tense and bracketing the semantics of plural deﬁnite descriptions,
Davidson assigned (90) as logical form to (9), where the variable was sup-
posed to range over events.36
(9) Claire slowly dealt the cards to Dana.
(90) 9e:deal(e;Claire; the cards) ^ slow(e) ^ to(e;Dana)
This analysis can account for the validity of an inference form (9) to ‘Claire
dealt the cards to Dana’ or to ‘Claire slowly dealt the cards’ (as instances
of conjunction elimination within the scope of an existential quantiﬁer)
without incorrectly predicting that the inference from the conjunction of
these sentences to (9) is valid. What Davidson’s proposal does not predict
is the validity of the inference from (9) to ‘Claire dealt slowly’, to ‘Claire
dealt to Dana’, to ‘Claire dealt the cards’, and to ‘Claire dealt’. To ﬁx
this problem, followers of Davidson suggested treating all the arguments
of the verb – with the exception of the event argument – the way adjuncts
are normally treated. This can be done if we assume that verbs assign
thematic roles to their arguments and if we interpret thematic roles as
binary relations between the event the verb describes and the object picked
out the by argument. (Ag stands for the relation between an agent and an
event, Th for the relation between a theme and an event.)
(900) 9e:deal(e) ^ Ag(e;Claire) ^ Th(e; the cards) ^ slow(e) ^ to(e;Dana)
The pattern of inference Davidson sought to account for is quite general –
it certainly extends beyond action sentences. But even if ‘Claire lived com-
fortably in Maine’ entails both ‘Claire lived comfortably’ and ‘Claire lived
in Maine’ without being entailed by their conjunction, it still sounds odd
to suggest that these sentences quantify over events. What they quantify
over are states or processes. Semanticists often call all such entities events
while acknowledging that this is an extended use of the term. Events in
this technical sense are the sorts of things gerunds apply to – in other
words, just the sorts of things I called situations.
36 Davidson (1967).
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Proponents of event-semantics are usually not fans of propositions.
Since I am, I would like to raise the question how we should think of the
proposition expressed by (9) in light of its proposed logical form (900). A
natural response would be that it is something like the proposition that
there is a slow dealing of the cards by Claire to Dana. But this leads to
trouble. Suppose Claire dealt multiple times to Dana, sometimes slowly,
sometimes not. Suppose (9) is uttered talking about a situation s in which
Claire’s dealing was not slow. We would like to say that the proposition
expressed by (9) is false (or, at least, not true) at s. But it’s hard to see
why it would be untrue at s that there is some slow dealing of the cards
by Claire to Dana, as long as we do not require that this be s itself. So,
we should ditch the existential quantiﬁer and bind the situation variable
by a lambda abstractor.37
(9000) s:deal(s) ^ Ag(s;Claire) ^ Th(s; the cards) ^ slow(s) ^ to(s;Dana)
If declarative sentences are predicates of events, events are situations, and
declarative sentences express propositions, then propositions are proper-
ties of situations. Truth-at thus turns out to be truth-of: when an act of
assertion or a state of belief is true simpliciter that is because the proposi-
tion it expresses is truly predicated of the situation the assertion or belief
is about.
The inferences that motivated the Davidsonean semantics can still be
accounted for, assuming we employ a conception of validity that is apt for
dyadic truth. Let’s say that an inference is valid iﬀ whenever each premise
is true of some situation the conclusion is also true of that situation. Then,
the inference from ‘Claire slowly dealt the cards to Dana’ to ‘Claire dealt
the cards to Dana’ and ‘Claire slowly dealt the cards’ is valid – if a situation
is a slow dealing of the cards by Claire to Dana then it is also a dealing of
the cards by Claire to Dana and a slow dealing of the cards by Claire. But
the inference from ‘Claire dealt the cards to Dana’ and ‘Claire slowly dealt
the cards’ to ‘Claire slowly dealt the cards to Dana’ is not valid – there
could be a situation where Claire dealt the cards to Dana and another
where she slowly dealt the cards without there being a situation where she
slowly dealt the cards to Dana.
37 Similar logical forms are quite standard in semantics since Berman (1987) and Kratzer
(1989), although typically they involve extra complexity. For a fairly detailed com-
positional semantics, see Elbourne (2005). I stress that the ontological assumptions
these authors embrace as well as many of the semantic details are negotiable.
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To say that propositions are properties may sound like a category-
mistake – I propose to think of it as a substantive analysis. Lewis initially
characterized propositions as properties of possible worlds, but in light of
de se attitude ascriptions he ultimately settled with the broader view, ac-
cording to which they are properties of possible objects.38 Since situations
are objects, this proposal is in the same ballpark as my own view. Lewis
was also committed to another reductive analysis: the claim that proper-
ties are just sets. I say no such thing. I hold open the possibility that to
provide an adequate account of mental state and speech act ascriptions we
must ultimately individuate properties of situations more ﬁnely than the
set of their possible instances.
One might complain that it is unnatural to assign the same kind of
semantic value to full sentences and bare verbs, adverbs or prepositional
phrases. In my view these are all propositions. How could ‘deal’ and ‘Claire
dealt the cards to Dana’ have the same kind of meaning? There are two
reasons one may feel this to be unnatural; to my mind, neither is par-
ticularly persuasive. One reason for insisting on a special semantic value
for sentences is their connection with illocutionary force. It is sometimes
suggested that we cannot make assertions uttering sub-sentential expres-
sions. But, apparently, we can: we can hold up a letter and utter ‘From
Spain’ thereby asserting that the letter is from Spain.39 The other reason
for wanting a special semantic value for sentences is their particular pat-
tern of syntactic distribution. Sentences can certainly not be substituted
salva beneformatione for mere verbs and verb phrases. Still, we do assign
the same type of semantic value to lots of expressions whose syntactic dis-
tribution is wildly diﬀerent: the complements of ‘believe’ and ‘want’ are
supposed by nearly everyone to be both propositions, yet most comple-
ments of one cannot be substituted for complements of the other. In the
end, what is special about sentences is that they are syntactically complete
– they contain a verb and all the obligatory thematic arguments lexically
associated with expressions within them are saturated. It is not clear that
syntactic completeness is a mark of a distinctive kind of meaning.
38 Lewis (1979).
39 For detailed arguments, see Stainton (2006).
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7. Closing
In a recent article, Scott Soames presented the following argument in favor
of the thesis that fundamental truth is monadic:40
“For a sentence S (which is used to make assertions and express beliefs) to have
a meaning, or semantic content, is for S to express a proposition that represents
something as being some way or other. In virtue of this, we speak derivatively
of S representing things. ‘Snow is white’ represents snow as white, while ‘The
U.S. President is male’ represents the property being U.S. President as uniquely
instantiated, and being male as instantiated by whatever instantiates being U.S.
President. A meaningful sentence of this sort represents the universe (or parts
of it) as being a certain way (or ways). Its truth conditions follow from this; if
S (simply) represents A as being B (and nothing else), then S is true iﬀ A is B.
We have no idea what it is to be representational, and hence meaningful, apart
from having such (monadic) truth conditions.”
I agree that for a meaningful sentence to represent, it must represent some-
thing as being a certain way, and that if S (simply) represents A as being
B (and nothing else), then S is true iﬀ A is B. What I disagree with is the
way Soames identiﬁes the A and B in the particular cases he mentions.
‘Snow is white’ does not represent snow as being white – it represents, in
use, a situation (perhaps as large as the whole world) as being one where
snow is white. And ‘The U.S. President is male’ does not represent a prop-
erty as being instantiated in any way – it represents, in use, a situation as
being one where the U.S. president is male.
The central point of contention is, I think, the one Soames touches
upon at the very beginning of the argument. He says propositions rep-
resent things as being some way. I say propositions are ways things can
be represented as being. Fundamental representations – the things that
represent and without which nothing would represent – are mental states.
Some of these have propositional content. The ones that do represent not
only in virtue of having that content, but also in virtue of predicating that
content of situations they are about. As Austin put it: “It takes two to
make truth”.41
40 Soames (2010, 125).
41 Austin (1950/1961, 124, n. 1).
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ABSTRACT
The significance of namespaces is becomingmore andmore recognized
with the spread of the world of networks and digital culture. Global, na-
tional and local namespaces are being built around the world. Before
clarifying what the concept of namespacemeans (and what it does not),
I will present some special namespaces in order to show how they work
and what their function is. After that, I will interpret the concept of
namespace and then briefly examine the practical implications of the
theoretical findings.
1. File names and the namespace
Perhaps the simplest but surely the most commonly used namespace is
the computer ﬁle system, whose only task is to ensure that each ﬁle has a
unique name on the computer. It depends on the operating system what
rules can be used to create names, but this is a secondary issue as far as
the functioning of the namespace is concerned. However, the creation of
unique names is facilitated by the possibility to build names from compo-
nents. Files can be collected into groups (folders, directories), folders can
be embedded into each other, and the complete (unique) ﬁle name can
be obtained by concatenating the (short) name of the ﬁle and the names
of the folders containing the ﬁle. This is a hierarchical method of name-
identiﬁcation, with all the advantages and disadvantages of hierarchical
control. From a linguistic point of view, hierarchical organization means
that names can be interpreted as compositions of distinct name elements,
so a name can be used more than once as a name element when composing
a speciﬁc ﬁle name. This is made possible by the fact that ﬁle names are
compound names, i.e. the full and complete (thus unique) ﬁle names con-
tain at least as many name components as the number of folders the ﬁle
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itself is embedded in, starting from the root of the ﬁle system. However,
these name elements do not have to be unique in themselves, they can be
duplicated.
With the requirement that each ﬁle should have a name and this name
should be unique, it can be ensured that each ﬁle is identiﬁed unambigu-
ously, and always found on the computer. This expectation is compatible
with a ﬁle having multiple names in the ﬁle system, since if the uniqueness
of names is guaranteed and all names are linked to ﬁles, then all ﬁles can
be found on the basis of the names. (It would not be true the other way
round, but it seems to be pointless to ﬁnd a name starting from a ﬁle.) In
linguistic terms, we can say that if two names belong to the same thing
(here: ﬁle), synonymy is allowed in the namespace, but if a name can only
belong to one thing (ﬁle), homonymy is not allowed.
It is also important to note that the ﬁle system as a namespace is
local in the sense that there is at least one ﬁle system on each computer,
so there are at least as many namespaces as computers. Of course, these
local namespaces can be combined (by connecting them to a network) and
therefore larger namespaces can be created. Their uniqueness is easy to
maintain if the machines connected have unique identiﬁers. With respect to
a ﬁle system, it is easy to answer the following question (which is important
for each namespace): Who can manage (create, delete, change) the names?
To simplify things a little, the answer is that it is the owner (user) of the
computer.
2. Domain names and the namespace
Similarly to the case of the ﬁle system, the expectation for the uniqueness
of names and for the accessibility of the computer resources denoted by
names arises with respect to the domain names of the World Wide Web,
too. The system of domain names is a namespace as well. Both the do-
main names on the web and the hierarchically structured set of web page
addresses can be regarded namespaces (the latter containing the former).
What is the main function of domain names? To mark the common roots
of web page addresses (facebook.com, microsoft.com, mit.edu) with char-
acter series that can be unambiguously identiﬁed and easily memorized
by humans. There are rules for creating domain names (concerning what
characters can and cannot be used as name elements, or stating the fact
that separators have to be used among the name elements, etc.) and there
is a basic expectation for the whole set of domain names: each name must
be unique. This can be achieved by distributing the task of registering
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domain names among speciﬁc institutions, which are expected to comply
with the principle of unique name distribution in the namespace of their re-
sponsibility. This naming system is based on hierarchical organization, too.
Maintaining the domain namespace is necessary in the ﬁrst place so
that, in the case of a new naming request, it would be possible to know
whether the required domain name exists in the namespace. If it is a name
already present in the namespace, it cannot be registered. If the required
name is not yet in the namespace, it can be registered (provided it com-
plies with the naming rules). What does this registration mean? It entails
establishing a connection between domain names and the owners of do-
main names. The other important function of the domain namespace is to
create a clear link between domain names and IP addresses that belong to
computers.
Domain namespace is thus a hierarchical registry of unique names and
the dynamic connections between names and owners on the one hand and
names and physical addresses on the other. The uniqueness of the domain
names ensures the unambiguous identiﬁcation of their IP addresses and
the registration provides the right of use of the domain name for its owner.
As the main function of the domain namespace is the clear identiﬁcation
of all communication nodes on the web, it is obvious that this is a global
namespace. This namespace allows synonymy but forbids homonymy, and
uses the technique of creating composite names, since domain names can
be divided into components, and the same name elements may be reused
in other domain names as well.
3. Person names and the namespace
After the two examples from the world of technology, let us look at why
and how person names are used and how to build namespaces for person
names. In a family, the use of diﬀerent ﬁrst names obviously has the same
meaning as in the two examples above: by using unique names, we create
the possibility of referring unambiguously to the entities denoted by the
names, the children within the family. For a family, it is enough to choose
names from a collection of a few thousand ﬁrst names that have become
acceptable in the course of time, but beyond family communities, such a
quantity of names is clearly unsuitable for the identiﬁcation of every child.
From this point of view, the formation of compound names where the full
name of the person consists of the concatenation of a family name and
a ﬁrst name can be a bit of help, but we know that this solution cannot
ensure that everyone has a unique name. With the help of composite person
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names, we can only identify people clearly if we determine the domain of
people, in other words, we create a naming context with a precise boundary.
What does this mean? In narrow contexts (family, small community, clan,
village) there could be hope that all people can be identiﬁed with the
help of family names and ﬁrst names, but in a wider context this hope
is eliminated because homonymy will become more and more common.1
The name John Smith is no longer able to identify a person unam-
biguously if there are several families in the village called Smith that have
given the ﬁrst name John to one of their sons. This example highlights the
importance of the naming context. Within the family as a naming context,
the good functioning of the namespace can be guaranteed; everyone can
have a unique name. If this context is expanded, the homonymy-free state
can still be maintained for a while, but expansion can reach a limit where
it cannot be assured that one particular name denotes only one person.
At this point, the namespace becomes useless or, more precisely, partially
useless, as it may have some segments that can still function well, but the
functionality of the namespace can only be restored if the scope of the
naming context is narrowed to the required size.
The example of the person namespace indicates that names in them-
selves are not able to identify the entities denoted, only with the use of the
context and the names together can we hope for the successful operation
of namespaces.
4. The components of the namespace
The next important question is what the components of namespaces are.
It is obvious that whatever one means by namespaces, names are always
among their elements. On its narrowest possible interpretation, a name-
space could be deﬁned as a simple collection or a list of names, where the
type of objects they denote is also speciﬁed. According to this approach,
a namespace is a unique list of names that can be used for some purpose.
This means that in a geographical namespace the name Old Hill could only
appear once, and the only thing we could say about it is that it possibly
points to one or more geographical locations. Similarly, a family namespace
interpreted in the narrowest sense could only be expected to include all
possible family names in a manner that every name only occurs once. Such
1 Synonymy does not cause any problems here, either. One person may have several
names; if they are unique, each of them may be suitable for identifying the given
person.
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a namespace must be disjoint and exhausted simultaneously (Bittner et al.
2004). Disjointness ensures the uniqueness of the names, and exhausted-
ness guarantees that all possible usable names are included. A namespace
deﬁned so narrowly could be used to control the process of selecting names
in a data system by requiring that at certain input points only elements of
a given namespace (family namespace) can be chosen. Such a namespace,
however, would not have too many practical beneﬁts, it would not help
to reach the goal of uniquely identifying the set of things to be described
with namespace elements. For such a purpose, a namespace like the one
above would only be suitable if the number of names were larger than that
of the things to be denoted, or if the names could be reused with the help
of a hierarchical name composing technique. For people, organizations, ge-
ographical locations and many other things that could not be guaranteed,
so in such contexts no homonymy-free state can be achieved.
Returning to the question of what the additional elements of the name-
space can be, the answer must take into account the purpose for which the
namespaces are used. If we want to use namespace elements to identify
things of a certain type, then we have to include in the namespace the
entities that the names refer to. These can be called name holders. In aﬁle
system ﬁles are the name holders that can be identiﬁed by ﬁle names, and in
a domain name system IP addresses (and content packages packed there)
are the name holders that can be identiﬁed by domain names. A name
holder may be a person who can be referred to with one or more names
but name holders may be organizations or geographical locations, too.
If namespaces contain not only names but also name holders, they
must include something else, too: the relations between names and name
holders. In fact, managing these relations is the real sense of the use of
namespaces.
5. The definition of the namespace
Namespaces can be deﬁned on the basis of the quality of the system of
relations between names and name holders (dynamically changing in space
and time): a namespace is a function that returns one and only one name
holder for each possible naming. This deﬁnition seems simple, but the
question is how a namespace deﬁned in the manner above can be used in
practice.
In the case of person namespaces it has already turned out that the
names themselves are not capable of unambiguously identifying people
(name holders): several people may be named John Smith. The question
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is how the namespace can operate as a function under these conditions. In
order to be able to proceed, the concepts we have used so far need to be be
clariﬁed further. The ﬁrst clariﬁcation can already be seen in the deﬁnition
of the namespace above, which does not contain the term possible name
but possible naming. What is the diﬀerence between these two terms and
why is it necessary to introduce the new category (naming)?
It is true for all of the namespaces referred to so far (even if in some
cases it may be surprising) that the names that appear as elements of
namespaces can be interpreted as proper names. For person names, names
of geographical locations, organisations this is self-explanatory, it is easy
to see and accept it for domain names as well, but in the case of ﬁle
systems this qualiﬁcation may be surprising for the ﬁrst time. But it is
true. File names play the same role for ﬁles as person names do for people
or names of geographical locations do for geographical locations. They refer
to a speciﬁc existing entity (ﬁle, person, geographical location) in order to
distinguish this particular thing from the other similar, speciﬁc things (the
given ﬁle from the other ﬁles, the given person from the other people, etc.).
When using names for this purpose, we use special names: proper names.
A unique feature of proper names, which diﬀerentiates them from
common names, is that proper names are rigid designators (Kripke 1980).
Philosophers are in dispute about whether proper names have a meaning
but there is a consensus among them concerning the fact that with a
proper name we refer to a single individual, and this reference is rigid in
the sense that under all possible conditions (in all possible worlds) the
reference remains permanent between the proper name and the individual
referred to. This is not the case with common names, where the scope and
extension of names may change in diﬀerent conditions (in diﬀerent possible
worlds). However, the question arises as to how names (especially proper
names) can fulﬁl their function if they are very diﬀerent from the denoted
entities in an important philosophical quality. What are we talking about?
When talking about name holders and names that we use for identiﬁ-
cation, we always talk about speciﬁc individuals (people, group of people,
institutions, geographical locations places, books, IP addresses, etc.) that
can be placed in some kind of category. Their existence, concreteness and
uniqueness cannot be disputed: they are all unique in the sense that they
can be always localized in space and time.2 However, when we refer to these
2 A deﬁning quality of individuals is that they are always connected to space and time.
In the case of an individual we must always be able to determine (in principle) where
he/she “is located” in space and time. A building, a mountain, a person, a book, a
video cassette, a CD can always be clearly localized in spatial and temporal dimen-
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individual name holders with the help of their names registered in a given
namespace, we can face a serious problem because of the time-and-space-
independent quality of the names. Names can exist in more than one place
at the same time. As far as a person is concerned, we can tell a exactly
where he/she is at a given time, but we cannot say that “his/her name is
here now”. This is exactly the source of the phenomenon of homonymy.
When we want to identify a person with a name, we might face the same
problem: the same name can be assigned to several people. The big ques-
tion is then the following: how can namespaces be used for identiﬁcation
if proper names themselves are not suitable for that purpose?
6. Unambiguous names
We can ask the question a little bit diﬀerently: how can (proper) names be
made unique in such a way that they become ﬁt for identifying individual
name holders? The solution might be that for the identiﬁcation we use
namings (naming events or naming states) and not proper names. This
solution can be traced back to Kripke’s interpretation of proper names
(Kripke 1980). According to Kripke, a reference of a proper name can be
determined not by any description associated with it but by the naming
events associated with the name in a historical chain:
“[…] when I pronounce the name ‘Ernő Rubik’, its reference is the person who is
determined by the historical chain (or rather web) of the use of names associated
with my utterance. At the beginning of the chain there is the introductory use
of the name, which is followed by the forwarding (repeating) use of the name,
by which the name ultimately came to me.” (Zvolenszky 2015)
Giving and using a proper name means creating and maintaining a rigid
designator in the practice of a naming community. The new elements here
are the concepts of naming and of naming practice. By means of “pointing”
and naming gestures in a community’s practice, a name gets attached to
sions. Geographical entities are to be determined in the ﬁrst place by specifying where
their components are located in a geographical area at a given time. In principle, we
could identify any person by specifying the segment of the space at a particular time
where he/ she is, but this would not be economical in terms of its informational needs,
since we should know about each and every one their temporal and spatial locations
at all times. It is more practical to identify remarkable events from people’s lives and
to link them to space and time coordinates. Such a notable event is the birth and
death of a person, which we can “catch” with the space and time coordinates of the
two events.
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a name holder and this maintains a permanent relation between the name
and the entity referred to through a coherent network of naming events.
It is not the (proper) name itself that identiﬁes but the naming practice
of the naming community, the naming chain, which in turn means a chain
of unique events. This is important because individual name holders can
be identiﬁed through individual naming events. This will eliminate the
philosophical diﬀerence between names and name holders, since a naming
as event and a name holder are both individual entities. Of course, the same
proper name can be applied to diﬀerent name holders through diﬀerent
naming events, simultaneously or at diﬀerent times. This interpretation
can thus handle the phenomenon of homonymy that we mentioned earlier.
Naming is not merely a one-shot action but a continuous naming sequence
(or just a naming state). This solution is able to ensure the identiﬁcation
of speciﬁc names because a naming (as an event or state) can already be
tied to space and time coordinates. This spatial and temporal localization
of the naming event can be interpreted as a way of creating the context
for the given proper name that allows the latter to become appropriate for
unique identiﬁcation.
We have not yet mentioned the fact, but need to do it now, that
names and naming events can belong to diﬀerent types, so we can typify
both names and naming events. As to person names, we can talk about
nicknames or pseudonyms, oﬃcial names, birth names, pen names, etc.
These may all relate to diﬀerent naming practices and communities, and
of course it may be the case that several name using communities have
the same name for someone. Viewing the naming practice as a context
can also handle the phenomenon of two names being identical in two nam-
ing practices but still belonging to diﬀerent name types within the two
contexts.
After this long introduction, let us turn to the question of what follows
from the theoretical considerations for the concrete practice of building
namespaces. They have several important consequences.
Due to the fact that the namespace has two equally important com-
ponents, the name and the name holder (the one that refers and the one
referred to), both components must be handled in the namespace. In prac-
tice, this means that both name holders and names must be identiﬁed in
some way, and (probably most importantly) there exists a third compo-
nent, the relationship between them, and it should also be included in the
namespace. The reason why this is important is because the phenomenon of
synonymy is very common in the case of all types of proper names (person
names, company names, geographical names, etc.), that is, a name holder
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may easily have several proper names. This should be treated as follows:
ﬁrst, we identify the name holder and all the names associated with it in
themselves, and, second, we record all the naming events as many times
as the naming event (praxis) occurs in the case of the given name holder.
Below we show why this is necessary.
It is enough to clearly identify the naming event as a context, there is
no need for a deeper analysis. In a person name space, by connectingthe
unique identiﬁer of the name holder (personid) and the unique identiﬁer of
the associated name (nameid) in a manner that identiﬁes the type of the
connection as well we can capture the naming context itself. Let us look
at the example of Biatorbágy (a Hungarian settlement). The independent
villages Bia and Torbágy were united in 1950 and the name of the new
settlement between 1950 and 1958 was Biatorbágy. In 1958 the two villages
separated from each other again and oﬃcially got back the names Bia and
Torbágy. Finally, they were reunited in 1966, and from then on the town is
named Biatorbágy again. The two formerly autonomous settlements, Bia
and Torbágy, were oﬃcially named by their original names twice, and the
name of the united settlement was Biatorbágy in two periods. We thus
have three names but six naming events (name usage practices). At the
level of names, the names of Bia, Torbágy, and Biatorbágy have existed
since their creation, they never ceased to exist, but at the level of naming
events or naming practices they did not always exist. This example also
shows that when we connect a name and a name holder in a naming event,
it could happen that we build the same link between the same name and
the same name holder in diﬀerent times, but these connections can be
instantiated and identiﬁed by diﬀerent naming events.
Naturally, it is the names that are of primary importance for people and
for them the multiple uses of the names (as it was shown in the case of
Bia, Torbágy, Biatorbágy) do not need to be separated, but for a pre-
cise, machine based and scientiﬁc processing, these diﬀerences need to be
handled.
In namespaces, we associate proper names with name holders through
naming events. So far we have talked about namespaces as having only
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proper names. After analyzing issues related to the management of proper
names, we should also look at the issue of common names. There are
language systems that contain common names and it can be useful to
clarify their relation to namespaces.
We have already distinguished between the narrower and broader in-
terpretations of namespaces. In the narrower sense, by the concept of name-
space we mean a unique list of proper names, which can be used in the
namespaces deﬁned in the broader sense. We can also compile such col-
lections from common names in order to characterize a certain domain of
knowledge by giving the list of valid, useable common nouns (concepts)
and the relations between these names (concepts). The latter is, however,
a diﬀerent kind of task and possibly yields diﬀerent results. While proper
names can only be organized in a semantically ﬂat structure, common
names can be formed into a semantically rich and complex structure. Such
a structure of concepts can be used to represent our knowledge about
the world.
7. Name structures - Knowledge Management Systems
A structured collection of names, i.e. a set of names and a set of relations
deﬁned on them is called a mathematical structure. In other knowledge do-
mains, the concept of Knowledge Organization System (KOS) is used for
the same phenomenon. We can distinguish a variety of knowledge organi-
zation systems, proceeding from simpler structures to more complex ones:
the term list, the classiﬁcation system, the thesaurus and the ontology.
We can also diﬀerentiate among the latter according to the logic of their
construction, and if we take into account the problem of control, we can
distinguish between controlled and non-controlled KOS. Non-controlled
KOS’s are exempliﬁed by the so-called folksonomy.3
Term lists simply list the names related in some sense, and apart from
the lexicographic ordering, other relations cannot be deﬁned on the ele-
ments of the set.4 The elements of classiﬁcation systems are linked by a
subordination (containment) relation, resulting in a hierarchical structure
of names. Since in many cases a single hierarchical relation is used instead
of several, semantically diﬀerent subordination relations when constructing
classiﬁcation systems, it is possible that a semantically inconsistent struc-
ture is created. The “weakness” of the classiﬁcation systems is that only
3 The term list, the classiﬁcation, the thesaurus, and the ontology are controlled KOS.
4 Proper name spaces with a narrower meaning can also be qualiﬁed as term lists.
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one subordination relation is used to express both generic (subclass/class),
partitive (part/whole), and even instance-of relations. This vagueness is
eliminated by the thesaurus, which deﬁnes multiple relations (generic and
partitive subordinate-of, instance-of, synonym-of, etc.). This creates a more
complex structure than the ones before. Ontologies move further towards
deep structuring in the sense that they allow the introduction of any ar-
bitrary, formally deﬁned relation, which can create an even more complex
structure than a thesaurus. The knowledge organization systems outlined
here are to be considered controlled systems in the sense that both the
elements of the systems and the relations between them can only be intro-
duced into the system by authorised people. Folksonomies are diﬀerent in
this respect because they are built without any control. Folksonomies do
not handle relations between elements, but any person who uses them for
something may add elements. The applicability and desirability of folk-
sonomies is greatly enhanced by the possibility that tags generated by
the users can be connected to the traﬃc (usage) data resulting from user
activities, which can be used as a quality assurrance ﬁlter.
Knowledge organization systems collect the terms needed to describe
the world, and through the relations between the terms they facilitate
access to the terms themselves. The diﬀerent kinds of knowledge organi-
zation systems diﬀer from each other in their relations only, and theoret-
ically there is no ontological constraint on the usable terms. In principle,
each system is capable of covering any knowledge domain (ontology) with
its terms.
Knowledge organization systems are, in a sense, insensitive to whether
they have to handle proper or common names; it often happens that a
particular knowledge organization system contains both proper and com-
mon names.
The concept of namespace can be applied to knowledge organization
systems, which appears understandable and manageable on the basis of
the considerations above. It would be reasonable to distinguish the proper
name spaces and common name spaces more from each other but it is more
important to know about a given system what types of names it is built up
from. If relevant, proper name spaces can be marked with an appropriate
qualiﬁer.
After this sketchy review of knowledge organization systems, we have
to answer the question of what such systems can be used for. They are
most often used to provide a suitable set of terminology for a knowledge do-
main – to support content description and to facilitate document retrieval.
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8. Name structures – Document Descriptor Systems
Both namespaces and knowledge management systems can be interpreted
as structures whose semantics depends partly on the relations applied in
the system and partly on the ontological commitments made in the course
of the compilation of the term set. These systems can be applied to all
knowledge domains, there is no area in which they could not be used.
However, there are other knowledge management systems that aim to
deal with knowledge from a given knowledge area only, based on a speciﬁc
ontological commitment. To narrow our focus to the world of libraries, we
can mention the Marc21, RDA or BIBFRAME systems. They also have
semantics, they can also be considered complex structures, but their func-
tionality is diﬀerent from the KOS systems discussed earlier. They can use
proper and common name spaces, or knowledge organization systems, but
their main purpose is more speciﬁc: the description of a certain type of
documents. They can achieve this goal by outlining a scheme represent-
ing the ontological commitment and the knowledge of the given profes-
sion, in which everything can be said about the type of document under
consideration. This scheme contains all the entities that are needed for
a professional description of the given knowledge domain, as well as the
relations between the entities and the points where “external” namespaces
and knowledge organization systems can be made use of. These document
descriptor systems may be connected to namespaces but their purpose and
content is diﬀerent.
The real signiﬁcance of namespaces is the unambiguous identiﬁcation
of names in the ontological segment that they want to describe. By com-
pleting this task, the inventory systems of libraries, museums, archives,
etc., which associate the identiﬁers of namespaces with their own identi-
ﬁers can be made interoperable because they are able to refer to certain
entities of the world in the same way due to the namespaces they all use.
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ABSTRACT
Hennie presented a very general sufficient condition for regularity
of Turing machines. This happened chronologically before Genera-
tive Phonology (Chomsky & Halle 1968) and the related finite-state re-
search (Johnson 1972; Kaplan & Kay 1994). Hennie’s condition lets us
(1) construct a finite-state transducer from any grammar implemented
by a linear-time Turing machine, and (2) to model the regularity in
context-sensitive derivations. For example, the suffixation in hunspell
dictionaries (Németh et al. 2004) corresponds to time-bounded two-way
computations performed by a Hennie machine. Furthermore, it chal-
lenges us to look for new forgotten islands of regularity where Hennie’s
condition does not necessarily hold.
1. Introduction
Generative Phonology (Chomsky & Halle 1968) is a rule-based string
rewriting system that has been scrutinized carefully over the years of its
existence. One of the major weaknesses of the system is that it has been
proven to be equivalent to Turing machines (TMs) (Chomsky 1963; John-
son 1972; Ristad 1990). As the derivations of such a machine do not neces-
sarily terminate, the system is seriously defective and impossible to falsify.
Thus, an unrestricted rewriting allowed by Generative Phonology does not
make a very good scientiﬁc theory in the light of Popper (1959), see also
Johnson (1972, 32).
In spite of the original shortcomings and the increased depth in the
current phonological theory, the original “SPE” formalism is interesting for
its own sake. First, the formalism has been employed extensively in natu-
ral language processing and descriptive linguistics. There, it has been used
to express phonological generalizations based on empirical data. Second,
revisiting the original formalism and its decidable subsets can produce
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valuable ideas that are applicable to more ambitious theories, such as
Optimality Theory (Prince & Smolensky 2004) and Harmonic Serialism
(McCarthy 2000).
1.1. The well-known islands of regularity
When realistic grammar instances in Generative Phonology have been
studied closely, a striking contrast between the original undecidable the-
ory and the actual grammars has been discovered. In pioneering studies
(Johnson 1972; Kaplan & Kay 1994), most practical grammars in Gener-
ative Phonology have been shown to satisfy a two-part condition under
which they correspond to ﬁnite-state transducers:
1. Non-self-embedding. Directional or simultaneous context-sensitive
rules whose non-contextual parts do not apply to their own output
are ﬁnite-state (Kaplan & Kay 1994, 363, 365).
2. Finite composition. If a grammar is deﬁned as a ﬁnite sequence of
rewriting rules, each of which is a regular relation, then the grammar
as a whole represents the regular relation given by their composition
(ibid., 364).
These observations have led to the development of algorithms for trans-
forming restricted fragments, or islands, of Generative Grammar into
ﬁnite-state transducers. For example, the algorithm of Mohri & Sproat
(1996) constructs transducers from rules that are applied in a directed
fashion. Karttunen (1995) treats various application modes and diﬀer-
ent types of context conditions. These ﬁnite-state islands in Generative
Phonology have become standard textbook material (Jurafsky & Martin
2000; Beesley & Karttunen 2003), and many redesigned compilation algo-
rithms have been proposed to pursue eﬃciency, ﬂexibility and the generally
correct semantics.
The literature of methods that compile individual rules into ﬁnite-
state transducers suggests that regularity of phonological grammars is to be
proven inductively, by using operations that preserve regularity of regular
relations. But we should not overlook a more extensive picture of regularity
as a property of the relation rather than as a property of the construction.
Therefore, we should now start to pursue for a wider understanding of the
archipelago of ﬁnite-state islands in Generative theories as well as in all
computational models of language.
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1.2. The search for further islands
Proving that the input-output relation deﬁned by a grammar is regular is a
complicated task. The known ﬁnite-state islands and the closure properties
of ﬁnite-state transducers solve only the easy cases where the application
order of rules is ﬁxed and the rules can be combined under a ﬁnite composi-
tion. But if the grammar contains iterative rules, we do not have a general
method that would return a non-iterative grammar. The regularity of the
string relation deﬁned by iterative rules is computationally undecidable
already for context-free grammars (Stearns 1967; Greibach 1968), not to
talk about Turing machines and equivalent grammar systems.
In light of this, we see that the fundamental results in ﬁnite-state
Phonology (Johnson 1972; Kaplan & Kay 1994) have given us only islands,
suﬃcient conditions where the grammars or parts of grammars are ﬁnite-
state and generate regular relations. They do not exclude new conditions
that can also be valuable. New conditions are, ideally, constructive and
turn a formerly nonconstructive property into a method that gives a ﬁnite-
state transducer.
For example, it has been obvious since Chomsky & Halle (1968) that
a phonological grammar is regular when it contains only right-linear (or
left-linear) rules (Chomsky 1963). The left-linear rules have the general
shape  !  where ;; are symbols and  does not match any left-
hand side in the grammar rules. The achievement of Johnson (1972) was
to expand the default regular subset of Generative Phonology by showing
that the linear and the simultaneous application of phonological rules with
context conditions can also generate a regular relation.
Kaplan and Kay (1994) also discuss general situations that are usually
known as cyclic derivations (Mohanan 1986). For example, the word unen-
forceable has the recursive structure [un[[en[force]]able]]. Here the phono-
logical rules are applied ﬁrst to the innermost part, force. Then the in-
nermost brackets are removed and the application is repeated until no
brackets are left. Kaplan and Kay point out that “there may be restric-
tions on the mode of reapplication that limit the formal power of the
[cyclic] grammar…”. However, Kaplan and Kay (1994, 365) seem to think
that these restrictions are analogous to context-free grammars with only
right- or left-linear rules.
Besides context-free grammars with only right- or left-linear rules,
there are also self-embedding grammars that generate regular languages.
For example, the context-free grammar S ! aS j Tb; T ! Tb j c
generates the regular language acb and the context-sensitive grammar
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S ! aS; aS ! abT ; bT ! cbT j c generates the regular language ac. In
these examples, the grammars look simple but are not immediately regular
on the basis of the shape of their rules.
In the sequel, section 2 presents a concrete example of a very simple
context-sensitive formalism whose conversion to a ﬁnite-state equivalent
grammar is tricky. In section 3, the reader is familiarized with a one-tape
Turing machine and Hennie’s suﬃcient condition for regularity. The paper
closes with remarks in section 4.
2. Safe unbounded composition
We will now give an example of a grammar whose regularity is not obvious
on the basis of the standard conditions.
2.1. hunspell
Our example of a non-classical ﬁnite-state grammar is the hunspell for-
malism (Németh et al. 2004) that represents a stage in the development of
spell checking algorithms. We only discuss its suﬃx rules and ignore many
details of the formalism.
The hunspell formalism is used to inﬂect and derive word forms
by a combination of continuation classes, truncation and appending. The
formalism resembles the Item and Process morphology (Hockett 1954) and
Lexical Phonology (Mohanan 1986). The formalism involves .dic and .aﬀ
ﬁles that specify the initial word forms and the steps to produce other
word forms:
(1) .dic: glossy/T
.aﬀ: SFX T y iest Cy
The word form glossiest is the combination of an input word glossy, having
the continuation class T, and a suﬃx rule (marked with SFX). The suﬃx
rule, for the continuation class T (T in the 2nd column), states that the
last vowel -y (y in the 3rd column) is replaced with -iest (iest in the 4th
column) if preceded by a consonant and the vowel -y (condition Cy in the
5th column).
When the hunspell dictionary formalism is interpreted as a rewriting
system, we see that the derivation glossyT ) glossiest# is described
with a Generative Phonological rule (2):
K + K = 120 / p. 545 / May 3, 2019
Forgotten islands of regularity in phonology 545
(2) Superlative Formation:
[y]T! [i][e][s][t][#] / C
While the shape of such a rule is context-sensitive, it is not diﬃcult to
see that this rule can be implemented with a non-deterministic ﬁnite-state
transducer. Furthermore, the suﬃx rules seem to be applied out from the
stem, at the right boundary of the string. However, such similarity with
right-linear grammars is only partial and does not imply that it would be
easy to compile the whole dictionary into a ﬁnite-state transducer. There
are two reasons:
– The rules do not only rewrite the continuation classes but they may
also back up and rewrite the phonological content produced earlier,
requiring, thus, two-way movements.
– The rules are non-monotonic: they can expand and shorten the input.
In order to analyse what actually happens, we need to construct a model
that shows how the dictionary form is processed by the aﬃx rules.
2.2. Automaton models
Now we analyse hunspell by viewing the derivation steps of its word for-
mation as a process that corresponds to a computation by a particular TM.
The general deﬁnition of a Turing machine is assumed to be familiar
to the reader. In short, it is a combination of a ﬁnite-state automaton and
a rewritable two-way working tape that is initialized with the input string
of length n. The machine is allowed to append new letters arbitrarily to
the input string; thus the working tape is inﬁnite. A TM can also have
auxiliary tapes, but we will restrict ourselves to one-tape TMs.
If we implement the derivation by the moves of a non-deterministic
one-tape TM, we obtain a machine that sweeps the working tape three
times in a row. During the ﬁrst pass (3.1), the machine recognizes the stem
(glossy) and its continuation class (T), then rewinds the tape (3.2) to the
beginning of the string and non-deterministically replaces the substring
syT$$$ with the substring siest# during the ﬁnal pass (3.3):
(3) $ # g l o s s y T $ $ $ $   
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! (3:1)
         (3:2)
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! (3:3)
$ # g l o s s i e s t # $   
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Since regular relations are closed under composition, a ﬁnite number of
similar suﬃx rules could be applied in a row and the lexicon would still be
regular. In this way, k suﬃx positions of morphology could be treated. The
corresponding non-deterministic TM would rewind the tape k times to the
beginning. Thus, the total time complexity is in O(nk) when the string on
the tape occupies at most n tape squares. Thus, the non-deterministic TM
implementation of a ﬁnite composition has linear time complexity.
In a more general situation, one does not want to specify the maximum
number of suﬃxes explicitly. One reason can be that, in some languages,
the suﬃxes can be added recursively after one other. For example, a Turk-
ish word can, in principle, have an arbitrary number of suﬃxes although
only some of the combinations are interpretable. Another example involves
Old Georgian where the nouns can theoretically have unlimited number
of case-number markers (Michaelis & Kracht 1997). Finally, orthographic
compounding of many languages can involve several stems and alternat-
ing bound morphemes. For example, the Swedish word (with our mor-
pheme boundaries) Spår-vagn-s-aktie-bolag-s-sken-smut-s-skjut-are-fack-
förening-s-personal-beklädnad-s-magasin-s-förråd-s-förvaltar-en-s contains
14 stems and, in addition, several bound morphemes. Similar and much
longer examples can be found in other languages. E.g., a 431-letter word
appears in the Sanskrit literature. Thus, it is hard to argue that the num-
ber of rule applications has a ﬁnite upper bound in general.
The unbounded number of applications of suﬃx rules breaks the two
principles: non-self-embedding rules and ﬁnite composition. Moreover, the
implementation based on a rewinding TM would spend O(n2) time to
produce the derived string through the back and forth sweeps that simulate
the composition steps.
We can, however, improve the TM implementation by optimizing its
moves. Instead of rewinding the tape completely, the improved computa-
tion strategy (4) just backs up until it has tested the precondition. In our
example, the precondition is just the suﬃx [C][y][T]:
(4) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! (4:1)
$ # g l o s s y T $ $ $ $
   (4:2)
! ! ! ! ! ! (4:3)
s i e s t # $
With this change, long words are produced in a zigzag style (5) where
every rule application may back up some letters.
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(5) ! !
 -
,! !
 -
,! !
: : :
 -
,! !
Since the union of the aﬃx-rules is applied repeatedly to its own output,
the standard two-part regularity condition of phonological grammars does
not apply. However, as long as the derivation deletes and appends new
material only at the right end of the string, the resulting process is linear
and, intuitively, a regular grammar. In addition, the moves taken by the
TM can now be deterministic because the machine does not completely
rewind the tape at any point but always makes relative moves that allow
it to remember its previous position.
2.3. Linear encoding
Although the grammar represented by a hunspell lexicon does not satisfy
the classical two-part condition of ﬁnite-state phonology, it is equivalent
to a ﬁnite-state transducer when restricted to the suﬃx rules.
There are now some methods to compile hunspell lexicons to ﬁnite-
state transducers. Early experiments on compilation are due to György
Gyepesi (p.c., 2007) and others in Budapest. The author developed his so-
lution (Yli-Jyrä 2009) using a variant of Two-Level Morphology (Kosken-
niemi 1983). This method viewed the lexicon as a collection of constraints
that described linearly encoded backing up and suﬃxation in derivations.
The method included an eﬃcient one-shot compilation algorithm to com-
pile and intersect several hundreds of thousands of lexical context restric-
tion rules in parallel as if the lexical continuations (morphotaxis) were
phonological constraints. A similar method, ﬁnally implemented by his
colleagues, Pirinen and Linden (2010), separated the lexical continuations
from the phonological changes at morpheme boundaries and used a three-
step approach where the ﬁnal step composed the lexicon with the phonol-
ogy. A separate compiler for lexical continuations was used and a two-level
grammar described the phonological realization of morphemes in diﬀerent
contexts.
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The key to understanding the method of Yli-Jyrä (2009) is that the
computations of the TM are encoded as a linear string (6.2). This string
is produced if the derivation actually reaches the ﬁnal continuation class
# whereas inﬁnite loops do not correspond to an output string.
(6) gloss y (6:1)
<#><Root>glossy<T> 1iest<#> (6:2)
gloss iest: (6:3)
Whenever the machine overwrites its own output, the overwritten part
(already on the left from the current position) is marked as deleted. The
deleted material is put between <D> and <-D>, two symbols abbreviated
now as  and  1, respectively. The occurrence of these optional lexical
symbols is enforced in deleting contexts but banned otherwise, correspond-
ing to the surface realizations with and without contractions. For example,
the segment y in (6.2) is surrounded by a pair of  and  1 because it is
cancelled by -iest, the next hunspell aﬃx.
The derivation of the combination of glossy and -iest is encoded
as string (6.2). This internal string is then mapped to the output string
(6.3) by a transducer that deletes the markers and the material enclosed
between each pair of  and  1. The computation can also be mapped to
the dictionary form (6.1) by removing the markers and the material that
belongs to the aﬃxes.
An interesting part in the method is that the underlying derivation
encodes a computation of a bounded Turing machine (6.2). This string is
produced with context-restriction rules introduced in two-level phonology
(Koskenniemi 1983). Since the output deletions are taken care of by the
simple transducer between (6.2) and (6.3), it is suﬃcient to describe only
one representation level. The three rules in (7) describe where the root
(Root) of the lexicon is visited, where a continuation class T is reached, and
how the next (in fact ﬁnal) continuation class is reached after a consonant,
a cancelled y and new material corresponding to lexical -iest.
(7) <Root> => <#> _ ; # the root symbol
<T> => <#><Root>glossy _ ; # glossy/T
<#> => Cy<T> 1iest<#> _ ; # SFX T y iest Cy
The one-level representation of the underlying derivation works immedi-
ately in cases where the successive deletions are disjoint from each other.
It can also be extended to cases where the deleted parts are nested:
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(8)
abcef<A>z }| {
abcef<A>
gh<B>z }| {
 1gh<B>
hij<C>z }| {
 1hij<C>| {z }
truncate f before gh<B>| {z }
truncate egh before hij<C>
The main functional diﬀerence between the methods described by Yli-Jyrä
(2009) and Pirinen & Lindén (2010) is in the way they treat non-disjoint
deletions. While the former method encodes the sequence of derivation
steps as one string, the latter encodes the lexical morpheme sequences
on one string and then the contracted sequences on the other level. The
latter method describes the contractions at morpheme boundaries via two-
level rules that constrain the way in which the underlying phonemes of a
morpheme are realized in the adjacency of various aﬃxes. In this approach,
a contraction corresponds to zero realization.
(9)
abcef<A>z }| {
abc e f<A>
gh<B>z }| {
gh<B>
hij<C>z }| {
hij<C>
abc 0 0 0| {z }
truncate f before gh<B>
00 0
| {z }
truncate efgh before hij<C>
hij 0
Since the truncations in this representation (9) are speciﬁed in parallel
rather than one after another, the semantics of the variant (Pirinen &
Lindén 2010) deviates slightly from the original method (Yli-Jyrä 2009).
In particular, note that the addition of the suﬃx hij<C> in (8) and
(9) requires diﬀerent suﬃxation rules as the truncations behave diﬀerently.
The rule applied in (9) must truncate more symbols. This semantic dif-
ference between the two methods can be compensated with an additional
pre-processing step that expands the set of suﬃxation rules. During this
step, a suﬃx rule that completely cancels the previous aﬃx is replaced
with a suﬃx rule that is applied before the completely cancelled aﬃx.
However, for most hunspell lexicons, the cancellation is restricted to the
most recent suﬃx, which means that the preprocessing step can be heuris-
tically ignored.
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3. The loosest sufficient condition
In the previous section, we related the hunspell derivations to one-tape
TMs. One reason to do so was that the regularity of one-tape TMs is an
old and carefully studied, well-understood problem.
In this section, we ﬁrst relate one-tape Turing machines with trans-
ducers (§3.1–3.2). Then we study bounded one-tape TMs that implement
regular relations (§3.3). We will use the bounded one-tape TMs to give a
new proof for the two-part regularity condition (§3.4) and to ﬁnd a more
general condition for a ﬁnite-state subset of Generative Phonology (§3.5).
Finally, we observe (§3.6) that even this condition does not cover all nat-
ural ﬁnite-state grammars.
3.1. One-tape TMs as transducers
Usually one-tape TMs and Hennie machines are viewed as language rec-
ognizers. Since it is not possible to construct a Hennie machine with two
readable tapes (Hennie 1965), the connection between Hennie machines
and one-way two-tape ﬁnite-state transducers is not obvious from the be-
ginning. In fact, most of the relevant literature discusses Hennie machines
as if they were equivalent to one-tape ﬁnite-state automata only.
As a notable exception, Engelfriet and Hoogeboom (2001) connect
Hennie machines to two-way two-tape ﬁnite-state machines. These ma-
chines are not allowed to read their output tape, but they are more pow-
erful than ordinary ﬁnite-state transducers.
Our way to view one-tape Turing machines as transducers requires
only the input tape with both reading and writing. As the machine modiﬁes
the contents of the input tape during its computations, the input tape will
be occupied with an output string when the machine halts. Thus, every
one-tape TM recognizes three sets:
– the set of input strings that occur as the initial content of the working
tape in an accepting computation,
– the set of output strings that occur as the ﬁnal content of the working
tape in an accepting computation,
– the relation consisting of the input-output string pairs where the ﬁrst
string is the initial content and the second string is the ﬁnal content
of the working tape in an accepting computation.
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Given the last deﬁnition, every one-tape TM can be viewed as a recognizer
of a binary relation.
3.2. Finite-state transducers as one-tape TMs
It is immediate that one-way ﬁnite-state transducers are equivalent to one-
tape Turing machines: one-way (non)deterministic ﬁnite-state transducers
are a special case of two-way (non)deterministic ﬁnite-state transducers,
and these are a special case of (non)deterministic two-tape Turing machines
that are equivalent to deterministic one-tape Turing machines.
If we restrict ourselves to ﬁnite-state transducers whose output pre-
serves the length of their input, we can view these transducers as one-tape
ﬁnite automata with a letter-pair alphabet (Kaplan & Kay 1994). This
gives an even more direct link from ﬁnite-state transducers to one-tape
Turing machines.
The restriction to these letter transducers is not a serious restriction if
we assume that the necessary 0’s are introduced non-deterministically to
the input string by an inverse homomorphic mapping h 1 :  ! ([f0g)
that preserves the alphabet . The 0’s are then removed from the output
string by the homomorphism h : ([ f0g) ! . In addition, we assume
that all states of the transducer have a self-loop on the letter pair (0; 0).
Let R1 and R2 be regular relations recognized by unrestricted ﬁnite-
state transducers, and let R01 and R02 be the corresponding same-length
relations recognized by the letter transducers with the self-loops. Now we
have the equation:
R1 R2 = h 1 R01 R02  h:
It is now obvious that the same length relations R01, R02 and even R01 R02
can be implemented as non-deterministic one-tape TMs that recognize the
relations in O(n) time by transforming the initial content of the tape to
the ﬁnal content of the same tape.
3.3. TMs running in O(n) time
The most ground-breaking regularity condition for one-tape TMs is due to
Hennie. Hennie’s result is the converse to the fact that every one-way deter-
ministic ﬁnite automaton is a deterministic TM. The machines considered
by Hennie do not only include all one-way deterministic ﬁnite automata
and letter transducers but they also extend them in two particular ways:
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(1) the one-tape TMs can move back and forth on the tape, (2) they can
overwrite the contents of the squares of the tape several times.
Hennie (1965) showed that a deterministic one-tape TM is equivalent
to a ﬁnite automaton if it runs in O(n). The results of Hennie have been
extended, by Tadaki et al. (2010), to linear-time non-deterministic one-
tape TMs whose O(n) time bound holds for all accepting computations.
A deterministic and non-deterministic linear-time one-tape TM are called
a Hennie machine and a non-deterministic Hennie machine, respectively.
Both of these one-tape machines recognize a regular relation on the basis
of section 3.1.
Hennie analysed the expressive power of one-tape machines using
the concept of crossing sequence (aka schema) (Rabin 1963; Trakhten-
brot 1964; Hopcroft & Ullman 1979; Birget 1996) that is strongly related
to visiting sequences (Fischer 1969). This concept is a powerful tool in
the analysis of the behaviour of two-way automata and one-tape TMs. It
refers to the sequence of target states s1; s2; : : : visited by a TM when
its pointer crosses the boundary between a pair of adjacent tape squares.
States s1; s3; : : : are reached when the pointer moves forward and states
s2; s4; : : : are reached when the pointer moves backwards. Figure 1 shows
how states are visited during a computation and how a crossing sequence
is deﬁned.
# W O R D I N G # #   
q0 q1 q2 q3 q4
q7 q6 q5  -
,! q8 q9 q10 q11 : : :
Figure 1: The crossing sequence between the 3rd and the 4th squares is
(s1; s2; s3) = (q3; q6; q9)
Every Hennie machine satisﬁes, by deﬁnition, the property that the length
of its crossing sequences is bounded by an integer (Hennie 1965). Since
the ﬁniteness of crossing sequences implies that the TM is equivalent to a
ﬁnite-state automaton, this bound lets us construct an equivalent ﬁnite-
state device. The good news is that for all Hennie machines, a bounding
constant k is computable (Kobayashi 1985; Tadaki et al. 2010).
Průša (2014) showed that, if a deterministic Hennie machine recogniz-
ing the input language has m states and n working symbols, we can con-
struct a minimal deterministic ﬁnite automaton that has 22O(n logm) states.
Thus, Hennie machines recognizing the input are much more succinct than
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the equivalent minimal deterministic automaton. Obviously, a determin-
istic letter transducer constructed from a Hennie machine is not smaller
than the minimal automaton recognizing only the input language aka the
domain of the transducer.
3.4. Completeness with respect to prior art
Now we can prove that Hennie machines can be used, on the one hand,
to build a ﬁnite-state subset of Generative Phonology using the two-part
condition of non-self-application and ﬁnite composition, and, on the other,
to obtain compilation methods for such grammars that previously required
specialized encoding and a compilation algorithm.
Theorem 1. Composition of regular relations is a regular relation.
Proof. Let R1 and R2 be regular relations and R01 and R02 the respec-
tive same-length regular relations. Then there are, respectively, two non-
deterministic Hennie machines T1 and T2 that recognize R01 and R02. The
composition R01 R02 is then computed by a Hennie machine that ﬁrst runs
like T 01, then rewinds the tape and runs like T 02. Since the combined ma-
chine preserves the string length, it is equivalent to an epsilon-free ﬁnite-
state transducer that recognizes the relation R01  R02. The composition
h 1 R01 R02  h is then equivalent to the regular relation R1 R2.
Theorem 2. The non-self-embedding application of rule of the form !
/_ corresponds to a regular relation.
Proof. Extend the original tape alphabet so that each square contains the
input letter and a Boolean vector indicating the validity of left and right
context conditions of the simultaneous rules. Let ML (MR) be a determin-
istic (co-deterministic) pattern matching automaton. The state computed
by this automaton indicates, for each string position, the type of the pre-
ﬁx (suﬃx) of the position. Modify this pattern matching automaton by
adding self-loops on 0’s. Then transform the automaton into a ﬁnite-state
transducer M 0L (M 0R) in such a way that each transition adds the informa-
tion on the occurring left (right) contexts to the Boolean vectors of each
square. This epsilon-free transducer is a Hennie machine. The composition
M 0L M 0R is then a Hennie machine that marks the occurring contexts at
all squares.
As a pre-processing step, make the length of each left-hand side  and
the respective right-hand side  identical by padding the shorter with 0’s.
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In addition, add synchronous 0’s freely to both. In this way we obtain a
letter transducer that recognizes a 0-padded representation of the regular
relation  .
Deﬁne a Hennie machine M1 that sweeps the string (containing 0’s)
from left to right and non-deterministically overwrites ranges of squares
that contain some left-hand-side string  with a corresponding right-hand-
side string  when the ﬁrst and the last square in the input range indicate
the presence of the required left and right context, respectively. Deﬁne also
a Hennie machine M2 that removes the Boolean context vectors from the
tape squares. Now the composition M 0L M 0R M1 M2 is recognized by a
Hennie machine M . Then h 1 M  h is equivalent to a non-deterministic
ﬁnite-state transducer that captures the semantics of the rule.
We have now used Hennie machines to show that simultaneous non-
overlapping rules are regular and that a ﬁnite composition of regular rules
preserves regularity. Other application modes of regular grammars are dis-
cussed in Johnson (1972); Kaplan & Kay (1994). The regularity of these
application modes can be proven similarly.
To conclude our argument, we show that Hennie machines actually
help us to compile hunspell dictionaries without special encodings.
Theorem 3. The iterated application of monotonic suﬃx rules of a
hunspell grammar makes a regular relation.
Proof. Every suﬃx rule corresponds to a Hennie machine that backs up
checking its context condition and then writes the non-truncated context
and the new suﬃx (4.2–4.3). The union of such Hennie machines is a non-
deterministic Hennie machine M . The closure M is a TM that applies
suﬃx rules iteratively. As the suﬃx rules increase the length of the string
monotonically, the closureM has a ﬁnite bound for the crossing sequences
and recognizes a regular relation.
3.5. The bound that cannot be improved
The Borodin-Trakhtenbrot Gap Theorem (Trakhtenbrot 1964) states that
expanded resources do not always expand the set of computable functions.
In other words, it is possible that the regularity of a TM holds even if
the O(n) is made slightly looser. A less tight time bound is now expressed
with the small-o notation: t(n) 2 o(f(n))means that the upper bound f(n)
grows much faster than the running time t(n) when n tends to inﬁnity:
limn!1 t(n)/f(n) = 0.
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As an application of the Gap Theorem, Hartmanis (1968) and Trakh-
tenbrot (1964) showed independently that the time resource of ﬁnite-state
equivalent deterministic one-tape TMs can be extended from O(n) to
o(n logn). This bound is tight: regularity is algorithmically unsolvable for
any bound that exceeds n + 1 in 
(n logn) (Gajser 2015). The extended
time bound has been generalized to non-deterministic one-tape TMs by
Tadaki et al. (2010). These extensions of Hennie’s core result give us a
new suﬃcient condition for the regularity of Generative Phonology.
Theorem 4. A generative phonological grammar is regular if its one-tape
TM implementation runs in o(n logn) time.
LetM be a one-tape TM implementation of a Generative phonological
grammar. The ﬁniteness of the crossing sequences of a given TM is, in
general, undecidable (Průša 2014), but there is a reasonably good decision
procedure: to test if M is equivalent to a ﬁnite-state transducer, we can
pick a function t(n) that is in o(n logn) and test if M actually runs in
t(n). Interestingly, Gajser (2015) showed that for any reasonable function
t(n), we can decide whether a TM M runs in t(n). If a TM then runs
in t(n), it actually runs in O(n) (Pighizzini 2009). Thus, the new one-
sided condition for regularity of the phonological grammar has a sound
approximate solution.
3.6. The existence of non-Hennie finite-state grammars
If the suﬃx rules are non-monotonic and can shorten their inputs, the TM
can produce the same conﬁguration again and again and produce arbi-
trarily long crossing sequences. The repetition may happen either a ﬁnite
or an inﬁnite number of times. Interestingly, the specialized compilation
method (Yli-Jyrä 2009) handles both cases correctly, whereas we fail to
get a Hennie machine if the suﬃx rules are non-monotonic.
Non-monotonic suﬃx rules are an example of a situation where the
TM is equivalent to a Hennie machine that restricts the length of the
crossing sequences. The bad news is that we do not know when we have a
correct Hennie machine: it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd such bound k for the length
of crossing sequences that a given TM preserves its semantics when longer
crossing sequences are abandoned. Since a suﬃcient bound k is such that
the semantics of the restricted TM does not change although we allow
longer crossing-sequences, there are reasonable ways to probe possible val-
ues of k, but such probing is still heuristic.
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The diﬃculty of non-monotonic grammars indicates that although
we now have a more general condition for those Generative phonological
grammars that are equivalent to a ﬁnite-state transducer, a specialized
compilation algorithm may still encode inﬁnite loops in a way that seems
to be beyond the Hennie condition.
4. Conclusions
It is historically interesting that Hennie’s regularity condition dates back
to the year 1965, that is, even before Chomsky & Halle (1968).
No decision procedure for the classical two-part condition (Johnson
1972; Kaplan & Kay 1994), is known. Compared to this situation, it is
remarkable that the new suﬃcient condition has several advantages:
– The new regularity condition has approximations that are decidable
(Gajser 2015).
– The equivalent ﬁnite-state transducer can be constructed from a Hen-
nie machine (Hennie 1965).
– The Hennie machines are extremely succinct compared to ﬁnite-state
machines (Průša 2014).
– Hennie machines seem to provide a more general framework for prov-
ing regularity of phonological grammars than the arguments based on
bimachine construction (Johnson 1972) or non-self-embedding gram-
mars (Kaplan & Kay 1994).
There are many interesting questions that could be studied in the future.
Here are some:
1. Despite the advantages of Hennie machines, the author is not aware
of any ﬁnite-state library that would be based on Hennie machines.
Would it be possible to develop a ﬁnite-state library that would use
Hennie machines to represent regular relations more compactly?
2. There does not seem to be much work that would link Hennie machines
and two-way ﬁnite-state transducers to minicomplexity, the computa-
tional complexity of two-way ﬁnite automata, that has recently ob-
tained attention in automata theory (Kapoutsis 2012). Could some of
the related results be extended to Hennie machines?
3. If a Hennie machine is used to implement a weighted rule system,
the machine must be constructed more carefully than what we have
done now: the 0-loops create new paths that make the computation
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of string weights tricky. Can we introduce weighted Hennie machines
and relate them to weighted automata?
4. We would like to understand why some natural ﬁnite-state gram-
mars, like nonmonotonic hunspell grammars, are ﬁnite-state, al-
though their crossing sequences seem to have no ﬁnite bound. Are
there thus other natural islands of regularity we should know about?
There are several potential applications for Hennie machines in Natural
Language Processing. We have already demonstrated that Hennie ma-
chines have applications in phonology and morphology (Yli-Jyrä 2009).
Weighted Hennie machines may be applied to OCR that is based on
weighted context-dependent correction rules (Drobac et al. 2017). Further-
more, non-monotonic Sequential Constraint Grammar is computationally
undecidable but has restrictions that have Hennie machine characteriza-
tions (Yli-Jyrä 2017). The search for Generative dependency grammars
that produce non-projective trees is an area that may also beneﬁt from
the concepts of crossing sequences and Hennie machines (Nederhof & Yli-
Jyrä 2017).
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ABSTRACT
Raised verb phrases denote elements of } (} (} (E))), that is sets of
type h1i quantifiers (and not just sets). Various arguments support-
ing the necessity of the VP raising, similar to the noun phrase rais-
ing, are given. Most of the presented arguments are related to the
semantics of the higher order comparative the same and the seman-
tics of the reciprocal each other but some other constructions with
raised VPs are also discussed. Predicates formed by such constructions
are “non-homomorphic” because they denote sets of quantifiers whose
characteristic functions are not homomorphisms (from the algebra of
quantifiers to the algebra of truth-values). Some formal properties and
analogies with “classically” raised NPs are indicated.
1. Introduction
The results of combinatorial logic allow us to abandon, in certain cases,
the distinction between an argument and the function of which it is the
argument: informally, the argument of a function can become the function
having as argument the function of which it was the argument. More for-
mally, in the categorial grammar that includes “functional categories” and
where grammatical categories are associated with logical types, an expres-
sion can be associated with at least two types: if it occurs “initially” in type
a it may also occur in any type hha; bi; bi for any type b. Probably having
this in mind, Montague made his by now well-known move which led to
the uniform treatment of noun phrases which all, including proper nouns,
denote sets of properties. In a categorial grammar in which NP and S are
primitive categories, and ignoring directionality, Montague’s idea can be
illustrated at the syntactic level, by the fact that the sequences of cate-
gories in (1) and (2) reduce, via the function application (symbolised by
“+”), to the same category S:
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(1) NP + S/NP=S
(2) S/(S/NP ) + S/NP=S
At the semantic level, adding (2) to the grammar amounts to consider-
ing that denotations of proper nouns, which “classically” denote individual
objects, that is objects of type e, get a “new” denotation which is the ultra-
ﬁlter generated by the element of the model corresponding to the referent
of the proper noun and is now of type hhe; ti; ti. This move makes it easy
in particular to compute the semantic values of Boolean compounds of
proper nouns with other NPs since in this case Boolean connectors are
interpreted by the corresponding Boolean operations.
In (1) the ﬁrst element is considered as an argument expression and
the second as the functional expression. In (2) the roles are inverted: the
ﬁrst element is the functional expression and the second is the argument
expression. Thus in (2) a type-raising rule, generally admitted in categorial
grammars, has been applied: this rule turns arguments into functions over
functions over these arguments.
Type-raising is one of the tools used in the strategy of ﬂexible cat-
egories. It amounts to the proposal that some linguistic units identiﬁed
by the (categorial) grammar may have many categories associated with
them and thus take their denotations among various logical types. As seen
from (1) and (2), type-raising is related to the rule of function application.
Other syntactic rules, such as for instance function composition (cf. Geach
1972), can be used to deﬁne other type changing operators that enrich
the tools allowing type shifting (cf. Partee & Rooth 1983; Partee 1987, for
some empirically justiﬁed pioneering proposals).
Obviously, from a theoretical point of view there is no reason for this
process of inversion of roles between a function and its argument to stop:
the reduction indicated in (3) is also possible:
(3) S/(S/NP )+ S(S/(S/NP )) = S
In (2) the category of the subject NP has been raised to the functional
category S(S/NP )) and in (3) the verb phrase, which was the argument
expression of category S/NP in (2) becomes functional expression of cat-
egory S(S/(S/NP )). Thus, in (3) the V P has been raised to the category
S(S/(S/NP )) whose type is now hhhe; tititi. This means that such raised
VPs denote a set of type h1i quantiﬁers and consequently the sentence of
the form (4), where V PR is a raised V P (that is, V PR is the abbreviation
K + K = 120 / p. 563 / May 3, 2019
On raised verb phrases 563
of the category S(S/(S/NP ))), is true iﬀ the quantiﬁer denoted by the
NP belongs to the set denoted by the V PR:
(4) NP + V PR
Of course V PR is a verb phrase. It gets an additional category, that is, V PR
is an abbreviation of S(S/(S/NP )) and is interpreted now by objects of
type hhhe; tititi, that is, it denotes elements of }(}(}(E))). Consequently,
given this alternative, verb phrases act as functions taking subject NPs
(which in this case necessarily denote type hhe; ti; ti objects) as arguments.
In this article I give some empirical reasons in favour of adding a rule
like the one in (3) to the grammar. In other words, I will indicate a series of
linguistic data which can be uniformly treated in the framework in which
it is assumed that in addition to the subject NPs also verb phrases have to
be raised. To do this I will discuss the semantics of some speciﬁc linguistic
constructions which induce or force the raising of VPs to which they are
related. Consequently, at the semantic level, I will show that it is useful,
if not necessary, to suppose that in some cases verb phrases denote sets of
type h1i quantiﬁers.
The idea of type shifting is that the type of some categories can change
depending on the environment they ﬁnd themselves in. This means that
the type of a given category has to be changed only in some grammatical
constructions. A consequence of this is the fact that lifted VPs are not
morphologically or syntactically “simple” since they are usually results of
various operations due to lift inducers, sometimes language speciﬁc. Prob-
ably for this reason, the proposal that languages might diﬀer from each
other as to whether it is the subject NP or the VP that takes takes the
other as argument is not new. In addition, some speciﬁc linguistic phenom-
ena may be better treated in such an extended framework. For instance,
Bach (1980) relates the diﬀerence between tensed and untensed intransitive
VPs precisely to the diﬀerence in types associated with them. Similarly,
it has been occasionally suggested that the speciﬁc “plural verbs” such as
to gather or collective predicates such as meet, have their type raised and
thus that they denote elements of }(}(E)) (van der Does 1993). However,
as far as I know, this VP raising always goes in pair with type shifting of
nominal elements, in particular of determiners, as well. For van der Does
(1993) the ordinary determiners which “classically” are relations between
sets, get an additional type making them relations between sets and sets
of sets.
A special case of VPs with higher type is discussed in Partee & Rooth
(1983). This case is special since it involves intensionality explicitly: in
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order to account for the semantics of complex VPs, which are conjunctions
of intensional and extensional verbs, they have to be raised and get a higher
order type.
More generally, Keenan and Faltz (1985) propose that (extensional)
VPs always denote speciﬁc characteristic functions of a set of type h1i
quantiﬁers, that is, they denote a set of quantiﬁers. Given that these
characteristic functions are homomorphisms in addition (from the alge-
bra of quantiﬁers to the algebra of truth-values), they indicate that the
denotational domain of VPs that they propose is isomorphic to the alge-
bra of sets (subsets of the universe), the classical denotational domain of
one-place predicates in ﬁrst order logic. At the same time, Keenan and
Faltz (1985, 265) indicate that in natural languages there exist various
“non-homomorphic” predicates such as collective and reciprocal predicates,
which cannot denote in the denotational domain of VPs that they propose.
In this paper I argue for changing the denotational type of VPs. I will
mainly discuss complex verb phrases containing transitive verbs whose
second argument, the argument in the object position, is what I will call
a generalised noun phrase (GNP), that is an expression which can play
the role of nominal arguments of a verb, as does an ordinary NP, but
which cannot freely occur in all argumental positions of the verb (cf. Zuber
2018). These expressions will be characterised by their logical properties
and not by their syntactic properties. A typical example of such a GNP
is the reciprocal each other and various Boolean compounds of it with
ordinary NPs or reﬂexive NPs. Another example that will be discussed
at some length is the “higher order” comparative like the same CN or the
same number of CN. It will be indicated that such GNPs, which force the
raising of VPs, have various logical properties that diﬀerentiate them from
ordinary NPs in the object position.
The second series of constructions I will discuss concerns raised VPs
formed from intransitive VPs. Such VPs, whose semantics necessitates
raising, can be either simple intransitive VPs or complex VPs with the in-
transitive verb modiﬁed by speciﬁc adverbials or gerundives which induce
the raising. As we will see, such adverbials are usually semantically related
to GNPs. In this context I will mention a possible analysis of cumulative
readings of some quantiﬁers and some other readings related to the plu-
rality of subject NPs, in which the rule of VPs raising is explicitly used. In
fact it will appear that cumulative readings (of NPs in subject and object
positions) can be, or even should be, related to the semantics of the GNPs
such as the same or each other. More generally, it will appear that many
expressions forcing the raising of VPs are semantically related, and some
K + K = 120 / p. 565 / May 3, 2019
On raised verb phrases 565
of them, roughly speaking, are deﬁned by others, at least at up to some
“degree of equivalence”.
Finally, I will recall that, as it is the case with proper nouns when they
occur in conjunction with quantiﬁed NPs, “Booleanly” simple VPs, given
by intransitive verbs, which are of type he; ti, must have their type raised
when they occur in conjunctions with (simple or complex) VPs whose type
is raised. Some other similarities with the NP raising will be indicated and
in particular the existence of the inverse rule of VP lowering. For this
reason we will call VP raising classical raising.
To conclude these introductory remarks I want to stress that the pur-
pose of this paper is not to give a full or detailed semantics of the construc-
tions that will be mentioned. I will discuss essentially examples of syntac-
tically complex constructions whose semantics has already been speciﬁed
precisely in the spirit of the proposal made in this article. Indeed, it seems
obvious that VPs may non-trivially denote types other than that of sets
only when they form syntactically complex constructions.
2. Formal preliminaries
We will consider binary relations and functions, in particular type h1i
quantiﬁers, over a universe E. To note the type of function we will use
not only Montagovian notation. In particular the type of functions from
binary relations to sets of type h1i quantiﬁers will be noted h2 : h1ii and
the type of functions having binary relations and sets as arguments and
sets of type h1i quantiﬁers as output will be noted h2; 1 : h1ii.
If R is a binary relation, D(R) denotes its domain.The relation Id is
the identity relation: Id = fhx; yi : x = yg. If R is a binary relation and
X a set then R/X = R \ (X X). The binary relation RS is the greatest
symmetric relation included in R, that is RS = R\R 1 and RS  = RS\I 0d
is the greatest symmetric irreﬂexive relation included in R. For any binary
relation R and any set A, the relation RA is the subset of R deﬁned as
RA = fhx; yi : hx; yi 2 R ^ y 2 Ag.
Let Q be a type h1i quantiﬁer. Q is atomic iﬀ it is a singleton. An
atomic quantiﬁer containing A as its only element will be noted QA. Q
is positive, Q 2 POS iﬀ ; /2 Q; Q is natural iﬀ either Q is positive and
E 2 Q or Q is not positive and E /2 Q. Two natural quantiﬁers have the
same polarity iﬀ either both are positive or neither of them is positive.
We will also use the property living on displayed by type h1i quantiﬁers
(cf. Barwise & Cooper 1981). The type h1i quantiﬁer Q lives on a set A
(where A  E) iﬀ for all X  E, Q(X) = Q(X \ A). If E is ﬁnite then
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there is always a smallest set on which a quantiﬁer Q lives. The fact that
A is a set on which Q lives will be noted Li(Q;A) and the fact that A is
a smallest set on which Q lives will be noted SLi(Q;A). If Li(Q;A) and
B  A^B 2 Q then B is a witness set of Q. The fact that B is a witness
set of the quantiﬁer Q, which lives on A, will be noted B = Wt(Q;A).
If Li(Q;A) then A 2 Q iﬀ E 2 Q and thus if E 2 Q and Li(Q;A) then
A = Wt(Q;A).
Observe that any principal ﬁlter is a positive type h1i quantiﬁer that
lives on the set by which it is generated, and, moreover, this set is its
witness set. Atomic quantiﬁers live on the universe E only.
Concerning syntactic aspects we will use a “simple extended catego-
rial grammar” admitting ﬂexible categories. Thus we assume that for each
derived category C of the form C = A/B there is a rule stating that an
expression of category A can be built by combining an expression of cat-
egory B with an expression of category C. For any grammatical category
C there is a corresponding denotational Boolean algebra DC of possible
denotations of expressions of category C. Expressions of the derived cate-
gory A/B take their denotations in the algebra DA/B which is the algebra
of functions from DB to DA. Furthermore, given that most categories are
functionally related (in principle all “major” categories are Boolean), the
corresponding denotational algebras are not independent of each other. In
particular the elements of the algebra DA/B are functions from DB to DA.
Given that functions interpreting functional expressions in general satisfy
various constraints, one usually considers just some sub-algebras of the
algebra of all functions from DB to DA. For instance NPs denote in the
algebra DS/V P of type h1i quantiﬁers.
Among type h1i quantiﬁers we distinguish nominal individuals Ia de-
ﬁned as Ia = fY : Y  E ^ a 2 Y g. Nominal individuals are deno-
tations of proper nouns. They are obtained precisely by the operation
of type raising applied to (denotations of) proper nouns “initially” hav-
ing as denotation objects of type e. Nominal individuals belong to the
class of quantiﬁers called principal ﬁlters generated by a set. Thus Ft(A),
the (principal) ﬁlter generated by the set A (for A  E), is deﬁned as:
Ft(A) = fY : Y  E ^A  Y g.
The notion of an individual can in fact be associated with any Boolean
denotational algebra:
D1: Let B be an atomic Boolean algebra and I  B. Then I is an individ-
ual on B iﬀ I , the characteristic function of I, is a homomorphism
from B to the algebra f0; 1g
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Nominal individuals are individuals on the algebra of sets in the sense
of D1.
An individual I on B is generated by the atom  of B iﬀ   i for
any i 2 I. Individuals of an atomic algebra B, generated by an atom of
B, are thus exactly the sets of elements of B which satisfy (1) the meet,
(2) the join and (3) the complement conditions. More formally, if I is an
individual (on the algebra B, generated by an atom of B) then for any
S  B we have (1) S  I iﬀ VS 2 I, (2) S \ I 6= ; iﬀ WS 2 I, and (3)
 2 I iﬀ 0 /2 I, for any  2 B (where “W” and “V” denote arbitrary meets
and joins respectively, in B).
The denotation of the expression  will be noted [] and we will be
interested only in the extensional aspects of the meaning. If  is a V P
which denotes the set P , a subset of the universe, then R, raised ,
denotes a set of type h1i quantiﬁers:
(5) [R] = fQ : Q(P ) = 1g, where Q is a type h1i quantiﬁer.
The set of type h1i quantiﬁers, associated with the property P , deﬁned
in (5) is particular because its characteristic function is a homomorphism
from the algebra of type h1i quantiﬁers to the algebra of truth values.
It follows from this that the set in (5) corresponds to the individual on
the algebra DNP generated by the atomic quantiﬁer QP . Such individuals,
that is individuals on the algebra DNP generated by atomic (type h1i)
quantiﬁers will be called verbal individuals. One can see that any verbal
individual has at least one nominal individual as a member. Furthermore,
a verbal individual is in particular a complete set of quantiﬁers (every
type h1i quantiﬁer or its Boolean complement belong to the set) and it is
consistent (no quantiﬁer and its Boolean complement belong to it).
Given the fact that the denotational algebras of (non-raised) VPs and
of characteristic functions of verbal individuals are isomorphic we can say
that “classically” VPs denote (up to the isomorphism) verbal individuals.
In this paper we consider a more general case: we suppose that there is
the denotational algebra DV PR , which is the set of functions from DNP
to the algebra f0; 1g, and these functions need not to be homomorphisms.
This lack of homomorphism property will be the basic semantic property
of the constructions that will be considered.
Since our basic argument for the necessity of raised verb phrases uses
transitive VPs with special direct objects we need to specify how the com-
position between the transitive verb and its second argument, the direct
object, is realised. I will follow here the well-justiﬁed proposal in Keenan
(2016) who indicates various merits of the interpretation of the direct
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objects in situ, as functions taking binary relations, denotations of transi-
tive verbs, as arguments. Thus, Keenan proposes that direct object NPs are
of the category (S/NP )/((S/NP )/NP ). Formally, at the semantic level,
this is done by extending the domain of type h1i quantiﬁers: in addition
to sets, the basic domain of type h1i quantiﬁers, relations are also con-
sidered as their possible arguments. Thus type h1i quantiﬁers, considered
as functions, can apply not only to sets but also additionally to relations,
denotations of transitive (ditransitive, etc.) verbs. When such functions
with the extended domain act as denotations of direct objects, they are
accusative extensions Qacc of the quantiﬁer Q, deﬁned in D2 (i), and when
they act as denotations of subjects (NPs in nominative case) of transitive
sentences they are nominative extensions deﬁned in D2 (ii):
D2 (i): For each type h1i quantiﬁer Q, QaccR = fa : Q(aR) = 1g
(ii): For each type h1i quantiﬁer Q, QnomR = fa : Q(Ra) = 1,
where aR = fy : ha; yi 2 Rg and Ra = fy : hy; ai 2 Rg.
The nominal extension of a quantiﬁer can be used to represent readings
of transitive sentences with the object taking wide scope (Keenan 2016).
Nominal and accusative case extensions are speciﬁc type h2 : 1i
functions. One can distinguish various kinds of type h2 : h1ii and type
h1; 2 : h1ii functions. Observe ﬁrst that any type h2 : 1i function whose
output is denoted by a (non-raised) VP can be lifted to a type h2 : h1ii
function. The accusative extension of a type h1i quantiﬁer Q can be lifted
to a type h2 : h1ii function in the way indicated in (6). Such functions will
be called accusative lifts. More generally, if F is a type h2 : 1i function, its
lift FL, a type h2 : h1ii function, is deﬁned in (7):
(6) QLacc(R) = fZ : Z(Qacc(R)) = 1g.
(7) FL(R) = fZ : Z(F (R)) = 1g.
The variable Z above ranges over the set of type h1i quantiﬁers.
We will also use two types of set partitions, deﬁned by the binary
relation R. First, if R is an irreﬂexive symmetric relation (i.e., R \R 1 \
Id = ;) then (R) is the least ﬁne partition of R such that each of its
blocks is of the form (AA)\ I 0d. A partition is trivial iﬀ it contains only
one block. Observe that if R is an irreﬂexive symmetric relation and (R)
is not trivial, then every block of (R) contains at least two elements.
Second, to analyse the sentences with the same CN and the same
number of CN we will use partitions induced by the following equivalence
relations associated with the binary relation R:
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D3 (i): eR = fhx; yi : xR = yRg
(ii) eR;n = fhx; yi : jxRj = jyRjg
To show that it is necessary to raise the type of VPs to get the right se-
mantics of some constructions I will indicate some semantic properties of
these constructions and show that they are incompatible with the prop-
erties held by non-raised VPs. For non-raised VPs the following is true:
sentences of the form in (8a) are equivalent to sentences of the form (8b):
a.(8) (NP1 V P ) and (NP2 V P )
b. (NP1 and NP2) V P
In other words ifNP1 denotes the quantiﬁerQ1,NP2 denotes the quantiﬁer
Q2 and V P denotes the property P then (9) holds:
(9) (P 2 Q1 ^ P 2 Q2)  P 2 (Q1 \Q2)
The property in (9) is a consequence of the fact that quantiﬁers denoted
by the subject NPs are homomorphisms from the algebra of sets (subset
of a given universe) to the algebra of truth values. This property will be
frequently used as a test to check whether a certain type of a VPs denotes
a set. It will be called homomorphism test or h-test.
In the same way, for type h2 : h1ii functions which are lifts of type
h2 : 1i functions we have:
Proposition 1: If a type h2 : h1ii function F is a lift of a type h2 :
1i function then for any type h1i quantiﬁers Q1 and Q2 and any binary
relation R, if Q1 2 F (R) and Q2 2 F (R) then (Q1 ^Q2) 2 F (R)
Accusative lifts satisfy the following higher order extension condition HEC
(Zuber 2014):
D4: A type h2 : h1ii function F satisﬁes HEC (higher order extension
condition) iﬀ for any natural type h1i quantiﬁers Q1 and Q2 with the
same polarity, any A;B  E, any binary relations R;S, if Li(Q1; A),
Li(Q2; B) and 8a2A8b2B(aR = bS) then Q1 2 F (R) iﬀ Q2 2 F (S).
For functions satisfying HEC we have:
Proposition 2: Let F satisﬁes HEC and let R = E  C, for C  E
arbitrary. Then for anyX  E either Ft(X) 2 F (R) or for anyX, Ft(X) /2
F (R).
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Thus, a function satisfying the HEC condition, whose argument is the
cross-product relation of the form E A has in its output either all prin-
cipal ﬁlters or no principal ﬁlter. Thus Proposition 2 can be used to show
that the function denoted by each other and by other expressions that
induce the VP raising do not satisfy HEC. Functions denoted by such
expressions satisfy conditions which are strictly weaker than HEC. Thus
the denotations of higher order anaphors satisfy the higher order predicate
invariance or HPI. By deﬁnition (Zuber 2014):
D5: A type h2 : h1ii function F satisﬁes HPI (higher order predicate invari-
ance) iﬀ for a type h1i quantiﬁer Q, any A  E, any binary relations
R;S, if Li(Q;A) and 8a2A(aR = aS) then Q 2 F (R) iﬀ Q 2 F (S).
An equivalent way to deﬁne HPI is as follows:
Proposition 3: Function F satisﬁes HPI iﬀ Li(Q;A) entails Q 2 F (R) iﬀ
Q 2 F ((A E) \R).
Similarly, higher order comparatives satisfy the so-called higher order ar-
gument invariance or HAI (Zuber 2014):
D6: A type h2 : h1ii function F satisﬁes HAI (higher order argument
invariance) iﬀ for any natural type h1i quantiﬁers Q1 and Q2 with the
same polarity, any A;B  E, any binary relation R, if SLi(Q1; A),
SLi(Q2; B) and 8a2A8b2B(aR = aS) then Q1 2 F (R) iﬀ Q2 2 F (R).
Obviously HEC entails both HPI and HAI.
3. Generalized noun phrases and raised verb phrases
The ﬁrst class of VP raising inducers we discuss, in some sense the most
important one, is represented by proper GNPs. We start by indicating dif-
ferences in entailments between sentences with ordinary NPs in the direct
object position and sentences with proper GNPs in the direct object po-
sition. We observe that the former sentences, in contradistinction to the
latter, pass the h-test. Consider ﬁrst the following examples:
a.(10) Leo and Lea hug ten/most students.
b. Bill and Sue hug ten/most students.
(11) Leo, Lea, Bill and Sue hug ten/most students.
It is easy to see that (10a) in conjunction with (10b) entails (11). This
is not surprising given the property in (9) and the fact that the VPs in
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(10a) and (10b) denote sets. However, sentences with proper GNPs in the
object position behave diﬀerently in this respect as shown in the following
examples:
a.(12) Leo and Lea hug each other/each other and Kim.
b. Bill and Sue hug each other/each other and Kim.
(13) Leo, Lea, Bill and Sue hug each other/each other and Kim.
a.(14) Leo and Lea read the same book/the same ﬁve books.
b. Bill and Sue read the same book/the same ﬁve books.
(15) Leo, Lea, Bill and Sue read the same books/the same ﬁve books.
Clearly, (12a) in conjunction with (12b) does not entail (13). Similarly,
(14a) in conjunction with (14b) does not entail (15). In the same way,
(12a) and (12b) do not entail that four persons hug each other, and (14a)
and (14b) do not entail that four persons read the same book. This means
that the functions denoted by the subject NPs in (14a) and (14b) do not
apply to the predicate denoted by the complex VPs in these sentences,
and the conjunction and is not understood pointwise. Furthermore, given
property in (9) and proposition 1 this means that the VPs in the above
sentences do not denote properties, and that the objects of these sentences
do not denote lifts of type h2 : 1i functions.
Another thing one observes looking at transitive sentences with GNPs
as direct object is that they can have virtually any plural NP as their
grammatical subject. Thus the following are all acceptable sentences:
(16) Kim and Leo/most students/three teachers/no two monks admire each other.
(17) Between ﬁve and ten students/some philosophers read the same book.
In the above sentences GNPs form with the transitive verb a VP, which
is a “natural” constituent. Hence, to avoid the type mismatch and get the
right interpretations we will consider that the GNPs each other, each other
and Kim, the same books and the same ﬁve books denote genuine higher
order functions on binary relations, that is, functions of type h2 : h1ii.
It is important to keep in mind that there are “many” proper GNPs
which have similar behaviour in transitive sentences. For instance all
Boolean compounds of each other with ordinary NPs or with the reﬂexive
himself such as each other and most teachers or each other, themselves
and Dan form such anaphoric GNPs. Similarly, reciprocal determiners (cf.
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Zuber 2016) such as every…except each other or most…in addition to each
other, when applied to common nouns, give anaphoric GNPs with similar
semantic properties.
There are also “many” comparative GNPs giving rise to similar dif-
ferences in the entailment. This is the case, for instance, with Boolean
compounds such as the same books and ﬁve articles or the same ﬁve stu-
dents and one teacher. In addition, higher order comparative GNPs can be
formed with other “comparative” determiners such as similar, very simi-
lar, diﬀerent, almost the same, almost the same number of, the same kind
of, comparable, interchangeable, related, analogous etc. These determiners
can also combine between them in a Boolean style, and the GNPs they
form with CNs in their turn can form Boolean compounds. The following
examples illustrate some of these possible compounds:
(18) Leo and Dan admire most linguists, except themselves and each other.
(19) Most logicians know the same ﬁve and ten diﬀerent theorems.
(20) No two philosophers admire each other and Plato.
(21) Some students admire each other and the same teachers.
(22) Most Japanese drive very similar cars.
(23) They read the same articles and Exciting Logic.
An entailment test similar to the one applied to sentences (14a) and (14b)
indicates that the h-test can be applied here to all the above sentences and
thus the VPs in these sentences do not denote sets.
I will provide now the semantics for the anaphoric GNPs each other
and for the comparative GNP the same CN using the fact that the VPs
they form with transitive verbs are of the category S/(S/(S/NP )). The
semantics of some other anaphoric GNPs is given in Zuber (2016), and the
semantics of some other higher order comparative NPs is given in Zuber
(2017). The functions deﬁning the semantics of each other and of the same
CN are important for what follows because they are used to deﬁne the
semantics of other constructions which induce the VP raising.
Functions corresponding to the semantics of each other and the same
CN use partitions deﬁned above. To deﬁne the type h2 : h1ii function EA
denoted by the reciprocal each other we use the partition (RS ) (Zuber
2016). This deﬁnition is a deﬁnition “by cases”, which depends on whether
the partition (RS ) is trivial or non-trivial. Thus:
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D7 (i): EA(R) = fQ : Q 2 PL ^ :2(E)  Qg if RS  = ;
(ii): EA(R) = fQ : Q 2 PL ^ QD(B)  Qg, if (RS ) is trivial
with B as its only block
(iii): EA(R) = fQ : Q 2 PL ^ 9B(B 2 (RS ) ^ Q(D(B) =
1g [ fQ : Q 2 PL ^ 9B(B 2 (RS ) ^ Q = :QD(B)g if
(RS ) is non-trivial.
The meaning of each other, deﬁned in D7, corresponds to strong logical
reciprocity. Weaker reciprocity can be obtained by taking into considera-
tion in D7 some subsets of the relation RS .
As the second example of a GNP which forces raising of the VP we give
the semantics of the comparative GNP the same CN. Strictly speaking, we
specify the function SAME(X;R), denoted by the (generalised) determiner
the same. We assume that this determiner denotes a type h2; 1 : h1ii func-
tion. To deﬁne this function we use the partition RX (E) corresponding to
the equivalence relation eRX , deﬁned in D2 (ii). This again is a deﬁnition
“by cases”. The output of the function to be deﬁned is a set of plural type
h1i quantiﬁers, which is denoted by the raised VP, will in general contain
three parts: positive, negative and “atomic”. The positive part corresponds,
roughly, to the set of quantiﬁers true of some block of the partition, and
the negative part corresponds to the set of quantiﬁers that are false of sets
which are not blocks of the partition.
We will say that a block of a partition is singular if it is a singleton.
A blockB is plural,B 2 PL, if it contains at least two elements. A partition
is atomic iﬀ all its blocks are singular. With the help of these notions,
using the partition RA(E) we can now express the function SAME(X;R),
where R is a non-empty binary relation, and X a non-empty set, as follows
(Zuber 2017):
D8 SAME(X;R) =
(i): fQ : Q 2 PLR ^ :2(E)  Qg, if RX (E) is atomic
(ii): fQ : Q 2 PLR^ 9B(B 2 RX (E)^B 2 PL^Q(B) = 1)g[
fQ : Q 2 PLR^9CE8B2RX (E)(C 6 B^:ALL(C)  Q)g,
if RX (E) is not atomic.
The above deﬁnition says that SAME applied to a set X and a binary
relation R gives as result a set of quantiﬁers, as desired. This set can
be decomposed into various subsets depending indirectly on the “content”
of the relation R and thus on the partition of E induced by R and X.
According to the clause (i), when the partition is atomic then no two
objects are in the relation R with all objects of a subset of X. This entails
in particular that the quantiﬁer denoted by no two objects and any of
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its consequences belong to the set SAME(X;R). This means that, for
instance, the quantiﬁers denoted by no ﬁve objects or no two students also
belong to the set SAME(X;R).
Clause (ii) concerns the case where the partition is not atomic. In
this case there is at least one plural block of the partition such that all
its members are, roughly speaking, in the relation R with the same subset
of X. This block corresponds to the property expressing the sameness
we are looking for and a plural quantiﬁer can be true or false of it. The
second part of the clause (ii) provides a set of quantiﬁers obtained from a
“negative information” given by sets which are not blocks of the partition.
If, for instance, Jiro and Taro are Japanese students who read diﬀerent
books then no set to which they belong is a block of RB (E), where R
corresponds to READ and B to BOOK. Then, according to the second part
of the clause (ii), the quantiﬁers denoted by the NPs not all Japanese
students, not all students and not all Japanese belong to SAME(B;R).
To describe the function denoted by the (generalised) determiner the
same number of we use the partition corresponding to the equivalence
relation eR;n deﬁned in D3(ii) above (cf. Zuber 2017).
Both functions, EA and SAME, have speciﬁc properties which make
them diﬀerent from any lift of a type h1i function. Using Proposition 1 it
is easy to show that they do not satisfy HEC in particular. Moreover, EA
satisﬁes HPI and SAME satisﬁes HAI. In addition, these functions have
another thing in common: in the description of their content the structure
of the relations which are their arguments, in particular the partitions
which can be induced by these relations, are explicitly taken into account.
4. Raised intransitive verb phrases
In the preceding section the arguments for raising VPs were based on
constructions in which special verbal arguments apply to transitive VPs
and give as result raised VPs denoting sets of type h1i quantiﬁers. In this
section I discuss brieﬂy a somewhat diﬀerent case of VPs that have to be
raised but are not formed from transitive verbs. Here one can distinguish
two cases: the case of a raised VP that does not contain any modiﬁer
inducing the raising and the case of an intransitive VP that does.
I start with intransitive (“on the surface”) verbs that express symmet-
ric relations, such as to meet or to argue (and not to meet with or to argue
with) and predicates such as to live on the same street or to be an enemy
(and not to live on the same street as or to be an enemy of ). As it has been
often noted, subject NPs of sentences with such symmetric predicates have
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to be interpreted “collectively”, since the “property” they express cannot in
general apply to individuals, as shown in the following examples :
a.(24) Leo and Lea met (in the park).
b. *Leo met.
a.(25) Most teachers met.
b. *A student met.
(26) ?Leo is an enemy.
On the other hand, sentences with VPs representing symmetric predicates
do not pass the h-test: for instance using (24a) and (27) as premisses one
cannot obtain (28) as conclusion:
(27) Bill and Dan met.
(28) Leo, Lea, Dan and Bill met.
The verb to meet and the predicate to live on the same street are interest-
ing in addition for another reason: as indicated above, they are among the
predicates that admit implicit or optional arguments. An item which can
take a complement is an item with an optional complement if it can occur
in a sentence with or without its complement and thus the omission of the
complement in a acceptable sentence does not lead to the unacceptabil-
ity of the sentence, but may lead to some meaning changes. In particular,
verbs with optional arguments can occur as intransitive, transitive, or with
oblique objects. The verb to meet in English, in addition to being intransi-
tive, can take direct and indirect objects. Similarly with other symmetric
predicates. In this respect they resemble verbs with GNPs in the form of
higher order comparatives:
(29) Leo met Lea.
(30) Leo met with Lea.
(31) Leo read the same book as Lea.
Words with optional complements pose various challenges for formal se-
mantics, one of them being their categorial and lexical ambiguity (Gillon
2012). One can notice that (24a) has two forms logically equivalent to it,
with “the same verb” taking either a direct object, as in (29) or an indirect
object (in “comitative case”), as in (30). In these sentences with explicit
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verbal arguments the VPs express a (ﬁrst order) property and sentences
with such VPs and plural NP subjects can have distributive meaning in
opposition to the corresponding sentences with omitted verbal arguments.
The semantics of sentences with verbs expressing symmetric relations
but in which the complements are omitted necessitates the raising of the
type of the verb. Given, however the fact that such sentences are in general
equivalent to corresponding sentences with each other or the same we know
already how to compute their meaning. For instance, (27) can be considered
as logically equivalent to (32) and (33a) to (33b):
(32) Leo and Lea met each other.
a.(33) Lea and Dan married.
b. Lea and Dan married each other.
As the following examples show not all verbs with implicit complements
express symmetric relations:
(34) Leo and Lea undressed.
a.(35) Leo and Lea undressed themselves.
b. Leo and Lea undressed each other.
(36) Leo and Lea kissed.
(37) Leo and Lea kissed each other.
Verbs undress and kiss are verbs in which arguments are optional and thus
they can occur either as intransitive verbs or transitive verbs. Sentence
in (34) entails neither (35a) nor (35b), and the one in (36) means, for the
pragmatic reasons, only (37). The representations of the “mixed” (reﬂexive-
reciprocal) reading of (34) and of the reciprocal reading of (36) necessitates
raising of the intransitive verbs undress and kiss.
One of the consequences of the above observations is that verbs ad-
mitting omitted arguments can take their denotations in three diﬀerent
denotational algebras: in D(S/NP )/NP , in DV P and in DV PR . This situa-
tion is similar to the one ﬁnds with some NPs, which can also denote in
three diﬀerent types (Partee 1987).
Let us see now some examples of constructions where raising is in-
duced by some verbal modiﬁers (that is adverbial phrases) and not by
verbal arguments. Before introducing adverbs that force the raising of
VPs, it is important to observe that they do not belong to the class of
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“classical” adverbs of quantiﬁcation with non-nominal domain forming ad-
verbials or prepositional phrases. For instance (non-nominal) quantiﬁers
such as always, everywhere, never, nowhere, often, most of the time, on
some occasions etc. do not force VP raising. Sentences with these adverbs
do pass the h-test: (38) and (39) together entail (40):
(38) Dan never drinks.
(39) Most monks never drink.
(40) Dan and most monks never drink.
A good candidate for an adverb forcing the raising of the VP is the adverb
together. Detailed semantics of this adverb may involve various aspects (cf.
Moltmann 2004) that will not be discussed here. Consider the following
examples:
a.(41) Kim and Dan left together.
b. Leo and Lea left together.
(42) Kim, Dan, Leo and Lea left together.
One observes that the above sentences behave like transitive sentences
with GNPs and sentences with omitted verbal arguments. Thus, (41a)
in conjunction with (41b) does not entail (42). This means, according to
Proposition 1 that the type of the object denoted by the VP left together
is diﬀerent from he; ti.
Sentences with VPs modiﬁed by the adverb together can also take as
subject virtually any plural NP, in the same way as transitive sentences
can take a proper GNP in the direct object position:
(43) Some/most/ten students/Leo and Kim left together.
It is worth recalling that in many languages the “reciprocal morpheme”,
which gives rise to proper GNPs with the reciprocal meaning we discussed
above, can have many uses and carry multiple “meanings” (Lichtenberk
1985). In particular, in languages related to Turkish this morpheme can
carry the so-called social or associative meaning expressed in English by the
adverbial together. So it should not be surprising that there are adverbials
forcing type raising of VPs even if they are categorially diﬀerent from
nominal verbal arguments discussed in the preceding section.
For present purposes it is enough to notice that (41a) can be consid-
ered as equivalent to (44):
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(44) Kim and Dan left with each other.
In this case left with can be considered as expressing a binary relation and
thus the raising of the VP is necessary because of the presence of the GNP
each other.
The situation is probably more complicated in (43). Very likely in this
case we need a “weaker” together: it is not necessary that any member of the
group of ten students or of the group representing the majority of students
leaves with every other member of the group. In other words together in
(43) should be deﬁned by a weaker each other.
An adverb related to together is the adverb separately. One can check
that sentences with VPs modiﬁed by this adverb do not pass the h-test
and thus this adverb also induces VP-raising. Similarly, adverbs related
to the same such as in the same way, equally, diﬀerently, etc. induce VP
raising. Thus, to get the semantics of the VPs such as argue in the same
way, be equally stupid and dress diﬀerently we have to raise their type.
Gerundives in many languages can act as VP modiﬁers, as for instance
in to dance singing and laughing or to sit reading a book. It seems natural to
consider that gerundives used as modiﬁers of VPs and formed from raised
VP force the raising of the VP which they modify:
(45) Leo and Lea came using the same taxi.
(46) Lea and Dan left kissing each other.
To obtain the semantics of the above sentences the VPs have to be raised.
I will not show this in detail since, in particular, it involves the semantics
of gerundives in general. It suﬃces to notice that in many cases gerundival
adverbials can be expressed by the conjunction of the modiﬁed VP with
the one from which the gerundive is formed. For instance, (47) can be
considered as being logically equivalent to (48):
(47) Lea and Dan were dancing talking to each other.
(48) Lea and Dan were dancing and talking to each other.
Recall that one of the arguments for NP raising is based on Boolean com-
pounds. This argument is related to the use of proper nouns in Boolean
compounds with quantiﬁed NPs: roughly speaking, in order to compute
the meaning of such compounds all members of the compound have to
denote in the same type and thus the type of the proper nouns has to be
lifted from e to hhe; ti; ti. The same argument applies in the case of the VP
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raising: one cannot conjoin, for instance, a raised VP and a non-raised one
if one wants to compute the meaning of the whole conjunction.
The argument for VP raising based on Boolean compounds applies
not only to cases with gerundival modiﬁcation. Consider the following
examples:
(49) Leo and Lea left and took the same taxi.
(50) Most students danced, sang the same song and held each other’s hands.
(51) Some monks met and discussed jokes.
Although the semantics of the ﬁrst VPs in (49) and in (50) can be given
without raising them when they are in isolation, being conjoined with
raised VPs in these sentences they too must be raised. Similarly, in (51)
the VP discussed politics must be raised since it occurs in a conjunction
with the raised VP met.
The fact that some adverbs inducing the raising can be “described”
with the help of GNPs such as each other and the same allows us to see in
a diﬀerent light some hard problems related to the semantics of cumulative
readings of some quantiﬁers in speciﬁc contexts. When one thinks about
the famous example of piano lifters (as in (52a)), it becomes obvious that
the cumulative reading entails that the lifters lifted the piano with each
other and that it was the same piano. In fact, strictly speaking, the same
in case is weaker than the same deﬁned in D8 because it only inverses
the scope of the direct object (Zuber 2017). Thus the meaning of (52a),
with the cumulative interpretation of its subject NP, can be expressed by
something like (52b). Similarly, (53a) can be paraphrased by (53b):
a.(52) Leo and Dan lifted the piano.
b. There is a piano such that Leo and Dan lifted it together.
a.(53) Three philosophers wrote nine articles (for the journal).
b. There are nine articles (of the journal) such that three philosophers wrote them
together.
The presence of the modiﬁer together, taken possibly in its weak reading,
in the above sentences is essential. In general both, subject and object,
NPs in cumulative readings are scopeless, but in this case the presence of
together allows for a representation with the object NP taking wide scope.
K + K = 120 / p. 580 / May 3, 2019
580 Richard Zuber
In fact, to have cumulative/collective readings, both the adverbial
together and the comparative the same have to occur: (54a) does not and
(54b) does express a collective/cumulative action:
a.(54) Leo and Dan read the same book.
b. Leo and Dan read the same book together.
The example in (54b) shows that functions forcing VP raising may be
predicate and argument invariant “at the same time”.
I conclude this section by indicating that the so-called categorially
polyvalent modiﬁers such as only, even, also, etc. can also be considered
as inducing VP raising when they have intransitive VPs in their scope.
This point will not be developed here.
5. Conclusive remarks
One of the most often used applications of type raising is related to the
diﬃculty of dealing with the semantics of “plural” NPs. In fact one can
notice that even “simple” sentences whose subject NP is a conjunction of
two proper nouns, and the VP is marked by the plural verbal marker, do
not pass the h-test. For this reason, many operators deﬁning speciﬁc rais-
ings of NPs, or even of the (nominal) determiner forming a NP, have been
proposed. In this paper I argue for the usefulness of the “classical raising”
strictly related to Montague’s NP raising, without any additional “non-
classical” raising of determiners. It can be deﬁned by set-theoretical (type
theoretical) means. Such VP raising is necessary for the compositional se-
mantics of various complex predicates whose readings are diﬃcult, if not
impossible, to express in ﬁrst order logic.
No formal results concerning VP raising have been presented. At least
two kinds of questions related to formal properties have to be investigated.
The ﬁrst concerns the constraints that should be imposed on the content
of raised VPs and on the operation leading to the raising. We have seen
that sets of quantiﬁers denoted by properly raised VPs are not verbal indi-
viduals because they are closed with respect to meets. It seems, however,
that any set of quantiﬁers denoted by a properly raised VP is increasing
in the sense that if a quantiﬁer Q1 belongs to it and Q1  Q2 then Q2 also
belongs to it. For instance we see that (13) above entails (12a) and (12b).
Similarly, (15) entails (14a) and (14b).
All examples we have discussed essentially involve the plurality of the
subject NPs in sentences with a raised VP. It seems thus obvious that
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individuals should be in some way excluded from the set of quantiﬁers
corresponding to a raised VP and thus the constraint on raising should
take into account the particular status of individuals. The set of quantiﬁers
denoted by properly raised VPs should also be consistent. Less obvious
is the constraint of completeness. We have seen that raised predicates
involve plurality and so probably nominal individuals should be excluded
from their denotations in some way. However, it is not clear whether such
plural predicates with singular subject NPs should be considered as non-
grammatical or just give rise to false sentences.
The second point concerns the status of other operations that go to-
gether with the classical raising, like for instance the operation of lowering
a raised VP. For instance, we need to know when, if ever, and why a raised
VP can be lowered in order to get its primitive type he; ti. More speciﬁ-
cally we want to know under what conditions to a given set V P of type
h1i quantiﬁers one can associate by an operation, that is the inverse to
the VP raising, a set (of individuals) such that by raising this set we get
the given set V P of quantiﬁers. Recall that in the case of the “classical”
NP raising the corresponding inverse operation is a mapping LOW from
type h1i quantiﬁers to elements of E. More precisely, it is a partial map-
ping that applies to nominal individuals, treated as quantiﬁers (principal
ultraﬁlters) and maps such quantiﬁers to their generators (Partee 1987).
The situation is quite similar in the case of VP raising: any set of type
h1i quantiﬁers that is a verbal individual can be lowered to a set. This set
is obtained by taking the meet of all nominal individual members of the
given verbal individual. Of course, only sets of quantiﬁers that are verbal
individuals can be lowered in this way. For instance for any binary relation
R and any type h2 : 1i function F , the set FL(R) of type h1i quantiﬁers
(where FL is deﬁned as in (7)) can be lowered: LOW (FL(R)) = F (R).
Another series of questions related to the VP raising concerns its com-
plexity and possible strategies for processing sentences with raised VPs.
Van Benthem (1986) proposes to measure the semantic complexity of types
by the function o of order which assigns to any type a natural number. It
is deﬁned recursively as follows:
a.(55) o(e) = o(t) = 1
b. o(ha; bi) = max(o(a) + 1; o(b))
Given this measure the complexity the type of raised VPs is of order 3.
This order is not higher than the order of the type of (nominal) determiners
(type hhe; ti; hhe; ti; tii) or the type of prepositions (type hhhe; titi; hhe; ti,
he; tii). Van Benthem indicates that order 3 is sometimes considered as
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the threshold for natural languages. Given the fact that the order of raised
VPs is 3, one can consider that the operation of VP raising does not go
beyond this threshold. It is not clear, however, what the consequences
of this fact are for the way sentences with raised VPs can be processed.
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